NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005451493
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2010
• Case Number: F-2009-00733
• Publication Date: December 18, 1992

APPROVED FOR RELEASED
DATE: 06-23-2010
Director of Central Intelligence
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
DAILY
Friday, 19 December 1992
vP .etret
CPAs Nm 92-2941Y
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1992
2~
 Even though recent polls show him running even with Prime Minister
Panic, Serbian President Milosevic's manipulation of the election
process should ensure his Socialist party a victory on Sunday. Muslim
attacks in eastern Bosnia are impeding relief deliveries in that region,
Milosevic Likely To The election on Sunday will determine representation in the federal
Win Election and Serbian and Montenegrin republic legislatures, as well as the two
republic presidencies. Some democratic opposition leaders believe
they can win control of the federal Assembly, reduce the Socialists'
majority in the Serbian Assembly, and help Panic force Milosevic
into a runoff on 4 January. Milosevic and his party, however, have
strong support in the countryside and industrial cities; they also have
the means to manipulate the election in the control of the media and
the support of much of the military and Interior Ministry militia.
Comment: If Milosevic wins, the pursuit of a greater Serbia by force is
sure to continue and actual conflict may spread. Such an electoral
outcome probably would also hobble the democratic opposition and
set the stage for Panic's departure from the Yugoslav political scene
and the isolation of federal President Cosic. A Milosevic victory also
would mollify local ultranationalists and radical Serbs in Bosnia and
Milosevic almost certainly would pursue the partition of Bosnia and
Croatia, a move that might renew Serbo-Croatian warfare. Efforts by
his government to consolidate the Serbian confederation would also
increase tension with Montenegro, which already suspects that
Belgrade wants to make it a vassal state. Serbian consolidation could
also encourage radicals, with or without Milosevic's blessine_ to initiate
hostilities and "ethnic cleansing" operations in Kosovo,
Domestic instability would be likely to increase in the long term as
economic sanctions and war weariness begin to erode Milosevic's
support. The weakness of the democratic opposition would increase
the prospects of a challenge to him from ultranationalists. The
stronger they are, the more likely Serbians will be to try to drive
Albanians and Hungarians from the provinces of Kosovo and
Vojvodina.
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