THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 MARCH 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005976644
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: March 2, 1969

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The President's Daily Brief
2 March 1969
19
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Top Secret
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32
n Israeli-controlled areas following !
June 1967 hostilities
?32?
Mediterranean Sea
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?28
Ismailia
Cairo
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ISRAEL
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93478 1-69
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
MIDDLE EAST
The picture of What has been going on inside Syria during
the past two days is blurted. It is reasonably certain, how-
ever, that the Defense Minister, Hafiz A sad moved .on 28 Feb-
ruary. to. take full control of the government. Reports from
'neighboring countries indicate that he has not, yet encountered
serioup.repistance, but it is by no means clear that the coup
is.a complete success. Although a member of the so-called rad-
ical Baathist Party, which has ruled Syria since 1966, he is
counted less doctrinaire than most of the men he is trying to
oust. He is repotted to favor bringing Syria into closer, align-
ment with the other Arab countries in the interest of develop-
ing a common anti-Israeli policy.. He _seemS also to favor keep-
ing the Communist Party of Syria at arms length and reducing
.his country's dependence on Soviet military.aid.
EUROPE 50X1
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SOVIET AFFAIRS
There were intermittent delays of traffic moving to and
from West Berlin during the past 24 hours including one total
closure of the major access route to the city between I AM and
3 AM yesterday. Backups at the checkpoints appear to have been
due both to heavy weekend traffic and a slow-down in processing
by the East Germans.
A meeting yesterday between Chancellor Kiesinger and So-
viet Ambassador Tsarapkin brought no results. In a television
report on the meeting, Kiesinger said "there was no possibility
of reaching an understanding" on the question of the site of the
Federal Assembly, and that the assembly therefore will convene
in West Berlin on 5 March. He said he had also rejected Soviet
charges that military goods were being manufactured in West Ber-
lin. Kiesinger stated the West Germans will be better able be-
cause of President Nixon's recent reaffirmation of America's
commitments to stand up to the "war of nerves" which can be ex-
pected in coming days.
2
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22-
CHINA
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93465 1-69
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Soviet military units continue to deploy to exercise areas
between Berlin and the West German border, and, apparently, to
positions astride the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn. Large numbers
of Soviet tanks, trucks, and other vehicles were seen in the woods
along the highway on 28 February and I March. The situation in
the Berlin (air) Control Zone and air corridors has thus far
remained quiet.
VIETNAM
Enemy activity declined further during the past 24 hours.
Most of this activity occurred in III Corps. There were two
terrorist incidents in Saigon, and a small enemy force attacked
the outskirts of An Loc, the capital of Binh Long Province.
There was little enemy action in I Corps, and Hue and Da Nang
were quiet. In II Corps, fewer incidents of enemy shelling
were reported than on any day since the offensive began. Spo-
radic mortar fire was directed against scattered allied mili-
tary bases in IV Corps.
Prisoners in I Corps have reported that the second round
of the offensive will open on 2 March.
/Attacks could, in any event, come at any
time because of the proximity of the enemy's main force units
to major objectives.
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II. OTHER IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS
LAOS
The important government guerrilla base of Na Khang in north-
eastern Laos has fallen. Worth Vietnamese troops, believed to
number about 1,000, attacked and seized outlying defensive po-
sitions early on I March. The US Air Force Tactical Air Navi7=
gation (TACAN) installation nearby was also captured. Enemy as-
saults on the main base continued into the night finally forc-
ing the defenders--who numbered 600 at the outset--to withdraw.
Loss of this base is a serious setback to the pro-govern-
ment guerrilla operations in northern Laos. Therewill also
be some impairment of air navigation through the loss of the
TACAN facility, but no severe disruption of US air operations.
The military situation elsewhere in northern Laos remains
quiet.
CHILE
? The Annex discusses ?the important congressional election
in Chile today.
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" FUR '1 RE PRESIDENTI' ONLY
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS IN CHILE
The results of the congressional elections to be held
in Chile today will have an important influence on the de-
velopment of the campaign for the presidential election in
1970, particularly in the formation of a coalition of the
far left. Chile's large Communist Party and its rival, the
even more extremist Socialist Party, together have the high-
est vote-getting strength of any Marxist parties in Latin
America and will play important, roles in both elections.
In 'fact, Chile is the only Latin American country where a
Communist-dominated coalition has a reasonable chance o
winning a free presidential election.
The Elections
Many of the electoral contests--for 30 of the 50 Senate
seats and all 150 seats in the Chamber of Deputies--will be
decided more on the basis of local issues and personalities
than on national politics. Because of Chile's complicated
proportional representation system, the percentage of the
popular vote received will not be directly reflected in the
make-up of Congress. For example, in the last congressional
elections in 1965 the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) re-
ceived 42.3 percent of the popular vote, but obtained an ab-
solute majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
Some races have assumed national importance because the
candidates are mentioned as presidential nominees. In par-
ticular, the Tenth Senatorial District could have an important
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impact on the presidential race as three presidential hope-
fuls--Socialist Salvador Allende, Popular Socialist Raul
Ampuero, and Christian Democrat Juan Hamilton--are among the
contenders for the five Senate seats.
Political Situation
The choices to be made in the election will demonstrate
the strengths not only of the five major parties but also of
the competing factions within them.
Of particular interest is President Frei's Christian
Democratic Party, in which a vocal leftist faction advocates
cooperation with the Communists in the presidential election.
Factionalism plus the problems of any incumbent party in
off-year elections make it unlikely that the PDC can ap-
proach its 1965 percentage. To maintain its position as the
country's dominant party, however, it hopes to obtain about
a third of the vote. Frei hopes for a strong showing by PDC
moderates that will weaken the leftists' position at the party
congress to be held a few months after the elections. Since
that meeting will set the tone for the presidential campaign,
and may also choose the nominee the congressional election
results could be crucial for the future direction of the
party.
Other political groups have equally important interests
at stake. The Socialist Party is engaged in a bitter battle
with its breakaway faction, the Popular Socialist Union. This
strife is almost certain to decrease the total Socialist vote,
which in the last congressional election was ten percent. If
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pro-Castro Socialist Senator Allende wins a large victory,
he would have a good chance for the nomination, for the
third time, of the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front.
It would be Allende's fourth try for the presidency.
The conservative National Party, which was formed in
1966 from two traditional parties after their serious defeat
in the congressional elections of 1965, may profit from a
general feeling of uncertainty in the electorate. The pace
of reform in recent years, too slow for many leftists, has
at the same time upset some members of the middle class.
Although some National Party candidates suffer from politi-
cal inexperience, and the party lacks organization and a
popular base,
it could
getter. It may derive
emerge as the second-largest vote-
some support from followers of former
president Jorge Alessandri, whom the Nationals openly favor
for the presidency. As an independent the 72-year-old Ales-
sandri has been careful to dissociate himself from partisan
activities.
The Radical Party, a traditional middle-class group,
has lately been led by people who see the party's future
tied to
has not
support
that of the Communists. Although the Communist Party
spurned Radical advances, it might be reluctant to
a "bourgeois" Radical presidential candidate if its
more militant Socialist allies did not follow its lead. In-
deed, the Radicals' national organization has been so frag-
mented by factionalism that if the party did make a strong
showing it might not have the unity of leadership necessary
to consolidate its gains.
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The Communists themselves have the strongest organiza-
tion of any of the parties and should improve on the 12 per-
cent of the vote they received in 1965. Because the Commu-
nist Party can deliver its vote virtually intact to the pres-
idential candidate it supports, the Socialists, Radicals,
and part of the PDC are courting it assiduously. Its sup-
port could be decisive in a close race.
Consequences
If the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals can agree
on one candidate, he would be a strong contender in the pres-
idential race next year. A strong showing by the Christian
Democrats, particularly the moderates, will improve Frei's
hand at the PDC congress and give the party strong momentum
for the presidential race. A strong showing by the National
Party would give Alessandri s campaign added momentum.
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