THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 4 FEBRUARY 1972

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005993119
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: February 4, 1972

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The President's Daily Brief
4 February 1972
47
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
4 February 1972
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peking has denounced the US peace plan but its com-
ments differ in some aspects from those of Hanoi.
(Page 1)
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Chile. (Page 4) 25X1
On Page 5 we note a change in Communist propaganda
concerning the Viet Cong's seven-point peace pro-
posal.
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CHINA-VIETNAM-US
Peking has loyally weighed in to denounce the
President's eight-point plan as an attempt to impose
"truculent and unreasonable" conditions for a US
troop withdrawal. Chinese commentary, however, has
stressed the importance of troop withdrawal while
fuzzing the political aspects of both the North Viet-
namese and US proposals. Unlike the North Vietnam-
ese, the Chinese have refrained from characterizinc
the proposal as "deceitful."
The most obvious divergence from Hanoi's treat-
ment-of the US plan appears in a Chinese account of
an article in the North Vietnamese party press on
29 January attacking the US package. The Chinese
version of this article carefully deleted those por-
tions of the Vietnamese comment which claimed there
was nothing new in the proposal. It also omitted
Hanoi's characterization of the Viet Cong seven-
point proposal as one comprising "two basic and
closely related points." This Chinese reluctance
to couple the military and political aspects of a
Vietnamese settlement as closely as does Hanoi has
been evident at-least since Pham Van Dong's visit
to Peking last November.
The Chinese seem to be trying to protect
their own interests vis-a-vis both Hanoi
and Washington. Peking is reluctant to
accuse the President of bargaining in bad
faith on the very eve of his visit to
China. At the same time it is anxious to
indicate to Hanoi that it is not deserting
the Vietnamese cause in order to strike a
deal with the United States. Neverthe-
less, it seems clear that Peking's own
priorities place an American military
withdrawal from the Indochina peninsula
ahead of a political settlement in Saigon
thoroughly acceptable to its North Viet-
namese allies.
(continued)
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The Chinese, however, are painfully aware
that their leverage on Hanoi is limited,
particularly in areas in which the Viet-
namese believe their vital interests are
involved. Peking knows that too much pres-
sure on Hanoi would simply push the Viet-
namese into the arms of Moscow. In these
circumstances, the Chinese are likely
merely to let Hanoi know how the situation
looks from Peking, hoping that their al-
lies will then draw the proper conclusion'
as to what course to pursue.
2
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CHILE
4
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NOTE
Vietnam: Communist propaganda yesterday con-
cerning the new "elaboration" of the seven-point
Viet Cong proposal contains a noteworthy change
from Wednesday's formulation. In their original
statement Wednesday in Hanoi, the Viet Cong had de-
clared that the "specific terminal date" for the
completion of the US withdrawal "will also be the
date for the release" of all prisoners. This left
the impression that no prisoners would be freed un-
til the end of the US withdrawal. In their state-
ment on Thursday, however, the Communists talked
of a "terminal date" for prisoner release as well
as for withdrawal. This language suggests that the
Communists have not in fact changed their earlier
position--contained in the seven-point plan--which
envisions a possible agreement on a phased release
of prisoners to match the pace of the US withdrawal.
5
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