17 NOVEMBER WHITE HOUSE DATA MEETING

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: Vietnam
• Keywords: WHITE HOUSE
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00130552
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 27, 1967

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LB J LIBRARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20503
Mandatory Review
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR Case # NLJ 61.8-16
riocument # c-
27 November 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 17 November White House Data Meeting
1. At 1700 on Friday, 17 November, a meeting was convened in the
White House Situation Room by Mr. Walt W. Rostow to review the Vietnam
data problem and related actions currently in train, both in Saigon and
Washington. The session was attended by Ambassador Robert Korner, Mr.
William Jorden., Mr. Richard Moose, Mr. Philip Habib, Dr. Victor Heyman,
Ambassador William Leonhart, Major General William DePuy, Mr. George
Carver and Mr. George Allen.
2. The specific occasion for the meeting was consideration of a
Washington reply to Saigon Embtel 10573, 7 November 1967. As Mr. Rostow
explained, however, the more general objective was to get the US Mission in
Saigon and the Washington community thinking together on the data problem
and thus forestall a burgeoning exchange of lengthy cables attempting to argue
differences of opinion better settled around a table. Mr. Carver pointed
out that Ambassador Bunker had been advised at lunch on 17 November that
such a meeting was going to be held and had expressed a great interest in
attending. Since this was obviously impossible because of the conflict with
a speaking engagement in New York, it was agreed that the results of the
meeting would be shown to the Ambassador for his review prior to the dispatch
of any further messages to Saigon.
3. Dr. Heyman went systematically through the argument of Saigon
1,rnbtel 1057a. outlining the elements in the US Mission's position with which
the Washington community had problems. These were, principally, the
Mission's proposed treatment of recruitment, infiltration, and related net loss
computations on VC strength.
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4. After some brisk but helpful discussion, two fundamental points
were unanimously agreed to:
a) A sharp distinction must be and will be made between data
series and computations used as management tools by the US
Government and data publi.cly surfaced for general consumption
to enlighten the world at large with regard to the status of the
Vietnamese struggle.
b) Henceforth, public explanations of the state of the war and
progress being reported therein will not be pegged on statistics,
though statistics will be used where relevant as illustrative examples
to support general qualitative judgments.
5. In line with the policy agreed to in (b) above, the thesis (that all accept)
that the Viet Cong are having recruitment problems will henceforth be publicly
argued on the basis of captured documents describing such problems and will
utilize available evidence of the increasing number of North Vietnamese assigned
to what were historically Viet Cong units. Our estimates of recruitment rates
(probably 7,000 per month for 1966 and probably down to the order of 3,500
per month for 1967) may be cited, but as ancillary illustrations and not as the
keystone of the argument. Infiltration rates and loss calculations will be
similarly handled in a low key with appropriate caveats, so that we may let
the facts speak for themselves without appearing to claim that our statistics
are better than they are or prove points they do not necessarily demonstrate
beyond reasonable doubt.
6. The Washington participants in the 17 November meeting reviewed
all aspects of the data problem and work being done on it with Ambassador
Komer. Ambassador Komer was given a copy of the 26 October 1967
preliminary report of the Washington interagency Data Task Force and brought
up to date on the current activities of that Task Force's various components.
He, in turn, outlined work going on in Saigon and new projects being initiated
there. Of these, the most important was the development, under Ambassador
KornerIs aegis, of a reporting procedure designed to evaluate the effectiveness
of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and to give reliable information on the
strength, disposition and current duties of Regional and Popular Force units.
Ambassador Komer agreed to furnish this information to Washington and also
agreed to furnish the Washington community with copies of the provincial
pacification plans for each of South Vietnam's provinces. We, in turn, agreed
to provide Ambassador Komer with analytic back-up and support, particularly
computer support, to assist him in analysis required in the field.
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7. The Hamlet Evaluation System was discussed in considerable detail.
While acknowledging its weaknesses, Ambassador Komer praised it highly as
the best thing ever developed and an indispensible management tool. There
was unanimous agreement that HES was designed primarily as a management
tool, not as a way of measuring population control, and that it should not be
allowed to be corrupted for public relations reasons. Ambassador Komer
emphasized that he had given personal instructions to every district advisor
to report honestly through the HES mechanism, making it plain that he was
interested in problems, not progress. Ambassador Korner gave his personal
assurance that pressure for "results" would not be allowed to corrupt the
HES system.
8. A number of other technical data questions were raised, discussed
and resolved at this meeting. In general it was a most useful session which
gave every appearance of achieving its principal object, i. e., getting Washing-
ton and Saigon on the same wave length. Ambassador Komer is now reviewing
the Data Task Force report in detail. Dr. Heyman is charged with drafting a
message to Saigon outlining our substantive agreements and making detailed
recommendations in light thereof. This will be reviewed by the Data Committee
and by Ambassador Bunker prior to transmission.
z:
Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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