THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00145460
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 8, 1967

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Mandatory Review
Case # Nrij_53-D(7.
r)ocurnent #
8 December 1967
II. The Viet Col/North Vietnamese
Winter-Spring Campaign
1. Numerous recently captured documents have
brought into focus Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnam-
ese (NVN) plans and ambitions for their 1967-68
winter-spring campaign. This campaign is to con-
sist of three phases: a first phase from October
to December, 1967; a second phase from January to
March 1968; and a third phase from April to June
1968. �(CDEC 11-2436-67) The campaign entails mil-
itary and political ambitions which surpass any-
thing previously attempted in such a relatively
short period of time by the VC/NVN in South Vietnam.
Moreover, thus far VC/NVN activity indicates that
they are indeed attempting to implement these plans
at their intended levels of intensity. For example,
there has been a definite increase in coordinated
attacks on GVN and Allied installations. The most
notable of these thus far have been at Loc Ninh
and Dak To. In these attacks, the VC mounted sus-
tained assaults despite very heavy casualties, and
apparently with less preparation than is normal for
VC operations of such size, in an only partially
successful attempt to "coordinate" the two attacks.
In brief, the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign is
described by the VC/NVN as the "decisive" phase
of the war, crucial to its ultimate outcome.
2. In their assessments of the current situ-
ation, the VC state that they are in a very favor-
able position. Strategically, the American military
forces are described as having been forced into a
defensive posture as a result of the widespread
VC/NVN attacks, especially in the DMZ. Moreover,
according to the VC/NVN, the combat strength of
the U.S. forces has been reduced and their attacking
power limited, thereby leaving the over-all U.S.
position weakened. (CDEC 11-1206-67) In addition,
the U.S. is viewed as being increasingly isolated
politically abroad and torn by mounting dissension
from within. The VC/NVN state that the present
U.S. administration feels itself under pressure
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to end the war before the 1968 elections in order
to guarantee its political survival. (FVS-16,187,
CDEC 10-2255-67)
3. Within South Vietnam, the VC/NVN also view
their position optimistically. They describe the
Government of Vietnam (GVN) as corrupt, increasingly
unpopular, and inefficient. They also apparently
believe that the GVN is becoming weakened by in-
ternal disagreements within the Vietnamese society,
such as those represented by the militant Buddhists
and the disgruntled candidates in the recent national
elections. Furthermore, the GVN military forces are
now described by the VC/NVN as playing only a minor
role in the war, a situation that the VC/NVN believe
will lead to increased anti-U.S. sentiment in the
GVN armed forces and in the Vietnamese body politic
as a whole. In any event, the VC/NVN consider these
forces as incapable of fighting effectively, as
having failed to protect the pacification program,
and, most important, as incapable of being improved.
(CDEC 11-1206-67)
4. The VC, on the other hand, consider them-
selves in a strategically offensive posture with
the initiative firmly in their hands. While admit-
ting "certain difficulties" such as recruitment and
manpower problems, food shortages, and war-weariness,
which have given rise to hopes or "illusions" of
peace among "some" troops, (CDEC 11-1591-67) the
VC/NVN describe the over-all situation as offering
a significant opportunity for gaining great military
and political victories in the forthcoming winter-
spring campaign. (CDEC 11-1206-67)
5. Viet Cong pronouncements concerning the
significance of upcoming periods of activity (winter-
spring, summer-autumn, etc.,) traditionally stress
the importance of impending campaigns. Descriptions
of the current 1967-68 winter-spring campaign, how-
ever, are placing unusually heavy emphasis on its
historic significance and decisive nature. A letter,
dated 31 August 1967 from the Central Office for
South Vietnam to party chapters and members through-
out South Vietnam exhorts its addressees to "make
all-out efforts to achieve unusual and historical
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successes during the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign."
(CDEC 10-2038-67) A letter dated 18 September 1967
from one military cadre to another in Long Khanh
Province states that "the period of late 1967-early
1968 is being regarded as a "historical phase."
(CDEC 10-1558-67) A directive outlining the missions
and objectives of the winter-spring campaign issued
by the current affairs section of VC Military Region 3,
dated 21 October 1967 and classified Top Secret,
describes VC/NVN missions in the 1967-68 winter-
spring campaign as "militarily and politically de-
cisive to the achievement of our (VC/NVN) objec-
tives." (CDEC 11-1206-67) Numerous other references
to the decisive nature of this winter-spring cam-
paign have been noted in enemy documents, circulars,
notebooks and letters.
6. These same documents call for all-out, co-
ordinated attacks throughout South Vietnam utilizing
both military and political means to achieve "ulti-
mate victory" in the near future. (CDEC 10-2038-67)
Although the exact date by which this "ultimate
victory" is to be achieved is not specified, it
is strongly implied that it will be some time in 1968.
7. VC/NVN strategy for this campaign is de-
scribed as an "all-out attack." This is a departure
from the traditional VC/NVN three-phase strategy "of
resistance, general offensive, and general uprising."
(CDEC 11-1209-67) The immediate objective is to
step up military and political offensives "on all
battlefronts" and to create favorable conditions for
a "turning point" which will result in "a general
counter-offensive and general uprising." (CDEC 11-
1206-67) A notebook captured in KonturP states that
"we must carry out large-scale and continuous at-
tacks" and "coordinate activities with other areas
of operations throughout South Vietnam." (CDEC 11-
1421-67) A directive captured in Dinh Tuong Prov-
ince describes the winter-spring campaign as a
"campaign of large-scale and continuous attacks
conducted evenly on all battlefields (in South Viet-
nam)." (CDEC 11-1501-67)
8. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese military and
political missions for the winter-spring campaign
can be broken down as follows--
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A. Military:
(1) Conduct large-scale continuous,
coordinated attacks by main force
units, primarily in mountainous
areas close to border sanctuaries.
(2) Conduct widespread guerrilla at-
tacks on large U.S./GVN units in
rural/heavily populated areas.
(3) Attack key U.S./GVN agencies and
rear service bases.
(4) Destroy lines of communications.
(5) Conduct terrorist activities in
the cities by special action and
sapper units. (CDEC 11-1501-67)
B. Political:
(1) Consolidate and strengthen VC/NVN
organizations at province, district,
and village levels throughout South
Vietnam.
(2) Coordinate military actions with
political activities to promote
political turmoil and struggle
movements.
9. Through these tactics, the VC/NVN hope to
force the redeployment of major Allied military units
to the border areas where the VC/NVN enjoy sanctuary
and will be able to inflict heavy casualties on them.
According to the VC/NVN plan, this will tie the Allied
forces down in static defensive positions and, equally
important, will relieve the pressure on the VC/NVN
activities in the populated areas. Elsewhere, the
VC/NVN intend to accomplish the systematic destruc-
tion of the GVN's administrative apparatus in the
rural areas, and to "liberate" most of these areas.
A final goal of the VC/NVN is to launch the long-
promised "general uprising." To accomplish this,
the VC/NVN have set themselves the task of occupying
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and holding some urban centers in South Vietnam and
of isolating many others.
10. The VC/NVN state that if they are success-
ful in the above activities, the conditions will
have been created for the overthrow of the present
GVN and its replacement by a regime which will con-
sent to form a coalition government with the Na-
tional Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
(NFLSV) and will follow the program of the NFLSV.
Moreover, in these circumstances, the VC/NVN state
that they would assume control of the country's armed
forces and would ensure that they exercised control
at the local administrative level. (CDEC-10-1811-67)
The second major expectation on the part of the
VC/NVN is that if they are successful, this will
break the "aggressive will" of the Americans and
force them to agree to wpthdraw from South Vietnam
in a short period of tilde. (CDEC 10-2038-67 and
10-1558-67)
Conclusions
11. VC/NVN strategy toward the war appears to
have reached a crucial phase in which changes in
the tempo and scale of the war are envisioned. In
which direction these changes will go probably de-
pends very much on the success or lack thereof of
VC/NVN efforts during the next few months. Based
on the position that the VC/NVN have taken in this
campaign so far, they appear to have committed
themselves to unattainable ends within a very
specific and short period of time.
12. Despite the apparent lack of realism in
their goals, it would be illusory to assume that
the higher VC/NVN echelons have no realistic objec-
tives in this campaign. These real objectives are
still obscure, but based on present information,
it appears that VC/NVN strategy in the winter-spring
campaign involves the following three related stra-
tegic options--
A. A serious effort to inflict unacceptable
military and political losses on the
Allies regardless of VC casualties
during a U.S. election year, in the
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hopes that the U.S. will be forced to
yield to resulting domestic and interna-
tional political pressure and withdraw
from South Vietnam. This would probably
involve the commitment of at least some
elements of the NVA's reserves to South
Vietnam.
B. Negotiations after a major military and
political effort to place themselves in
as advantageous a position as possible.
C. Reversion to a relatively low-intensity
stage of warfare after having inflicted
maximum casualties on the Allies and
pre-empting any major allied offensive
campaign.
These options are not n6cessarily mutually exclusive,
but the degree of success attained by the VC/NVN in
the winter-spring campaign will probably determine
which strategy will be emphasized.
13. In this context, the winter-spring cam-
paign appears to be an attempt to utilize to the
maximum possible extent current VC/NVN resources in
North and South Vietnam in an attempt to place max-
imum pressure on the Allies to come to an agreement
on terms favorable to the Vietnamese Communists. It
is doubtful if the higher VC/NVN echelons seriously
expect to be able to accomplish all of the tasks
they have enumerated for their troops. They may feel,
however, that at current rates of attrition the pres-
ent scale of the conflict cannot be continued for
much longer in any event, and that a retrenchment to
a lower-intensity form of struggle will probably be
inevitable unless there is a major change in the
situation. Any such retrenchment would probably in-
volve the dismantling or scaling down of many pres-
ent VC/NVN organizational components -- military,
political and economic -- since they would not be
necessary for support of a much reduced level of
activity.
14. If the VC/NVN view the situation in this
light, it is probably to their advantage to use their
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present apparatus to the fullest extent in hopes of
fundamentally reversing current trends before attri-
tion renders such an attempt impossible. This could
explain the risk they are taking in promising their
followers and cadres victory within a short period
of time. This tack has the effect of bolstering
morale in the short run for an all-out effort. It
does, however, run a high risk of engendering seri-
ous disillusionment and disaffection among the VC/
NVN rank and file when the promises are not fulfilled
Even if the VC/NVN fail in this endeavor, however --
so the reasoning goes -- they would hopefully have
at least inflicted serious damage to Allied military
units and the GVN infrastructure, pre-empted any
major offensive plans the Allies may have had for
the current dry-season, and placed themselves in
a better position to continue a long-range struggle
with a reduced force. The cost to themselves would
be substantial, but one they would ultimately have
to pay anyway.
15. If this speculation is correct, then op-
portunities for negotiations would be most likely if
the winter-spring campaign enjoyed unexpected suc-
cesses and would be designed largely to facilitate
acceptance by the Allies of the VC/NVN's major ob-
jectives -- withdrawal of U.S. troops and organi-
zation of a so-called "coalition government" under
the control of the NFLSV. Barring this, the pros-
pects of negotiations to settle the war would de-
pend on the situation prevailing at the particular
time, and the VC/NVN assessment of it. We are un-
able to estimate what this might entail, but both
external and internal factors would be involved.
We do believe, however, that it is unlikely that
the VC/NVN would opt to negotiate unless they
could do so with some aura of success, or at least
the semblance thereof, to place before the world
and their followers. They have already paid too
high a price to negotiate a defeat. We believe
that they would prefer instead to let things drag
on and on at reduced levels, rather than to nego-
tiate under such adverse conditions.
16. In sum, the one conclusion that can be
drawn from all of this is that the war is probably
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nearing a turning point and that the outcome of the
1967-68 winter-spring campaign will in all likelihood
determine the future direction of the war.
*17. Sources used in the preparation of this
report, in addition to those citecrin the text, in-
cluded the following: (CDEC numbers unless otherwise
specified)
10-1698-67, 10-1282-67, 11-1353-67, 11=1375-
67, 11-1426-67, 11-1563-67, 11-1543.-,67, 11-1613-67,
11-1608,67, 09-1983-67, 11-1754-67,11-1690-67,
11-1959-67, 11-1935-67, 11-2036-67, 11-1794-
67, 11-2152-67, 11-2272-67, 11-1365-67, 11-1761-67,
11-1728-67, NIC No. 1275/67, NIC No. 1276/67, FVS-
16,142, FVS-16,187, and 11-2552-67.
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