PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION -- JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00163357
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 172
• Document Creation Date: January 21, 2025
• Document Release Date: January 15, 1983
• Publication Date: August 3, 1977

PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
SUBCOMMIITEE ON
HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
AUGUST 3, I977
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
and Committee on Human Resources
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-40F WASHINGTON : 1977
sob by the Supyribteibblit lb,clintebb, I G"%erbbiebt Printtbg ()thee
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DAVI). WINNTON. MiflOritp COWIArl
CONTENTS
Statements of:
Admiral Stansfield Turner. Director. Central Intelligence Agency : ac-
companied by: Frank Laubinger, Office of Technical Services, Cen-
tral intelligence Agency: Al Brody. Office of Inspector General.
Central Intelligence Agency; Ernest Mayerfield, Office of General
Counsel. Central Intelligence Agency. and George Cary, Legislative
counsel. Central Intelligence Agency
Philip Goldman. former employee. Central Intelligence Agency 50
John Gittinger. former employee. Central In Agem�y 51
Appendix A.�XVII, Testing and 'Use of Chemical and Bitdogical Agents
by the Intelligence Community
Appendix B.�Documents Referring to Discovery of Additional MKULTRA
Nlaterial 103
Appendix C,�Documents Referring to Subprojects 109
Material Submitted for the Record:
Psychological Assessments 17
-Truth" I trues in Interrogatiim 27,
Construction of Gorman Annex 39
Sul project a-ojeet 41
Drug Testing lit Ftireign C4,1)111 rips 43
MKSEARCII. OFTEN;CIIICKWIT 369
Employees Terminated Because of Their Participation in lkIKULTRA
Subproject 3 170
QKIIILLTOP Definition 171
(III)
Pate
PROJECT MULTRA. THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977
SEN ATE.
SELEcT (.1)M M IYITE (IN I NrI:I.Jj;Nr.
AN)) Slit( 1)M NI 11711: 1)N 1 ft:Arm
Am, Suit:N.1111e lir_sEAncit
or Tilt: Com Ntri-m-: iN 1 I'M .1 N Es1)URCES. -
Washington, D.C.
The committees met. pursuant to notice, at :tf7 a.n i. in mom.1202.
Dirksen Senate Office Building. Senator Daniel K. Inouye (chairman
of the Select Committee on Intelligence) presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh.
Hathaway. Huddleston, Hart. Schweiker, Case, Garn, Chafee, Lugar
and Wallop.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director, Select Committee on
Intelligence: lir. Lawrence I Forowitz. stitl' director. Subcommittee
on Health and Scient iti, Research: and profes,ional staff members of
both cotionittees.
Senator 1m-it-ye. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is
meeting today and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of Mas-
sachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator
Hathaway and Senator Chafee are memliers of both committees. We
are to hear testimony from the I /irector of Central Intelligence. Adm.
Stansfield Turner. and from other Agency witnesses on issues concern-
ing new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug
testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.
It should be made clear from the outset that in general, we are
focusing on events that happened over l2 or 31:4 long as 25 years ago.
It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest con-
cern have stopped and that we are reviewing these past events in
order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
necessary to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We
also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA
in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses
are occurring.
I want to commend Admiral Turner for his full cooperation with
this committee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing
that this issue needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our com-
mittees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at
remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.
111
2
The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing pro-
gram and reitorts of other previonsly unknown drug programs and
project- fm behavioral control underline the necessity for effective
ovet sight procedures 110111 in the executive brrincli and in the Con-
gress. Thi. Select roilonittec on Intelligence has been working very
closel.� with President Carter. the Viiqs 1111.i(11'111. and Admiral
Turner and his associate- in developim, basic concepts for statutory
;guideline- whieli will tzovern iii actrvitie- of the intelligence agencies
of the 1'1144.41 States.
In fact. it is 111V eXp1'1�1:11 ion I 11111 the Pre-:1111'1n vu11 :,0011 1111011)1(1`
11.1-� 111.1�1�-:1011.- 011 1111W lie has derided the intelligence agencies of' the
United :-;.tates shall be or,ranize.l. This committee �vill lw working
closely AA it hi the Pre-ident and .�iliniral Turner in placing this new
-tin ti 11111'11'r 1 lie law and to develop effective oversight procedures.
It i- clear that effective mersight requirt� that information twist
be hut and tot thcoming. Full and timelv. information is obviously
liect-,,-;11. if the committee and the public is to lie confident that any
transgressions can be dealt with quieldv and forcefully.
One purpose of this hearing i, to give the committee and the public
an miderstandin"y of what new information has been discovered that
adds to the knowlede.e already avail:0,1e from previous Church arid
Kennedy inquiries. and to hear the rea-ons why these dociiments were
no: available to the Church and lentiedy committees. It is also the
purpose of this hearing- to address the i-slies raised by any additional
illegal or improper ;iclivit le- that have emerged from the files and to
develop remedies to prevent such improper activities from occurring
again.
Finally. there is. an obligation on the part of both this committee
and the (1.� to to:11:, every 01011 to help t1}41,:c ithlivithml- iw.,tittt-
tioti.: that too \ lianot.41 by anv of these improper or illegal
art ivit le.-. I ain certain that .Admiral 1.111ner will WOrk with1 i111S e0111-
millpi. ti -1.e i11:11 t111- Will lie (100(..
W0111,1 11(1W likv in W4'1101111' the 1110.4 1.1 1,1111(011.1114.1 Senator from
)fa-sacliusetts. the chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator
Kenned.\-.
Senator KVVNEnr. Thank you very ititihi. 1 1.. Chairman. We are
delighted to join tiP,.'tt1It'i ill this %cry important area of public in-
quiry :old 1,111,lic int ercA�
:! Year- a.(0. 1114' S1.11:11 t I 1e:1 luluSubeonimittec heard chilling
te"11111,111.\ :1111)111 1111' 1111111:III 1�\14.1)1111`111:1114111 iVil II���� 4,f the Central
Intelligence .kgency. !him!, of the CI.% revealed that
over II imiversit ie., and institutions mere involved in an -extensive
le-ling mid p\licrimetituti1414.� prf)gnitii which covert drug
tests on unwitting- it izens -at all soeial le� el-. hi.rh and low. native
Americans and Several of these test- in\ 4,1\4�41 the adminis-
tration of 1,S1 / itting subjects in -oeial situations.-
.11 least one death, that of 1 11sen. re-tilled front the-e
The .�uctic� itself acknowle,bred that these te-t- inade little scientific.
sense. The al..rents doing the monitoring: were not qualified scientific
oliser% et -. eA ".1111 HIS Wert' !"i'Ll.1111 :14.4V"-Silde ht.V01141 the fiNt
hours of the test. In a number of instances. the test silbject became ill
for hours or da.xs. mid effect ivy follow up w ;is impossible.
3
Other experiments were equally. offensive. For example, heroin
addicts were enticed into part icipat mg in LSD experiments in order
to get a reward�heroin.
Perhaps most dist �rbing of all was tlw fact that the extent of ex-
perimentation on human !�q1blect!,wa unknown. The records of all
these activities were destroyed in January 1973. at the instruction of
then CIA l iirector Richard I lelros. In spite of persistent inquiries by
both the Health Sids.tanmittee and the Intelligence Committee. no
additional records or information Were forthcoming. And no one�
no single individual�could be fimmi who remembered the details, not
the Director of the CIA. who ordered the doenments destroyed, not
the official responsible for the program, nor any of his associates.
We believed that the retain'. ineomplete as it was. was as complete
as it wa., going to be. Then one individual. through a Freedom of In-
formation request, accomplished what two US. Senate committees
could not. Ile spurred the ageitcy into finding additional records per-
taining to the CIA's program of experimentation with human subjects.
These new records were discovered by the agency in March. Their
existence was not ninth known to 11a. Congress until July.
The records reveal a far more extensive serieS of experiments than
had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or institutions
were involved. New instanees of unethical behavior were revealed.
The intelligence community of this Nation. which requires a shroud
of seerecy in �rile). to operate. has a very sacred trust from the
American people. The CIA's program of human experimentation of
the fifties and sixties violated that trust, It WaQ violated again on the
day the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is
violated each time a responsible official refuses to recollect the details
of the program. Tin. he-t safeguard against abuses in the future is a
complete paid ie arrolltit ing of tin al 11154'S of the past.
I think this is illustrated. as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These
are Is!4lies are qiiestions that happened in the fifties and sixties, and
go bark some 15. Ott years so,o. but they are front page news today. as
we see in the major newsi)apers anti on the television and in the media
of ti�s country: and the reason they are. I thi�k, is because it just con-
tinuously begins to trickle out. sort of. mouth i after month. and the
best way to put this period behind ns, obviously. is to have the full
information. and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of
the members of this (Tann tit lee.
The Central Jut elligenee Ageney drugged American citizens with-
out their knowledge or consent. It used university facilities and per-
sonnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often
without their kiiowledge.
These institutes, these individuals. have a right to know who they
nre and how anti when they were used. As of today, the Agency itself
refuses to deelassify the names of those institutions and individuals,
quite appropriately. I might say. with re�rard to the individuals under
the .Privacy Act. It seems to me to he a fundamental responsibility to
notify those individuals or just itnt ions. rather. I think many of them
were eanght no in a� unwittito, Dimmer to do research for the
Agency. Many researi.hers. distinguished researchers. some of our
most outstanding members of our scientific community. involved in
4
this networl;. now really dii not know whether they were in-volved or
not, and it seem- to nu that tho whole health and climate in terms Of
ow university awl our scientific and iteAllji facilities are entitled to
that response.
So. I intend to do all I can to per-mule the Agency to. at the very
least. officially inform those in-litut ions and individual- involved.
Two years ago. when these ahtt.es were first revealed. I introduced
legi,dation, with Senator Sehweiker and Senator javit,. designed to
minimize the potential for any similar in the future. That
legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National ('ommission on
Human Subjects of llioniedical alt1 lieluivioral Research to cover all
federally funded re,,earelt involving human subjects. 'The researell
initially tva-, just directed towaril ii EAV netivitie,. but this legi-lation
covered 1)01) as. well as the (1.1.
This Nation ha-, a biomedical and behavioral research capability
second to none. It has had for subjeets of HEW' funded research for
the pa-t years a system for the iiroteet ion of huntan subjects of Lin-
and behavioral research second to none. and the Human Ex-
iwrni�,ntatinn Commi.....ion ha- proven it, value. Today's. 'hearings
and the record already established under�core the neva in expand
jurisdiet 1(111.
The l'1.� supported that le!li,lat ion in 197:I.:Ind it pas-ed the Senate
unanimously ht-1 year. I believe it i, needed in order to assure all
our people that they v% ill have the degree of protection in human ex-
perimentation that they deserve and have ('VII tight right to expect.
senator �()11 murk Now �ve will proveet1 with
the hearinu-. Admiral Turner?
[The prepared Antement of ..kiliniral Turner follows :I
Pai,:cAnt:n STATEMENT Or APMIRAT sTAsisriri.n TuRNER, I tiREcTon OE CENTRAL
1N1ELHGENt-E
Mr. Chairman Iii my letter to you of .lnly1. 1977. I reported oar recent dis�
eovery of seven boxe, .4 document, related to Project :%1K1'LTI{.1. n closely held
CIA proje t condticted front 197.3-Inn-I. As you may recall. AIKULTIL% was an
'�unihrella project- tinder which certain sensitive subproject. were funded. in-
VOD nig anwng. ,'titer things research on drug- and behavioral modification. Dur-
ing the Ituehefeller commission and Church Committee investigations in 19T5.
the criittnoiii became putiiicly known wlien details of the drug-related death of
I W. Frank Id-un were publicized. lit 1913 IIr. Ads,ni. a civilian empioyee Of tile
Artny al Fort Detrick, leaped to his denth front a hotel room window in New
York f'ity about a week after having unwittingly consumed LSD administered to
hint eNperintent at a meeting of LSI u researcher, (-ailed by ('IA.
Most I Of W ha t Wa\ k II I 1W11 about the Agency's no ohentent with behavioral
drugs during the investigations iii 1977; W/1", rallifli111.11 iii a report on Project
!k11:1"1:1-1t.k preparod hy the Inspectnr General's office in 111113. As a result of
that report's recommendation,, unwitting testing if drugs Ott C.s. citizens was
suIrsequently diseontinued MK1'1.111A-related report was made available to
the Cleurch Committee investigators met to the staff of Senator Kennedy's Snb-
committee on Health. Until the reevnt discovery. it y'as believed that all of the
NIKULTIZA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in
1973 401 111V orders of the then retiring l'hief of the Office of Technien1 Service.
With the authorization of the then Del. as has been previonsly reported Almost
all of the people who had had any eonia..tion with the aspects of Ito' projeet
u.liich interested SP11811. investigators in 1975 \\Tn. no longer with the Agency
at that tittle. Thus. there W;i, 111110 kinm ledge of the NIX1-1,1'RA
project, available to I' l. during the Church Committee investigations. This
lack of available details. 1.!oreover. was probably not wholly attributable to the
5
destruction of 'A1T-1.TRA files in 1973: the 19113 report on 1MKI'LTRA by the
Itispe,tor General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records
of the planning and approval of test programs.-
When I reported to you last on this matter. my staff hail not yet had an
opportimity to review the newly- located material in depth. This hats now been
rieconiplished. and I am i in a position to give you a deseript ion of the contents ef
the recovered material. I believe 3-41u will be most interested in the following
aspects of the recent discovery :
flow the material was discovered and why it was not previously found;
l'he nature of this recently located material ;
II (1W much new information thi�re is in the inaternil which may not have
been previously known and reported to Senate inve,tigators; and
What we believe the most sig-niticant aspect., of this rind to be.
Ti begia. as to how we discovered Mess). material,. The material had been
sent to our Retired Records Center outsid f NVashington and was discovered
there a, tll re�Illt of the extensive search efforts of an employee charged with re-
spon,ibility for maintaining (air laddings (4n behavioral tlrugs and for resiminding
to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. I iuring the t'llurch
Committee investigation in 19171, searches for MN Ill material were
lit:1414 1.Y examining both the active and retired records of all branches of ('IA
considered at all likely Ill lltiVe had IISstwitit loth with MEIT'1,Tici, documents. The
retired records of the Budget and Fiscal ti ti of the Branch resi�onsible for
such work were not searched. however. This was because financial papers as-
soeinted with sensitive projects such as :1M1'111t..1 were normally maintained
hy the Branch itself under the project lii.. not by the Budget and Fiscal Section.
in the case at finial. however. the newly 'waled material was sent to the Re-
tired Record, Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal Seetion as part of its
own retired holdings. The reason for this departure from normal procedure is not
kn�%rn. As a resiiii i if it htWte�er. the material eseaped retrieval and destruction
in 1:173 by 1114. then-retiring I Director of the tithe, as well as discovery in 11475
by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned
in his effort, Ill req..1111 to HilA Tett1ie0S. 11.. reviewed :ill listings of material
of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Center. inclinling those of the
Budget and Fiscal Seetion and. tints. discovered tlw MKILTIlAreiaiud &len-
mods which had beet) missed in the previous searelies. In sum. the .Agency failed
ti nneo�er these particular d..nnu.uit ii 197:1 in the process of attempting to
destIlly them: it similarly fail...1 to locate thou. iii 1971 iii response to the Church
Committee hearings. I ain ronvinced that there was no attempt to conceal this
material during the earlier ',partite,.
Next. as to the nature of the nwently hunted material. it is important to
realize that the recovered folders are finance folders. The bulk of the material in
them consists of approvals for advance of funds. vouchers. aceotintiugs. and the
lilo.�most of whirh are not very informatiie as to tlw onion. of the activities
I out Were undertaken. ()erasion:it project proposals or memoranda comment-
ing oil some aspect of a sal)project are scatter( ii throughout this material.
In general. however. the recovered material doe, not include status reports or
other documents relating to operational ronsiderat ions or ivrogress in the various
subprojects. thongli some elaboration of the solidi ies contemplated does appear.
The recovered document, fall ronghly into three eategorie,:
First. there are 149 M k1.1.11t.1) ,nl.pr.)jects. many ))f which appear ti.have
some count-Ohm with research into behavioral tooth ticat ion. drug acquisition
and test ing or administering drugs surrept it ion,ly.
seelm(1. there are two boxes of inis.ellaiwous :NIKI.I.TRA papers. including
audit reports and financial statements from (Le.. intermediary )
funding ineehrinisnis used tit eonreal CIA's sponsorship of various research
pnijects.
Finally. there are additional subprojects eoncerning certain intelligence
activities previonsly funded under :Mil- 1.TItA which Itaxe nothing to do
either with behavioral modifieat ion, drugs. and toxin, 4in with any other re-
lated matter,.
We have attempted Ii,group the ;to it flies rot ervtl by the 149 subproject, into
categories natiher descripthe headings. In broad outline. at len -1. this presents the
contents if these files. The activities are plaved ii the following 17) categories:
6
1. Researeh into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
17 subprojects probalily not invol vine human testing;
14 subprojects definitel involv ing tfo,ts on human volunteers ;
19 snbprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not
known. some of these ,utoprojects may have included tests on unwitting sub-
Jets ;r- vil1;
suloprojeets involving test, int 1111Wilt ing subjects.
2. Itt.scarch on hypnosis :C SlItiprOj(41-, including 2 involvine hypnosis and drugs
in combination.
3. Acquisition of chemical: or drugs :7 subprojects.
4 .�speets of magicians* art useful in eovert operations: e.g.. surreptitious de-
Iivvr if drne-rela tell materials : 4 sulit.rojects.
n. Studies of human behavior. sleep research, and behavioral changes during
psyclmtherapy : ti subprojects.
fl library searche� and attendance at seminars and international conferences
on behavioral modification :II suliprojeets.
7. Nlothational studies, studies of defeettors. assessment. and training tech-
e''.1 subprojects.
Polygraph research : 3 sithprojects.
9. Fundine mechanisms for NIK1-1,TRA external research activities: 3
suhprojects
W. Research on drugs. toxins, rind biologicals in human tissue: provision of
eNott.� pathogens and the capnbility to incorporate theni in effective delivery
system, :II stibpruieet s.
11. Act iVil objeetiNes cannot be determined front availahle documen-
tation : 3 subprojects.
12 Sulipnijects involving funding support for utists-cified netivities connected
with the Army ''s Special operations Division at Ft. Detrick. Md. This activity is
onthtie iii ltook I of the Church Committee %port. pp. 3ss�:Isli. Si',' Appendix A.
pp. 6._69. I'mler CIA's l'rojeet MKNAONII. the Army Assisted CIA in develop-
ing. testing, and maintaining bitilogival agents and delivery systems for use
against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these
51119,1'".if�cfs eanoof 14' identified froni the reeovered material beyond the fact
that the Ittolicy VC:i��: iii 11,ed ftturriirii channels would require
Irvin- %%filleti or oral justiti..ation than appeared desiralde for security reasons
0.r ti here operational ...orsid,rat ions dictated short lead times for purchases. About
$11.94101 was invol luring this period 197.3-194o : :1 subprojeets.
11. Single subpro'ects iii suit areas as effects of elect ru�shock. harassment tech-
nique, for offenske use analyst, of extrasensory perception. gas propelled sprays
and acr,,,ds. and four sulipreject- involving crop anol material sabotage.
14 I in,' or lw. .011,1,1�,,Jort earl, if the jug :
..iii,��1 froupieg- research. eontrolline the activity of animals, energy
et urage and tra ti,fer iii organi, ,ystetio.: atal
and response in hiological systems.
17, l'Itree sultprojocts cancelled before any work was done on them having to
do with laboratory tint': Si.reeniug. resear.d. on brain concussion. and research
on biologically a et ive materials tolte tested through the skin on human volunteers.
Now, as to bow 111111�11 new the ree,o�ered material adds to what has previously
been reported to the rlotr.it Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee
till Health on these topics. the :111,Vt additional detail. for the most part e.g..
the name, of itrevionsly unidentified researelters and in,titutions Itssociated on
either a witting or ram itting ha-is with MK1-1.TRA activities. and the names of
CIA official, who approNed or monitored tlie various subprojects. Sump new sub-
stantix e material is also present : e.g.. details concerning proposals for experi-
mentation and elinical testing associated with various research projeetc. and fit
possibly improper vontrilintion by CM to n private institution. However. the
itriticipal types of activities included have, for the most part. either been outlined
to some extent or generally described in what was Tirevionsly a Vtlit:ible to CIA
In the wny documentation mid was supplied by CIA to Senate investigators.
For 4�NallIttle :
Financial disbursement records for the period 1901-19G-I for 7r. of the 149
nundtered 3,1K1'1.TRA subt,rojeets hail been recovered from the Office of Fillallee
hy CIA and were made nvailaltle to the Church Committee investigators in August
or September 19771.
The 19113 Inspector General report on MKVI.TR.1 made a :ailAble to both the
Chnroli Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions electrtsshock
7
and harassment substances (pp. 4. 16 : covert testing mi unwitting U.S. citizens
(pp. 7. 141-12) : the search for new materials through arrangements with special-
ists in universities. pharthaueutical houses. hospitals. state and federal institu-
tions. and private research i organizations i pp. 7. 91: and the fact that the Tech-
nical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control
of human helm viiir between 1953-3963 ( p. 211.
The relevant section of a 1957 Inspectnr General report on the Technical Serv-
ice Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report
discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of com-
munication (p. 2011: discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly
administered (pp 201-202) ; studies on magicians arts as applied to covert oper-
ations ip. 2021 ; specific funding mechanisms for research performed outside of
CIA I pp. 202-2113. 2051 ; research being done on -K" i kill/Ck011t I material, alcohol
tolerance, and hypnotism (p. 203 ) research on I.SD I p. 2041; anti-personnel
harassment and assassination deli�Cry systems ineluding aerosol generators and
other spray devices I pp. 206-20S tile role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's
BiologiearChentical Warfare ca tati lit y ( p. 20s ; and nail trial sabotage research
(p. 209). Much of this material is reflected in the Church Committee Report,
lbsIk I. pp. 3s5-422. ( See Appendix A. pp. 65-102
The most significant new data discovered are, first. the names of researchers
and institutions who partieipated in the MNULTRA project and, secondly, a
possibly improper contribution by CJA to ii private institution. We are now in
possession of the names of 15 non-government researchers and assistants who
are identified in the recovered material dealing with the 149 suliprojects. The
names of SO institutions where work was done or with which these people were
affiliated are also mentioned.
The institutinns include 4-I colleges or universi(ies. 15 research foundations or
chemical or pharmaceutical ciantianies and the like. 12 hosidtals Im clinics tin ad-
dition to those associated with universities), and 3 penal institutions. While the
identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
discovery of the new identities adds tit our knowledge of MI:VITRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows:
One project involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private
medical institution. The fact that a contribution was made was previously
known: indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the
Technical Service Division of CIA. pertinent portions of which had been re-
viewed by the Church Committee staff. The newly discovered material, however,
makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which
made it appear to be a private donat inn. As a private donation, the contribution
was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the
true source of the gift. This project was approved by the then nci. and concurred
In by CIA's top management at the time, including the then General Counsel who
wrote an opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents give-a greater insight into the scope of the
unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have col-
laborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on
iii safehouses in Sall Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that
three individuals were involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously
reported one person. We also know now that some unwitting testing took place
on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additional-
ly. research was die OD a knock-out or "K" drug in parallel with research to
develop pain killers for cancer patients.
These. then are the principal findings identified to date in our review of the
recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of
researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship of drags and be-
havioral moditieation is a new element and one whieh vises a considerable prob-
lem. Most of the people and institutions in are not aware of Agency
sponsorship. We should certainly as.11111P that the researehers rind institutions
which cooperated with CIA on a witting basis acted in good faith and in the
belief that they were aiding their government it, a legitimate and proper purpose.
I believe we all have a moral oldigation to these researchers and institutions to
protect them from any unjustified emha misstated or damage to their reputations
whieh revelation of their identities might bring. In addition. I have a legal
obligation tinder the Privacy Act not to publicly diselose the names of the in-
dividual researchers without their consent. This is especially true, of cours.,., for
8
those researehers end institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA-
MKOIS:ored act iv it ies.
Nevertheli-ss. recogniving the right 111111 t lif` need of both the senate selpet
('ominittee on Intelligence and the senate Subcommittee on 1 1,:/ It Ii to illVeA iga f.
the circumstances of these activities in whatever derail the onsider necessary.
I ant providing your Committee %% Oh All of flie names oil a (1 --unit
hulk tIvit tlii,.will facilitate your invest igat ion while protecting the individuals
and institutions involved. Let Iii, emphasize that the AIKULTItA events are 32
to 2' your.. in the past. I assure you that the (*IA i, in no way engaged in either
witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
Finally. 1 am working closely with the Attorney �ctiertil and with thy Seertar% of Health. Education and 1Velfare on this matter. We ane niakinz available
to the Attorney General whatever materials he may deem necessary to any
investigation lie may elect to undertake. NVe :ire working with both the Attorney
1:eiteral anit till. Secretary of Ilealth. 1:duration and Welf-ire to determine
whether it is practicable from ioelx pvi(1.-oo4. to attempt to identify any of
the persons to whom drugs may have been administered unwittingly Ni' such
1111's Z1 r, 3iar1 of these records. hilt AVP are %vorking to determine if there are
ifiloquate eines to lead to their identification : and if so. how to go about fulfilling
the ttfivernment�s responsibilit ies in the matter.
TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAITBINGER. OFFICE
OF TECHNICAL SERVICES: AL BRODY. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL: ERNEST MAYERFIELD. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL:
AND GEORGE L. CARY, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
A(11161%11 TriZNER. Thank you. :Th.. Chairman. I would like to begin
by thanking you atul :''Zettator liemiedy for having a joint hearing this
morning. 1 hope this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the
inforniat ion that both of your committee, need into the record quickly.
I would like also to thank you both for prefacing the remarks today
by reminding ns all that the events about which we are here to talk
are 12- to 24-vearsold. They_in no way represent the current activities
or_uoli(jes of the Central Int ."-ence Agency.
What we are hem to do is to give you a ate information that we
now have and which we did not previously have on a subjeet known
as Project AIKULTRA. a project which took place from 1953 to I4.
It was an umbrella project under which there were numerous sub-
projects for research. among other thing's. on drugs and behavioral
modification. What the new material that we offer today is a sup-
plement to the considerable material that was made available iti 1975.
during the Church committee hearincrs. and also to the Senate Sub-
committee on Health and Scientific Research.
At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and docu-
ments it believed it haul available. The principal One available at that
time that gave the frreatest amount of lamination on this subject
was a report of the( '1 A's Inspector General written in 1t163. and which
led directly to the termination of this activity in 19(11. 13 years ago.
The information ;Iva ilable in 197:1 to flue various investigating
group- was indeed :parse. first bei�ause of the destruction of Material
that took !dare in 1973. as detailed by Senator Kennedy a minnte ago.
with flue concurrence of the then Director of Central Tntelliffence find
under the :upervision of th, Di reet or of the fifr of Technical
Services that snpervised Project MK1-14TRA.
9
The mat et.ial in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people
W11"11:1,11,elli I() 1964 in I his activity had retired front
the Agency. I would flirther add that I think the material was sparse
in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detailed
records in this category. ,
For in-t o flue. 7 he 19(;:', report 07 t lie 11Npert Or GNIP1111 notes:
Praeti(1. iSlit iliflhlil till lilt records of the planning and approval of
tel programs.
In brief. there were few records to begin with and less after the
dest nict ion of 1973.
WI at IIN ould like to do now. though. is to proceed and let you know
what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topie. and I
will start by describing how the material was discovered and why it
wit- not previously discovered. The material in question. some seven
boxes. had !teen sent to 0111 ltt ired Records Center outside of the
Washington area. It was discovered then as the result of an extensive
search by an employee charged with the responsibility Int maintain-
ing our holdings on belt:LI-hold drugs and for responding. to Freedom
of I nformat on Act requests on this subject.
Durine. the Church committee investigation of 1975. searches for
MK1-1,TII.k -related material were made by examining both the active
amlthe retired records of all of tlw branehes of CIA considered likely
to have had an associat ion with MNI-LTRA documents. The retired
records oft lw lindi,et and Fiscal Section of the branch that was respon-
silde for sorb work were not searched. however. This was because the
financial pat aT ze,-:ociated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
were normally maintained lty the branch it,-elf under the project title.
MN 1-1,TliA. not by the Budget and Section under a special
budget tile.
In the rase at hand. however, this newly located material had been
sent to the liet ired Bemirds Center in 197t) by the Budget and Fiscal
Sect ion of t his hranch as part of its own ro irf.a holdings. In short. what
should have been tiled bv the brand' itself was filed by the Budget
and Fiscal Section. and what should have been filed under the project
lit It. wa- tiled under bmbret and fiscal matters. The rea-
son for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply
lit ii known. and as a result of it. ht wever. he material escaped retrieval
and destruction in 1973. as well a- discovery in 1975.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone
mutinied in his efforts to re-pond to a Freedom of Information Act
reyie-1. or several of them. in fart lit reviewed all of the listings of
material of this branch. stored at the Rot ire,' Records Center. including
those of the lindget and Fiscal Sect ioti. and thus ch.:covered the
M K F LTII A -relat ed documents. which had lteen missed in the previous
sea
In sin�. the agency failed to uncover these partieular doeuments in
in the process of attempt ing to (lest Foy them. It similarly failed
III locate them in 1975. in re,ponse to the Church committee hearings.
I alit !WV-4)11:111y pen-MI(1141 lhat there is no evidence of any attempt to
compal this material during the earlier searches. Moreover, as we will
discuss as we proceed. I do not believe the material itself is such that
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11
Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs toxins, and
biologicals in human tissue. provision of exotic pathogens. and the
capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems.
Eleventh. there are three subprojects on activities whose nature
simply cannot be determined..
Twelfthh there are subprojects involving funding support for un-
specified activities conducted with the Army Special Operations Divi-
sion at Fort Detrich. Md. This activity is outlined in Book I of the
Church committee report. pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp.
6S-69).
Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI. the Army assisted the CIA in
developing. testing. and maintaining biological agents and delivery
systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.
Thirteenth. there are single subprojects in such areas as the effects
of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use. analysis of
extrasensory perception. gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four
subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
Fourteenth. one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood
grouping research; controlling the activities of animals; energy stor-
age and transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in
biological systems.
Finally. 15th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work
was 41one on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, re-
search on brain concussion. and research on biologically active
materials.
Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds
to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and
to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basi-
cally additional detail. The principal types of activities included in
these documents have for the most part been outlined or to some
extent generally described in what was previously available in the
way of documentation and which was supplied by the CIA to the
Senate investigators.
For example. financial disbursement records for the period of 1960
to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subprojects had been recovered by the
Office of Finance at CIA and were made available to the Church
committee investiffators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General
report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electroshock and harass-
ment substances. covert testing on unwitting V.S. citizens, the search
for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals
and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of
CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control of human
behavior.
For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General
report was also made available Co the Church committee staff. and
Clint report discusses the techniques for human assessment and un-
orthodox methods of communication, discrediting and disabling ma-
terials which can he covertly administered, studies on magicians' arts
as applied to covert operations. and other similar topics.
The most si,rnifieant new data that has been discovered are. first,
the names of researchers and institutions who participated in
l2
proik-rt,. and ,econd. a 1,0-sib1- improper contribution
II y the c1.1 to a private institution. 1Ve are now- in the posses-
sion of Ili(' name, Of nowirovertiment researchers and assistants
who alv ill 1111 i-itnveiitl iij:ittiiai ilealing with these 149
suI project,.
There are also names of so institutions where work was done or
with which these people were affiliated. The institutions include 44
colleg-e, or universities. research f 0111�1:11 ion or chemical or pharina-
(Pin ical colapaliii-- 01' tile like. 1.2 hospital- or clinics. in addition to
those associated with the 11111VVI'Sita',... and 3uoivai 111,-ii11111o1P-.
11a. of some of the. people and inst ititi ions were
known previoiedy. the di,covery of' the law identities add, to our
knowledge of MN I LTJA.
The fact, a- they pertain to the pos,ibly improper contribution are
as follows. One projert involVt'S a (Talirihntion Of t::),;:i.noti to a build-
ing- fluid ofii privaic niedieal in-titution. The fact that that eon-
triloo ia Wal.; Math' Wa:. previously known. Indeed, it was mentioned
in the 1917 n' unit of tilt' 111-peclor Cioneral on the Terhilical SN'Yire
Iii viioiuof (1A that supervised M I1 LF14A.and pertinent portions
of this had Lee� reviewed by the Church committee staff.
The newly di,covered material. however. makes it clear that this
eont fibotion wa, made throng-li all intermediary. which made it ap-
pear to be a private donation. A, a private donation, the contriblition
wa- then tilaplied by Federal fund,. The institution was not made
awn o' 01. tin 11111, of the gift. This project was approved I'
1]. then Director of Central Intelligenee and co�curred in by CI.1's
top ii aim ineluding the then General Counsel. who wrote an
opinion supporting the legality of tlw contribution.
jaunt iv di-covered documents also give greater insight into
the seope of tile unwitting nature of the drug testing. but eontribute
hit le more than that. 1Ve DOW do have corroborating in that
some of lily um% itt drug testing was carried out in what is known
in the intelligence trade a, safe houses in San Filthej,:e0 and in New
ii Irk city. and we have identified that three indiVidlialS were in-
vol \I'd iii 1lliS undertaking. whereas wc previously reported there was
only one perma).
1Ve also know now that some miwittini..� testing took place on crimi-
nal sexual psyehopatli, confined at a State hospital. and that addi-
tionally research was done on a knoekotit or K drug in parallel with
researrh 10 develop painkiller, for cancer pat Wilts. �
These. then. are the principal finding- identified to date in onr re-
view of thi- recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the de-
tail on tlw identities of researchers and institntions i�vol�-ed in CI
sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification research is a new
element and one which pose- a considerable problem. :1Iost of the pan-
ply :,7),1 in,-tit lit ion- involved were not aware of CIA spon,orshi�_ We
should certainly 11..-111111. 111;11 the researchers and institutions whirl)
enoperated with (AA on a wittiti, basis acted in good faith and in
the belief that the were aidimr their Gover�ment it) 8 legitimate and
prop t' 11111 ,ose,
believe that we all have a moral obliffation to these researchers
and institution,. to proteet them frm� any nit:justified embarrassment
13
or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might bring. In addition. I have a 1Pg:11 obligation under the Privacy
Act not to publicly disclose tlie names of the individual researchers
wit hi tilt t 1101r ConsVnt.
is especially true. of course. for those researchers and institu-
tion- which were unwitting participants in ('IA siaansored activities.
Nonetheless. Mr. Chairman. I certainly recognize the right and the
need of both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Semot, Subcommittee on Ilealth and Seient ific Research to investigate
the circumstances of these net in whatever detail you consider
"4"'"a 11% I am Providing' Ymir commitle" with all of the documenta-
tion. incliningg all of the names. on a classified basis. I hope that Uri,
will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals
and the institutions invol%til
Let me emphasize again that the MKULTRA events are 12 to 24
year.. in tin, past. and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in
either witting or unwitting testing of drun's today.
Finally. I am working closely with the Attorney General on this
matter. We are making available to the Attorney 'General whatever
materials he inav deem necessary to any investigations that he may
elect to undertake. Beyond that. we are also working with the Attorney
General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence
to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may have been admin-
istered unwittingly. No such names are part of these records. We have
not identified the individnals to whom drugs were administered, but
we are trying now to determine if there are adequate clues to lead to
their identification. and if so how best to go about fulfilling the Gov-
ernment's responsibilit ies in this matter.
Mr. Chairman. as we proceed with that process of attempting to
identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper re-
sponsihility to them. I will keep both of these committees fully ad-
vised. I thank you. sir.
Senator 'km-Yr. Thank you very much. Admiral Turner. Your
siiirit of cooperation is ninell appreciated. I would like to announce to
the committee that in order to give every ineml,er an opportunity to
participate in this hearing, that we would set a time limit of 10 minutes
per Senator.
Admiral Turner. please give this committee the genesis of MKT-T,
TRA. Who or what rommittee or eommission or agency was responsi-
ble for dreamitpr up this grandiose and sinister project. and why was
it necessary? What is the rationale or justification for such a project
and was the President of the United States aware of this?
Admiral TunNee. Mr. Chairman. I am aniner to ask Mr. Brody on
my right, who is a long-time member of the CIA to address that in
more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was
turned over to the Church eommittee and is eontaimal in that ma-
terial. Basically. it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of
concern of our being taken advantage of by other powers who would
mio drwls against our personnel. and it was approved in the Agency. I
have asked the question you lust asked me. and have been assured that
there is no evidenee within the .1.,ency of any involvement at higher
echelons. the White House. for instance, or specific approval. That
does not say there was not. but we have no such evidence.
14
.4016.
Mr. Brody, would you amplify on niy collnliPlits there. please?
Buoi�-. Mr. Chairman. 1 really have very little to add to that.
To my knowledge. there was no President knowledge of this proj-
ect at I lw I Ma.. It was a CIA project. and as the admiral said, it was
a project designed to attempt to couffieract what was then thought to
be a serious threat by our enemies of liSing drugs against us. Most of
what Ise. we know about it is in the Senate Church committee report.
Senator !Nay rE. Were the authorized Illelnhers of the Congress
made :INN are of this project throligh the budget a ry process ?
r. Bra tor. We have no knowledge Of that. sir.
Senator IxouvE. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept
away front the Congress alid the President of the Flirted States?
Adiniral Ti ENER. No. sir. We are only saying that we have no evi-
denee one way or the other as to whether tlw Congress was informed
of this particular projert. There are no record- to indicate.
Senator IxourE. Admiral Turner. are you personally satisfied by
actual ins est igation that this new-ly discovered information was not
intent ionally kept away front the Senate of the United States?
Admiral Tt�uxtai. I have no way to prove that. sir. That is my con-
viction from everVtlitligl have seen of it.
Senator INiwyt:. Now. we have been advised that these documents
were init iallY discovered in March of this year. and you were notified
iii .luly of this year. or June of this year, and the committee was noti-
fied in July. Can you tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence
wa- notified toonths after its initial discovery. why the delay?
Admiral Tt�I:N En. Yes. sir. All this started with several Freedom of
In Art requests. and Mr. Laubinger on lily left was the in-
dividual who took it upon himself to pursue these 11,(111eStS with great
diligence. and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center. and
then made the decishm to look not onlv under what would be the ex-
pected subject files. lint through every file with which the branch that
condurted th1S type of activity had any conceivable connection.
Very late in ilarch. lw discovered these seven boxes. Ile arranged
to ha v, them shipped from the Retired Records Center to 'Washing-
ton. to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. Ile advised his
approlwiate Superiors. who asked him how long he thought it would
ti he him to go through these and screen them appropriately, clear
them for Freedtan of Information Act release.
There are, we originally est Minted. 5.0(111 pages here. We now think
that wit,- an undereA intuit ion. and it mav be closer to S.000 pages. He
estimated it would take about 4 days or into the middle of May to
do that. Ile was told to proceed. and as he did so there Was nothing
uncovered in the beginnim, of these 149 cases that appeared particu-
larly startlim, or particularly additive to tlw knowledge that had al-
ready lwen given to the Church committee. some details. but no major
revelat ions.
Ile and his asso�iates proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great
sense of urgency. There were other interfering activities that came
and ileinanded his time also. Ile was not all to put loo percent of his
tutu' on it. and there 41141 lint appear to be valise for it great rush here.
1Ve were I rving to he re...ponsive to the Freedom of Information Act
request within the limits of our manpower and our priorities.
15
In en rly June. however. he dj,coVered two prOjeetS. the one related
In K drug- and the one related to the funding :it the institution. and
realized immediately that he had snh.tantial new information, and
Iii immediately reported this to his superiors.
Two actions were taken. ()ne was to not the lawyers of tin prin-
cipal Freedom of 1111'4 winin ion Act requestor that we would have sub-
stant:al new material and that it Won Ii I fortheoming a, rapidly as
and tio -iroiil wa,, to start a memorandum up the chain
that indicated hi, belief that we should notify the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intellig-ence of this discovery because of the character at least
of these two documents.
A, that proceeded up from the 13th of June. at each echelon we had
Iii go through thc legal (Alice. the legislative liaison office and at each
echelon about tlw saint question was asked of him: Have von gone
through all of thk SO that when We nOtify the Senate Select Com-
mittee we do not notify half of the important relevat on and not the
other half? The last thing I warn. Mr. Chairman. is in any way to
he on any topic. give tin appvaranip on any topic of being recalcitrant.
reluctant. or having to have you drag things out of me. and in sub-
ordinates. much to my plea,nre. had ea^11 asked. have you really gone
through thee f'..01/11 pages enough to know that we are not going to
uncover a bolithshell down at the bottont?
By late June. about the '.1.",t b. process reached my deputy. He
notified me after his review of it on the 7th of .Ittly. which is the fiNt
I knew of it. I began reading into it. 1 asked the same probing ques-
tion 41irectly. I then notified my superiors. and on the 1r)th delivered
to you HIV letter letting you know that We had this. and we have been
work nr. many people. many hour, since then, to he sure that what we
are telling you today does include all tin relevant material.
senator 1Nut-YE. 1 would like to rommend Mr. Laubinger for his
dilio-onee and eNperti!.e. but was thi, diligence the result of the Free-
dom of 'Information Act or could thi..
diligence have lwen exercised
churel, hearing...? Why was it not exercised?
.1dmiral TveNru. There is no 9111'I loll that theoretically this dili-
gen.-e could ha e been exercised at :my time, and it may well be that
the Freedom of Information Act has made us more aware of this.
Would von slwak for your,ell.plea-e.
mr. LAI-RINGER. I really don't attribute it. Senator. to diligence so
noich as thorotorhuess. If you can imagine the pressures under. an
organization tryiw, to respond. which I think the CIA did at the time
of thu Churi-11 committee hcaring-. liii hallway,. of the floor I am on
were full of boxes from 1)1u1. reeords center. Every box that anyone
thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It
wa, one of a frant ic effort to momply.
When the pn�sure of that situation cool, down. and you can stall
lookiti,� at thing- SV�4eltia1 Wally. you are apt to find thnozs that you
NVollhill.t miller the heat of it crash program. and that is what happened
here.
Senator INovvE: Thank von very much. Senator Kennedy?
Senator KENNEDY. .1dniit-al Turner. this is an enormotislY distress-
ing report that yon give huthe American Congre-, and to the American
11e44ple today. Granted, it happened many years ago. but what we are
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18
The other psjchological assessments involve handwriting analysis or grapho-
logical assessment. The %Nod, is done by a pair of trained graph gist, assisted
by a small nuniffer of measurement technicians. They generally require at least
a page of handwritten script by the subjeo. Measurements are made of about
:10 different writing characteristics, and these arc charted and furnished to the
graphob,gist for assessnients.
The psjchologists also gi�e courses in pschological asseissiinent to group of
opurtitiow, �dicers, to sharpen I lair own Capil liiit its Li size up peeple. AE part of
the training course, the instructor dues a psychological assessment of each
student. The students are witting participants, and results are discussed with
thew.
It is important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a service
to the operatioos officers. In the twat analjsis, it is the responsibility of the
operations officer to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to
make a judgement as it whether any agent is telling the truth.
Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we are interested in is, what
will motivate a man to become an agent of the United States in a diffi-
cult situation. We have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal
response that we can expect front people we approach to for one reason
Or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very
specific listing of these.
Senator KEN NEDy. Would you do that for the committee?
In the followups. in the AlliSEARCI I, in the . OFTEN, and the
cmcKwrr, could you give us also a report on those particular
programs?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation, human
experimentat ion ?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. None of them?
Admiral TURNER. Let me say this, that CIIICKWIT program is the
code name for the CIA participation in what was basically a Depart-
ment of Defense program. This program was summarized and re-
ported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they
have been rement toned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not.
had time to go through and personally review them. I have ascertained
that all of the tiles that we had and made available before are intact,
and I have put a special order out that nobody will enter those files
or in any way touch them without my permission at this point, but
they are in the Retired Records Center outside of Washington, and
they an' available.
1 am not prepared to give you full details on it. because I simply
haven't read into that part of multistory:lint in add it ion I would sug-
gest when we want to get into that we shouhl get the Department of
Defense in with its.
Senator KENNEnv. Well. you will supply that information to the
Intelligence Counnittee. the relevant. I mean. the health aspects. obvi-
ously, and the research we are interested in ?
Ai lmiral TURNER. Ye. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Will You let us know. Admiral Turner'?
Admiral TURNER. I will he happy to.
['See p. 1(9 for the material referred 10.1
Senator KEN NEM-. Thank you. 1 ant running out of time. Do you
C1114)(111 life eNtewion of the protect ion of human subjects legislation
to include the CIA and the DOI)? You commented fa -orably on that
19
before, and I am hopeful we can. get that on the calendar early in
September, and that is our strong interest.
Admiral TURNER. The CIA certainly has no objection to that pro-
posed legislation. sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the
supporter of it or the endorser of it.
Senator KENNEDY. As a personal matter. since you have reviewed
these subjects. would you comment ? I know it is maybe unusual, but
you can understand what we are attempting to do.
Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.
Senator liExxEny. From your own experience in the agency, you
can understand the value of it.
Just finally, in your own testimonv now with this additional infor-
mation, it seems quite apparent to me that you can reconstruct in very
careful detail this whole project in terms of the responsible CIA
officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony.
Now with the additional information, and the people. that have been
revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be pretty
clear that you can track that whole program in very careful detail.
and I would hope. you know, that you would want to get to the bottom
of it. as the Congress does as well. I will come back to that in my next
round. Thank you very much.
Senator IsourE. Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.
Senator INours. Senator Schweiker?
Senator SrHWE1KF.R. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to go back to your testimony on page
12. where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a
private medical institution. You state. "Indeed, it was mentioned in a
MT Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division of
CIA. pert inent portions of which had been reviewed by the Church
committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very
carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee.
My staffer did a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He
made notes on the IG's report. My question to you is. are you saying
that the section that specifically delineates an improper contribution
was in fact given to the Church committee staff to see?
Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." The infor-
mation that a contribution had been made was made available, to the
best of my knowledge.
Senator ScnwEisEa. Only certain sections of the report were made
available. The report had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not
reviewed here, and copies were not given to us here. I just want you to
carefully consider what you are saying. because the only record we
have are the notes that the staff took on anything that was of
significance.
Admiral TURNER. My understanding was that Mr. Maxwell was
shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the con-
tribution had been made.
Senator SCHWEIKER. To follow this up further. I'd like to say that
I think there was a serious flaw in the way that the 16 report Was
handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any
accusations, but because of limited access to the report, we haye a situ-
20
ation where it is not even clear whether we actually saw that material
or not, simply because we could not keep a copy of the report under
the procedures we had to follow. We were limited by notetaking, and
so it is rather ambiguous as to just what was seen and what was not
seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not
be bound by procedures that so restrict its ability to exercise effective
oversight.
I have a second question. Does it concern von, Admiral. that we used
a. subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construc:ion grant
funds to finance facilities for these sorts of experiments on our own
people ! lievause as I understand what you are saying, while the CIA
mavi,,, ',toy put up UI 144. this triggered a response on the part of
the Federal (;4pvernment to provide on a good faith basis matching
hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of
matching fine Is, sonic based on an allegedly private donation which
was really CIA money.
Isn't there something basically wrong with that?
Admiral Max En. I certainly believe there is. As I stated, the Gen
era Counsel of the CIA at that time rendered a legal opinion that
this was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and
revisit t hi atmosphere. the laws. the attit IltIVS at that time, so whether
the counsel was on good legal ground or not. 1 am i not enough of a
lawyer to he sure, hut it certainly would occur to me if it happened
today a- a very questionable activity.
Senator Sr ii WEIK ER. Well. I think those of us who worked on and
aillendell the I lin-I/Union Art and other hospital construction as-
si-lance laws over the years. would have a rather different opinion on
the legal intent or object of Congress in passing laws to provide hos-
pital construction project money. 'These funds weren't intended for
this.
It reminds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which turned
up when I was on the Church cone mutt cc. The Public Health Service
was used to produce a deadly poison with Public Health money. Here
we are using general hospital construction n money to carry on a series of
drug expermients.
Admiral Tui:Nrii. Excuse me. sir. If I could just be. I think. ac-
curate, I di )11.1 think any of this $37:..000 or the matching funds were
used to conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hos-
pital. Now. the cl A then put more money into a foundation that was
eonducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedly in that hospital, so
the intent was certainly there. but the money was not used for
experiment at ion.
Senator Scnwrmint. Well. I understand it was used for bricks ancl
molt ii'. l lilt the bricks were used to build the facility where the experi-
ments w ere carried : were they not ?
Admiral Tt�liNE1:. We do not have positive evidence that they were.
It certainly would seem that that was the intent. but I do not want to
draw inference- here- �
Senator Sci iwi, Kra. Well, why else would they give this money for
the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that
benefited the CI A program?
uhmi lira! TritNylz. 1 certainly draw the inference that the CIA
expeilvd to I WIlt�fil from it. and some of the wording says the General
21
e
Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if 1 b CIA was going
to derive adequate benefit from it. hu1. sir. there is no evidence of what
benefit was derived.
Seilator Si iwilki:u. There must have been some pretty good benefits
al stake. The Atomic Energy Commis-i4al was tO bear a share of the
cost. and when they backed out for some reason Or another, the CIA
picked up pail of their tab. SO, at Iwo different points there were
indicat ions that CIA deeisionmakers thought i here was great benefit
to be deriVed fit un Wiltilever hapi)ened within the brick and mortar
walls of t hat facility.
Tt uNr.a. You are absolutely right. I RID only taking the
position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derived.
Senator Scilwriurt:. The agreement documents say that Ow CIA
would have access to one-sixth of t he simee involved in the construction
of the wing. so would you enter into an agreement that spt)cifically
says that von will have access to and use of one-sixth of the space and
not perform something in that spare? I cannot believe it was empty.
Admiral TuuNra. Sir. I am not disput ing you at all, but both of u-
are saving that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was osed.
that experimentation was done. and so 011, 1)111 there is no factual evi-
dence of what went on a- a result of that payment or what went on ill
that hospital. It i- just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.
Senator Sco \vim; ru. Admiral Turner. one other�
Senator KEN xEoy. \Vould the Senator yield on that point ?
Setwor S4.11wrthEa. I understand that in the agency's documents
on the agreement it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility
would I 44 4 ICSig11:11(41 fOr .� INV and made available for CIA. re-
search. Are you familiar �
N1r. Senator. :es I recall. Vol] are right in that there is it men-
tion of one-sixth. but any ment ion at all has to do with planning. There
are no suhseqnent reports as to what happened after the construction
ool;
Senator SciiwimEn. Admiral Turner, I read in the New York Times
that part of this series of MRI'LTRA experiments involved an ar-
rangement with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to test LSD sur-
reptitiously on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and San
Franeiseo. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hos-
pitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were
(10114"; there and how it was carried out ? I assume it was through a safe
house openn ion. 1 don't believe your statement went into much detail.
Admiral TuuxEn. I did mention the safe house operation in mv
statchocnt� it.and that is how these were carried out. What we have
learned from the new 114,cunientat ion is the location and the dates at
ft � 10)11SV:� WVIV by. the CIA and the identification of
three individuals who were associated with running those safe houses.
We know something about the construction work that was done in
them beeanse Ilium. weiv contracts for this. Beyond that. we fire pretty
11111(.11 drawing inferences as to the thing- that. went Im as to what vou
are saying here.
Senator Scilwrilirn. Well, the subjects were unwitting. You can
infer that much. right ?
Admiral TURNER. Right.
22
Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the
wrong place and time, you got it.
Mr. Moor. Senator, that would be�contacts were made, as we
understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may have been
invited to these safe houses. There really isn't any indication as to
t fact that this took place in the bars.
Admiral TURNER. We are trying to be very precise with you, sir, and
not draw an inference hen% There are 6 rases of these 149 where we
have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that
there was unwitting testing and some of that. involves these safe
houses. There are other eases where it is ambiguous as to whether the
testing was witting or voluntary. There are others where it was clearly
Young ary.
Seliat or SC/ 1 \ViJ Iru. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable
whether informed consent means anything to a person in a bar
any
Admiral TURNEn. Well, we don't have any indication that all these
eases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are
eases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner
was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't given a choice.
but I don't positively know that he was. and I classify that as an
amlUguous incident.
Senator INot-ve. Your time is up. Senator.
Stunt or uddlest on!
Senator l lunnetisToN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner. you stated in your testimony that you are con-
vinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently discovered docu-
mentation during tlw earlier searches. Did you question the individ-
uals connected with the earlier search before you made that judgment ?
Admiral TURNER. Yes: I haven't.. I don't think. questioned every-
body who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in
the files hark in 197:e but Mr. Lanbinger on my left is the best author-
ity on this. and I have gone over it with him in sonic
Senator IlynneEsToN. But you have inquired, you think. sufficiently
to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person
to conceal these records from the previous committee?
Admiral TURNER. I am persuaded of that both by my questioning
of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these docu-
ments were filed. by the fact which I did not and should have men-
tioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones
that we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were work"-
hie- files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
different location, and again I say to you, sir. I can't imagine their
deliberately concealing these particular files and revealing the other
things that they did reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that.
bera iise these are lif it that damning compa red with the overall material
that wa: provided.
Senator ITI-noty.sToN. Is this the kind of operation that if it were
continuing now or if there were anA-thine, similar to it. that you would
feel compelled to report to the Select Committee on "Intelligence?
Admiral TuuNen. Yes, sir. You mean. if I discovered that some-
thing like this were e-oing on without II IV knowledge? Yes. I would
feel absolutely the requirement to �
23
Senator Hvooixsiv x. But if it were going on with your knowledge,
would you report it to the committee? I assume you would.
Admiral Ttliskat. Yes. Well, it would not be going on with my
knowledge. but theoretically the answer is yes, sir..
Senator lit-rnoixsmx. Well, then, what suggestions would you have
as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies? What
provision would you suggest. to prohibit this kind of activity from
taking place.? Would you suggest that it ought to be specifically out-
lined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the per-
missible operation of the various agencies?
Admiral TURNER. I think that certainly is something we must con-
sider as we look at the legislation for charters. I all not on the face
of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the particular
wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue
as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and
curbs on the intelligence activities.
Senator HuomEsTox. In the case of sensitive type operations, which
this certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight
activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time?
Admiral TURNER. Much more so. I mean. I have briefed you. sir.
and the committee on our sensitive operations We have the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Se-
curity Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the
amount of spotlight focused on these activities is many, manyfold
what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.
Senator Ili-DDLEsTox. How about the record keeping?
Admiral TURNER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gall to
think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the
attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that
that i- not the case.
Senator Huniu.r.sTos. Admiral. I was particularly interested in the
activity that took place at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at
Lexington. Ky.. in which a Dr. Harris- Isbell conducted experiments
Oil people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcotics
institution. I take it. and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York
Times story. earring on a secret. series of correspondence with an
individual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who
that person is?
Admiral TURNER. Sir. I find myself in a difficult position here at
a public hearing to confirm or deny these names in view of my legal
responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of
individuals here.
Senator Ilront.EsTox. I am just asking you if on have identified
the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who
he was. I just want to know if von know who be is.
Admiral TURNER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y?
Senator Huonr.F.s.rox. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y. in
quotations.
Admiral TURNER. NO. sir. we have not identified him.
Senator Hutan.r.s�rox. So you have no knowledffe of whether or
not he is still a member of your staff or connected with the Agency in
any way. Have you attempted to identify him?
24
[Pause.]
Admiral TURNER. Senator. we have a former employee whose first
name is Pay who may have had some connection with these activities.
Senator IIi-mor,Es-rox. You suspeet that but you have not verified
that at this time, or at least you are not in a position to indicate that
you have verified it ?
Admiral TunsEn. That is correct.
Senator Ht-nou:s.ros. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Senator IxouyE. Senator Wallop? .
Senator WALLor. Thank von. Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, not all �of the�and in no way trying to excuse
you of the hideous nature of some of these project. but not all of the
projects under KULTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature.
Is that a fair statement?
Admiral TURNER. That is correct.
Senator WALLor. Looking down through some of these 17 projects
not involving lmma� testing. aspects of time magician's art, it doesn't
seem as though there is a�vtiming very sinister about that. Studies of
human behavior and sleep research, library searches. Now, those
things in their way are still of interest. are they not, to the process
of intelligence gathering.?
Admiral Trtrolt. Ye''. sir. T have not tried to indicate that we
either are not minim or would not do any of the things that were.
involved in MK1'1.,TRA. but when it comes to the witting or unwitting
testing of people with drugs. that is certainly verboten, but there are
other things
Senator WAtJor. Even with volunteer patients? I mean. I am not
trying to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on. but 1 mean.
it is not an uncommon thin.% is it, in the prisons of time Vniteml States
for the Public Health Service to conduct various kinds of experiments
with vaccines and. say, sunburn creams? I know in Arizona they have
done so.
Admiral Trnxr.n. Mv �nderstanding is. lots of that is authorized.
but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's business. and
that if we need some information in that category. I would prefer
to go to time other approimriate ies of the Government and ask
them to I'M 11 for 11, r`tilvr f11:111 to in any way
Senator WALIA .1% You know, you have library searches. and at_
tendants at time national seminars This is why 1 wanted to risk You if
the bulk of these projects were in any way the kinds of things that the
Agency might not do now. A Pmvsimlont would not have been liorrifitql
by the list of flit legitimate types of timings. Isn't that probably the
ease?
Admiral TURNER. YV,Z. sir.
Senator Wvi.i.or. And if it did in fact appm-ar in the TG report. is
there any reason to suppose tlint Ow President did not know of this
project 1 You said there was no reason to suppose that he did. but let
me revere that. Ts there an- reason to suppose that they did not ?
Admiral TURNER. No.
Senator W.mor. Well. you know. I just cannot imagine you or
literally anybody undertaking project; of time magnitude of dollars
here and just not knowing about it. not informing your superior that
23
these were going on. especially when certain items of it appear in the
Inspector General's report on budget platters.
Admiral TunNEIL Well. I find it difficult when it is that far back to
hypothesize what the procedures that the Director was using in terms
of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from
today. and I think we do a lot more informing today than they did
hack. then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowl-
edge \-VaS
Senator WaLLor. I am really not asking yon to second-guess it, but
it just seems to me that. while the past is past. and thank goodn&s we
are operating under different sets of circumstances. I think it is naive
for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the
knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times.
It is just the kinds of research informat ion that was being sought was
vital to the United States. not the means. lint the information that they
were trying to find.
Admiral TuaNr.n. I am sorry. Your question is. was this vital? Did
we view it as vital ?
Senator WaLLor. Well, your implication at the beginning was that
it was a response to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal
Minilszenty's trial and other things. I mean. somebody must have
thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else.
on the part of the States.
Admiral Tt-usr.a. Yes, sir, I ant sure they did. latt again I just don't
know how hi,di that iwrmeated the executive branch.
Senator W-1.1.1)1'. But the kinds of in are still important
to you. I mean. I am not suggesting that anyone go back and do that
kind of thing again. but certain it would be of use to you to know
what was going to happen to one of your agents assuminxr someone had
put one of these things into his bloodstream. or tried to modify his
belin Viol.
Admiral TURNER. Absolutely. and you know, we would be very con-
cerned if we thought there were things like truth serums or other
things, that our agents or others could be subjected to by use or im-
proper use of drugs by other pliWPrs: agaillst OUT* people or agents.
Senator WALLOP. Are there? I don't ask you to name them, but are
there such serums?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to
answer that for the record. sir.
Senator Wau.or. I would appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows:]
"TituTit" 14065 IN INTERItociAiniN
The search for effertive aids to interrogation is probably as old as MAWS need
I. oldain information front an unpooperative Nonni, and ns persistent a. his
impatience to shortcut any tortuous path. In the iiiiIia1 f poliee investigation.
physival round:on has :it limes la-en snip:Willed for 'painstaking: and thnp-eon-
sinning inquiry in the la.lief that ilirvet method. produce 1uihk rt41111S. Sir :hi ineS
Stephens. writing in 1ss. rationalizes a grist.% example of -third degree- prac-
tices by the police .If India : "It is far pleas:inter to sit voinfortably in the shade
rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes than In izo about in the sun hunting tip
evidence."
More recently, police 44ficial, in sonic vomit rips ha % p turned to drugs for assist-
ance in extracting vonfe.,Nions front accused persons drugs which ans esumed
26
10 tol:IN the flPfplisr,,z 1., 1114 point flint lie unknowingly reveals truths
he 1,�� i�.o, I r iii to conceal. This invest igat ive technique. however linmanitarian
as ati alternative to physical torture. still raises serions questions of individual
rights and liberties. In this entintry. where drugs have gained only marginal
aemptatiec in police work. their use has proloked cries of "psychtilagiral third
degree- and has precipitated medico-legal controversies that after a quarter of
a cent nry still oceasiimally flare into the open.
The use of so-called -truth" drugs itt police work is similar to the aceepted
psychiatrie praetice of tuireo-analysis: the difference in the two procedures lies
in their different objectives. The police investigator is concerned with empirical
truth that may be used against the sust.e.'1. and therefore allinist solely with
rr,.fia fir( trut Ii : Ii.. usefulness of the sitspectss revelnt ions depends nit i fliarely on
their acco.tatiee in evidence I .Y et Mil of law. Thi. psychiat ist ('ii the other hand.
using the same -truth- drugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill. is
primarily concerned with p5yrhologim7 truth or psychotogical reality rather than
empirical fail. A piitient's aberrations are reality for him at the time they neem,
rind an iiveiinIte act-taint of these fantasies and delusions. rather than reliable
reilillect ion of past events. 'all be the key to recovery.
The notion of drugs eapabli of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind lie/p-
ing to heal the mentally ill aml preventing or reversing the miscarriage of justice.
has provided tin exceeditigly (hirable theme for the pre. s and popular literature.
.While acknowledging that -Math k a misnomer twine over�the drugs
are �ot sera and they ii. not necessarily bring forth probative truth�journalistic
rotitill114. to exploit the rippcal of the term. The formula is to play up
a few 9tectacular "truth- drug suecessess and II. I n.j .ly that the drngs are more
maligned than need be and noire widely emplo% ill in criminal investigation than
can officially be admit tell.
Any teeltnique that promises an inerement of success in extracting information
front nit itheompliant source ijoo, facto of interest in intelligenee operations.
If the ethical eonsitlerat ions which in 'Western 1,ililltries inhibit the use of wirer.-
interrogation in poliee work are felt also in intelligence, the Western services
must at least be tirettareil agililliSt its posSii.ii, emptiquient by the adversary. An
understantlim: of "truth- drugs, their charatleristic aetilms, and their potentiali-
ties. positi�e and negative. for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an
a de' n:i ti defense against t In qn.
aiscussimL tapaht to hop toward such an mitierstandi�g. draws primarily
upon openly published materials. It has the limitations of projecting front crimi-
nal investigative practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psycho-
therapy.
su-iiPrLAM1Xt: AS "TR1-111 SERUM-
Earls in this evntury physicians began to entIdoY scopolamine, along with
morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep- during childbirth.
A (*.M.,' it 111.11! of bertha ne..4(1n1(11:1111i1W Wits k iii ItVii 141 in iii seda that and drtIlt Si-
ness. discirientation. incoordinatbiti. and allitiesia for events ex-
perieneed during Yet j,liysiniaii 114,1ed that women in twilight sleep
answered quest it MN nill lin) if.)). and often volunteered exeredingly Climb() remarks.
In 192:: it occurred to Robert House. a Dallas. Texas obstetrician. that Li similar
technique might be emphoed in the int err-tgat bill of susta-cted in and he
arranged to interview under seopo/amine two prisoners in the 11a/his county
PIP %%hose guilt seemed elearbk rontirnied Under the drug, both men denied the
charge.ii, which the% were held: and both. upon trial. Wpre found not ',sally.
F.1111)11siasiii� :It !hi.: %neves... /1,olse eottehtfleil that a patient under the influence
of scop thimble "cannot create it lie . . and there is no power to think or rea-
son." 1131 Ills experiment and this eonclusion attracted wide attention and the
idea of a "Inn li- drug u as thus launched upon the put,h,
The phrase "truth serum" is believed to Inoe appeared first in a news reptirt
of House's experiment in the Lox .4 Hat 1. Rucord. stitnetime Ibillse resisted
the term for a while but el entnally we to eta id 'v it regularly himself. Ile pub-
fished sonie eleven artirles out seopoltimine in the %ear s 19:21-11rg9, with a noicr.
able increase in polonipal zeal as time went till. What had begun as something
of a scientific statement turtital finally into a dedicated crusade by the "father of
truth serum- on heltalf of his offspring. %%herein he was "grossly indulgent of its
wayward helm% hr and stubbornly proud of its minor achie�einents -ill)
27
Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine WAS used for police interroga-
tion came to public notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some police
tomes may have used it extensively. 12. 161 One police writer claims that the
threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions
from criminal suspects, who are told they will first he rendered 1111ConseiCIIIS by
chloral hydrate placed covertly in their coffee or drinking water.1161
Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolaniine was shortly dis-
qualified 11S a "truth" drug. Among the most disabling of the side effects are
hallucinations. disturbed perception. somnolence, and physiological phenomena
such as headache. rapid heart. and blurred vision. which distract the subject from
the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues, in some cases, to make
anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing secre-
tions that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully,
dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking.
even in a tractable subject.
Till, BARBITURATES
The first suggestion that drugs might facilitate communication with emo-
tionally disturbed patients came quite by accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart
and his associates at the University of Wisconsin. experimenting with respiratory
stimulants. were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide. a catatonic
patient who had long been mute and rigid suddenly relaxed. opened his eyes, and
even answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists
were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to established methods of therapy.
At about this hale police officials, still attraeted by the possibility that drugs
migh help in the interrogation of suspects and witnesses. turned to a class of
depressant drugs known as the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarenee W. Muehlberger.
head of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing. was using
barbiturates on reluctant suspects. though police work continued to be hampered
by the eourts� rejection of drug-induced confessions exeept in a few carefully
circumscribed instances.
The barbiturates. first synthesized in 1903. are among the oldest of modern
drugs and the noist versatile of all depressants. In this half-century some 2.500
have 1...011 prepared. and about two dozen of these have on an imp,irtant place
in IllEr..11,1111.. An estimated three to four Ninon doses of barbiturates are pre-
scribed by physicians in the United States each year. and they have come to be
known by a variety of cmunierciai names and colorful slang expressions: "goof-
Ltnninal. Nembutal. "red devils." "yellow jackets." "pink ladies." etc.
Three of them which are used in narcoanabsis and have seen service as "truth"
drugs are sodinni ninytal I amobarhital pentothal sodium ( thiopental t, and to a
lesser extent ,:ec.,nal i secobarbit al .
1.111 pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the influence of a
barbiturate injected intravenously gDps through all the stages of progressive
drunkenness. Ion the time scale is on the order of minutes instead of hours.
OutIvarilly the sedation effect is dramativ, especially if the subject is a psychiatric
patient in tension. his features his body relaxes. Soule people are
momentarily excited: a few beocme silly and giggly. This usually itasses, and
most snhjects fall asleep. emerging later in disoriented sembwakefulness.
The descent into narcosis and beyond with progre,.sively larger doses can he
divided as follows:
I. Sedative stage.
IT. Uneonsciousuess. %vitt) exaggerated reflexes (hyperactive wage).
III. Unconsciousness. without reflex even to painful
IV. Death.
Whether all these stages ('all be distinguished in any given subject depends
largely on the dose and the rapidity with which the drug is induced. In
anesthesia. stages I and 11 may last only two or three seconds.
The first or sedative stage etin be further divided :
Plane 1. No evident effect. or slight sedative effect.
Plane 2. Choudiness. 1111111111',N. amnesia. (Upiin recovery, the subject will
not remember �vhat ham.cued sit this or "lower" planes or at
Plane 3. Slurred 1.11)(4.4.11. old thought patterns disrupted. inability to inte-
grate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware
of paniful stimuli.
28
Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may lest only a few minutes, but
It can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to
bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as be pasaes
back into the sedative stage on the way to full consciousness.
CLINIcAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ErrrnIEs
The general abhorrence in Western countries for the use of chemical agents
"to make people do things against their will" has precluded serious systematic
study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities of drugs for interroga-
tion. Louis A. Gottschalk. surveying their use in information-seeking inter-
views.( 131 cites 136 references; but only two touch upon the extraction of
Intelligence information. and one of these concludes merely that Russian tech-
niques in interrogation and indoctrination are derived from age-old police
methods and do not depend on the use of drugs. On the validity of confessions
obtained with drugs, Gottschalk found only three published experimental studies
that he deemed worth reporting.
One of these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intravenous sodium
amytal was helpful in detecting malingerers.(12) The subjects, soldiers, were
at first sullen, negativistic, and non-productive under amytal, hut as tht- inter-
view proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes for their malingering. Usually
the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.
The other two confession studies, being more relevant to the highly special-
ized. untouched area of drugs in intelligence interrogation, deserve more detailed
review.
Gerson and Victoroff[12] conducted amytal Interviews with iT neuropeychiatric
patients. soldiers who had charges against them. at Tilton General Hospital,
Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytal by a psychiatrist, who,
neither ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under
scrutiny, urged each of them to discuss his eocial and family background, his
army career, and his version of the charges pending against him.
The patients were told only a few minutes in advance that nareoanalySis would
be performed. The doctor was considerate. hut positive and forthright. He indi-
cated that they had no choice hut to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes
varied from unquestioning compliance to downright refusal.
Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he
became semieonseious and could be stimulated to speak. he was held in this stage
with additional amytal while the questioning proceeded. lie was miestioned
first about innocuous inntters front his baekground that he had discussed before
receiving the thaw. Whenever possible. he was manipulated into twinging up
himself the charges pending against hint before toeing questioned ahem them.
If he did this it: a to fully eonseious state. it proved more effective to ask him
to "talk about that later- and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion.
delaying the interrogation on his criminal activity until he was hack in the
proper stage of narcosis.
The procedure differed from therapeutic narroanalysis in several ways: the
setting, the type of patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects
were kept in twilight consciousness longer than nsunl. This state proved richest
in yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it his speech was thick,
mumbling. and disconnected. but his discretion was markedly reduced. This val-
uable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a time, could be
reieduced by injecting more amytal and putting the it:16cm hack ttt sleep.
The intem.gation ecl miii jn vii rhsl from rit,4e to east. nevordinz to background
information about the patient. the seriousness of the charges. the pntient's WU-
tilde under narcaisis and his rapport with the doctor. sometimes it was useful to
pretend, as the patient grew more fully conscious, that he had already confessed
during the ninnestic period of the interrogntiOn, and to urge him, while his mem-
ory and sense if self-jirimteetion were still limited. to continue to elaborate the
details of what he had "already described." Wilma it was obv;tms that a subject
was WithhilWilla the truth, his denials were qinekly passed over and ignored,
and the kej WIPS1 ions would be reword:A in a new atuir�ma
Several patients revealed fantasies. fears, and delusions approaching
much of which vonld rendily be distIngukhed front reality. But sometimes there
was Ito way for the OVilittleT to distinguish truth from fantasy except by refer-
ence to other sources. one subject elaimed tt, have n child that diti not exist,
29
another threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had been dead a year, and
yet another vonfessed to partieipating in a robbery when in fact he had only
purchased goods Irian the partivipants. Test jimmy concerning dates and specific
plaees was untrustworthy and ofteu contradictory because of the patient's loss
of tinossesse. His veracity in citing names amid events tiroved questionable. Be-
cause it his confusion about actual events and what he thought or feared had
hat petied. the patient at times managed to colleen) the truth unintentionally.
As the subject revived, be would become aware that he was being questioned
about his secrets and. depending upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or
the degree of his disillushatment with the doctor, grow negativistits hostile, or
PhYsisallY aggressive. Occasiosally patie�ts had to be foreibly restrained during
this ppriml I revt-tit injury to themselves or others as the doctor continued to
intern gate. Some patients, moved by fierce atul diffuse anger. the assumption
that tiles had already bees tricks() into eonfessing. slid a still limited sense of
discretion, defiantly acknim ledge!! their guilt and ehallenged the ollserver to
"do something sbsut it.- As the excitentent passed. S4.nie fell back 4 in their orig-
bud stories and others verified the confessed material. During the follow-up
interview nine of the 17/admitted the validity of (heir ronfessions; eight re-
pudiated their confessions and reaffirmed their earlier tosstunts.
With respect to the reliability of the resnits, of suet( interritgation. Gerscra
and Vicioroff eimelude that persistent. careful questiiming can reduce ambigui-
ties in drug interrogation. lint camas eliminate theut altogether.
At least isie expuriment has shown that subjeets are capable of maintaining a
lie while tinder the intluesce of a barbiturate. Redlich and his associates at
IStleisn1 administered sodium amytal to filme volunteers, students and profes-
sionals. who had previously, for purposes of the experiment, revealed shameful
and guilt-producine episodes of their past and then invented false self-protective
stories to (slyer thens Iii nearis every ease the cover story retained some ele-
ments of the guilt inherent in the t story.
Under the influence of the drng, the subjects were crossexamined on their
cover stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive. showed
that normal individuals who bad good defenses and no overt pathological traits
could stick to their invented stories and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals
with strong unconselaus self-punitive tendencies, on the other hand, both con-
fessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the truth. con-
fessing to offenses never actually e(illinlitted.
In recent years drug therapy has made some use of stimnlants, most notably
ann.betamine (Benzedrine! and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrinel.
These drugs, used either absie or following intravenous barbiturates. produce
an outpouring of ideas. emotions, and memories which has been of help in diag-
nosing mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has re-
ceived little attention. unless in unpublished work. In one study of their psychi-
atric use Brussel rt al. 171 maintain that methedrine gives the liar no time to
think or to orgsnize his devils ions. Imes tbe drug takes hold. they say, an in-
surmomitable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on
the other hand, sass that this claim is extravagant. asserting without elabora-
tiim that the stmly lacked primer conirols.1131 It is evident that the combined
use of barbiturates and stimulants, perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquilizers),
should be further explored.
oRsEKVATIoNs }VIM PitAcTict:
J. M. MacDonald. who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver
has had extensive experience with narcoamilysis. says that drug interrogation
is (If doubtful value hi obtainifig confessions to crimes. Criminal suspeets under
the influence of barbiturates may deliherately withh(Od information. persist in
giving untruthful answers, or falsels eonfess lii erinies they did not commit.
The psychopathic personality. in particular. appears to resist successfully the
inflitenve of drues.
MacDonald tells of a criminal psychopath who. having agreed to narco-inter-
rogation. reeehed 1.5 grams of sodimai attlytal ((yes a period of five hours. This
man feigned amnesia and gave a false aceomit of a murder. -Ile displayed little
ir no remorse as lie tfailsely i deseribed the crime. including burial of tbe hi sly
Indeed be was very self-possessed and lie appeared almost to enjoy the examina-
tisn. From tittle to time be 1�1,11h) request that Itlnytal 1.e injeflell."121)
MacDonald concludes that a person v,tio gives fslse information prior to re-
30
ceiving drugs is likely to give false information also under narcosis, that the
drug, are of lilt I..value for revealing (Ie.:options. and that they are II lore effective
iii releasilig uneonseitatsly repressed material than in evoking consciously sup-
press :d informal
Another 1.schiatrist known for his work with criminal,. L. Z. Freedman.
ye sodi wit awytal to well a.e�used iii various civil and military antisocial acts.
The subjects were mentally unstithle. their conditions ranging front character
disorders to tiehroses ;Old J.sychoses. 'Ito- drug interviews pr..ved psychiatrically
benetieial to the patients, lint I:I-pea:nail found that his view of objective reality
was seldom improved by their rei elation,. Ile was unable to say on the hasis of
the nil reo-interrogat ion whether a given act halt or Ittid 1101 occurred. Like Mae-
lolia hi he fiutnl thot Iisl.litt(i1( iutdiviitittl eitti deitY to the point of IttiPoll-
m�j,.1).1w...: o�rino., that every objective sign imlieates thej haNe eominitted.110]
I. Inhan. Professor of Law al Northwestern I'm%irsil who has had eon.
siderable ei.perienet observim: and participating in "truth- drug tests. claims
111:1 they are effective on persons �Nliii ttilil liliNe disclosed the
truth anyway had thej been properly interrogated. but that it person deter-
mined to tie will usually In� all, I. eontimn. the deception under drugs.
The two militarj lesyviiiiitrists who made the titit 0StelisiVe Ilse of min...anal-
ysis during 11,.. Nvat years. 110? it. (rink.-, and 34111/1 conflthiPti that
iii ailliost all oases the:, von1(1 'Again from their pati. tits essentiall the %Hale
111:1101-i:11 Mot Vi vi them the Sallie 011101i1/11;11 relPilso 1/) therapy without the use
..I drug,. provided they had sufficient I hoe.
Ti. es,enee of t 4,1111melif S fr ti pnifessionais of haig exrierienee is that
drug- pros rapid nets- to information that is psy..hiatrically useful but of
doubtful validitj empirival truth. The same psychologieai inform:10mi and a
adul`..ntliql empirieal truth can be obtained from fully conseious subjects
through tioti-drug p,j.:)iotherapj and skillful tool:ice interrogation.
APPLICATION TO CI INTERKoGATION
'lla� almost total abseneeof eontrolled eNIN�rimental studies of "truth- drugs
and ;Ii i.t t and anecdotal nature of ps.�ciiiittric Had police evident* require
that r�trafrdati4u1, Ii. 'fa (11.1�ra t i1,11S 114- !made with care. Still. enough
is know in about th.� drug,' at.tion to suggest rertaii vonsiderations affeeting the
tiwir ti.o iti ititerrogatiotis.
Ii s111011ht hi. Hoar frolii the foregoilig that at best a drug can only serve BP
an aid ii 111i illlerroLtator Who has a shire understanding of the psychology and
teeminiiies 1 teirinal interrogation. In some respects, indeed. the demands on his
skill will be inereased In the battling iiiiNture of truth and fantasy in drug-influoed
4-tit it. And the tetaletto Heaths? Which he must guard in the interrogate to give
the re,potise, that seem ii he wanted without regard for facts will be heightened
In drug, : the literature abounds with wanlings that a KlItlieet lit narcosis is
eNI remel j suggest i
It seen., pos,i1.1.. that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic
state might WI? II, Hely:Mt:we in the ease of a subject feigning ignorance of a
languagi or some other skill that had beelime atitoniatic with him. Lila...0201
rowel sodium a mytal Ittlpfni ill determining 'IN hether a foreign subject vvas merely
pretending not to understand English Ity eNtension. 0110 nit guess that a drugged
interrogate.. might hisie ditticillty plaint:dont:: tile pretense that he did not com-
prehend I he idiomi of a profession be was trying to hide
There 1, I he further prohleni of hostility in the interrogator's relationship to
re.iNintire sun roe. The neenni$Oaleti kinnv1rileg,. a) Wilt "truth- drug reactitai
lia, emu. largely from patient-physician relationships of trust and confitienee.
The sul..ieet lit tiarcoanalysis is usually litiail'a1041 et priori 10 ritOpertile with the
psyellintri,t, either to obtain from mental suffering or to eontribute to a
s.lttitjti study. Kivu in police work. where ati atmosphere of anxietj and threat
may be dmainalit. a relationship sdl trust frequently asserts itself, the drug is
administered h,,) a u�.dieal niati Naiad hi a stri01 Code of ethics: the suspect
agreeing to iiislerg, nareoatialy-is in a desperat I` bill for eorrolioration of his
testimony trusts both drug and psjchiat however aptirehensi�elj : and finally.
alid NINO italic:Mal. the Whet, psychiatrist frequently
deal, with ii -sick- eriniinal. seine order of patient-physician relationship
II V es.
31
Rarely has a drug interrogation involved "normal- individuals in a hostile
or genuinely threatening milieu. It was from a non-threatening experimental
setting that Eric Lindemann could say that his "normal- subjects "reported a
general sVIINe of euphoria. ease and eonfidenee. and they exhibited a marked in-
crease in talkativeness and conanunicalbility."(ls�1 Gerson and Victoroff list poor
doetor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and au-
thenticity of confessions by the Fort Dix soldiers, caught as they were in a
conimand performance and told they had no choice but to submit to narco-
intern wothin.
From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtain-
ing tin' ipsychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-play-
ing on the part of the interrogator might be a possible solution to the problem
of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy. the British nareo-
analyst William Sargent recommends that the therapist deliberately distort the
facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response
and abreact ion.12.71 ln the drunken state of nareoanalysis patients are prone to
accept the therapist's false must rIldi011S. There is reason to expect that a drugged
snbject would comimmieate freely with an interrogati,r playing the role of rela-
tive. colleague, physician. immediate superior. or any other person to whom his
backgroand indicated he W4ilini be responsive.
Even when rapport is tioor, however. there remains one facet of drug action
eminently exploitable in interrogation�the fact that subjects emerge from
narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal. even when they have not. As
Gerson and Victoroff demonstrated at Fort Dix. this psychological set provides a
major opening for &tattling genuine confessions.
POSSIBLE VARIATIONS
In studies by Beecher and his associates,[3-6] one-third to one-half the
Individual, tested proved to be placebo reactors, subjects who respond with
symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regard-
less of what it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the
placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation. it seems reasonable that
when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebo
for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility
for his acts and thus clear the way for free communication. It is notable that
Placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals
most likely to react to phieelsos are the more anxious, more self-centered, more
dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely
socially, talkers who drain off anxiety by conversing with others. The non-
reactors are those clinically more rigid and with letter than average emotional
control. No sex or I.Q. differences between reactors and non-reactors have been
found.
Another possibility might he the combined Use of drugs with hypnotic trance
iii posl-hyphotic suggestion: by pio,sis eonhl presumaldy taeVent any recollec-
tion of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against
hi, will or unaware, however, is a matter of some disagreement. Orne, in a surrey
of the potential uses of hypoosis iii interrogation,123I assert, that it is doubt-
ful. despite ninny apParent indications to the contrary, that trance can be induced
in resistant subjects. It may be Ise:Ade. he adds, to hypnotize a subject Unaware.
hut this would require a posit ice relationship with the hypnotist not likely to
found in the interrogation setting.
In medical hypnosis. pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a
possibility for interrogation, but if a satisfactory level of narcosis could be
aehieved through hypnotic trinket. there would appear to be no need for drugs.
DEFENSIVE 7.41EASUBEs
There is no known way of building tolerance for a 'truth" drug without creat-
ing a disabling addiction. or of arresting the aetion of n barbiturate once induced.
The only full safeguard against nareo-interrogation is to prevent the adminis-
tration of the drug. Short Ili this, the best defense is to make use of the Same
knowledge that suggests drugs for offensive operations: if a subject knows that
on emerging from narcosis he will have an exaggerated notion of how tm:ch he
has revealed he can better resolve hi deny he has said anything.
32
The disadvantages and shortcomings of drugs in offensive operations become
positive features of the defense posture. A subject in nareo-interrogation is
intoxicated, wavering inetwern deep sleep and semi-wakefulness. His speech is
garlantil and irrational, the amount of ontput drastically diminished. Drugs
disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to resist, but they do so
indiseriminately and thus also interfere with the patterns of substantive infor-
matHan the interrogator seeks. EVen under the condilions most favorable for
the interrogator, output will be ettolaminated by fantasy. distortion, and untruth.
Possibly the nuts' effective way to arm oneself against narco-interrogation
would la- tit undergo a "dry rim." A trial drug interrogation with on taped
for playback would familiarize RH individual with his own reactions to "truth"
drugs. and this familiarity would help to retitlee the effects of harassment by
the jot erritgat or iteftate and after the drug has been administered. From the Vir0W-
point of the intelligent' service. the trial exposure of a particular operative to
drugs might pritvide a rough Itenclimark for assessing the kit id and amount of
informatita, be mould divulge ilillar0�11si4..
There may Ile coiteern over the possibility of drug addictio� intentionally or
atteidentally itallottal hy an adversary servire. Most drugs will cause addietion
with prolititged use, anti the barltititrates are no exception. In recent studies at
the 'U.S. Pundit. Health Service Hospital for addicts in Lexington. Ky.. subjects
rovi v.43 Linz., 111/sl's if 11 iler4141 of Innoths. Upon removal of
the drug, tiny experiethaal acute withdrawal symptoms and behaved in every
respect like chronic
Because their action is extremely short, however, and because there is little
likelihood that they would lat administered regularly over a prolonged period.
barbital-ale "truth" drugs present slight risk of operatioaal addiction. If the
adversary serviett were intent on creating addietion in order to, exploit with-
drawal. it woidil have other. more rapid means of producing states as unplea,sant
�vitlidno�:11 symptoms
The hallucinatory mid psyclettominielic drugs such as mesealine. marilimma.
Lsi) 2n. and thierotine are sometimes mistakenly asstatiated with narenanalytie
interrogation. These drugs distort the perception arid interpretation of the sen-
sory input tit the central nervous system anal affect vision, amlition. smell, the
sensation of the size if body parts and their position iii spnee. etc. 'Mescaline and
LS11-271 liii i been 41wt1 11 create experimental "psychotic stales." and in B
minor way as aids in psychotherapy.
Sim* in obtained trim' ap4trson in a psychotic drug state would he
unrealistic. bizarre, and extremely difficult to assess, the self-administration of
whit 'it is effective iti ndnute lbws:nays. might in speeial eircumstances
offer an operative temporary proteetimn agai�st interrogation. Conceivably, on
the other hand. an adversary service could use slain drags lit maxima. anxiety or
terror in medically 111isopliistie:111001 subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced
PsYcloisis front actual in Air enlightened ttperative con II not be thus
frightened, however, knowing that the effeet of these hallucinogenic agents is
transient ii normal itillivilltatls.
Most broadly. there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
individitals with good defenses and good emotional control. and that anyone who
can withstand tine stress of eompotteitt interrogation in the waking state Cali do
so in nareosis. The essential resources for resistance thins appear to lie within
the ilitliVit114/11.
CON( 1.1:041ONS
The salient points that emerge front this discussion are the following. No such
magic brew nts the popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by
disrutiting defetisive patterns, may sometimes be helpful iti interrtigation. but
even under the best tainditions they will elicit an ttatput contaminated 11:1 (leepp-
fantasy. garbled spett,li. etc. .% ;union 1�1411)0T:11,1114y they nroiluee hit the sub-
jeet is a tendency to believe he has revealed nuortt than he has. It is fatssible. bow-
ever. for both normal individuals arid psychopaths tit resist drug interrogation;
It secnis likely that any inalk idual who can withstand ordinary intensive inter-
rogation can bold out in narcosis, The best aid to it (1(44011,(0 against narco-inter-
rogation is foreknowledge of the 1.1-1,��40ss 411101 its /1111110101/114.. Then. is an seine
need for vont rolled experimental st nines of dring 14.:10�114)4/, not only to depressants
hut also to stimulants and to combinationts of depressants, stimulants, and
atarnxics.
33
Ittt Ext:Nc Es
1. Alliiiiis. E. Ita rhit orates. svi. .4 in.. Jan. 1955,
2. Kirkham, J. Truth Drugs : The new crime solver. Oiron r� 1. Jan, 19:4. 29,
7:1371.teeelier. II. K. Anesthesia. Sci. A rn Jan, 19:17, Pes, p. 70.
Aldiraisal drags intended to alter subjective responses, symptoms.
.1. .1 to, t .11 �1 .l .e,. 1117171, 1.5s. 3911-401.
. Evidence for increased effectiveness of placebos with increased
st re-. .4 1'hy,iol.,197)6. D(7, 103-1(!'.
6. . Experimental pharmacoIogy and measurement of the subjective
resiwnse. seiciir( . 1117i:t. 1/6. 1:17-102,
7. Brussel. J. A.. Wilson. 1). c.. & Sha like). L. NV. The use of methedrine in
psychiatric practice. J',q'Iuirf. conarf.,397.1.2s. 351-394.
5. Delay.)). Pliartnacologil. exphirations of the personality : nartaninalysis and
"Inetliedrine" shock. Prot., Roy. Me iL. 111-49. 42. 492-196.
9, (1(.1itpr, Th 1 bo.o.ok n�,1 the Mind. New York : Grove Press. Inc., 1960.
In. Freedman. L. Z. "Truth" drugs. .sci. .4m.. March 19n4u. 14:1-114.
1/. Geis. G. In senpolatnine veritas. The early history of drug-induced state-
ments. ./. of Crim. Lair. Criminal. h Pot. Sol., Nor.-Iiee. 19.-0, 30(4). 347-338.
11. Gerson. I. .1.. & Victoroff, V. Experimental investigation into the validity
eonfessions obtained under sodium amytal narcosis. J. Clin. and 1,11).
JkiIiho-
ytith.. 1945 1-01-37:1.
13. Gottsehalk, L. A. The use of drugs in infortnation-seeking interviews. Tech-
nical report #2, ARDC Study SI? 177-D Contract AF Th (600e 17107. Dec. 19N.
Burean of Social Scienee Resvarch.
14. House. R. E. The use of scopolamine in criminology. Texas St. J. of Med.,
19= 18.:27,9.
Jlonsto�. F. A preliminary investigation into abreaction comparing met he-
driiie and sill 1111 a iu. tat with other Methods. J. Men I. Sri.. 1952. 9P. 707-710.
10. Khan. F. 11. Self-incriniination. Springfield : C. C. Thomas. 1930.
37. KM.. W. H. Police interrogation. 1940.
IS. Legal dose of truth. Newsweek, Fel). 23. 19514. 25.
39. Litalcunami. E. Psychoh(gical changes in normal and abnormal individuals
(miler the influenee of sinlium a may tat. Amer. J. Pimehiat.. 1932. 11. ItKi-1(P9.1.
241. Lipton. E. L. The amytal interview. A review. .4111(T. Precut. Digest Treat.,
197.11.1, 14.i..-11:3.
21. MaelIonald. 3. M. Narcoanalysis and criminal law. Amer. J. Ppyrhinf., 1954,
ill. � "4:3-�2S*.
22. Morris. I). 1'. Intravenous barbitnrates: all aid in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of conversiii� hysteria and malingering. Mil. stiro., 1947., 96, 509-313.
23. Dille, M. T. The potential of hypnosis iti interrogation. An evaluation.
ARDC Study SI/ 177-1) Contract .4F 1S06001 1797, Dee. 195s. Bureau of Social
Seiciuie Researeli,
24. Pelikan. E. W.. & Kensler. C. .1. Sedatives: Their pharmacology and uses.
Reprint front The Mcdieal clinic)) of A" talk .1 nteri�-41. W. B. Saunders Contlinizy.
Sept 195".
23. Redlich. F. C.. R:Ivitz. 1., C1. II. Narcoanalysis and truth.
Amer, .1. 1 1i Mt 1951, 107 .7o-d; :193.
20. Rohn. :I. Police. Drugs. Tronsinled by L. .1. Bandit. New York : Philosophical
Library. 1950.
27. Sa rat+ nt. W.. & Slater. K Physical niethoil.e of treatment in psychiatry. (3rd.
ed.) Baltimore: and Wilkins. 19:14.
25. Snider. R. S. Cerebellum. sei..4 tn.. Aug. 19718. R;.
29, Uhr, L.. & Miller. L. (. (eds.). Drury/ and licharinr. New York-London :
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 19(141.
Senator WALLOP. If they are. I would assume that you would still
try to find front either theirs or somebody else's information how to
protect our people from that kind of activity.
Admiral TUMNF,R, Yes.
Senator "Wm.l.or. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafec?
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
34
Admiral Turner. I appreeiate that these tawdry activities were tak-
ing place long before your watch. and I think you have correctly
labeled them as abhorrent. but not only were they abhorrent, it seems
to me they were rather bungled. amateurish experiments that don't
seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, at least from the
scanty evidence we have.
It seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the
Agency didn't have the ability to call it quits It went on for sonic 12
yean-:, as you limit ioiwd. What I would like to get to is, are you con-
vineed now in your Agency that those scientific experiments. legiti-
mate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were
being conducted in a scientific manner and that yon are handling it in
a erred ma�ner to get the best information that you are seeking in
the end?
Admiral TrasEn. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence
that we am limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be in-
volved as opposed to area where we can rely on others.
Senator niArr.r. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do
hope that you have people who are trained in not only handling this
type of experiment. but in preparing the proper reports and drawing
the proper data front the reports. You are convinced that you have
t his type of people ?
Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.
Senator CuArri-:. The second point I am interested in was the final
lines in your testimony here. which I believe are very important, and
that is that the Agency is doing all it can in cooperation with other
liranobes of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of
those who were in sonic way adversely affected, and see what can be
done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might
add that I commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it
vigorously.
A hospital in my State W1V,; involved in these proceedings, and it is
unclear exactly what did take place. so I have both a parochial interest
iii this
with it. It ilIVOIVV7: not oni .y you�. / appreciate, but also HEW Slid per-
haps the Attorney General.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you. sir. We will.
a" " national
"'ter"I well, and I do hope pm �.�1 on
:
Senator ('ii .w:. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator. I N, it-Yr. Thank you very much.
Admiral Turner. MNI-I.TIZA subproject 3 was a project involving
the surrePt it ions admillist rat ion of LSI) on unwitting persons. was it
not ./
Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.
Senator I xouvr. In February 194, and this was in the very early
stages of NIKULTIZA. tlw Director of Central Intelligence wrote to
the technical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because
they 11:141 Part jet fat "I in air exPeri1114111 inv"Iving the :141miniOrat011
of LSI I on an tin wilt lug basi- to Dr. Frank Olson. who later committed
suicide. Now. the individual- criticized were the same individuals who
were rt'Sl)inISO)li, for this subjwoject involving exactly the same prao-
t ices. Even though these individuals were clearly aware of the dangers
of smTept it ions administ rat ion and had been criticized by the Director
35
of Cent nil Intelligence. subproject 3 was not terminated immediately
ain't Dr. deat h.
I� fact. according to documents. it emit inued for a number of years.
Can you provide this committee with any explanation of how such
testing. could have continued under these circumstances ?
Admiral TunNen. No. sir. I really can't.
Senator INot.ye. Are the individuals in the technical services who
carried on subproject 3 still on tlie CIA payroll ?
Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking. are they today?
Senator Iicouye. Yes.
Admiral TURNER. No. Sir.
Senator INoUYE. What would you do if you criticized officials of Cl
technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimenta-
el for a number of years ?
Admiral TrENEa. I would do two things. sir. One is. I would be sure
at the Iteginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I
didn't want that Ti) be continued anywhere else. and two. if 1 found it
being eontillued. I would roll some heads.
Senator INot-ve. Could You provide this committee with informa-
tion as to whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled ?
Admiral TURNER. I don't believe them is any evidence they did, but
I will double check that.
(See p.170/ for material referred til
Senator IN))eye. As you know. Senator Illuddleston and his subeom-
inittee are deeply invoked in the drafting of charters and guidelines
for the intelligence communit y. We will be meeting with the President
tomorrow. Our concern is. I think, a basic one. Can anything like this
occur again ?
Admiral TURNER. j thj tWoithi be very, very unlikely, first, be-
cause we are all mod) more conscious of these issues than we were back
in the fifties, second. because we have such thorough oversight proce-
dures. I cannot imagi�e that this kind of activity could take place
today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me. if I were
authorizing this, and writing to the ltitelligenee Oversight Board, and
blowing the whistle On this kiml of activity.
I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with
myself and a free communication in the Agency. so that I am the one
who finds these things if they should happen. the fact is that we must
keep you and your committee and now the new committee in the House
informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a
degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper
authorities to stop it.
Senator INouve. A sad aspect of the NIKII.TRA project was that
it naturally involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got in-
volved in experimentation. I would appreciate it if you would report
back to this commit tee in 3 months on what the Agency has done to
notify these individuals and these institutions. and furthermore, to
notify us as to what step- have been taken to identify victims, and if
identified, what you have done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.
Admiral Tresee. All right. sir, 1 will be happy to.
Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield ?
36
Senator INovrE. 'Yes. sir.
Senator Goi.DwATER. I WODiler if he V011id 'in dint report for
our information only a complete listing of the individuals and the
experiments done OD then). and whether t hey were wilting or unwitting.
i-o111111(.01* or liollVOIllitteer, and what has been the result in each case.
I think that �voulil he interesting.
Admiral TraNEn. Fine. Yes. sir.
SellatOr 1Not'YE. Senator Kennedy e
.svnat,n. KENNEDy. Thank yon. It is your intention to notify the in-
dividuals who have been the subjects of the research. is that right.
Admiral Linter ? Do you intend to notify those individuals?
Admiral TURNER.
Senator KyNNEDY. If you ran ide�tify them. you intend to notify
1 hem ?
Admiral TURNER. YeS.
Senator KENNEDy. And yon intend to �otify the universities or re-
se:,1,14rent tis well
Admiral Trux ER. Sellater. I flit) torn on that. I understand Your
opeiong statement: I pin myself i� the positim of the president of one
of those universities. let's say. If lw were witting�if his university
had been witting of this activity with !is. he has access to all that in-
format on today. If he were not witting. I wonder if the process of
informing him might putt his institution's reputation in more jeopardy
than 'letting thein go 01) the way they are todaV. not knowing. I really
don't know t he equit ies here.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. the problem is. all you have to do is pick up
the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many in-
stances: I think you are putting the university people at an extraordi-
may disadvantage. vlucre there is a complete ehange of administra-
tion, and they may for inn: reason or another not have information
that they are tinily!. suspicion. There is innuendo: there is rumor. I
cannot help hut believe that it will just get smeared all over the news-
papers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.
Ii SeerlIS to Me t hat those universit ies should be entitled to that infor-
mation. so that the ones with other administrations can adapt proce-
dures to protect those universities. The importa�ce of preservin,g the
mdeiuvinlence of our researeli areas and the communit ies seems to flue to
be a very fundamental kind of quest nun about the protection of the
integrity of our universities and our research centers.
Admiral TunNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify
them privately to themselves. We can luenefit them in an adequate way to
VOVer the risk that this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are
lots of hut' Sul who have not been identified publicly at this point.
Senator hux NEM% I think the universities themselves should be noti-
fied. I think then the universities can lake whatever steps in ermsof
their setting up the procedures to protect their own kinds of integrity
in terms of the futon.. I would certainly hope that they would feel
that they emild make a pnlulie comment or a publie statemou on it.
I think it is of general piddle interest. particularly for the people that
are involved in those universities. to have some kind of awareness of
whether they were tr.4.,1 or were volt n,eti and Itow they were used.
I think th.eV are entitled to it. and quite frankly. if there is a public
official Or an 'official of the university that you notify and he wants
37
for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why
those in a lesser echeloii or lower echelon who have been effectively used
by it should not have the in as well.
So. I would lou le that you would notify the universities and then
also indicate to tlw public. I can't conceive that this information will
not be put out in the newspapers. and it puts the university people at
an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course sonic of it is wrong,
which is the fact of the matter. and I think some university official
saving, well, it isn't so. is a lot different than if they know it is con-
firmed or it is not confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. 1 think that
there is a responsibility there.
Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying.
I have already notified one institution because the involvement was so
extensive that I thought they really needed to protect themselves, and
I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the
people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the diffi-
culty I will have is. I can't quite do. I think, what you suggested, in
that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of
its participation.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to the best of your in-
formation. and it seems to me that just because the university or an
individual is going to lw embarrassed is not a reason for classifying
the information. so. I wo111,1 mvan. I obviously speak as an
individual Senator. but 1 feel that that is an incredible disservice to
the innocent individuals and. I think, a thi-service to the integrity of
the universities unless they are notified. to be able to develop pro-
cedures von are developing with regards to your own institution and
we are trying to in terms of the Congress. Certainly the universities
art entitled to the same.
Admiral TraNea. Yes. Not all of these. of course. were unwitting.
Senator KENN ilDy. That's right.
Admiral TURNER. :IMITIV of them were witting. and therefore they
can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly
open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way that when
identifying a university it will not lead to the public disclosure of the
individuals. whom I :mu not allowed to disclose. and so on.
Senator KENNEDY. That could In 111�11C. it SePTIIS to
Admiral TtaNea. So. we will see if we can devise a way of notifying
these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their
own decision whether their 1(111 it it� are best _served by their announc-
ing it publicly or their attempting in maintain it�
Senator KEN xyny. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you
to announce or indicate ?
MI1111111 TURNER. MV personal conscienee. sir, at this time. is that I
would be doing a di-serve to these universities if I notified the public.
Senator KENNEDY. WOillti you meet with some university officials
and ask what their views are or whether they feel that the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the universities would be better served or not ?
I think that would be useful to find out from small. large. private, and
public universities' officials how thee view the integrity�
Admiral TuaNn:. Fine. I will phone seventh university presidents
today who are my friends and who are not involved in this. and ask
them what they think tlw equit Ws would
38
Senator KTNNEny. All right. You let us know. too.
.Admiral TraxEa. But I am not sure that I see that there is any grent
i� fit in my notifying the public as opposed to the university notify-
ing 111(.111. Let hint have his choice whether he wants�each institution
wants to have it made publie.
Senator YNNEOY. The fart would remain that the institution's
credibility would be better r;.erieil if the institution's president were to
deny it and the university indicated that it did not part icipate in that
program than if the university were to deny it and the Agency says
nothing. Ti seems to ine that that woldil be the strongest. and the only
�va hint ,�ivihhly. 1 would value it if you would get
some input from universii ies as to what they believe is the fairest way
in terms of the preservation of the inte(o.ity of the universities.
Let me. if 1 could. ask on the (plet ion of the uses of these Rafe
houses. as I understand front infot�mation that Wie, prOVided to us in
the erinr-e of our last emninittee. the test ing of various drugs on in-
dividuals ha petted at all social levels. high and low, it happened on
native Americans and also on foreign no ionals. That is what I under-
stand was the nature of the project itself.
Now � I aln 111=1 wondering "11(1 herI hu'e te!'t!' Were conducted at the
two locations on the en �:1 eon -4 and the WeA roast which were known
as safe hou,es. To your knowledge. is that correct ?
Admiral Tvexrn.
Senator KEN NEM'. In terms of the research in this particular pro-
gram. it did not go beyond the safe houses located on the eat coast and
the west eonst ? 1 lieliere I am coureo on that.
Admiral 'It-uxi n. That type of unwitting testing of sort of ran-
domly spleried
Sonator *KEN \ Elio% It wa,- lovated in filo-4, two places?
Tutrx En. To the hest of our knowledge. there were only two
Sell:110r KEN NE10-. Well, how oho we interpret randomly sebbeted ?
Adniiral Ttitx tin. Well. as oilposed to IiriSolierS in a prison who were
somellow select
Senator KEN xrny. Alt right. Do you know from this information
how many people were recruited during this period ?
Admiral TunNvii. No idea.
Senatot 'KEN N UM'. 1 to you know approximately ?
Admiral Turxrn. I asked that question the other day. and we juNt
don't have�apparently we are Very�well, either there were no
revord, ktpt of t ht art ual numbers and tylws of iwoide te,tod or they
'were de,t roved.
Synator IxI PUIT. Senator S�hweiker.
Stunt to St�nwErtint. Thank pin.11r. Chairman.
Admiral Turner. I would like to cow late.k to the experiments
which may have been conducted at the holutal research facilities
whit 'ii the CIA helped to finam�e. It wasn't clear to me from your pre-
vious answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you are un-
clear on that. too. from your remarks. yet I find in the CIA docu-
mentation which you have supplied us. a list describing some of the
advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:
(ft one sixth of Ito total price in the new hospital wing will be nvailahle to the
Chemical Ilivishm of TSS � � � (hi .gene sponsorship of sensitive research
39
projects will he completely deniatile; (c) Full professional cover will be provided
for up to three biochemical empto3ees of the chemical (d) Human
patient!, mid volumeers for experimental use will be available under controlled
elinial co�ditions with the full supervision of
and there is a Maul:, something has been deleted.
It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that par-
ticular w.ing. Ihiesn't it to von ? Why would you go to such elaborate
preparations. to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own per-
sonnel there. give them a Cover, and give theni access to patients?
Why would you g() to such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if
Volt "('It'll
t pla nning to experiment on people in the hospital ?
Admiral Ti-RNFT. I agree with you 100 percent. sir. Those were
clearly the intentions. I have 1)0 evidence that it was carried out in
tIntl way. I mu not trying to be defensive. Senator. I am only trying
to be absolutely precise here,
Senator Slimmin:. Well. then, as to the nature of what WAS (IOW'
there. the last paragraph on the same page of the document says,
"The favilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled
experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materials with
which any agency connection must be completely deniable will aug-
ment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS.
such as. and then there's another deletion.
Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still
classified. or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized
aml released. It seems to lie that whatever was deleted right there would
give von a pretty good clue as to what they were doing. since it says
that the activilies W0111ii -augment filld ConipIPMPIlt other programs"
undertalien by TSS, So., I have trouble understanding why you don't
know what was contemplated. Just the fact that similar programs are
referred to in the document. though what they are is still deleted,
should enable you to died; it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned
following the -such as- in the classified version of this document.
Admiral Tt-ax Seliatifi'. I littNI.110t said that we don't know what
was contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done
there,
Senator 5,suw11kEti. Why did von delete that reference? Why ig
that still classified. that particular project of whatever it is?
Admiral Ti / don't know this pa it icular ease. We will get 3.0u
the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite
probable that that other ca:,e is unrelated to this in tlw�well. not un-
related. but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.
[The material referred to follows:}
conqroetion of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex WIIF
ill March 1n7tti. tif the several Nlk1.1.TRA projects conducted at
Georzetown only one involving liminin testing ri ver,.d n thin- 1911111 SI111sKIllela
1,, NIA Sobproje,t i71. ran from 1955 to 1963, Hilts it is possible that
tIi' fimit four years Illt59-Itott31 of the sal.projevt 1.ould have been spent in
the I ;o1-1111111 AlIlleN, However, there is no reference to the Gorman Annex or a
-new Annex- iii Subproject 45 toper,. neither is there aii mention of the sub.
pro.Owt touring toil Hell. 1n/11, inn hi IWO or hour.% nar,l.
utiu.riz:ttiit I' eoupilime CIA funds toward eonstruction of the Gorman
Annex iil Subproject 37, of Recently rlisoovered material
indicatiit that tin. iesubicktcr motioned his re:Paroh for sleep- and amnesia-
lir4,41m.Ma drm:s tinder 1.;�oject through July 194.l7 at Georgetown
tnilersity Hospital. But it is impossible to determine if the facilities of the
Gorman Ant 11 were involved.
40
Senator ScuwEnirrt. I think that wonld give us a pretty good clue
as to what was going to be done in the wing the CI A helloed to finance.
Was there any indication at all in the records Ymi found that the
pi�cf 1,161,00,1y voiimi, patients in
connection with this facility?
Admiral TuRxEn. I III sorry. I missed your question because I u-as
trying to get the data on the last tme. I will read you the hlank.
nI 01 SCHWEIKER.
Atijiral TynNEtt. QK Ill I.LT�P, It doesn't help von. but�
Senator ScitwEtimit. Can you tell us what that is. or is it still
cla,siticd ?
Adnor:d 1�1-ENEti. I don) Iatim. and I assume from the fact that
we deleted it. it is still classified. but I will get von that an-wen, sin
Senator Simi-AK-Ey. Thank you. ld like to see that information.
I See p. 1 71 for nutter-nil referred to.1
Nov my next question J, there any indication. Admiral. that
projects in that particular center involved experimentation on ter-
minally ill cancer patients?
Admiral TuasEit. I missed the first part of your question. sir. I am
very sorry.
Senator SCHWEIRER. Do you have any indication that some experi-
ments in the facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?
You do acknowledge in your statement and it is Air from other (loot-
thlkl hind- of "Nlwriment, Were at some 1"'int being done
somewhere. My question i-. is there any indicatiim that cancer patients
or terminal lv ill patient- Vert' experimented with in this wing?
Admiral TURN: EL% YO!.;.. it does appear there is a connection hen.. sir.
Senator Senwrinni. The other question I had relates to th( de-
yeloiiment of something which has been called the perfect concussion.
A series of exia,riments towtml that end were described in the CIA
documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your un4lerstanding
of perfect co�russion S.
Admiral TuRNER. Is that in my testimony. sir, or in some other
document ?
Senator Scnwv.iiii.n. Subproject 54. 11IK1LTR.1. which involved
examination of ted11111111C7- 10 cause brain concussions and amnesia by
using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without giving
warning and without leaving any (dear physical marks. Someone
dkihhe,i ii -p,rfeet ronen,.....ion �maybe that was poetiO license on the
part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if 3-ou
could ju4 tell us what brain concussion experiments were about ?
Admiral TuRsEn. This project. No. i4. was eanceled. and never
carried out.
Senator ScitwEitiEn. Well. I do believe the first year of the project
in I wa. carried out by the Oflice of Naval Research. according to
the inf4irmat ion that you stipplied Tlw SPel1i:-. to have been par-
1 i.-i]iat Iuig iii waY at Ihat taUnt, bi.cause the !words go on to say
that the experime�ter at ONE found out about CIA's role. discovered
that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to
K 1 'LIRA in 19I(. Again. this is all front the backup material you
have given us. So. it was canceled at -one time. 1 11111 not disagreeing
41
with that. hut apparently for at ionA a year or two. somebody Was
investigating the priHluct ion Of brain concussions with special black-
jacks.s4mnd waves, and other methods as detailed in the backup
mat crial.
Admiral TraNrit. The data available to me is that this project was
never funded by the CIA. but I will d mble-check that and furnish the
infnrmation for the record for you as to whether there was ever any
connection here and if so. what the nature of the work was.
[The material referred to follows :]
Mr. Lanbinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
September 21. 1977 bearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research of the Human Resources Conmiittee. The relevant portion is reprodueed
below:
Mr. I.AUBINtiER. On project 54. it has got a rather sensational proposal in there,
in terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal
aml I said. in fact. it was never funded under MKI'LTRA. Now. I overlooked�at
least. my memory did not serve ate correctly when I went through that file folder
to see one memorandum dated January 10. 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a
matter of fact, that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded hy
the Agency.
Selmtttr SCIIWEIKER. 137 what?
Mr. ',Arum:Ea. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It
did not happen to be in my head when I testified.
Senator St nwmira. I think I might have read you that, and that Is why I
argued at the time with you. because I think I had in front of me. as I recall,
some indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did
Nupply it to us: there is no argument at stilt that infiirmation.
Mr. LAURINGElt. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong. myself, and in my own new.
a�i reading under the ULTRA project. that if it had bee� funded under
ULTRA. it would have had a project number and identified as such. The thing
that threw toe it as that it was funded, apparently. outside of any MR ULTRA
activity and it was under the normal eontrarting proeess. KO that it was not
�winded in MliruntA as any work dime under that funding umbrella.
MI. tile folder that you have and I have. right here, nmkes it quite clear.
however. that a year's work was done through navy funding�a navy funding
mechanism�no ii hich the itroposaI was based that ultimately came into the
Mli1-1.TRA /program. That second proposal was never funded. So, there was
contliet and I. iwrsooally. I think, introduced a little bit of confusion in that in
my testimony.
senator st-nwt:mvs. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's atatement
here that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really a conduit for
the ('1A'
Mr. LAURINGER. I think that is correct.
Senator SelIWEINER. Yes: I would appreciate that. I would like to
In tow how it went from ON 1.1 to CIA after a year. Somebodv made a
decision to make that transfer, anti to make this an 11KULTIZA sub-
ject.. There laid iii 11(' SOUR' sort of review that led to a decision to
eont inth . that kind of concussion�total blackout. maxitimin amnesia,
and whatever else it was .vou were interested in�studv and testing.
Mr. ',Army:cult. Se na t or . if I may try to say a few words on that.
flue files that were available to us for inspection. which are limited.
mu bunt that tlwre was a project being carried on bv the Navy having
to do with the effects of brain concussion. The CIA developed an inter-
est in I nat, and eonsidetvd funding it. but actually never did. and as
the admiral lest t lie MK ULTRA is merely a funding mechanism.
a place they go for money to do such things. but there is no evidence
that I know of that that project was ever funded.
42
Senator Scnvvi 'urn. Well. I am confused. because here again is an-
other quote from a document that we have seen. whirl' you have re-
leased and supplied 1(�Is:
Following is the technical progress made under the current (deleted] contract:
Stwrialized instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been
developed to obtain the desired dynamic data : (?) eonsiderahle data has now
been obi ;Oiled supiwirting the resonance-eavilation theory of brain concussion and
IV I preliminary aeeelerat ion threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled
gia, simulated skull.
It goe, on to talk al ,out a blast range and a 1-s41 mire- foot inborn-
tory. The document notes that -Three blast test series have been run
t.o date:: It de:sel'il SpVC1:11 blaekjack device. "a pancake-t vpe black-
pick giving a high peak impact force with a low unit surface pressure.-
I agree I he records are ini�onclusive as to the results of this work.
but it certainly seems that some testing- WAS (1011e.
My. LAUB} 01, you are putting us in the SAM(' position
I think you were stating that you were in earlier in referring to docu-
ments not before its. but I believe you are quoting front a proposal
that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work. and he is referring
to I iast work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of things
like that. but CIA wa,, not involved with that.
Senator SciiNvEi Ea. What do you mean. Admiral. on page C of your
testimony when you mention projects using magician's art ? How do
niagicians get into the spook business?
.1111161111 TiliNEIZ. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickev
into the finn. Inn I would like to ask my advisers here to continent.
Mr. Baum-. I t hink that is essentially it. Senator. It is surreptitious
administration of material 10 SOMPolie. deceptive practices. how to
dist raet someone's attention while you are doing something else, AS
1111dVIS111111.1 it. 11 WA'- Rho 501111 tyjw of a covert communication
project involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants
iwthaps -titiiiiiitiijcnte in format ion to one another without having other
people know it. Iii i 15 the type of thing that was involved. sir.
Senator Sitiwri kill:. Thank oll. Mr. (111111'1MM.
S'11:1110* Svilalor 1111(14111011 ?
Senator 11x-1,1,1.Es-11,N. Thank vou. Mr. Chairman.
Admiral. in vow eltecking these newly discovered documents and
interviewing mendours of the CIA staff, did you find information that
would confirm the etintent ion described by the reporters for the New
York Times that this type of experimentation was begun out of a
ft-at Agency that foreign powers might have hail drug". which
WI Mill idlOW 1 berli III alter bellaViOr of American izens or agents
or mend of t he Armed Forees who were taken into custody, and
which would 'nue resulted in false confessions and. the likt? IS my
quest ion clear ?
Admiral Tin N. ER. YU!". Sir. I II:11.01.1 1e1-4Inally rend the documen-
tation on that. In lIly di,cussions with the people who are well in-
formed ill this arca at goiwy. 1 3ni told that that is the ease..
Senaloi rit'ont.i.s�roN. Wa- there any evidence or any indication that
there \veil, other MO .IN't� the .kgency might also be looking for
tht ti that could be applied for other purposes. such as debilitatingan
individual or even killiwr another person ? Was this part of this kind
of experiment at 1011 ?
43
Admiral Ti-RNER. Yes: I think there is. I have not seen in this series
of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but 1 think the project
tur1,.(1 it chararter from a defensive to an offensive one as it went
alot ig. and there certainly was an intent ion here to develop drugs that
could Is Of use.
Senator Ilt-tnu.Esvox. The project continued for some time after it
was learned that. in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as
was at first feared. didn't it ?
Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes. sir.
Senator Hunnixs-rox. Is there any indication that knowledge gained
as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in
any way to present operations? �
Mr. liniov. Senator. I am not sure if there is an body of knowledge.
A great deal of what there was. I gather. was destroyed in 1973. I
would like to defer to Frank here. I )o you know of any ?
Mr. L.kt-tuNGER. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed
under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use
today.
Senator Hynnit,r.sToN. So apparently any information that was
gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth
further development on the part of the Agency.
Mr. LAI-RINGER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.
Senat or 111-1)1A.ESTON. I Can hardly hear myself..
dniiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have
no evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should
remember
rate to say that this experimen-
Senator I 1 UDDLEsToN. Well, is it :lent
tat ion produced few useful results or had little application at all to the
operations of the Agency or anybody else as far as we know?
Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time.
I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in
the Soviet Union at this time, and we were concerned as to what kinds
of things might be done to them. but I am not saying that�
Senator I1t0111.ESmN. Have you detected any sign that any other na-
tion is continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to
this or with a similar objective!
Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top
of mv head, sir. but I will get it to you.
The material referred to followsl
We maintain no flies of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs in
foreign countries. Some years fig." OCCaSilSnrinY would review foreign research
on antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil
defense assesments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign
research on LSI) under Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such
drugs might lw etnployed gains( Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information
relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In this
early. work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation: we
long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements
are any longer served. As 1'1.11Sn/111'r interest in this area has dropped off
and higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually no present coverage
with tin' possihle exception of an occasional scantling of the literature for a
slweific program. Ti the best of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence
Community is tracking this subject now.
4�.
44
Senator Ilunin.rs-roN. Yon don't know whether an of your agents
anywhere in tlw world have been subjected to any kind of procedure
like this?
Admiral TraNr.n. We certainly know of other powers conducting
1V,Parell in these arefiS. yeS.
Senator IIrianys-roN. Do you know how they go about that research ?
Admiral TraNr.a. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.
Senator llrianysTlix. Do you know of any other organization in this
C01/�11'y or any institution that has conducted extensive research on
unwitting individuals and through unwitting institutions?
Admiral TraNtat. Well, I have read something in the newspapers
about this. but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.
Senator IlronixsTox. It is not a normal mode of operation for hu-
man research, is it?
Admiral TrRNER. NO. sir.
Senator 1-11-nni.Es-rox. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Isoryv.. Senator Wallop?
Senator W.tmor. Mr. Chairman. I only have one to follow up on
Senator Iluddlest on's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really
sayin,r. areyon. Admiral Turner. that there are no mind-altering
drugs or behavior modification procedures which have been used by
foreign powers?
Admiral TrriNr.n. No. sir. I am not.
Senator WAr.r.or. I drew that inference partly in answer to my ques-
tion that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but
surely there are relaxants that make tongues looser than they would
otherwise be. 'Isn't that true?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLor. So I think it is fair to say. too, that the experience
of many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would
indicate that there are behavior modification procedures in use by
foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of sophistication.
Admiral TIMNER. Yes, sir.
Senator WALLoe. Again. I will just go back and say I think this
must have been part of the motivation. T don't think you would have
mentioned Cardinal Mindszentv had you thought his behavior was
normal at the time or had anybody else. So. I would just again say
I think it is a little bit scapegnating. I don't think the object of this
hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or
otherwise. but I think it is a little bit scapegoating to sav thn.t it
stopped with the directors of the CIA or the DCT's of the time. Also
T think it is n little bit scapegonting to say they didn't even know it.
hilt that it was some lower echelon acting alone.
think this was n behavior pattern that was prevalent in those
Years. and I think the object le--cm is that we have discovered, we
think and we hope. throngh your assurances and other activities of
the Co�gress means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ixouvr., Senator Chnfee?
Senator C11.111.7r. No questions.
Senator INot-vc. Senator Kennedy. I think you have another
question.
45
Senator KEN \ Just talking about the two safe houses on the
east and west roast a- bent,- the sources for the unwitting trials. now,
the importance of this and the magnitude of it. I think, is of signifi-
cance, becans, WE' ha VC 'Wen 11'011 .VOinr records that these were used
orpra pori,d years. and I lie 1)111111 ii'.. could have been con-
siderable. You are unable to determine. at least in your own research.
what the nundgq.s. would bc and what the drug- were. how many people
Wit, involved. but it could ha Vt. been considerable &Whig' this period
Oft
It would certainly appear to Da' ill examining the documents and
t he flow charts of cash slips that were expended in these areas that it
was considerable. but that is it judgmental factor on it. but I think
it is important to try and iind out what the Agency is attempting to
do to get to the bottom of it.
Now, I In puititipal agent that was involved as I understand it is
deeca-ed and has Leen deceased fm years. The overall agent. Mr.
�ott lick has indicated a fuzzy memory about this whole area. He
has test died before the Intelligotwe Committee. Yet he was respon-
sible fm the whole prfpgram. Then. the Director had indicated the
dest.ruction of the vu lions materials and unfamiliarity with the
protect.
Now, yon have indicated in your testimony today that there are two
additional agents on page of your testimony. you indicated there
II i�e I wo additional agents which you have uncovered at the bottom of
it. and you say. the mimes of CIA otlieials who approved or monitored
the various projects. Yon talk about the two additional agents in your
testimony.
Nov. I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents
to fiml out exactly what is bein., done. I suppose. first of all. shouldn't
the project manager know what was being-done ?
Admiraln. Our first problem, Senator. is that we have been
unable to as,oriale an individual with those names at this point. We
ark. still burrowing I i find out who these people are. 'We haven't identi-
fied them as having been CIA employe,,s. and we don't know whether
these were false names.
Senator I IN N EDI% 'You are tracking that down. as I understand it ?
Aulittital TURNER. Yt'S.
SCIla I or KENNEDY. Yoll art' t rack I 11(r that down. and you have every
intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can
about the program and project !
Admiral Ttafxrn. Nly only lwsitat ion here is whether 1 will do this
or the Justice 1 lepart mem.
Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued. though. I understand?
Admiral Tt-irsErf. Yes. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Jus-
tice Department ?
Admiral Tt-axiqz. ['Nods in the affirmative.]
Senator KENNEnr. Is it plausible that the director of the program
would not understand or know about the details of the program?
Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb would not understand the full range
of activities in those part nada r safe houses?
�.,..4,41 0 � 4
46
Adiniral TURNEE. Lot tin. say it is unlikely. 1 don't know Mr. Gott-
Senator KENNEDY. lIns anybody in the Agency talked with Mr.
Gottlieb to find out about this?
Admiral TIAINEn. Not since this revelation has come out.
Senanir KENNEDy. Not since reVelati011 ? Well, why not ?
Arno ra 1 TtatNEI:. lie has left our employ. Senator.
Senator KENNEny. I ktes that mean that anylaaly who leaves is. von
"mow. covered for lifetinw
Admiral TunNEn.
Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out ?
you have new informatign] 811010 111),Z It has been a matter
of considerable interest both to our committee tool to the Intelligence
Cononittee. Why wouldn't yon talk to Mr. Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. 'Well. again. I think the issue is whether this
should he tlone by the Just ice 1)(1)110mm11 or ourselves.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. are we wrestling around because you and
Attorney General Bell can't agree
Admiral TuaNER. No. sir.
Senator KENNEDY feolitinllingl. On who ought to do it ?
Admiral Ti RN We tire proceeding together in con Ii)] et e agreement
Rs to 11()Nv to go. I have. in connection with trying to find all of these
Americans or others who were unwittingly tested. I have some con-
siderable concern about the CIA running around this count iv inter-
viewing and interrogating people. I wen w..1, 1 don't want to give any
impression that we are doing domestic
Senator KENNEi�-. I am just talking about one, in this ease. That
was the man who was respon,sible for the whole proaTam. and to
find out whether anyone within the A,rencv since von have had this
new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975. and if the answer is
110. 1 want to know why not.
AdMirfil TVUNER. The reason ii was not interviewed in connection
with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA
and there was a concern on the part of the Agency that it would appear
to the investigators that the CIA was in some way trying to influence
him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
committees have no objection. we would be happy to. contact Dr.
Gottlieb and see if lie can augment anything here in this new infor-
mation. though I don't think there is much in this new information
that he ran add lo as opposed to what was available in 1975.
Senator KyNNEDy. Well. you ee. Admiral Turner. you come to the
two comMil tees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the
in We don't have to be converned about anything in the
future on it. Now. I don't know how N'On can give those aSsIlralices to
the menilwrs of these committees as well as to the American people
when You haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that
was in charge of the program. and the records were destroyed. lie is
the fellow that was running the program. and the Agency has not
talked to him since the development of this new material.
Admiral Ti 'RN Our Only cOlicern here is the proprieties involved.
and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on
47
who, if either of us. should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as
not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved here, or to ap-
pear in any way to be improper.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. do I understand you have not contacted the
:hist ice Department about this particular care since the development
of this new material about Gottlieb ?
Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted
him.
Senator Iii:NxEnv. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you under-
stand the difli,!ulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehend-
ing that when you develop a whole new series of materials that are on
the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every tele-
vision. I mean. that mean s something. but it does not mean nearly as
ninch as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of un-
witting Amerieans, and every single document that the staff reviews
has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and yon come up to tell us that we don't
have to worry any more. we have these other final facts, and Mr. Gott-
lieb has not been talked to?
Admiral TrasErt. Sir. I am not saying that these are in any way the
final facts, I am saying these are all the facts we have available.
Senator KF.NNEDY. And you have not talked to the person who was
in charge of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight
can we give it ?
Admiral TunsEtt. We are happy to talk to him. I thinkIthe issue
here again is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not,
I believe, enough new information about Gottlieb's participation here
to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than
what was revealed in 1973.
Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it. I think, from our point
of view, is. he would know the drugs that were administered, the vol-
ume of drugs. how it was administered, and in terms of your ability
to follow up to protect these people and their health, to the extent that
it can 1 w done. that opport unity is being lost.
I want to get on to some others. but will you give us the assurance
that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that von will talk to Attorney
General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KExsEov. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't
see how we can 1'10111 our responsibility in this area on the drug test-
in g without our bearing from Gottlieb as well. but / think it is im-
port ant that on do so. particularly since all of the material!, have
liiri (lest royed.
These ot her two agents. have they talked to them?
Admiral TURNER. We (1011.1 know who they are. sir. We are trying
In track down and SVP whet her these WIMPS can be relented to anybody.
Senator 1\ EN NEVI'. That is under act ire investigation by the Agency?
Admiral TURNER, YVS. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those
peol )Ie wheii you b Hate 111011. is that correct ?
Admiral TunNEn. Yes, sir. under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.
Senator KEN N my. And you have people working on it ?
Admiral TURNER. Yes. sir.
48
KI-:NNEDY. With regards to the activities that took place in
these :if houses. as I miderstand from the records. two-way mirrors
were used. Is that your underst am huge
Adwirai l't-Ext.it. Yes. sir. 1Ve have records that construction was
done to put in tWi)-Way
Se11;11()t. All(1 they Were placed ill the bedroom. as I
understand.
[Pause.
Senator KIIN EDI-. Well. we have document s�
Admiral TURNER. I believe that WaS ill the Church record. but I
don't have the del a
Senator KEN NEI}Y. And nit lier elaborate decorations were added. as
I understand. at least. to the one in San 1:raneisco. in the bedr(x)m,
which are French can-can daticer. floral pictures. drapery, including
instal1:0 Ion of bedroom mirrors. three framed Toulouse Lott rec post-
ers with black silk mats. and a windier of other�red bedroom eur-
tains and reeording equipment. and then a series of documents which
NVere 1)11)1'1(10a to tile tpl Wiliell indicate a with pra ferat 1011
Of different (-ash for $110. generally in the $16() range over any period
of tin II on the particular checks. Even the names are blocked out. as
to the per-4m Who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents. operat-
ing ('N ix'' drinks. entertainment while administering. and then it
is (lashed out. and then the other documents, that would sup...gest. at
least with the signature of principal agent out there. that�
'called to the operat ion. midni(dit. and climax.
-
What can you tell us that it might suggest to you al gait what tech-
niques were beim, used by the ..kreticv in terms of reaching that sort
of bron(1-based gnaw of .�nierican- that were being evidently enticed
for testing- in term- of drwrs and others? Do you draw any kind of
conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these
safe houses ?
.A(11111'111 TURNER. No. sir.
[General laughter.]
Senator There is 11 light side to it. hut there is also an
e�orn musk- serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which
are used III Well. 115041 ill t of testing. and trying to find out ex-
actly the range of (11.11,rs used and the numbers of l�1 14 involved and
exaetly what that operation W :11 N1111 . as well as the constant reitera-
tion of the Ilse of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety
of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of
documentat ion put t lug these matters together.
When you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that
has been t VII. 0,4141ill t 111.`q� I WI) areas. with the kind of cash slips
that �Vere 11-e.1 ill tili. piyiltent and deeorati011s and all
of the rest. we atv not alwle to put a bottom line on it but one thing is
for sure, and that is. Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure. be-
cause his tianie 111111081*s 011 0,41 :11+011t every one of these dOellnlerlt?'.
ftlid it I. I thilik. Yen' important to fuel out what his understanding
is of the nature of that. So, we will hear more about that.
.1(1111iral TunNFI:. I believe Gottlieb lias been interviewed by the
Congress.
Senator lr:Nxyuy. That's ritylit. he ha-. and in reviewing the record.
it is Ont Very satisfactory. and it just seems with the new information
49
and the new documentation and the new memoranda�and he did not
have the checks at that tinw�and with the wide variety of different
memoranda w it h hi, name on it. hi, memory could be stimulated on
that.
Thank you,
SenatIa- iNotTE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for
part icipat jug in this hearing. I belicve the record should show that this
hearing was 114,1(1 at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was
not held because we insisted upo� it. It was a volunteer effort on the
part of the Agency. I think the record should also indicate that Ad-
miral Tunwr has forwarded to this committee a classified file including
all of the name, of the institutions and the persons involved as the
experiment ors.
I slamld also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in
I he eon�) i ee's invest igiit1011 of drug abuse. Just as you have had much
work in piing over the ts.litio lives. the Ft afr of this committee has had
equal pi.ohlems. but I would like the record to show that you have
II ade these papers and do(aunents available to the committee. I thank
ymi for that.
A, part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon
many dozens of others. exiieriment ors, or those officials in charge, and
one of tho,e will be Dr. Gottlieb.
In thanking you, I wonld like to say this to the American people.
that what WI. have IsNpPrifMet'll this morning in this committee room
is not I winr dnidi(lited in any other committee room in any other part
of lilt' WOIld. I di 01111 11 tat Vi`ry 11111c11. Mr Agency and our intelligence
community has !wen Tinder much criticism and ha, 'been subjected to
nowlt abuse. in twiny cases justified. but this is the most open society
that I can think of. For example. in Great Britain there are about six
people who are aware of the identity of the man in charge of intelli- �
gence. ln other countries. similar conditions exist. Here in the United
state, we ma only know Admiral Tomer, we have had open bearings
with him. sorb as this. The confirmation hearing, were all open.
In a few week-. the Senate of the United States will debate a resolu-
tion to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds
being usekl for oounierintelligence and national intelligence. I would
hope that in presenting t his issue to the public, the media will take note
that the Ageney has cooperated and will continue to. The ahuse that
11:111' lear�ell id Pont t hi, morning is one I hope will never happen
again. hail without constant over,ight 011 the part of the Execntiv:'
Office. on the part of the Congress. it could happen again. It is impor-
tant therefore that we rout how in this oversight activity.
.So. once again, Admiral. I thank you very much for helping us. We
will 4.ont �me to call upon you for your assistance. We would like to
submit ti) you several que,i ions that the members and staff have pre-
pa yea. We ho ,' on will look them over carefully and prepare re-
sponses for the recoil]. sir.
Senator lit:NNEor. 1u. Chair111:111?
Senator Ixoryt:. Yes, sir?
Senator Krxxri�.. I. too. want to thank Admiral Turner for his
responsivenes,. I have had myelin, with him in the committees and
0150 VOIlVerS8 t .1011S. telPp11011V conversations. and private meetings. and
50
I have found him personally to be extremely responsive. and it is a
ddli,�1111 el1111Pngt` AVhirh 11:1-� aVeerlid in heading tlds Agency.
I W Voll 10 1
ill1W. pe1
1Mil I. y. till). iiiiltIlikPto SM. t iii put behind
114,1 :*1 think w. are linite there yet in terms of this particular area
that WI are interested In. I think the Intellig.ence Committee has
speri:,I responsibilit ies in this /IIT:1 of the testing. so we look forward
to N�niling. with Y"" in exPedit nig Iht' time that we ean put it behind)
I ut it 414)es seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter.
So. I want to personally express lily appreciation to you. Admiral
Turner. and thank yon for your eooperat ion and your help. and I look
forward to working with you.
Admiral Thank you.
Scuitor I 1 youivs-roN. Mr. Chairman. I am not sure you emphasized
this enom,h. hut I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner
informed the Select Counnittee on Ii i OWII initiative when the new
chwunwill at I' 0) was found. Tile documentation has been made avail-
able to us volimt:irily. in a spirit of eooperation.
I think thi- shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that
existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and
a difference 161 15 11(.11(fld.
St'llatfir INtiV1-1:. Thank you very much. Thank you very much,
Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Alr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John
Gin inger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger. will you please rise and take the
oath.
I )4. you solemlv swear that the testimony yon are about to give is
the truth. the whole tijitli and nothing hut the t i'iith. so help you. God ?
Mr. G4,1,101 �N. dn.
:k urn N cnt. I do.
S4'11001' 1-Nt WYE. Thank you. sir.
Ii. Goldnian. will you identify yourself, and after that. Mr.
I ;in .
Senator KIN Nvnv. liefore we start in. we had a third witness. Mr.
Chairman. N1 I. Past crime, who planned to testify. traveled to WfISh-
ilort on �he lives in Washington. and was rontacted recently�with
the intention of testifying thi- motility,. And something�he called
uu lan this mornin,, and indicated that he wanted to get a counsel
before he WI add wish to testify.
Senator 1 xot-vr. )1r. Goldman.
)fr. i'oldinan, will you ident ifv yourself. sir.
TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN. FORMER EMPLOYEE. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
'N. I am Philip Goldman.
Senator 1x:4.1-vv. And you are a former employee of the Central
Intelligence .1ge1Icv ?
)1 r. itint %N. ( 1() Vears ago.
Simatm. 1N(ii�rE. And you were employed at the time when
)1K I -1..T1Z A W:nr� in operation?
Ii. (;19.11M AN. There wen. some 'AIKI-I.T11 A.:, in operation at the
time 1 W:1,
51
Senator INovvE. And Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former em-
ployee of the Central Intelligence Agency?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. GITT1NGER. I am.
Senator INorvE. Are you still an employee?
Mr. G1TTINGER. No.
Senator INourE. Were you a member of the Agency at the time
MKULTRA was in operation?
Mr. GITTINGER. Yes.
Senator INot-i-E. Thank you. Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENNEDY. I want to welcome both of you to the committee.
If we could start with Mr. Goldman. Were you the project engineer
for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York?
Mr. GowsrAN. I know of no safe house in San Francisco.
Senator KENNEny. How about in New York?
Mr. GommAN. I knew of one facility that was established there,
but I didn't know anything of its operation.
Senator KENNEDY. Were you a monitor on any testing of drugs on
unwitting persons in San Francisco?
Mr. Goi.nmAN. No.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. we have a classified document here that was
provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the pro-
gram and I would appreciate it if you would look�
Mr. GoEnm.,N. I think the misunderstanding arises because I was
project officer.
Senator ErNNEDY. Well, would you take a look at that!
(Mr. Goldman inspected the document.]
Mr. GOLDMAN. This document as it states is correct. However,
'Senator KENNEDY. That document is correct?
Mr. GOLDMAN. As far as I see on the first page, the project. But
my�
Senator KENNEDY. Well. could I get it back. please.
That wmild indicate that you were a monitor of the program.
Mr. GOLDMAN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan
Hall.
Senator KENNEDY. To whom Was that ?
Mr. GommAN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top
of that document.
Senator KENNEDY. And yon knew that he was running the project
in San Francisco?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew he WAS the person who was in charge out
there.
Senator KENNEDY. All right.
Mr. GommAN. But I had no knowledge nor did I seek knowledee of
actually what he was doing. because there would be other things
involved.
I d;d receive�
Senator KENNEDY. What were you doing?
52
Mr. GoLnat.vic. I was collecting�I had to be sure that all the re-
ceipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were
paid out to see that everything was run all right. There was no illegal
use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash.
Senator KENNEDY. So even though the Agency document indicates
that you were a monitor for the program. One of the few monitors of
that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and
Mill Valley. Calif.. you described your responsibility only as a carrier
of ii Ioney. is that correct ?
Mr. (;oLoNIAN. I would say as a disburser or carrying out�seeing
that the moneys were handled properly. There was within that�I
don't know wItat's done or what he did do in conjunction with other
people.
Senator KENNEoy. Were you responsible for the disbursement of
all the funds?
Mr. GI 4,i1MAN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.
Stuntor KENNEDY. And what did you know of the program itself ?
Mr. GoLomAN. The only thing I knew of the program was what be
furnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't in-
dult, or eoncern myself in that.
Senator KENNEDY. You still wrote. and I'll let you examine it�
it's a classified document�but you wrote a rather substantive review
of the program in May of 1963. talking about the experiments, the
fa-tual data that had been collected, covert and realistic field trials.
about the necessity of those particular�and talked about the effec-
tiveness of the various programs. the efficiency of various delivery
systems. That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only
Mr. tisti.omAN. Well, if you would refresh my memory. if I could
read this I would eertainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was
written.
Senator Kr.NNroy. I ant t ryini! to gather what your role was. You've
indicated first of all that you didn't know about�you knew about a
safe house in Nev, 'York : now We find out that you're the carrier for
the resources a, well and the agent in San Francisco. We find out now
that the CIA put you :1,! a monitor. You're testifying that you only were
the courier, and here we have just one document. and there are many
others that talk tdtout the substance of that program with your name
Oil it and I ant just trying to find out exactly what role you were
itla vim!.
Mr. tio! n N. The Only thing I can tell you about this and I am
drawing completely on my mentor y is that this individual who was
in cliarge out there clinductl'd these things and reported them back to
tIn A.,ency. I didn't part ivipate in any of them. All I know was that he
furnislted na with reveipts ftir thing- that were done and told of the
work that th,v had done.
Senatsn I 1-N ilo. Well, that doeument rovers more than receipts.
Mr. GolumAN. Yes. it tells of what�they had conducted work out
there.
Senator KENNEDY. It describes. does it not ? Read the paragraph 2.
Mr. t ;la tem \ N. "A windier of coverl..
SI�11:1101* KITN vr-i�-. Well. von can't read it. it's a classified document.
and I don't know WilV. %lite frankly. Ina it relates to the substance
53
of those programs and your name is signed to the memorandums on
it. I am i not interested in you trying to review for us now what is in the
document. but I think it wi Imild be unfortunate if we were left with the
opinion that all you were WR5 a courier of resources when we see a
document with your name on it, signed. that talks about the substance
of the program. And what were interested in is the substance of the
program. We have the recent documents that were provided by the
Agency. which do indicate that you were at least involved in the
substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether you're willing to
tell us about that.
Mr. i;oLnmAx. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that
I can remember.
Senator KENNEDY. But you can't remember anything.
Mr. GommAN. I can't remember the substantive parts of these
things. I really can't.
Senator KENNEI)Y. Of the program that wac taking place.
Do you have any greater familiarity with what was happening in
New York?
Mr. GommAN. No, no.
SVII:1101' KENNEDY. And you have the same function with regards
to New York?
Mr. GOLDMAN. The same function with regard to New York.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you ever go to San Francisco?
Mr. GOLDMAN. YeS.
Senator KENN-EDI% Did you meet with the agent in charge?
Mr. Got,nmAx. Yes.
Senator KENxEpr. And why did you meet with him?
Mr. GOLDMAN. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were
there to find out if these were indeed true expenditures and to find out
if everything was going along all right for the work that was being
done.
Senator KENNEDY. What work was being done?
Mr. Gioi.D3i .N. N. the reports of these things and whatever was
being done. I don't know who be reported to but he did report to
somebody.
Senator KENNEDY. You travel out there to find out about the work
that's being done. and what does be tell you, that the work is being
done well and-
02:11r. GOLDMAN. lie told me that the work that they were doing was
von
along. progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with
Senator KENNEDY. But he didn't tell you what the work was?
Mr. GoLomAN. To be very frank with you. Senator. I cannot re-
member the things that happened bark in those days. I've been away
from the company�from the Agency for over 10 years. and that is
even farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I
first engaged in this. so it was my first�
Senator KENNEDY. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks, to
your recollection?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I don't recollect it. but if you have it there, then
they did.
,Senator KENNEDY. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
Mr. GoLD31.�x. Yes.
54
Senator KENNEDY. How did you know Dr. Gottlieb?
Mr. GOLDMAN. He had been head of the division when I was re-
cruited.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you talk to him about these programs? Did
you have anything to do with Iii iii during this period of time?
Mr. Got.i.NIAN. I didn't have anything to do with him until I would
say pro' 'ably in the sixt it.
Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us what you had to do with
hini then?
Mr. GoLnmAN. Just what you see there on the papers.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the request. for the money and he
approves it.
Mr. GommAx. That is the request for money and he approves it.
and I am quite sure that I probably discussed with him whether the
work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned
in. and whether he was swished with the way things were going
and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
requesting him, but I did not engage myself in anything he was doing.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, did you get the impression that Gottlieb
knew what was going on?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I didn't. ask.
Senator KrxNE:Dv. But you told him that your impression that what
was going on even though you didn't know what was going on, was go-
ing on well. I guess? [Laughter.]
Mr. GoLnmAN. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the
things appeared to be going along all right. I was repeating and par-
roting bark the words that were given to me while I was there.
Senator KENNEDY. What was the money being spent for, do you
know?
Mr. GOLDMAN. No; I can't recall that, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you remember if we told you it was red
curtains and can-can pictures�
Mr. GOLDMAN. No. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Floral pictures and the rest.
Mr. GommAx. No, sir.
Senator KENIczny. Recorders.
Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Recorders and two-way mirrors.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Wait, hold on. You're slipping a word in there now.
Senator KENNEDY. But you would have authorized those funds,
would you not. since you were the�
Mr. Goi.nmAs. Did you say two-way mirrors?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?
Senator KENNEDY. In the safe houses.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Where?
Senator KENNEDY. San Francisco.
ME. GOLDMAN. No.
Senator KENNEDY. How about New York?
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. You remember now that you approved expendi-
hires for New York?
�
�
55
Mr. GOLDM A N. Yes.
Senator KEN NEDY. What were those expenditures for?
Mr. GoLom.xs. That was a transfer of money over for the use in
an apartment in New York by the Bureau of Narcotics. It was for
their use.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you have any knowledge of what was going
on in the apartment?
Mr. GOLDMAN. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, ac-
cording to the information that I have been given, it was used by the
Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individuals who they were
interested in with regard to pushing dope�not pushing dope, but sell-
ing narcotics and that sort of thing.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. I am sure you had many responsibilities and
it's a long time ago. but the Agency does indicate that you were project
monitor for that particular program.
Mr. Goi.n31Ax. That's correct.
Senator KENNEDY. Your own testimony indicates you went out to re-
view the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being
wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, Mr.
Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what was going on out
there.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator KENNEDY. All those things are true, and yet you draw a
complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where
the record is now.
Mr. Goi,nmAs. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did
I come back and talk with Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed
in terms of any projects that they�that is. other parts of the Agency
might have in operation there. I simply reported back those things
which were told to me by the individual out there who�and I carried
them back and they are contained in the report that you have in front
of you, word for word. just as it was given to me.
Senator KENNEDY. The report that you examined here is a substan-
tive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think
anyone who wasn't familiar with the project�this is a personal evalu-
ation�could write a report on the substance of it without knowing
about it. Now, that's mine. Maybe you can't remember and recollect,
and that's
Mr. GOLDMAN. No; everything I put down in there is things that I
was told while I was out t here. and if there was any ancillary informa-
tion involved in there I can tell you I just don't remember that. I really
don't.
At the time�that was some years ago. At the time�a lot of time has
passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it
at all. I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to cer-
tify whether yes. this is so or that is so, I can do that. but I can't recall
it mentally.
Senator KENNEDY. You just certified the principal. There are others
up here.
I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.
Mr. Grrrixorn. It's Mr. Gittinger.
Senator KENNEDY. How long did you serve with the Agency?
001116,:?�,. -
. �
56
Mr. GrrrixoEn. Twenty-six years.
Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me?
Mr. G rrnmalt. Twenty-six years..
Senator KENNEDY. Twenty-six years.
And at some point yon moved into the operational support side, is
that correct ?
Mr. firm Nom:. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb ?
Mr. GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And did he Morin you about the research proj-
ects involving LSI)?
Mr. GirriNcEa. Yes. sir.
Senator KEN xr.ny. It is my understanding that you were also aware
of some of the drug testing. projects conducted on unwitting suhjects
on the west coast using the Bureau of Nareot ics people in the operation.
Is that true?
Mr. GirrixoEn. I was.
Senator INott-E. Excuse me. Would you speak into the microphone?
I cannot hear you.
Mr. Germ:GER. Sorry.
Senator KENNEDY. 1>o you know which drugs were involved in those
tests?
Mr. (firrixtalt. LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the
others. What is the sul,sta nee of marihuana. cannabis, is that right, that
can he delivered by other than smoking ?
Senator KENNEor. Cannabis?
Mr. (;rrriNcEn. There had been some discussion of that yes.
Senator K EN EDY. And was heroin also used ?
Mr. Grrri Nova. I feroin used by CIA ?
Senator K EN N E�Y . No. In the west coast operation.
Mr. GirriNGEa. Absolutely not.
Senator KENNEDY. Now, to your knowledge. how were the drugs ad-
ministered to the unwitting suhjects?
Mr. Girt-Excl.:a. I Jut 'v no direct knowledge.
Senator Kuiy. Why did you go to t he safe houses?
Mr. Girrixt:Ea. les a very complicated story. Just in justification of
myself. this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had
erDiugh time to get it all straightened in my mind. so I ramble.
Senator KENNEDY. Well. you take your time and tell us in your own
words. We've got some time here.
Mr. Cirr-riNcr.a. My responsibilities which wonld involve any of the
period of time that you were talking al pout really was not directly
related to drugs at all. I was a psychologist charged with the responsi-
bility of trying to develop as notch information as I could on various
cultures. overseas cultures. anthropological type data, if yon follow
what I mean. I was also engaged in trying to work out ways and means
of assessing people and understanding people.
I originally became inv(d veil in this throtodi working on Chinese
culture. and over a series of time I was hit rod�red to the problem of
brainwashing. which is the thing that really was the most compelling
thing in rehitionship to this, and became charged with the responsi-
bility of trying to find out a little bit about interrogation techniques.
57
And among other things. we decided or 1 decided that one of the best
sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and inter-
view and become in with experienced police interrogators in
the country and experienced people who had real praetical knowledge
of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well
convineed after the experience of the hrainwashing problems coming
out of China. that it was the techniques. of the interrogators that were
causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth i� relationship
to this. rather than any kind of drugging and so forth. So we were
very much interested in interrogation tevliniques, and this led to me
being introduced to the agent in the west coast. and I began to talk to
him in connection with these interrogation terliniqiieS.
Senator KENNEDY. OK. Now, that is the agent that ran the tests
on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in.
correct?
Mr. GirrtxcEn. If I understand�would you say that again?
Senator KENNEDY. The name Morgan Hall has been�that is the
name that has been used.
Mr. GITTINGEn. Yes.
Senator KEN NEM'. And that is the agent that you met with.
31r. CirrriNuEa. Plat is right.
Senator KEN NEOY. And yon met at the safe house.
Mr. GirriNcEn. Yes. sir.
Senator Kr N E0Y. Whop) did you meet with in the safe house?
Mr. GirriNorn. This is the part that is hard for me to say. and I am
sorry that I have to. In eonneetion with some work that we were
doing% we needed Pt have some information on sexual habits. Morgan
Han provided in for me to talk to in connection with the sex
habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one
period of lime the safe house. as far as I was concerned, was used for
just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red
curtains.
Senator KEN Nein% Those were prostitutes. were they?
Mr. (1vr1NavR. Yes. sir.
Senator KaINNEoy. now many different times were yOU there that
you had similar�
Mr. GrrriNuEn. I couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that.
Four or five times.
Senator KENNET. Four or five times.
Mr. G ern cEn. Over�you remember now, the period that I'm talk-
ing about when I would have any involvement in this is from.about
nrit; to 1961. so it's about n 4- or 5-year period which is the only time
that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.
Senator Kr'. Eivr. Morn ii Hall make the arrangements for
the pros( it nt es to meet with you?
GirriNutaa. Yes, sir.
Senator 11-VNNEDy. Did the interviews that you had have anything to
do with drugs?
Mr. GyrrixnEr. Well. as T tried to explain earlier when this was
being discussed a little bit beforehand. again I think it is pretty hard
for most people now to reco,,nize bow little there was- known about
drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the
.0�01.-.f � -
drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequently, those of
US who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trying to
get as noich in ft itmat it as we could on t he subcult tire. the subculture
drug group-. and obviously the Bureau Of Narcotics represented a
means of doing this. Consequent ft. ot her types of things that were
involved in di-cussion- at I hat time would have to do with the under-
ground use of drugs. When I ant talking about this I am talking about
tho folkwaY,-ill terms of unwilling 1P-P of drug'''. Dill these Pe�1)1(' that
I wa- I alking in ha Vt. :1�y 1�fol'111:11 ion about this and on rare instances
they were able to tell no- about their 1.�.4�, anti in most eases this would
largely turn mu to he a Mickey Finn or something of that sort rather
than anything esoteric.
1 also was very much interested because we had relatively little
inform:it ion, belie% e it or not, at that time. in terms of the various
react 1,111!' that twig& were having to drugs. Therefore. these iteople
wen- very in fonnat lye in terms of they knew a great deal of informa-
tion about reactions.
Senatt ii K EN N EnY, At least you gathered---or am I corn-i-t in assmn-
ing that you gathered the impression that the prostitutes that you had
talked to were able to slip the drugs to people as I understand it. Did
you form any impression on that ?
Mr. GrrriNoEn.I certainly did not form the impression that they
did t hi- as a rule or �
Senator KENNEDY. But they had the knowledge.
I. Glyn sm:a. They had the knowledge or some of them had had
knowledge of this being done. But again. as it turned out. it was largely
in this area of knockout drop:.
Senator KENNEDY. Looking hack now did you form any impression
about how the Agency was act ually testing the broad spectrum of social
clas.ses in these safe houses ? With the large di-bur-al of cash in
small (plant it it's. l i Hi hills and the kinds of elaborate decorations and
two-way mirrors in the bedroluns and all the Vest. is thvre any question
in Your own mi�t1 what was going on in the safe houses, or the tech-
niques that were being used to administer these drugs?
Mr. Grimy:or:v. I find it ver,� difficult to answer that question. sir. I
bad absolutely no direct knowledge then, was a large TOIMIKT Of this. I
hail no knowledge that anyone other than�than Morgan 1 lall was in
any xvav involved in the unwitting administration of drugs.
ScItatur KEN NEDY. Bla t lid) Wifilla know. would he not ?
Mr. t;ri-riNuEn. 1 believe so, yes. sir.
Senator KEN NEM'. Collid wt. go into the Human Ecology Founda-
tion and talk about that and how it was used as an instrument in terms
of the support of research ?
Mr. GrrriNoEu. Yes. sir.
Senator KEN NED C y. Could You describe it to us? Could you describe
the 'Human Ecology Foundation. how it functioned and how it worked ?
Mr. Girrixorii. May I tell something about how it evolved, which I
think i- important ?
Senator KENNEDY. Sure.
Mr. Gm-FINGER. The Society for the Investigation of lit1111811 Ecol-
ogy_ so-called. was ae!ually a-1 am confused here now as to whether
I should name you names.
59
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we're not interested in names or institu-
tions, so we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in
arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the
institutions.
But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it
funetioned and what its purpose was.
Mr. (urrriNneit. Well, it was established to undertake research in the
general area of the behavioral sciences. It definitely had almost no
focus (o� interest in. say. drug-related type of activities except in a very
minor way. ttecause it was largely set up to attempt to gain a certain
amount of information and to .fund projects which were psychological.
sociological. anthropological in character. It was established in the
sense of a period of time that a lot of us who are in it wish we could
do it over again. but we were interested in trying to get together a panel
of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to
oversee and help in terms of developing the Society for the Investiga-
tion of Human Ecology type of program.
The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the
projects. Now, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of innocent peo-
ple who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology
money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything
for the CIA but they did get through this indirectly. They had no
knowledge that they were getting CIA money.
Senator KENNEDY. Over what period of time did this take place?
Mr. GITTINGER. As far as I was concerned, it was the period of time
ending in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out
in 1965. but I was not involved in this phasing out.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you give the range of the different sort of
individual projects of the universities- in which it was active?
Mr. CirrrrsoEa. Well, it would have as many as�I am very fuzzy
on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10. 20. 30.
Senator KENNEDY. After it made the grants. what was the relation-
ship of the Agency with the results of the studies? The Foundation
acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it
made the grants to these various research programs.
Mr. GITTINGF.R. Yes. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And that included eight universities as well as
individual researchers?
Mr. Gil-met:ea. Yes. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Then what follow-up was there to that. sir?
Mr. Girrixoen. Well. in every sense of the word. the organization
was run exactly like any other foundation. and it carried with it the
same thing in terms of making certain that the people that they had
given money to used it for the purpose for which it had been granted,
that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out. but
there were to strings attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason
they couldn't publish pnything thnt they put out.
Senator KtxxEny. What sort of budert are we talkinff about here?
Mr. Grrrreara. I honestly do not remember. I would feuess we are
talking in the realm of about $150.000 a year. but don't hold me to that.
because I don't know.
60
Senator KENNEDY. What is your view about such funding as a pro-
fessional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a univer-
sity. sir!
Mr. Grrmtomt. Well. obviously, sir. insofar as today there is no
question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this
there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude. and I do
know for a fact that we moved to start towards phasing out the So-
ciety for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecol-
ogy Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that
it was moving into an area but this would be compromised.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is commendable, both yonr attitude
and the reasons for it, but during that period of time it still was in-
volved in behavior research programs, as I understand it.
Mr. GrrriNnEn. Yes, sir. On its own, in connection with this, it
participated again, and these again were not CIA-directed projects.
but these were all thins which would theoretically contribute to the
treneral knowledge at the time where the things like the study of the
Hungarian refugees�obviously. the study of the Hungarian refugees
who (lime to this country after the Hungarian revolt was a very use-
ful exercise to try to get information about the personality character-
istics of the Communists and so forth.
Senator KENNEDY. Were there other foundations that were doing
similar kinds of work?
Ms. GIT-raNCER. Not to my knowledge. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. You believe�
tleriiNcr.a. You mean. CIA. other CIA!
Senator KF.NNEDY. Right.
Mr. GrrrtxGrn. Well, my answer is in the sense that I know of no
other CIA foundations. no. There were, of course. other foundations
doing similar kinds of work in the United States.
Senator KENNEDY. Have you heard of the Psychological Assess-
ments Foundation?
Mr. (4 rrrTNcrit. I certainly have.
Senator KENNEDY. What was that? What function did that hare?
Mr. CorrrvoEn. Now, this was bringing us up to a different era. I
believe the functions of that organization have nothing whatsoever
to do with the things that are being talked about here while I was
associated with it.
Senator TiENNEny. Rather than getting into the work. it was another
foundation. was it not ? It was another foundation supported by the
Agency?
Mr. Girrrvora. What. the Psychological Assessment?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Mr. Grrrivora. No. sir, it was not.
Senator Krxxr.ny. It did not get any support at all from the
Agency?
Mr. Orrrusora. Oh, yes. sir. It did get support. hut it was a business
firm.
Senator KENNEDY. It was a business but it got support from the
Agency?
Mr. Girrmora. It got money from it. Nit it definitely was not in
NIKULTRA or in any way associated with this.
61
Senator KENSFJ1Y. All right. T want to thank you for your helpful
testimony. Mr. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I
think you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think
it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards
now from what they were 25 years ago. and I think you have responded
very fairly and completely to the inquiries, and I think with a good
deal of feeling about it.
You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's
interest. so I want to thank you very much for your statement and
for your helpful timeliness.
Mr. GirriNnErt. Thank you. sir.
Senator Ixourv. Senator Case?
Senator CASE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had
another committee that I had to complete the hearing with this morn-
ing before I got here.
I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreci-
ate Your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on
one point. and that is. it relates to a story in the press yesterday about
part of this program involving the funding of a grant at a *foreign
university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to the addi-
tional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your
standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen. if you will.
Mr. Gm/INGER. I will say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter
stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money
outside the United States when it was CIA money. I can categorically
state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the
way aeross of the human ecology functions, but to my knowledge. and
this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting
money from CIA. and they were not asked to contribute anything to
CIA as such.
Seiroor CAsE. It would lie interesting to try to examine this by turn-
ing the thing around and thinking. what we would think if this hap-
pened from a fiireign official agency to our own university. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator l�voi�ric. Senator Schweiker.
Senator Sciiwni:Eri. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Goldman. I wonder if you would tell us what your training and
educational background is?
Dr. Gow3tAx. I have already given a biography for the record.
Senator Sciiwrihra. I have not seen it. Who has it ? Is it classified ?
We may have it for the record. but may I ask you to briefly describe
your training and background for 11,, now? I hope it is no secret.
Dr. GolomAx. Well. I was told if I was asked this to say that. I was
told that by your staff people. but I have no objection to telling you.
I am a resident front Pennsylvania. southwest Pennsylvania, Lan-
caster County. I went to Penn State. and I am in nutrition.
Senator seilWEIKElt. In what ?
Dr. Gia.nmAx. Nutrition.
Senator SWIIWEIKE11. Were You in charge of a section or segment of
the CIA in your past capneit .?
Dr. GoLomAx. During the time I was with that organization. I was
in charge of one small section of it. one small segment of it; yes.
62
Senator SCHWEIKER. What was the function or purpose of that sec-
tion that you headed ?
Dr. GommAN. To provide support for the other parts of the division.
Senator SCHWEIKEn. Where in the chain of command would that put
you in relation to Dr. Gottlieb?
Dr. Gomm AN. l'ret ty far down tlw line.
Senator Sr3IWMEER. Mr. Gittinger. I would just like to ask you a
few questions. We appreciate your frankness and candor with the com-
mittee. and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not
quite clear on t wo matters that Were raised earlier. First. were the safe
houses we were talking about here used on occa.sion by the prostitutes
you referred to?
i. GITTINGER. I really have not the slightest idea.
Senator Settler:tern. Were the prostitutes used in any way to slip
the rust milers drugs for (Ibsen-to ion purposes?
Mr. C; ern Nom. Not to my direct knowledge.
Senator Scowl:teem Would you have been in a position to know the
answer to either of these questions?
Mr. CrenNoya. May I say. probably not, and may I make an aside
to explain a little bit of this. please. sir?
Senator Setiwroira. Mr. Gittinger. a moment ago you mentioned
brainwashing teehniques. as one area that you had. I guess. done some
work in. I Tow would you characterize tilt state of the art of brain-
washing today? Who has the most expertise in this field. and who is
or is not doing it in terms of other governments?
During the Korean Avar there was a lot of serious discussion about
bra i�wa-hing techniques being used by the North Koreans. and I am
interested in iindine� out what the state of the art is today. as you see it.
Mr. Gem Non:. Well, of conrse, there has been a great deal of work
on this. and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that
as far as I knew. by 19b1.1902.. it was at least proven to my satis-
faction that brainwashing. o railed. is some kind of an esoteric device
where drug:, or mind.abeeinor kinds of conditions and so forth were
useil. did in 41 cxist t.ven though -The Manchurian Candidate" as a
movie really set us back a lonz time. because it made something im-
possible look plausible. 1)o von follow what I mean? But by 19C.-2 and
the general idea that We WPM abb. to come up with is that brain-
wa-hinf: was largely n proeess of isolating a human being, keeping
hini out of contact. putting him under long stress in relationship to
interviewing and interneett ion. end that they could produce any
change that way without having to resort to any kind of esoteric
means. �
Senator SCIIWEIK vit. Are there ways that we can ascertain this from
a distance when we see a captive prisoner either go on television, in
a pine oeTaph. or at a press conference? In other words. are there cer-
tain signs that you have learned to recognize from your technical
background. to tell when brainwashing has occurred ? Or is that very
difficult to do?
Mr. GrrnNorn. Ti is difficult to do. I think it is posit& now in terms
of looking at a picture of somebody who has been in enemy hands for
a long period of time. We can get some pretty good ideas of what kind
of circumstances he has been under. if that is what you mean.
63
Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Ixot-rE. Thank you very much.
Before adjourning the hearings. I would like to have the record
show that D. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated
with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning
voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.
Gentlemen. I realize that this experience may have been an unhappy
one and possibly a painful one. Therefore. we thank you very much
for participating this morning. We also realize that the circumstances
of that time differed very much from this day, and possibly the na-
tional attitude, the national political attitude condoned this type of
activity. So. we have not asked von to come here as persons who have
committed crimes but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying
this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we
thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working
with you further in this case.
Thank you very much.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman. I would like also to thank the
witnesses. These are difficult matters, and I think all of us are very
grateful.
Senator SEIIWEINER. I think the witnesses should know that though
it may not always seem that way, what we are trying to do is to probe
the past and look at the policies of the past to affect the future. I think
our emphasis really is on the future, not the past. but it is important
that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation
for the future. I hope that all of the witnesses who did come before us
voluntarily this morning. including Admiral Turner respect the fact
that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it
should be looked at in that light.
Senator Kr.sxriff. I think that is the spirit in which we have had
these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and
others. Gottlieb knows the information and can best respond, and we
are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to get
Mr. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to cooperating
with Senator Inouye and the other members of the committee in get-
ting the final chapter written on this. but we want to thank you very
much for your appea ranee here.
Senator IxorrE. The hearing will stand in recess, subject to the call
ofthe Chair.
[Whereupon. at 12:12 p.m.. the hearing was recessed, subject to the
call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX A
XVII. TESTING AM) USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-
CAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Under its mandate 1 the Select Committee has studied the testing and
use of chemical and biological agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed
descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence agencies in-
volving chemical and biological agents vill be included in a separately
published appendix to the Senate Select Committee's report. This sec-
tion of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their
monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has
revealed about the relationships among the intelligence agencies and
about their relations with other government agencies and private in-
stitutions and individuals.=
Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemi-
cal and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led
to the development of a defensive program designed to discover tech-
niques for American intelligence agencies to detect and counteract
chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became
secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information
from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.
Research and development programs to find materials which could
be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and
early 1930s. These experimental programs originally included testing
of drugs involving willing human subjects, and culminated in tests
using unwitting. nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were de-
signed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biological
agents when used operationally against individuals unaware that they
had received a drug.
The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the in-
telligence agencies administering them. Few people. even within the
agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either
the executive branch or Congress were ever informed of them. The
highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in
part by an observation made by the CIA Inspector Oeneral that, "the
knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi-
Senate Resolution 21 directs the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities to investigate a number of issues:
"(a) Whether agencies within the intelligence community conducted illegal
domestic activities (Section 2(1) and (2) )
"(b1 The extent to which agencies within the intelligence community cooper-
ate (Section 2(4) and (8)1 ;
"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intel-
ligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11)1 ;
"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citi-
zens (Section 2(13))."
'The details of these programs may never be known. The programs were highly
Compartmented. Few records were kept. What little dpcumentation existed for
the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.
(385)
(05)
6t;
386
ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles
and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions."3
The research and development program, and particularly the co-
vert testing programs, resulted in inassve abridgments of the rights
of American citizens, sometimes with tralric consequences. The deaths
of two Americans 3a can be attributed to these programs; other partici-
pants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual ef-
fects. While some controlled testing of these substances might be de-
fended, the nature of the tests' their scale, and the fact that they were
continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration
of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a funda-
mental disregard for the value of human life.
The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chem-
ical and biological agents also raise serious questions about the ade-
quacy of command and control procedures within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships
among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and
private institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrative
controls were waived for programs involving chemical and biological
agents to protect. their security. According to the head of the Audit
Branch ,.71 the CIA. these waivers produced "gross administrative failures.- They prt nted the CIA's internal review mechanisms (the
Office of General Co5.asel. the Inspector General. and the Audit Staff)
from adequately supervising the programs. In general. the waivers had
the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative con-
trols and less effective internal review for controvecsial and highly
sensitik e projects than those governing normal Agency activities.
The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers
of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of corn-
partmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the
CIA's Medical Staff from the principal research and testing program
employing chemical and biological agents.
It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing
and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA
component involved.
Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by juris-
dictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of information which initially
characterized the programs disappeared. Military testers withheld in-
Tormat ion from the CIA. ignoring suggestions for coordination from
their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to
the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate
was conspicuously manifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal
'CIA Inspector General's Survey of TSD. 1957, p. 217.
" On January 5. 19:1 Mr Harold Mauer died of circulatory collapse and heart
failure following an intravenous injection of a synthetic mescaline derivative
while a sul,jeet of tests conducted by New York State Psychiatric Institute under
a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigation
into drug testing by U.S. intelligence agencies focused on the testing of LSD. how-
ever, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Amy Inspector General's
Report. issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances of Mr. Blaner's
death Ilis death was directly atributahle to the administration of the synthetic
mescaline derivative.
67
387
their overseas testing program. which included surreptitious admin-
istration of LSD. from the CIA. Learning of the Army's program,
the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obtain details of it.
The-decision to institute one of the Army's LSD field testing projects
had been based, at least in part, on the finding that no long-term resid-
ual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The
CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the
surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well
have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal
program.
The development, testing, and use of ch, ':,iical and biological agents
by intelligence agencies raises serious questions about the relationship
between the intelligence community and foreign governments, other
agencies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and in-
dividuals. The questions raised range from the legitimacy of American
complicity in actions abroad which violate American and foreign laws
to the possible compromise of the integrity of public and private insti-
tutions used as cover by intelligence agencies.
A. THE PROGRAMS INVESTIGATED
I. Project CHATTER
Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of
1947. Responding to reports of "amazing results- achieved by the
Soviets in using -truth drugs.- the program focused on the identifica-
tion and testing of. such drugs for use in interrogations and in the
recruit men- of agent s. The research included laboratory experiments
on animals and hum � subjects involving Anabasis aphyllo. scopola-
mine, and niescaline n. ,irder to determine their speech-inducing quali-
ties. Overseas experiments were conducted as part. of the project.
The project expanded substantially during the Korean War, and
ended shortly after the war, in 1953.
2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
The 'earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of
chemical and biological agents. Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by
the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:
(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent
unauthorized extraction of information from them by known
means. (b) investigating the possibility of control of an in-
dividual by application of special interrogation techniques,
(c) memory enhancement. and (d) establishing defensive
means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.4
As a result of interrogations conducted overseas during the project.
ar,other goal was added�the evaluation of offensive uses of unconven-
tl.mal interrogation techniques. including hypnosis and drugs. In
'August 1951. the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTI-
CHOKE included in-house experiments on interrogation techniques,
conducted "under medical and security controls which would ensure
4 CIA memorandum to the Select Committee, "Behavioral Drugs and Testing,"
2/11/75.
68
388
that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the ex ri-
ments." Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium
pent ot ha) and hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of
the subjects were also part of ARTICHOKE.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI ). which studied scientific
advances by hostile powers. initially led BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE
efforts. In 19:a overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was trans-
ferred from OS) to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), pre-
decessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Serv-
ices and Medial Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would
retain liaison function with other government agencies.6 The change
in leadership from an intelligence unit to an operating unit appar-
ently reflected, a change in emphasis; from the study of actions by
hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes,
of spe,ial interrogation techniques�primarily hypnosis and truth
serums.
Representatives from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE
met almost monthly to discus-s their progress. These discussions in-
cluded the planning of overseas interrogations" as well as further
exporiment at ion in the 'U.S.
Information about project ARTICHOKE after the fall of 1933
is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project et-hied in 1956, but evi-
dence sug!,est, that Office of Security and Office of Medical Services
use of -special interrogation" techniques continued for several years
thereafter.
3. 31K.V.4 OM/
NIKNAOMI was another major CIA proIrrarn in this area. In 1967,
the CIA summarized the. purposes of NIKNAOMI:
(a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandes-
tine operational requirements.
(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal ma-
terials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Di-
vision].
(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique
items for the dissemination of biological and chemical ma-
terials.
(d) To provide for the required surveillance. teing. up-
grading. and evaluation of materials and items in order to
assure absence of defects and complete predictability of re-
sults to be expected under operational conditions.'
'Under an atrreement reached with the Army in 1952- the Snecial
Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in
developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery
lienrictrartrthra from Robert TaTfor. 0/DIVP to fbe Akalstant Deputy (In-
spection and Security I and Chief of the Medical Staff, 3'22152.
"Memorandum from H. "Mar,han Chudn-c11. AQ,4stant Director. Scientific Intel-
lifrenee, to the Deputy Direetor/Plan ITIT)1'I Preiect ARTICHOKE," 8/23,152-
� -Pronrect Report, Project ARTICHOKE " 1/12/53.
� Memorandum from Chief. TSH/Riniogical Branch to Chief. TSD "MKNA071/411 :
Fundiur Ohieetirpc., and Aceometict,....nt.� inctSin:. D. 1. For a fuller descrire
Lion of NIKNA0.111 and the relationship between CIA and SOD. see P. 360 If.
69
389
systems. By this agreement, CIA acquired the knowledge, skill, and
facilities of the Army to develop biological weapons suited for CIA
use.
SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and pills con-
taining several di trerent biological agents which could remain potent
for weeks or months. SOD also developed a special gun for firing
darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapaci-
tate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to
consciousness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop
a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also physically transferred
to CIA personnel biological agent.; in "bulk"' form, and delivery
devices, including sonic containing biological agents.
In addition to the CIA's interest in biological weapons for use
against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of biological agents
against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the CIA stated:
Three methods and systems for carrying out a covert attack
against crops and causing severe crop loss have been devel-
oped and evaluated under field conditions. This was accom-
plished in anticipation of a requirement which was later
developed but was subsequently scrubbed just prior to put-
ting into action."
- MKNAOMI was terminated in 1970. On November 25. 1969. Presi-
dent Nixon renounced the use of ally form of biological weapons that
kill or incapacitate and ordered the disposal of existing stocks of bac-
teriological weapons. On February 14. 1970. the President clarified the
extent of his eaCier order and indicated that toxins�chemicals that
are not living organisms but are produced by living organisms�were
considered biological weapons subject to his previous directive and
were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of
material held for the CIA by SOD. a CIA scientist acquired approxi-
mately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort De-
trick which were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went
undetected for five years."
4. MKULTRA
MKULTRA was the principal CM program involving the research
and development of chemical and biological agents. It was "con-
cerned with the research and development of chemical. biological,�and
radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine oper-
ations to control human behavior.- 11
In January 1973, MK ULTRA records were destroyed by Technical
Services Division personnel actin it on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb. Chief of TD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Direc-
tor Helms has confirmed, that in orderin,r the records destroyed. Dr.
Gottlieb wris carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.
MKULTRA began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy
Director for Plans. Richard Helios. to the DCI. outlining a special
1" Ibid. p.2.
Senate Select Committee, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vo. 1.
uMemoranduni from the CIA Injector General to the Director, 7/26/63.
70
390
fir, :nig mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and develop-
ment projects that studied the use of biological and chemical materials
in altering human behavior. The projects involved:
Research to develop a capability in the covert use of bio-
logical and chemical materials. This a ';ea involves the produc-
tion of various physiological conditions which could support
present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the of-
fensive potential. the development of a comprehensive capa-
bility in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare
giN es us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical
potential. thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe
who might not be as restrained in the use of these tech-
niques as we are."
MKI'LTRA was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the
lines pr(posed by ADD') IIelms.
Pail of the rationale for the establishment of this special fund-
ing tnedianini was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's
survey of :MK-ULTRA in 19113 noted the following reasons for this
sensitivit y7
a. 1;7.-eareli maiiipulation of human behavior is con-
sidered by ma 7.� Authorit ies in medicine and related fields
to la. 'profe.:sio!. ,:e unethical. therefore the reputation of
professional participants in the MKI-LTRA.program are on
oceasion in jeopardy.
Ii. MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality
implicit in the original charter.
r. A final phase of the testing of :11KFLTRA products
place-, the rights and interests of U.S. citi7ens in jeopardy.
d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA aetiv-
ity could induce serious adver-e reaction in U.S. public
opinion. as well as stininlate offensive and defensive action
in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services."
OV(T the ten-year life of Ow program, many 'add it ional avenues to
the eontrol of human behavior- were designated as appropriate foi
invest i;_rat loot under the 11K 1.1.11? A charter. These include "radiation.
eleetrosho,k. various fields of psychology. psychiatry. sociology, and
anthropolterv. graphohavv. harassment substances, and paramilitary
il!yiee. and "
The i.e.:eat-eh and development of materials to be used for altering
:einem la.havior eonsisted of three phases: first. the search for ma-
terials suitable for study: second laboratory testinn on voluntary
human saliipets in various types of in.it it lit ions third. the application
of 'AIKI-LTRA materials in normal life settinns.
The search for -nit able materials WaQ entidurted throw+ standing
a rra nrrement. with snwialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses,
hospitals. state and federal institutions, and private research organi-
Momorandilm from ATIDP FP-1mQ to Del Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab A. PP 1-2.
u Ttoport on NIKULTRA,19a3. PP. 1-2.
" Jj4 p. 4.
71
391
zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made
under ostensible research foundation auspices, thereby concealing the
CIA's interest from the specialist's institution.
The next phase of the MKULTRA program involved physicians,
toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general
hospitals. and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the
basic researeh phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.
One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of
Mental Health. This study was intended to test various drugs. includ-
ing' hallueinogenies. at the NINTH Addiction Research Center in Lex-
ington. Kentucky. The "Lexington .Rehabilitat ion Center,- as it. was
then called, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug
violations.
The test subjects were volunteer prisoners who, after taking a brief
physical examination and signing a general consent form, were admin-
istered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the
program. the addiets were provided with the drug of their addiction.
LSD was one of the materials tested in the AIKULTRA program.
The final phase of LSD testing involved surreptitious administration
to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life settings by under-
cover officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the
The rationale for such testing was "that testing of materials under
accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reac-
tions and attributions that ma v occur in operational situations.""
Accordiwr to the CIA. the advantage of the relationship with the
Bureau was that
test stibjects could be souglit and cultivated within the setting
of narcotics control. Sonic subjects have been informers or
mend wrs of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bu-
reau of Narcotics' has obtained resolts of otter:1601ml value
through the tests. 0/, thi other hand, On eircetir(ness of the
oh ihrb7,',lii.,1N at all social ic rils. ln'ah and low,
nate'r, Ann r;ran and fore;gic, is of great significaner and
test #'n9 has. o pv if ',ran d u, a raKety of indir;daals Ir;the'n
these eat( 90,7'4 Emphasit, added.] "
A special procedure. designated MK DELTA, was established to
govern the use of il K ULTRA materials abrrod. Snell materials were
nsed on a number of occasions. Because MKULTRA records were
desteoved. it is impossible to reconstruct the operational use of
MNI-LTIZA materials by the CIA overseas: it has been determined
that the use of these materials abroad began in 19. and possibly as
early as 19.-A
Druo's were used primarily as an aid to interrogations. but
mKrunz.� 'MKDELTA materials were also used for harassment.
discredit ing. or di s:il lii 1;.* purl loses. ecord in!, to an litspeetor General
Survey of the Teobnical ServiceF. Division of the CIA in 19:)7�an
inspection which did not discover the MKI' LTl t Project involving
the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting. nonvolunteer
" p. 21.
"Ibid., pp. 11-12.
72
392
S
subjects�the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and
they had been used in six different operations on a total of thirty-three
subjects." By 1963 the number of operations and subjects had in-
creased substantially.
In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General
survey of the Technical Services Division. a member of the Inspector
General's staff, John Vance, learned about 111KULTRA and about
the project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to un-
witting, nonvolunta7 human subjects. As a result of the discovery
and the Inspector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted
and much tighter administrative controls were imposed on the pro-
gram. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly
each budget year until its complete termination in the late 1960s.
5. The Testing of LSD by the Army
There were three major phases in the Army's testing of LSD. In the
first. LSD was administered to more than 1,000 American soldiers who
volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the
second phase. Material Testing Program EA 1729, 95 volunteers re-
ceived LSD in clinical experiments designed to evaluate potential
intelligence uses of the drug. In the third phase, Projects THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects
were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field
tests.
B. CIA DREG TESTING PROGRAMS
1. The Rationale for the Testing Programq
The late 1940s and early 1930s were marked by concern over
the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union. the People's
Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States
concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers
was acute. The belief that hostile powers had used chemical and bio-
logical agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed
to harass, disable, or kill Allied personnel created considerable pres-
sure for a "defensive- program to investigate chemical and biological
agents so that the intelligence community could understand the mech-
anisms by which these substances worked and how their effects could
be defeated.''
Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had received
reports that the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to pro-
duce LSD: and that the Soviet Union had attempted to purchase the
world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA officer who was deeply
involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times:
"[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening
all of this was to us at the time. particularly after the drug scene has
become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this country as it did.
But we were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we
' Ibid, 19717, p 201.
"Thus an offil�er in the Office of Security of the CIA stres..-.I the "urgency of
the discovery of techniques and method that would permit our personnel. in the
event of their capture hy the enemy. to resist or defeat enemy Interrogation.-
(Minutes of the ARTICHOKE conference of 10/22/53 )
73
393
had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possi-
bilities if used wrongly." '9
But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and
biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques . . .
for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or
not" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities and
mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." 20 One
Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain con-
trol of bodies whether they were willing or not" in the process of re-
moving personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. 2' In
other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and
maintain in operational readine.,s materials which could be used to
harass. disable, or kill specific targets."
Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries provided
the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defen-
sive to an offensive orientation. As the Chief of the Medical Staff of
the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 195:2:
There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable inter-
rogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical
duress. electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their ene-
mies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from be-
coming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this
mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the
development of these techniques, but must be cautious to
maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that
could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands."
In order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, sub-
stantial programs for the testing and use of chemical and biological
agents�including projects involving the surreptitious administra-
tion of LSD to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels,
high and low, native American and foreign--were conceived, and
implemented. These programs resulted in substantial violations of the
rights of individuals within the United States.
29 Testimony of CIA officer. 11 '21 75. p.33
" Memorandum from the Director of Security to ARTICHOKE representa-
tives. Subject : "A F. Resta tement of Progra
" A ClloK E memorandum, 7.3713
" The Inspector General's Report of 1957 on the Technical Services Division
noted that -six specific pi-4011(1s have been de% elotked and are available for oper-
ational use. Three of them are discrediting and disabling materials which can tie
administered unwittingly and 1aq-wit the exercise of a measure of control over the
actii.fis of the subject."
A memorandum for the Chief. TSD. Biological Branch to the Chief. TSD.
10/167. described two of the objectives of the CIA's Project NIKNAOMI as:
"to stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal MU terials for the specific use of
TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for
the dissemination of biological and chemical ma terals."
"Memorandum from the Chief of the Medici/ Starr. 1/25/32.
74
394
Although the CIA recognized these effects of L.`.4D to unwitting in-
dividuals within the United States, the project continued.24 As the
Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Direc-
tor. of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessa-
tion of unwitting testing:
While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any pro-
gram which tends to intrude upon an individuals private
and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the
Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current
on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior,
and maintain an offensive capability,-.2'
There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial
aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.
The nature and extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even
DCI McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program in-
volving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1963. It was
deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the Ameri-
can people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957:
Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations
from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these ac-
tivities from the American public in general. The knowledge
that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities
would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
circles and would la. detrimental to the accomplishment
of its niiion.2.
2. Th( Nati( of Dr. Frank (Thion
The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the
death of 1)r. Frank Olson. a civilian employee of the Army, who died
on NovendWr '27. 19.'4. 11 is death followed his part ieipation in a CIA
experiment with 1,S1). As part of this experiment. Olson unwittingly
received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau
he (frank on November 19, 19:)3. The drug had been placed in the bottle
by a CIA officer. Dr. Robert Lashbrook. as part of an experiment
he and 1)r. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and
CI A sHent ist s.
Shortly after this experiment. Olson exhibited symptoms of para-
noia and schizoidirenia. A venni parried by I 4. Lashbrook. Olson sought
Fie assiA mice in Nem York City from a physician. 1)r. Harold
Abramson. whose research on I.SD had been funded indirectly by
I he ('IA. h. in New York for treatment. Olson fell to his death
front a tenth story window in the Statler
s' Even during the di.cusqions which led to the termination of the unwittinz
testinz. the turnett clown the option nf halting such tests within the U.S.
and continuing' Milli abroad despite the fact that the Tevhnical Services Divi-
sion had contlneleti numerous operations rthroad makinE use of 1.SI). The IIDP
nit' thk deeision nn the basis of security notim: that the pttst efforts overseas
had resulted in -makin;.: muni.er of f,,rvisrn nati�inal, witting of
our role ii) the very sen-iti�e tiethitv " I.Mt�mor:intluni for the Deputy Director
of rent fromi the Itcputy Iiirector for l'hins. 12 17.1..3, p. 2.)
/hod . pp 2 3
" I sarvey of TS1), 197�7, p. 217.
75
395
Background.�Olson, an expert in aerobiology who was assigned
to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biolog-
ical Center at Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three
primary functions:
(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations
to biological attack;
(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological
weapons; and
(3) biological research for the CIA."
Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both
the Army and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson's immediate
superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with
Olson. According to Colonel Ruwet : "As a professional man ... his
ability . . . was outstanding." 2" Colonel Ruwet stated that "during
the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing which
would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind."" Dr. Lash-
brook, who had monthly contacts with Olson from early 1952 until
the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD,
"as far as I know, he was perfectly normal..." This assessment is in
direct contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emo-
tional stability made in CIA internal memoranda written after
Olson's death.
b. The Eaperimunt.�On November 18, 19,53. a group of ten scien-
tists from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review
and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, Mary-
land. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Serv-
ices Staff. The Detrick representatives were all from the Special
Operations Division.
According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division
participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment would be
desirable." 31 This account directly contradicts Vincent Ruwet's recol-
lection. Ruwet recalls no such discussion, and has asserted that he
would remember any such discussion because the SOD participants
would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects."
In May. 1953. Richard Helms. Assistant DDP, held a staff meeting
which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting
Helms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he
should be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." " In
addition, the then DDP, Frank Wisner, sent a memorandum to TSS
stating the requirement that the IMP personally approve the use of
LSD. Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment," securing the ap-
" Staff summary of Vincent Ruwet Interview, S /13 /75. p. 3.
Memorandum of Col. Vincent Ruwet, To Whom It May Concern, no date.
p,2.
" Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
"Joseph B. Treaster, New York Time', 7/19/75, p. 1.
Memorandum for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick. 12/1/53. p. 1.
r Rowel (staff summary I. :1 p.6.
� Inspector General Diary, 12/2/7.3.
Ibid. Dr. Gottleib has testified that lie does not remember either the meeting
With Ilelms nor the Wisner memorandum. (Gottlieb. 10/1S/75. p. 16.)
76
396
proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor
the DDP specifically authorized the experiment in which Dr. Olson
participated.33
According to Gottlieb." a "very small dose- of LSD was placed in
a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday.
November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Lash-
brook. All but two of the SOD participants received L$D. One did
not drink the other had a heart condition.3 About twenty minutes
after they finished their Cointreau. Gottlieb informed the other par-
ticipantn that they had received LSD.
Dr. Gottlieb stated that -up to the time of the experiment," he
observed nothing unusual in Olson's behavior.3'� Once the experiment
was underway. Gottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on
the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and they
could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation."
The meeting continued until about 1:00 a.m., when the participants
retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others,
complained of "wakefulness- during the night." According to Gottlieb
on Friday morning "aside from some evidence of fatigue, I observed
nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general be-
havior.- 39 Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at
breakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnormal under the
� circumstances.- 4�
C. Th4 7'n-elm-O.�The following Monday. November .23. Olson
was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7:30 a.m. For the
next two days Olson's friends and family attempted to reassure him
�� and help him "snap out- of what appeared to be a serious depression.
On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and. after an hour long con-
"Dr. Gottlieb testified that "given the information we knew up to this time,
and based on a lot of our own self-administration. we thought it was a fairly
benign substance in terms of potential harm." This is in conflict not only with Mr.
Helms' statement but also with material which had been supplied to the Technical
Services Staff. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD which
was supplied to TSD. Henry Beecher described the dangers involved with such
research in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland
came when I raised the question as to any accidents which had arisen from
the use of LSD-25 Ile said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned out
this answer could he called overly positive, for later on in the evening I was
discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl. Jr.. a psychiatrist in Bleulera's
Clinic in Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stotil, when asked
the same question. replied. 'yes.' and added spontaneously. 'there is a case
Professor Rot bland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who bad been
subject to depression to some extent took LSD-25 in an experiment and became
severely and suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later.
While the connection is not definite, common knowledge of this could hardly
have allowed the positive statement Rothland permitted himself. This case is
a warning to us to avoid engaging subjects who are depressed, or who have been
subject to depression.�" Dr Gottlieb testified that he had no remilection of
either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottlieb telstituony,
1019/75, p. 75.)
"Memorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record. 1172S/53, p. 2.
Lashl,n�ok ( staff summary t. 7:39. T. p. 3.
4" Got tlieb Memorandum. 12/7 /53. p. 2.
"Edwards memorandum. 11/2s 53. p. 3.
" Gottlieb memorandum. 12/7.'53. p. 3.
" Ruwet memorandum. p. 3.
397
versation. it was decided that medical assistance for Dr. Olson was
desirable.4'
Ruwet then called Lashbrook and informed him that "Dr. Olson
was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention.- 42
Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet
to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to
Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York
at about 2:30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.
At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and immunologist
practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in psychia-
try. but was associated with research projects supported indirectly
by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
in the early 1905.43 Silice Olson needed medical help. they turned to
Dr. Abramson as the doctor closest to Washington who was experi-
enced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.
Ruwet. Lashbrook. and Olson remained in New York for two days of
consultations with Abramson. On Thursday. November 26, 1953, the
three flew back to Washington so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving
with his family. En route from the airport Olson told Ruwet that he
was afraid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion, it was de-
cided that Olson and Lashbrook Nyould return to New York. and that
Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to MN. Olson."
Lashbro,,k and Olson flew back to New York the same day, again
for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night in a
Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with
Abramson. In further discussions with Abramson. it was agreed
that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an
institution closer to his home.4'
d. Th( Ii-atli.�Tiecaue they could not obtain air transportation for
a return trip on Friday night. Lashhrook and Olson made reservations
for Saturday- morning and checked into the Statler Hotel. Between
the time they checked in and 10:00 p.m.; they watched television.
visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.
According to Lashbrook. Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy
the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed,
and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment.""
After dinner Lashbrook and Olson watched television for about
an hour. and at 11:1)0. Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that
"he felt more relaxed and contented than he had since [they] came
to New York." 41 Olson then left a call with the hotel operator to wake
them in the morning. At approximately 2:34) A.111. Sat urday. Novem-
ber 2S. Lashbrook was awakened by a loud "crash of glass." In his
report on the incident. he stated only that Olson "had crashed through
the closed window blind and the closed window and he fell to his death
from the window of our room on the 10th floor.- 48
" lb id.. p. 4.
42 Lashbrook mi.moranduin. 12/7:53. p. 1.
"Staff summary of Dr. Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.
" La:librook memorandum, 12/7 .53. p. 3.
" Atirlmson memorandum, 12;4 /53.
La...librook memorandum. 12/7/53. p. 3.
p. 4.
"Ibid.
78
398
Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to his death, Lash-
brook telephoned Gottlieh at his home and informed him of the in-
cident. 4� Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson's death
at approximately 2:45 a.m." Lashbrook then called the hotel desk
and reported the incident to the operator there. �Lashbrook called
Abramson and informed him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lash-
brook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely." but later
changed his mind and agreed to assist Lashbrook."
Shortly thereafter. uniformed police officers and some hotel em-
ployees came to Lashbrook's room. Lashbrook told the police he didn't
know why Olson had conunitted suicide, but he did know that Olson
"suffered from ulcers.""
e. Th A.ftermath.�Following Dr. Olson's death. the CIA made
a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits,
but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his
demise. The Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the
death being connected with the CIA. and supplied complete. cover for
Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.
After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investiga-
tion of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this investiga-
tion. the General Counsel wrote the Inspector General. stating:
I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude
on the part of TSS representatives to the way this expen-
merit was combicted and the remarks that this is just one of
the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not
eliminate the need for taking risks. but I do believe, espe-
cially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the
prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to mini-
mize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable
negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned
after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest
also revealed the failure to observe normal and reasonable
precautions."
As a result of the investigation DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal
letter to the Chief of Technical Operations of the Technical Services
Staff who had approved the experiment criticizing hint for "poor
31' idg-inent ... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwitting
basis and without proximate medical safeguards" 54 Dulles also sent
s a letter to Dr. Gottlieb. Chief of the Chemical Division of the Tech-
nical Services Staff. criticizino him for recommending the "unwitting
application of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give sufficient
emphasis for medical collaboration and for the proper consideration
of the rights of the individual to whom it was being administered." 55
'CIA Field Office Report. 12 '3/53. P. 3.
Ruwet Memorandum. p. 11.
4' CIA Field Office Report. /2/3/53. p. 3.
� " Nlemora whim from the Goneral Counsel to the Tmkpect or General, 1/4/54.
" Memorandum from PCI Chief. Terhnicol Opera Hons., Th.6=, 2/12/54.
Memorandum from I WI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12 TO.
79
399
The letters were hand carried to the individuals to be read and
returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence to Mr. Helms instructed him to in-
form the individuals that : "These are not reprimands and no person-
nel file notation are being made." 56
Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them
as such, these notes were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participa-
tion in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparent
effeot on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals involved.
3. The Surreptitious AdminiNtration of LSD to Unwitting Non-
Volunteer Human Subjects by thc CIA After the Death of Dr.
Olson
The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as sonic argued at the time.
as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new sub-
stances. It might be argued that 1,SD was thought to be benign.
After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious admin-
istration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated 57 a
project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD to non-
volunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous individuals
in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their
informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary
follow-up to determine any long-term effects.
Prior to the Olson experiment. the Director of Central Intelligence
had approved MKULTRA. a research program designed to develop
a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent
materials- In the proposal describing MKULTRA Mr. Helms. then
ADI >P. wrote the Director that :
we intend to investigate the development of a chemical mate-
rial wItich causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state.
the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted �
for each individual. This material could potentially aid in
diserediting individuals eliciting information, and implant-
ing suggestions and other forms of mental control."
On February 12. 194. the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency wrote TSS officials criticizing them for "poor judgment- in
administering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate
medical safeguard,:* to Dr. )1::on and for the lack of "proper consid-
eration of the rights of the individual to whom it was being admin-
istered.- 59 On the same day. the Inspector General reviewed a report
on SIlbproiCCt Number 3 of MRULTIZA, in which the same TSS
officers. who had just received letters from the Director were quoted
as stating that one of the purposes of Subproject Number 3 was to
Note from IOC' to Richard Helms. 2/13 /54.
The 1963 It; Report, which described the project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD. placed the project beginning in 197.5. Other CIA docu-
ments reveal that it was in existence as early as February 1954. The CIA has
told the Committee that the project beg In in 1953 and that the experiment which
led to Dr. Olson's death was part of the project.
" Memorandum from ADDP ilotit, to Is-1 I/1111PS. 4/3 '53. tab A. p 2.
" Memorandum from 1111 to Sidney Gottlieb, '..!/"1'.! '54 ; and memorandum from
DCI to Chief of Operations, TSS, 2/12;54.
SO
400
"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after
having been given a drug." " There is no evidence that Subproject
Number 3 was terminated even though these officers were unequivo-
cally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD
and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical
safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed
even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and
security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project
continued until 1963."
In the project. the individual conducting the test might make
initial contact with a prospective subject selected at random in a bar.
He would then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug
was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA per-
sonnel might debrief the individual conducting the test, or observe
the test by using a one-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining
MOM.
Prior consent was obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.
There was also, obviously, no medical prescreening. In addition the
tests were conducted by individuals who were not qualified scientific
observers. There were no medical personnel on hand either to admin-
ister the drugs or to observe their effects, and no follow-up was con-
ducted on the test subjects.
As the Inspector General noted in 1963:
A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is
the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of re-
sults. The [individuals conducting the test] are not qualified
scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible be-
yond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in
perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface
characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect."
This was particularly troublesome as in a
number of instances, ... the test subject has become ill for
hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case,
and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry
after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness
and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects
of the tsting.63
Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety
of foreign nationals against whom 1) was used abroad. In several
cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD."
'Nleim,randum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on
Subproject #30! ".%11: LTRA. 2/104.
16 Report on MKULTRA,11163.
Ibid.. p.12.
18 Md. According to the IG's survey in lacia, physicians associated with
NIKULTRA could be made available in an emergency.
". The Technical Services Division which was responsible for the operational
use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination of the subject
is required prior to administration of [LSD] by TSS trained personnel. A WM-
81
401
Moreover, the administration abroad was marked by constant obser-
vation made possible because the material was being used against
prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally,
during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians
were on call, though these physicians had had no experience with LSD
and would not be told that hallucinogens had been administered."
The CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of
LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally
halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an
Inspector General survey of the Technical Services Division. When
the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy
Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed.
The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally
familiar with MKULTBA. He in(licated, however, that he was not
sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.
On May 24. 19(, the 1)1)P advised the lnspectof General that he had
briefed the Director on the ME:ULTRA program and in particular
had covered the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD
to unwitting human subjects. According to the Inspector General, the
DDP said that -the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore
the 'testing' will continue." 66
One copy of an -Eyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was
prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination
of the surreptitious administration project. The project was suspended
following t he Inspector General's report.
On December 17, 1963, Deputy Director for Plans Helms wrote a
memo to the DDCI. who with the Inspector General and the Executive
Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two
aspects of the problem: (1) -for over a decade the Clandestine Serv-
ices has had the mission of maintaining a capability for influencing
human behavior:" and (2) "testing arrangements in furtherance of
this mission should be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable
as possible." helms argued that the individuals must be "unwitting"
as this was -the only realistic method of maintaining the capability,
considering the intended operational use of materials to influence
human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting.
Should the subjects ofthe testing not be unwitting, the program would
only be -pro farina" resulting in a "false sense of accomplishment and
readiness." 67 Helms continued :
cian need not be present. There is no danger medically in the use of this material
as handled by TSS trained personnel." The Office of Medical Services had taken
the position that LSD was "medically dangerous." Roth the Office of Semrity
and the Office of Medical Services argued that LSD "should not he administered
'mks!: preceded by a medical examination � .. and should he administered only
by lir in the lore-alive of a phy-adan who had studied it and its effect." (Memo.
randum from James Angleton. Chief. Counterintelligence Staff to Chief of Oper-
ation,. 1.2,12 '57. pp. 1-2.
'Physicians night be called with the hope that they would make a diagnoeis
of mental breakdown which would be useful in discrediting the individual who
was the subject of the ClA interest.
" Nlemorandom for the Record prepared by the Inspector General, 5/15/63, p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
82
402
If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this
unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing.
there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously,
the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit
the opportunity to observe the results of the administration
on the target. It also goes without saying that whatever test-
ing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards
for the protection of the Agency's role in this activity, as
well as minimizing the possibility of physical or emotional
damage to the individual tested."
In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June,
1961.lms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At that time
General Carter. then acting DCI. approved several changes in the
MKULTRA program proposed by .1r. Helms as a result of negotia-
tions between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten
note. however. Director Carter added that "unwitting testing will be
subject to a separate decision."' 69
No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had
been halted and, according to Walter Elder, Executive Assistant to
DCI Mc Cone. the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of
authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer.
the DM' did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP
raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's
attention to what he described as "several other indications during
the past year of an apparent Soviet aggressiveness in the field of
covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplic-
able and disturbing." 7�
Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing. the
A.c,rency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing,
owing to a lack of realistic testing. With increasing knowledge of thc
state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet advances
in this field. This in turn results in a waning capability on our part
to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Depart-
ment of Defense ) from pursuing operations in this area." "
Helms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high
risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem."
He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that
which had been used, and that "we have no answer to the moral
issue.- '7-
Helnis asked for either resumption of the testing project or its defini-
tive cancellation. He argued that the status quo of a research and de-
velopment program without a realistic testing program was causing
the Agency to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming
minimal and furthermore is expensive." '3 Once again no formal action
was taken in response to the helms' request.
" 'Memorandum from DDP Helms to DDCI Carter. 12,/17/63.
" Memorandum from DDI' Helms to DCI, 6/9,64. p. 3.
" Ibid.. 11/9/64. p. 1.
n Ibid.. pp. 1-2.
" Ibid.. p. 2.
"Ibid.
83
403
From its beginning in the early 1950's until its termination in 1963,
the program of surreptitious administration of LSI) to unwitting non-
volunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leader-
ship to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to pro-
vide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that
the testing was dangerous, the lives of subjects were placed in jeop-
ardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of testing
which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws
of the United States were being violated. the testing continued. While
the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished
by the Director, at the same time they were also told that they were
not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment- would not be
made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project
was terminated in 196:l. none of the individuals involved were subject
to any disciplinary action.
4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing and l'se of Chemical and
Biological Agent. by the CIA
The ,Seleot Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring
and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents
within the (1;1.4 An analysis of the failures can be divided into four
sections: (a) the waiver of normal regulations or requirements; (b)
the problems in anthorizat ion procedures: (c) the failure of internal
review mech:thisins suoh as the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector
General. and the Audit Staff: and (d) the effect of compartmentation
and competition within the CIA.
a. The Woicer of Administrotire Control..�The internal controls
within any agency rest on : (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2)
clear lines of authority: and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct
themselves in accord with agency regulations and understandable and
immediate sanctions against those who do not. In the case of the test-
ing anti use of chemical and biological agents. normal CIA adminis-
trative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the
largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of
the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.
These documents were destroyed in early 193 at the order of then
DUI Richard Helms. According to Helms. Dr. Sidney Gottlieb. then
Director of TSD:
... came to me and said that he was retiring and that I was
retiring and he thought it would be a good idea if these files
were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for
our thinking this was advisable was there had been relation-
ships with outsiders in government agencies and other orga-
nizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a
thing but that since the program was over and finished and
done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as
'Section 2(9) of S. Res. 21 ln,,tructs the Committee to examine: the -extent
to which United States intelligence agencies are governed by Executive Orders,
rules, or regulations either published or secret."
84
404
well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not
be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment, if you
The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regula-
tion. CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."
As Thomas Karamessines, then Deputy Director of Plans, wrote in
regulation CSI-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience or
of storage but of conscious judgment in the application of the rules
modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of
this judgment is to ensure that the complete story can be reconstructed
in later years and by people who may be unfamiliar with the events.""
The destruction of the MKULTRA documents made it impossible
for the Select Committee to determine the full range and extent of the
largest CIA research program involving chemical and biological
agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and pro-
viding medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the
program. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the
full extent of the operations which made use of materials developed in
the MK ULTRA program."
From the inception of MKULTRA normal Agency procedures were
waived. In 1953, Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,
propo,ed the establishment of MKULTRA. Under the proposal six
percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be
expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations"
because contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted
that qualified individuals in the field -are most reluctant to enter into
signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity
since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputa-
Rieba rd Helms testimony. 13/11/75, p. 5.
Many Agency doeuments recording confidential relationships with individuals
and organizations are retained without politic disclosure. Moreover. in the case of
MKULTRA the ('IA had spent millions of dollars developing both materials and
delivery- systems which could be used by the Clandestine Services; the reconstruc-
tion of the research and development program would be difficult if not impos-
sible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested
against the document destruction on those grounds.
'Clandestine Services Institution (CSI) 70-10. When asked by the Select
Conuni!tce a koit the retrularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr.
Gottlieb to destroy the MK ULTRA records. Helms responded :
Well. that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular procedure or
not. because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain
Pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by
certain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose.
would ha VP I unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyed
bocause Simiebody had raised this specific issue rather than because they were
encompassed in the regular records destruction program. So I think the answer
to your question is probably yes." (Ilelins testimony. 9/11/75. p. 6.)
71 Even prior to the destruction of documents, the MK ULTRA records were far
from eomplete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963 :
"Files are notably incomplete. poorly organized. and lacking in evaluative state-
ments that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substan-
tial portion of the MIN:uurft.t. record appears to rest in the memories of the prin-
cipal otfi,ors and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures."
(IG Report on M ULTRA, p. 23.)
85
405
tions"." Other Agency procedures. i.e., the forwarding of documents
in support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures.
were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles
approved MKULTRA. noting that security considerations precluded
handling the project through usual contractual agreements.
Ten years later investigations of MK ULTRA by both the Inspector
General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which re-
sulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right to
audit the books of contractors in MKULTRA, the CIA had been
unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another
firm had failed to establish controls and safeguards which would as-
sure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the
result that "funds have been used for purposes not contemplated by
grants or allowable under usual contract relationship.- " The entire
MKULTRA arran.(,ement was condemned for having administrative
lines which were unclear. overly permissive controls, and irrespon-
sible supervision.
The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:
led us to see ME-ULTRA as frequently having provided a
device to escape normal administrative controls for research
that is not especially sensitive, as having allowed practices
that produce gross administrative failures, as having per-
mitted the establishment of special relationships with unreli-
able organizations on an unacceptable basis. and as having
prt .duced. on at least one occasion, a cavalier treatment of a
bona fide cont racting organization.
While admitting that there may be n need for special mechanisms
for handling sensitive projects. the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote
that "both the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling
such special projects should be spelled out in advance so that diver-
sion front normal channels does not mean abandonment of controls.
Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security of highly
sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal .con-
trol mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensitive
operations. Moreover. only those regulations which would endanger
security should be waived: to waive regulations generally would
result in highly sensitive and controversial projects haring looser
rather than stricter administrative controls. MK-NAOMI, the Fort
Detrick CIA project for research anti development of chemical and
biological agents. provides another example where efforts to protect
the security of agency act ivt ies overwhelmed administrative controls.
No written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shell-
fish toxin were kept. �because of the sensitivity of the area and the
desire to keep any possible use of materials like this recordless."" The
"Memorandum from ADDP Helms to Del Dulles, 4/3.'53. Tab. A. p. 2.
"Memorandum from IC to Chief, TSD. 11/5/63. as quthed in memorandum
from (Thief. Audit Branch.
"The memorandum suggested that administrative exclusions. because of the
importance of such decisions, should require the personal approval of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on an individual ease basis. Present CIA policy
is that only the Dr! can authorize certain exemptions from regulations.
" Sidney Gott lieb testimony. 10/15/75, Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 51.
86
406
l'es1212 1,1:21S that the ..A;_71.21/.v had no Avay of had bee
4h-termini/pry what mate_
rials %%ere on hand. and coult
h as d art guns. or dea dl tib Stilli y sCeS Stich as rohnt Ve110111 n
issued to the field. I ci.rt a ill (idiTvery systems
such
F.
...10/i.m.;.:,/tion..-1he destruction of the documents regarding
:111i I .1,11Z.1 made it dillicult to determine at �ritat Text.] specific proj-
el'IS III tilt' pl'OgT;1111 %%en.' IllItliOrIZE'd. T.1/12. 111.4/1/1i.n) is pot solely a re-
sult of the document destruction. litmever. Even at the height of
NII11;1.1:.% the 1( noted that. at least with 1.1*--pyrt Iii the
rat bin of 1,S1). the "present practice is to maintain no
records of the planning and approval of test programs."
\Vhui it it is clear that Allen Dulles authorized -1.111.1. the rec-
ord 1111.'1e;11* 2IS it/ \\110 21112 hOriZed sptritic projectS 2-11ch :IS that ill-
v(Ph 2/12.: SIIITe1/22t2/)11S 21(1211211 2741212201i of LSD to unwitting non-
volunteer human subjects. Even giveru the sensitive and controversial
nature of the prnieet. there is no e% idence that NV11411 .10/111
111)111'4'd Allen 1/111h.s as the 1)irect or of the Central Intelligence
.1gency ht. w a- briefed on the details of this project and asked whether
it should he continued.- Even during the lltt;:". cliscu-sions on the pro-
priety of uii itting test ing. the DI >I' quest ioned whether it was "neces-
sa ry to twirl ( icherai Caller.- the I ///iiiit I)irector of Central Intelli-
gt nce and the I )irector's "alter ago,- because (1.1 offi.�ers felt it neces-
sary to keep details of the project restricted to an ab-olute minimum
hidilMi fpeople.-1
In May cif D1/1) Helms told the inspector (lent rill that the
euu\trl test Mg 1tile.q:1111 NVitS ho hilli gone to the
Director. briefed 20111 2/11 it anti -the Director indicated no disagree-
ment and therefore the testing vill continue."'" Such authorization
even for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than ex-
plicit authorization: in areas such as the surrept itious administration
of drugs. it is particularly undesirable. Vet according to testimony
141 Report on Ntli1-1.11i.l. 1963. p. 14.
According t// at/ as-1.0:1 /;1 thereour, annual t.rieting, of the
1111 and the IOW NIM.I.Tit.� by I/0 '11111.f ..f 1'51, or hi,. deputy. 11,,we�er. a
Nlity 111/13 Montoratiglum f..r fr,az, the In-pootor i;onoral fluted th:it
Mr hot) ti..t boon brill-v(1 iii detail tho pr.,zr.wi. Mr. 1-2�cm.-
i%t� Inn, or, \\*atter tetitied that ii AVil' -pert. lit apparent re rae" that
neither Jrl. :tleceile tier Gelieral carter th. a tile 1/11/1. xvii, n�vare of the sur-
rt!ptiti,�11. :1.1111411,i ralbat project "or if the 1iad bee!, briefed they had blot under-
Eider, 12,1% p. 13.1 Mr. '..�1,Votic tc,titied tbit, lie -did not ktiolv"
��lietlier he talked azip�ni. at,,mt the prciject bill That 11,, one had told him about
it ua a it ily ilia? it turtit.41 ../i all tile lizt.i,��
3 70;. p. III
" A../�//r/lim.! I/. Dirocii.r. tit illy kiiiitVit�ili.".%
/las wier been briefed or was it ever thought tie, ry I,. brief them to the (Alt lit
wouid brief iheItt
ji; Ntilnoratiduni for It,. r: 17, 6.3
(iii the gin-1,u of authorization //t. th/. /.//vert 1:1/1.�r
as'its:
-111IT thy rea../.1112/1.� Pith:meta that thi, 1./ 1/1� ill 121/ arva
iii i:lit 'r' liavinz: 'hi,' tutu II//�
1�11, atithorizat...la earring tilt' lieXf
part willarly itiapl.r.l.ria1,. for ii-i1,11., highly sci,,itive
ii 1,1, 1, 1- id-, attention by ,.it, r, 1,,,I 1,-.tV.,� III the
a!!..r!ti�,11 .,f tor.
87
407
before the Committee, authorization through lack of agreement -is
even more prevalent in sensitive sit uations.h6
The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Gordon
and his subordinates, in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have
resulted from the failure of the Director to issue written instructions to
Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in
the Agency. The Director, Mr. Helms, had instructed Mr. Karames-
sines. the Deputy Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of
Technical Services Division, to relinquish control to the Army of any
chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort De-
trick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr. Gordon. While
orders may be disregarded in any organization. one of the reasons that
Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not
received written instructions forbidding it.
In sonic situations the existence of written instructions did not pre-
vent unauthorized actions According to an investigation by the CIA's
Inspector General TSD officers had been informed orally that Mr.
Helms was to be .�advised at all times- when LSD was to be used. In
addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD was
not to be used without the permission of the DDP, Frank Wisner. The
experiment involving Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of
either Mr. Wisner or Mr. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate
punishment for that act must undercut the force of other internal in-
structions and regulations.
One last issue must be raised about authorization procedures within
the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959 for dis-
crediting or disabling operations, or for the purpose of interrogations
with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the
approval of the Deputy Director for Plans was required for such
operations. Although the medical staff sought to be part of the ap-
proval process for these operations, they were excluded because, as the
Inspector General wrote in 1957:
Operational determinations are the responsibility of the
DD/P and it is he who should advise the DCI in these
respects, just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It
is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief,
Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over clan-
(lestine operations.) "
Given the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the
Medical Staff might well have been useful.
Questions about authorization also exist in regard to those agencies
whic:h. assisted the CIA. For instance, the project involving the sur-
reptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non-volunteer human
subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. There is some question as to the Commissioner
of Narcotics' knowledge about the project�
"Mr. Elder was asked whether the pmeess of bringing forward a description of
actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence of disagreement
was a rnminon one. He responded. "It was not uncommon.... The more sensitive
the project the more likely it wmild lean toward being a common practice, based
Oil the need to keep the written record to a minimum.-
" Na than Gordan testimony, 9/16/75, Hearings, Vol. 1.
.1957 IG Report.
88
408
In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD
had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not indi-
cate the level of detail provided to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I
remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he
was aware." " Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of
testing on unwitting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Com-
missioner Anslinger.
In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that
Harry Giordano, who replaced Mr. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that
when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the
arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to
know the details." The same memorandum states, however, that there
were several continents which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that Mr. Gior-
dano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that
the Commissioner provided a general authorization for the arrange-
ment without understanding what it entailed or considering its pro-
priety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and
the CIA's hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a number of
instances during the Select Committee's investigations. This problem
is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congres-
sional relationships with the Agency.
c. Intcrhal Revicte.�The waiver of regulations and the absence of
dorumentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized
which activities. More importantly, they made internal Agency review
mechanisms much less effective." Controversial and highly sensitive
projects which should have been subject to the most rigorous inspection
lacked effective internal review.
Given the role of the General Counsel and his reaction to the sur-
reptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson. it would have seemed
likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any
subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done.
He did not -learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the Gen-
eral Counsel's opinion sought, on other MKULTRA projects. though
these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957
Report on TSDas�unethical and illicit."9'
There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's
survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitious administra-
tion of II). That project was apparently not brought to the attention
of the survey team. The Inspector who discovered it during the IG's
1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,
"Gottlieb, p 25.
" The IG's report on NIKULTRA in 19033 stated:
"The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting con-
trol of MK1'1..TRA lied\ ities. In so doing, however. TSD has pursued a phi-
losophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some
of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete rword,
in( hiding most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained
little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine
inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning manage-
ment and fiscal controls."
CIA, Inspector General's report on TSD, 1957. p. 217.
89
409
rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially
sensitive project."
Thus both the General Counsel and the Inspector General, the prin-
cipal internal meehanisms for the control of possibly improper actions,
were excluded from regular reviews of the project. When the project
was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong op-
position to it; it is possible that the project would have been termi-
nated in 1937 if it had been called to his attention when he then served
as Inspector General.
The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function
through the examination of Agency expenditures, also encountered
substantial difli,ulty with MK ULTRA. When MKULTRA was first
proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This
was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual pro-
cedures" in MK ULTRA increased the likelihood of "irregularities"
as well as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit
Branch characterized the :NIKULTRA procedures as "having allowed
practices that produced gross administrative failures." including a
lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper
accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the
CIA's capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms.
d. Conipartmeutation and jurisdictional Conflict 'Within the
Agcn.cy.�As has been noted, the testing and use of .chemical and
biological agents vas treated as a highly sensitive activity within the
CIA. This resulted in a high degree of compartmentation. At the same
time substantial jurisdictional conflict existed within the Agency be-
tween the Technical Services Division, and the Office of Medical Serv-
ices and the Office of Security.
This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have
led to duplication of effort within the CIA and to Agency policy-
makers being deprived of useful information.
During the early 19:ars first the BLUEBIRD Committee. and then
the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together rep-
resentatives of the Agency components which had a legitimate inter-
est in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 19.57 both these
committees had fallen into disuse. No information went to the Tech-
nical Services Division (a component supposedly represented on the
ARTICHOKE Committee ) about ARTICHOKE operations being
conducted by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services.
The Technical Services Division which was providing support to the
Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and biological agents, but
provided little or no information to either the Office of Security or the
Office of Medical Services. As one TSD officer involved in these pro-
grams testified : "Although we were acquainted, we certainly didn't
share experiences." "
"Even after the Inspector came upon it the IG did not perform a complete
investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an extensive survey of TSD
and t1. Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post within
the Agency.
"Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.
so
410
QX ILI.TOP, another group designed to coordinate research in
this area also had little success. The group met infrequently�on1)
lek a year�and little specific information was exchanged."
Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to
share information,Q5 but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD
officer stated that the Office of Medical Services simply wasn't "par-
ticularly .interested in what we were doing" and never sought such
information." On the other hand, a representative of the Office of
� 11.1cd14.al Services consistently sought to have medical personnel par-
�
ticipate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that
TSD did not inform the Office of Medical Services in order to pre-
vent t hei r invol vement
Jurisdictional conflict was constant in this area. The Office of
Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction of
ARTICHOKE. consistently sought to bring TSD operations in-
volving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The
� Office of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and
participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector Gen-
eral described it in 19:)7, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent
of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over
the activities of Tsn which encroach upon or enter into the medical
field," and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior
approval of the Chief. Medical Staff, and often without informing
hint of their nal tire and extent." 97
As was noted previously, because the projects and programs of
TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the
DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activi-
ties by the Medical Staff:
It. is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the
Chief. Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority over
clandestine operations. Ft/it/rumor,. some of 1h( aetirities
of rhcmiyal Piri,;on are hot only oho/I/haw' but unethical
aml konhtimrs illegal. The It14" is in a better pokition to
cealaat, fit. jfi.'t,jc ,i1ee, fo#Stlf111 Opt than the Chief,
.11(11;r1,1 Staff."' [Emphasis added.]
Because the advice of the Director of Security was needed for
"evaluating the risks involved" in the programs and .becnuse hie
knowledge that the CIA was "engaging in unethical and illicit activi-
ties won hi have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
Circles." the IG recommended that the Director of Security be fully
advised of TSlYs activities in these areas.
in after the Inspector General's Report of 1957. the compa rtmen-
tat ion and jurisdictional conflict contimied. They may have had a sub-
" The (me Kt., of minutes: from :i (111111.1.1t
WI i tit HIV I of Service', StreNSell neeil for more emit:wt.
why information the ailimiii-tration of 1.,51r
wa` 11'4 PreNtlited t" the Aleriell()KE committee. Dr Gottlieb re.,p�milet1: "1
Il..131(1 have. betli a oilieerii for the aware-
pi-, of it, exi,telice.-
" I '1.% ..11i,er. 11 71. 1, 1� 4
II; Si.rt oil'Sip. 197,7. p 217.
" Ibid.
91
411
stantial negative impact on policymaking in the Agency. As the Dep-
ut:,. Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted in 1958, due to the
different positions taken by TSS. the Office of Security, and the Office
of Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was
possible that the individual who authorized the use of a chemical or
biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which
to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the
DDP in 195s, to attempt to rationalize Agency policy did not have ac-
cess to records of testing and use. This was due, in part. to excessive
compartment at ion, and jurisdictional conflict.
C. CoVERT TESTING ON HUMAN SUBJECTS BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
OR,�ups: 'MATERIAL TEsTING PRonRANI EA 1729, Pao.ircr THIRD
CHANGE, Aso Pao.tErr DERBY IIAT
EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program
for lysergic acid diethylamide (I I)). Interest in LSD was originally
aroused at the Army's Chemical Warfare Laboratories by open litera-
ture on the unusual effects of the compound." The positive intelli-
gence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like
LSD. and suspected Soviet interest in such materials.'" supported the
development of an American military capability and resulted in ex-
periments conducted jointly by the r.S. Army Intelligence Board and
the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.
These experiments. designed to evaluate potential intelligence, uses
of 1,s1). were known collectively as "Material Testing Program EA
1729." Two projects of particular interest conducted as part of these
experiments. "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY IIAT", involved
the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the
Yar East.
In many respects. the Army's testing programs duplicated research
which had already been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved
the risks inherent in the early phases of drug testing. In the Army:s
tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights were also subordi-
nated to nat lila I security ennsiderat ions; informed consent and follow-
up examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the
secrecy of the tests. Finally-. the command and control problems which
were aolkarclit iii the CIA's programs are iiaralleled by a lack of clear
authorization and supervision in the Army's programs.
"1-)4.kINT(' staff study. "Material Testing Program. EA 1729." p. 4.
"" This !sante ESAINTe study cited "A 19.1'2 several years prior to initial *U.S.
inter..., in LSI ) report that the Soviets purchased a large quantity Of I.SE)-25
from the Sandoz Conn tally in 1951. ref titled to be suffirient for 54) million doses."
,p. If;
Generally accepted Soviet nitttlotds and counterintelligence concernc were also
strong motivating favtors it, the initiation of this re,earch :
".1 primary histifieation for held experimentation ii intelligence with EA, 17211
is the (*mutter-intelligence or defense implication. Wt� know 11181 the enelly.r
1","I'llY litli-
(Cnil.,)it�!:alty kind of coercion or violence fir intelligence mirposes. There
is proof that hi- intelligefiee ...er) ire ha- iis..t ftriirs in the past There is strong
evidence nf keen intere,t in EA 172t4 hini. !f for no other purpose than to know
what to expect from ()Hello intelligence of the material and to. thus, be pre-
hard ti counter it. held i\.i'rinri.niIatiei js justified." (/b141. p. 34)
92
412
I. Scope of Teeing
Between 1955 and 195S research was initiated by the Army Chemical
Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare inca-
pacitating agent. In the course of this research. LSD was administered
to more than 1,000 American volunteers who then participated in a
series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their
ability to function as soldiers. With the exception of one set of tests
at Fort Bragg. these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evalu-
ate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical
Wa Tea re Laliorat ones. Edgewood, Maryland.
In 195S a new series of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood.
These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of Material
Testing Program EA 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of
LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers."' As part of these
tests, three structured experiments were conducted:
1. LSD was administered surreptitiously at a simulated
social reception to volunteer subjects who were unaware of
the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were
participating;
2. LSI) was administered to volunteers who were subse-
quently polygTaphed; and
3. LSI) was administered to volunteers who were then
confined to "isolation chambers".
These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity
of the traditional security training all subjects had undergone in the
face of unconventional. drug enhanced. interrogations.
At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of Material Testing
Program EA 1729 in 1960. the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intel] Urence (A ('SI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. The
first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Arm Special Pur-
pose Team ( SPT ) during the period from May to August of 1961.
These tests were known as Project TI MM CliANCE and involved
eleven separate interrogations of ten subjects. None of the subjects
were volunteers and none were aware that they were to receive
LSD. All but one subject. a U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of
classified documents. were alleged to be foreign intelligence sources
or agents. While interrogations of these individuals were only moder-
ately successfi l. at least one subject (the 'U.S. soldier) exhibited
symptoms of Se Vert. paranoia w hi le under the inflnence of the drug.
Th, seeond series of field tests, Project DEliny HAT, were con-
ducted by an Army SPT in the Far East during the period
from Aiorust to November of 1962. Seven subjects were interrogated
under DENBY HAT. all of Idiom were foreign nationals either sus-
peeted of dealing in narcotics or implicated in forei:m intelligence
opora ion-. The purpose of this !,2r011(1 :�4't of experiments was to col-
lect additional data on the itt lilt v of LSD in field interrogations, and
to evaluate any different effects the drug might have on -Orientals.-
'"' mr General If the Art0 rtei.rt. -1-.0 of Vt�Imitei.r, in Chetnicni Acent
3'144 76. p. 13s
93
413
2. Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agenda
On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared
lengthy staff study on Material Testing Program EA 1729. The stated
purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA
1729 on non-US subjects in selected actual operations under controlled
conditions.'02 It was on the basis of this study that operational field
tests were later conducted.
After noting, that the Chemical Warfare Laboratories began experi-
ments with LSD on humans in 1935 and had administered the drug
to over 1.000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study
concluded:
There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Study
of the prolific scientific literature on LSD-25 and personal
communication between US Army Chemical Corps person-
nel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose
an authenticated instance of irreversible change being pro-
duced in normal humans by the drug.1�3
This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there were
inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this
same study it is noted that:
The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially
dangerous drug, whose pharmaceutical actions are not fully
understood and there has been cited the possibility of the
continuance of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic.
form, particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject,
with consequent claim or representation against the U.S.
Government.'"
An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by care-
ful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that
the drug might be hazardous, the study continued:
The claim of possible permanent damage caused by EA 1729
is an unproven hypothesis based on the characteristic effect
of the material. While the added stress of a real situation
may increase the probability of permanent adverse effect,
the resulting risk is deemed to be slight by the medical re-
search personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories. To
prevent even such a slight risk, the proposed plan for field
experimentation calls for overt, if possible. or contrived-
t hrough-ruse. if necessary. physical and mental examination
of any real situation subject prior to employment of the
subject .103
This conclusion was drawn six years after one death had occurred
which could be attributed, at least in part, to the effects of the
very drug the Army was proposing to field test. The USAINTC staff,
however, was apparently unaware of the circumstances surround-
ing Dr. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of the
T�SA1NTC staff study. "Material Tecting Program EA 1729." 10/15/59, p.4.
p. 4.
''fhiiP..p 25.
1"' Ibid.
QF.4080 - 77 - 7
94
414
tzenend lack of interagency communication on drug related research.
A. tlw 04.tober 19:19 study noted. "there has been DO coordination
with other intelligence agencies up to the present.""
On December 7.19:59, the .krnty Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelli-
gence (ACSI al)ParenilY it General \Villeins) was briefed on the
proposed operati(mal use of II) by l'SAINTC Project Officer Jacob-
son, in preparation for l'roject TI Ii It D C11.1 NCE. General \Villeins
expressed concern that the project hail not been coordinated with the
FM and the (IA. lie is quoted as saying "that if this project is going
to be m any-thin" it LSD1 should be used on higher types of
non-l".S. subjects in other words -staffers.- lie indicated this could
I e accomplished if the CIA were brought in. The sm�mary of the
brietin., prepared by a Major:\ lehovskv continues "Of part icular note
is that ACSI did not direct coordination with CIA and the FII1 but
only mentitated it for consideration by the planners." �'
After the briefing. four colonels. t wo lieutenant colonels and Major
Ilehovsky met to discuss interagency cooperation with CIA and FBI.
The group e(m-ensus was to postpone efforts toward coordination:
Lt. Col. Jacobson commented that before We coordinate with
('IA we should have more far-trial findings from field experi-
mental ion, 1% it h counterintelligence cases that will strengthen
our position and proposal for cooperation. This approach
Nvas agreed to by the conferees.'" �
lion! such coordination been achieved, the safety of these experiments
might have I )(4.11 vie \veil thfierelitly and the tests themsel yes might
have been seen as unnecessary..
S 01; n,,t;an Of I m1 1,1;g1, ft 70 Nat i �nal Secur;t y C onsid
rat ;
Just as many of these experiments may have been unnecessary. the
nature of 111.. operational tests (polygraph-assisted interrogations of
drugged suspects) reflects a basic disregard for the fundamental
human rights of the subjects. The interrogation of an American
soldier as part of the TIM!) CHANCE 1961 tests is an example of
this di,Tegard.
The -trip reptirt- for Project THIRD CILtNCE. dated Septem-
ber 19G1. recounts the circumstances t-tirrouniling and the results of
the tests as follows:
[The subject) was a U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft.
of clas..ilivd documents. Conventional methods had failed to
aseert a in whet her espionage intent was involved. A significant
new admi,,,ion by subject that he told a fellow soldier of the
theft while he still hail the documents in his possession was
obtained durin., the E. 1729 interrogation along with Other
Varial ions of SUbjerrs previims account. The interrogation
results were deemed by the local operational authority satis-
factory evidence of Subject's claim of innocence in regard to
espionage intent."'"
Meltov�ky }'at Sheet. 12/9/(14). p 1.
101 /hid
sPT Trip Report. Operation T111111) CHANCE. 916/61. p. 5.
95
415
The subject apparently reacted very strongly to the drug, and the
interrogation, while productive, was difficult. The trip report
concluded:
(1) This case demonstrated the ability to interrogate a
subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost
incapacitating reaction to EA 1729..
(2) The apparent value of bringing a subject into the EA
1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.
(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the de-
vice of inviting the subject's. attention to his. EA 1729-
influenced state and threatening to extend this state in-
definitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to
bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was
shown to be effective.
(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme
paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
(5) it was brought to attention by this case that where sub-
ject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to
the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly
during conventional interrogation, adherence to the same ver-
sion while under EA 1729 influence. however extreme the reac-
tio�, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the
ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story."0
This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanying discomfort
this individual suffered were exploited by the use of traditional inter-
rogation techniques. While there is no evidence that physical violence
or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physi-
cal and psychological techniques were used in the THIRD CHANCE
experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state, and to maxi-
mize the stress situation. Jacobson described these methods in his trip
report :
Stressing techniques employed included silent treatment be-
fore or after EA 1729 administration, sustained conventional
interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of
food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained isolation
prior to EA 1729 administration. hot-cold switches in ap-
proach. duress "pitches'', verbal degradation and bodily dis-
comfort. or dramatized threats to subject's life or mental
health."'
Another gross violation of an individual's fundamental rights oc-
curred in September 1962 as part of the Army's DERRY HAT tests
in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionage agent was given 6
micrograms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration
of the drug was completed at 1035 that morning:
At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready.
lie Wiv, placed in a supine position. lie began groaning with
expiration and became sem icomatose."2
11"/hift., pp. 17-1.g.
p. 13
'DERBY HAT" Medical and Pliarniacological Report: Case #1. 9/20/62,
P. DIO :2.
96
416
For the next 2R minutes, the subject remained sem icomat use.
At 114g, responses to painful stimuli were slightly improved.
At. 1155, he was helped ton sitting position.
At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to supine
position.
At 1212. he was more alert and able to sit up with help.
Al 1220. Subject was assisted to the interrogation table.
At 1230. he began moaning he trunted to die and usually
ignored questions. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."
At 1250, his phasic alertness persisted. He frequently re-
focused his eyes with eyelid assistance. He frequently threw
his head back with eyes closed.
At 1330. he was slightly more alert. He was forced-walked for
5 minutes. lie physically would cooperate until he became
shocky again (sweat ing, thready pulse. pale) .1"
For the next three hours the subject remained in about the same con-
dition. Continued attempts at interrogation yielded no relevant
answers. Six hours after receiving the drug. the subject began giving
relevant answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the
initial dosage. the subject was polygraphed. The interrogation con-
tinued for seventeen and one-half hours after the drug was ad-
ministered.
There was some psychological and medical screening of the in-
dividuals tested within the United States. in Europe, and in
Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for
such examinations. The fact of prescreening did not eliminate the
risk of injury; the availability of medical staff did, however, limit
injury and may well have prevented the death of one or more of the
subjects. A. the medical corps member of the team which surrepti-
t ionsly administered the LSD noted. "one subject ... did collapse after
the interrogation and tlw presence of the medical officer was not only
of value to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus
assured that an unnecessary untoward result would not occur." "5
In the October 15. 1059. USAINTe staff study. moral and legal
ramificat ions of covert administration of LSD in field conditions were
considered.
It was always a tenet of Army Intelligence that the basic
American principle of the dignity and welfare of the in- �
dividual will not he violated 1. more meticulous regard
for the prohibition against violence or duress is taken in
practice when the suspect is a VS citizen or ally as against
an actual or potential enemy, in peace as against war, and in
respect to the nature of the crime. . . . In intelligence, the
stakes involved and the interests of national security may
permit a more tolerant interpretation of moral-ethical values,
but not legal limits, through necessity kny claim
"a Ibid.. p
SPT Trip Report, Operat inn THIRD ellANrE. 7/27i/61. p. 1.
97
417
against the US Government for alleged injury due to EA
1729 must be legally shown to have been due to the material.
Proper security and appropriate operational techniques
can protect the fact of employment of EA 17�29.'"
On the basis of this evaluation, the st !.ly concluded that in view of
"the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the pro-
posed plan for field testing should be approved.
The surreptitious administration of drugs to unwitting subjects by
the Army raises serious constitutional and legal issues. The considera-
tion given these issues by the Army was wholly insufficient. The char-
acter of the Army's volunteer testing program and the possibility that
drugs were simply substituted for other forms of violence or duress in
field interrogations raises serious doubts as to whether national se-
curity imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms
which each American volunteer signed prior to the administration of
LSD are a case in point. These forms contained no mention of the
medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they
mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:
The general nature of the experiments in which I have
vol:mteered. have been explained to rue from the standpoint
of 17.,sible hitz:Irds to my health. It is my understanding that
the experimi are so designed, based on the resn)ts of
aniinals and pc,vious human experimentation, that the antic-
ipated results will justify the performance of the experi-
nu at. I understand further that experiments will be so con-
ducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and medical
suffering and injury, and that I mill be at liberty to request
that the txperiments be terminated at any time if in my opin-
ion I have reached the physical or mental state where con-
tinuation of the experiments becomes undesirable.
I recognize that in the pursuit of certain experiments
tran.sitory discomfort may occur. I recognize. also, that under
these circumstances, I must rely upon the skill and wisdom
of the physician superrising the experiment to institute what-
ever medical or surgical measures are indicated. [Emphasis
added.]
The exclusion of any specific discussion of the nature of LSD in
these forms raises serious doubts as to their validity. An "understand-
. . . . that the anticipated results will justify the performance of
the experiment" without full knowledge of the nature of the experi-
ment is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature of the
experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its re-
quest Its termination and the experimenter to implement such a request.
Finally, the euphemistic characterization of "transitory discomfort"
and the agreement to "rely on the skill and wisdom of the physician"
combine to conceal inherent risks in the experimentation and may be
viewed as disolving the experimenter of personal responsibility for
damaging aftereffects. In summary. a "volunteer" program in which
subjects are not fully informed of potential hazards to their persons
is "volunteer" in name only.
U4 USAINTC staff study, "Material Testing Program EA 1729," 30/15/59, p. 28.
1" Sample volunteer consent form.
98
418
This problem was compounded by the security statements signed
by each volunteer before he participated in the testing. As part of
this statement, potential subjects agreed that they would:
. . . not divulge or make available any information related
to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest or participation in
the Department of the Army Medical Research Volunteer
Program to any individual, nation, organization, business,
association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized
to receive such information.
I understand that any action contrary to the provisions of
this statement will render me liable to punishment under the
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'"
Under these provisions, a volunteer experiencing aftereffects of the test
might have been unable to seek immediate medical assistance.
� This disregard for the well-being of subjects drug testing is in-
excusable. Further, the absence of any comprehensive long-term
medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not only
unscientific; it is also unprofessional.
4. Lack of Normal Authorization and Superviaion
It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the
Army's testing programs often operated under informal and nonrou-
tine authorization. Potentially dangerous operations such as these
testing programs are the very projects which ought to be subject to
the closest internal scrutiny at the highest levels of the military com-
mand structure. There are numerous examples of inadequate review,
partial consideration, and incomplete approval in the administration
of these programs.
When the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in
"field stations- was authorized in May 1955, the Army violated its
own procedures in obtaining approval. Under Army Chief of Staff
Memorandum 385, such proposals were to be personally approved by
the Secretary of the Army. Although the plan was submitted to him
on April 26, 1956, the Secretary issued no written authorization for
the project, and there is no evidence that he either reviewed or ap-
proved the plan. Less than a month later, the Army Chief of Staff
issued a memorandum authorizing the tests."�
Subsequent testing of LSD under Material Testing Program EA
1729 operated generally under this authorization. When the plans for
this testing were originally discussed in early 195S by officials of the
Army Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and representatives of
the Chemical Warfare Center at Edgewood Arsenal, an informal pro-
posal was formulated. This proposal was submitted to the Medical
Research Directorate at Edgewood by the President of the Army In-
telligence Board on June 3, 1958. There is no evidence that the plan
was approved at anv level higher than the President of the Intelli-
gence Board or the Commanding General of Edgewood. The approval
at Edgewood appears to have been issued by the Commander's Adju-
tant. The Medical Research Laboratories did not submit the plan to
the Surgeon General for approval (a standard procedure) because
"9 Sample Voltinteer Security Statement.
Ito.peetor General of the Arm) Report, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical
Agent Research,- 3/10 '76, p. 109.
99
419
the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted
in May 1956.121
The two projects involving the operational use of LSD (THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the
Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General 'Willems) on
December 7, 1960.122 This verbal approval came in the course of a
briefing on previous drug programs and on the planned field experi-
mentation. There is no record of written approval being issued by the
ACSI to authorize these specific projects until January 1961, and
there is no record of any specific knowledge or approval by the Secre-
tary of the Army.
On February 4, 1963, Major General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI,
forwarded a copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army
Chief of Staff, General Earl Wheeler. 1" Wheeler had apparently
requested a copy on February 2. The report was routed through a Gen-
eral Hamlett. While this report included background on the origins
of the LSD tests, it appears that General Wheeler may only have read
the conclusion and recommendations.'" The office memorandum
accompanying the Trip Report bears Wheeler's initials.'"
5. Termination of Teeing
On April 10, 1963, a briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the
results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both
SPT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD
could be utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interroga-
tions. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General
Leonard (Deputy ACSI) directed that no further field testing be
undertaken.126 After this meeting the ACSI sent a letter to the Com-
manding General of the Army Combat Developments Command
(CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY
HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729
for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence
interrogations." 1" On the same day the ACSI requested that the CDC
Commander revise regulation FM 30-17 to read in part:
. . . in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interro-
gations in counterintelligence or security operations without
prior permission of the Department of the Army. Requests
to use drugs as an investigative aid will be forwarded through
intelligence channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval....
Medical research has established that information obtained
through the use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid....
It is considered that DA [Army] approval must be a pre-
requisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal,
medical and political problems inherent in their use for intel-
ligence purposes.'"
It' Ibid.. pp. 135. 137, 138.
Mehovsky Fact Sheet. 12/9/60.
in Memorandum from Leonard to Wheeler. 2/4/63.
'" sGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett. 2/5/63.
1' Ibid.
Maj. F. Barnett, memorandum for the record. 8/12/63.
in Yaniaki memorandum for the record. 7/16/63.
"" Ibid.
100
420
The subsequent adoption of this regulation marked the effective ter-
mination of field testing of LSD by the Army.
The official termination date of these testing programs is rather
unclear, but a later ACSI memo indicates that it may have occurred
in September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held
between Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), Major Clovis (Chemi-
cal Research Laboratory), and ACSI representatives (General
Deholm and Colonel Schmidt). "As a result of this conference. a deter-
mination was made to suspend the program and any further activity
pending a more. profitable and suitable use." 229
CODPERATIoN AND COMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COM-
MUNITY AGENCIES AND BETWEEN TiirsE AGENCIES AND OTHER
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS
I. Relationshi ps Among Agencies Within the Intelligence Community
Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area
vaned considerably overtime, ranging from full cooperation to intense
and wasteful competition. The early period was marked by a high
degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence commu-
nity. Although the military dominated research involving chemical
and biological agents, the information developed was shared with the
FBI and the ('IA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The
failure by the military to share information apparently breached the
spirit, if not the letter, of commands from above.
As noted above, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSI) under Project
THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern that the project had not
been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request. no coordi-
nation was achieved between the Army and either of these agencies.
Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may have been
evaluated in a different light.
The competition between the agencies in this area reached bizarre
levels. A military officer told a CIA representative in confidence about
the military's field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD
CHANCE, and the CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously
tlw nature and extent of the program. At roughly the same time Mr.
Ilelnis argued to the DI C1 that the unwitting testing program should
be continued, RS it contributed to the CIA's capability in the area and
thus allowed the CIA "to restrain others in the intelligence community
(such as the Departtnent of Ikfense) from pursuing operations." 1"
The MKNAOMI program was also marked by a failure to share
in The Army Special Forces (the principal customer of the
Special Operations Division at Fort Diet rick) and the CIA rather
than at to coordinate their efforts promulgated different re-
quirements which varied only slightly. This apparently .resulted in
some duplication of effort. In order to insure the security of CIA
operations, the Agency would request materials from SOD for opera-
twinal use without fully or accurately describing the .operational
requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist
flue CIA.
'Undated .1.9C1 memorandum. p. 2.
Mi.ntorandum front the 1/14 10 the DrI, 11/9 I. p. 2.
101
421
2. Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and
Foreign LiaisanServices
The subjects of the CIA's operational testing of chemical and bio-
logical agents abroad were generally being held for interrogation by
foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information
about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organiza-
tions. cooperation with them necessarily jeopardized the security of
CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American
Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the
rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the
country in which the experiments took place.
Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in
foreign countries was not limited to relationships with the intelligence
or internal security organizations. Some MKULTRA. research was
conducted abroad. While this is, in itself, not a questionable practice,
it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade
American laws. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTI-
CHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with the
scientists of a foreign country "might be very advantageous" since
that government "permitted certain activities which were not per-
mitted by the United States government (i.e., experiments on anthrax,
etc.)." 131
3. The Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies
awl Other Agencies of the C.S. Government
Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of
intelligence agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to pro-
vide "cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in
order to disguise intelligence community interest in chemical and
biological agents.
Other forms of assistance raise more serious questions. Although
the CIA's project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD
was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no open
connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau
was serving as a "cut-out- in order to make it difficult to trace Agency
participation. The cut-out arrangement, however, reduced the CIA's
ability to control the program. The Agency could not control the
proeess by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could not
regulate follow-up after the testing. Moreover, as the CIA's Inspector
General noted : "the handling of test subjects in the last analysis rests
with the (Bureau of Narcotics] agent working alone. Suppression of
knowledge of critical results from the top CIA management is an
inherent risk in these operations" 232 The arrangement also made it
impossible for the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the
surreptitious administration of LSD would be honored by the Bureau
personnel.
The arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics was described as
"informal." 133 The informality of the arrangement compounded the
problem is aggravated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had vir-
A Memorandum. f;'13/7.2.
It; Report on NH: ULTRA. 1963. p. 14.
Ibid. This was taken by one Agency official to mean that there would be no
written contract and no formal mechanism for payment. (Elder, 12/15/75, p. 31.)
102
422
apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to ask
for details. and the ClA's hesitation in volunteering information.
These problems raise serious questions of command and control within
the Bureau.
4. Relationship Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and
Other Institutions and Individuals, Public and Private
The Inspector General's 19(13 .Survey of MKI-LTRA noted
that "the research and development" phase was conducted through
standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceu-
tical houses, hospitals. state and federal institutions, and private re-
search organizations" in a manner which concealed "from the institu-
tion the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each
institution were "made witting of Agency sponsorship." The research
and development phase was succeeded by a phase involving "phy-
sicians. toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and
general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the products and
findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensive test-
ing on human subjects.', 134
According to the Inspector General, the NIKULTRA testing pro-
grams were "conducted under accepted scientific procedures . . .
where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the
programs." "5 This was clearly not true in the project involving the
surreptitious administration of LSD. which was marked by a com-
plete lack of screening. medical supervision, opportunity to observe, or
medical or psychological follow-up.
The intelligence agencies allowed individual researchers to design
their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which in-
cluded o�(' where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexington, Kentucky.
who were rewarded with the drug of their addiction in return for
participation in experiments with 1,S1)) call into question the deci-
sion by the agencies not to fix guidelines for the experiments.
The MN1'1.TRA research and development program raises other
quest ions, as well. It is not clear diet her individuals in prisons, mental.
narcotics and general hospitals can provide "informed consent", to
part icipat ion in experiment s such as these. There is doubt as to whether
institutions should be unwitt ina of the ultimate sponsor of research
being done in their facilities. The nature of the arrangements also
made it impossible for the individuals who were not aware of the
Sponsor of the research to exercise any choice about their participa-
tion based on the sponsoring organization.
Although greater precautions are now being taken in research con-
ducted on behalf of the intelligence community twencies. the dilemma
of classification remains. These agencies obviously wished to conceal
their interest in certain forms of research in order to avoid stinmlating
interest in the sonic areas by hostile governments. In sonic cases today
contractors or researchers wish to conceal their connection with these
agencies. Yet the fact of classification prevents open discussion and
debate upon which scholarly work depends.
asa Ibid. p. 9.
nit/. 1.1 10.
103
APPENDIX B
DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO DISCOVERY OF ADDI-
TIONAL MKULTRA MATERIAL
22 June 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director for Science and Technology
_
SUBJECT : Request for Guidance on Handling
Recently Located MKULTRA Material
�
�
1. (U/AIIJO) This memorandum is to advise you that
additional MKULTRA documents have been discovered and to
obtain your approval for follow-on actions required.
Paragraph 7 contains a recommended course of action.
I 2. (U/AIUO) As a result of John Marks FOIA re-
quest (F-76-374), all of the MKULTRA ratcrial in OTS
possession was reviewed for possible release to him.
Following that review, the OTS material in the Retired
Records Center was searched. It was during that latter
search that the subproject files were located among the
retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section.
These files were not discovered earlier as the earlier
searches were limited to the examination of the Active
and retired records of those branches considered moSt
likely to have generated Or have had access tp MKULTRA
documents. Those branches included: Chemistry,
Biological, Behavioral Activities, and Contracts Manage-
ment. Because Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and destroyed all
the MKULTRA documents he vas able to locate, it is not
surprising that the earlier search for MKULTRA documents,
directed at areas where they were most likely to be found,
was unsuccessful. The purpose of establishing the MKULTRA
mechanism was to limit knowledge of the sensitive work .
being performed to those with an absolute neeJ to know..
If those precepts had been followed, the recently found .
BF,F files should have contained only financial and
administrative documents. (In retrospect, I realite that
OveJa.s�To4by
deo
% � -2 g JUL 731
104
5:;..;,=: Request for Guidance on Handlin; Recent:y
Located NKULTT's.A Material
a serioLis error W2F node in no: haring BE,F files ind ether
seemin;..ly innocuous files searched earlier.) As i: Ea7ren
most o: :he individual subproject folders contain 7r:,5ect
proposals and menoranda for the reaard, which in
degrees, give a reasonably conelete piature of the oven:Les
of researcn funded through NKjlTIIA. For your infrrnarian,
the original memorandum set.ting u7: nKuLTnA, si;:tei by
Mr. V.:lies, is also anon; :hese documents. A cag7 :f t.he
nemoran.i::n is attached.
�
3. At this t:ritin;, it does net- .-
that. is anything in :hcse nc,wly Icaated
intica.e tne acti-.-itits were nere entensave
Or rtn-..reversial than h7 Se---=
(Chnr::) Re;sort.. If 4c
i.e., mts: of :he nt.arly 27' st:brreieats inntruc:
Th-:s, 'ant or:rview of is essentially unchan,:ef.
With cxceptions, the present find fills in $:7.f. af the
missin; Ctt:i:s.
Or: of ttn,.F-Z CYClar,:i27.5. is S...:ctr:L'ect
N:e.ber t;hich concerns an activite that hare been
ron:rle: carlier. Mc; rroject et...7.15 with the search Ear
2 dr.: which was conacr.i:an: with, a7.e. 2 by-Troltic
of, C27:C7 research 2: 2 major univa-c'-y I:
th:: 2n e:jective reading of that project .woL:Id !encnstratc
the search for knocl:owt materials and anesthetics wire
co-.pn:ihie activities. Hot:ever, the research
stated th:: "chenical be st:Icject-cd,::
screenin;....on advanced cancer patients-.
5. C*1 SL:bprojort Nunbe735 contains f1:12 fita!ls
of CrY. .:hution of 5373,0 to i El ,
Tht.. Al,onay t.sIhtn
in�e11 in ,Irt; resoarcit orotr:nts. mnnv of which were
being cor:ncto.: bv whose faci:itios
UCTC iii.2c.lantc. in �root to fa:ilit:!te the ongoin;
rescar:i. -,�rras. it was des-id:7.i tc .en:IzZito the h-;.il.:fng
pro;r:- to it :1:noe:!i
also bc.;?..: use..1 to fund sone of tho rosearc:, praczts..
105
SV7--IEC1: Rcr,uest for Guidance on Handling Recently
LccateKULT!IA Material
The ccntril-:;:icn co..:1d be controversial in that it W25
made through a mechanism mching it appear to be a nrivate
ecn:Fzien. Fri:.ate donations qualified for, and- ---
==-rtszeive. an equal anol:nz of Federal matching
funds. :2::57 from the Office of General Counsel dated
21 Fe!--tuar:LliE/ attesting to the legality of this funding
is in the ::2e.
- 6. -(1-A11:2) The Legislative Counsel has been -
rade aware cf :he existence of these additional NKULTRA
documents which are still under review and saniti:ation.
The MARKS case is in litigation and we are committed to
advise nr. narks cf the existence of these files shortly,.
and to ie�:-.- rel,acable material tc his attorneys �
by 31 Jul.:. A oletter from the Infor7-atien and Privacy
Staff to n7. nae.-::s* attorneys informing them of the
existence cf this material is in the ccordination process
and is schefu:td to be mailed en 2.: June.
7. There are new two actions that should
be tal:en:
a. Rilease aprropriate17, saniti:ed material to
Xr. c:torLeys as req;:ired by FOIA litigation.
I. Infcrm the Senate Select Comnittee of the
existence of the recently located records prior to
infcrmin; nr. Xarl:s' attorneys.
It is recemmended that you approve of both of these actiens.
S. (.VA:UC) If additional details on the contents
of this mntericl are dcsired the CTS officers cost familiar
with, it are rreared to brief yoL at your conYenience.
S.
David S. Srandwein
Director �
Office of Technical Service
106
The Director of Central Intelligence
wewpm.oclosas
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
During the course of 1975 when the Senate Committee, chaired
by Senator Church, was investigating intelligence activities, the
CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation
with the effect of drugs. Under this project conducted from 1953
to 1964 and known as "MK-ULTRA." tests were conducted on American
citizens in some cAes without their knowledge. The CIA, after
searching for such documentation, reported that most of the documents
On this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report
to you now that our continuing search for drug related, as well as
other documents, has uncovered certain papers which bear on this
matter. Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no
previous attempt to conceal this material in the original 1975
exploration." The material recently discovered was in the retired
archives filed under financial accounts and only uncovered by using
extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection.
Incidentally, I have personally commended the employee whose diligence
produced this find.
Because the new material now on hand is primarily of a financial
nature, it does not present a complete picture of the field of drug
experimentation activity but it does provide more detail than was
previously available to us. For example, the following types of
activities were undertaken:
a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on
American citizens, without their knowledge.
b. Research was undertaken on surreptitious methods of
administering drugs.
c. Some of the persons chosen for experimentation were
drug addicts or alcoholics.
d. Research into the development of a knockout or "K"
drug was performed in conjunction with being done to
develop pain killers for advanced cancer patients, and tests
on such patients were carried out.
107
2
e. There is a possibility of an improper payment to a
private institution.
The drug related activities described in this newly located material
began almost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over
10 years ago and do not take place today.
In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors
of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered. I would like to
volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this
unfortunate series of events. I am in the process of reading the
fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that
I have a complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be
In touch with you next week to discuss when hearings might be
scheduled at the earliest opportunity.
I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know
that it is essential to your oversight procedures that you be kept fully
Informed in a timely manner.
Yours sincere
STANSFIELD TURNER
109
APPENDIX C
DOCUMENTS REFERRING TO SUBPROJECTS
DRUT
date ,,,�4 17 1 May 1953
MEMORANDM FOR TEE ITECCRD -
SUSZECT: Project IOCZTRA, Subproject 2
1. aproject 2 Is being set up to provide a secure and
C2-4
efficient means to expleitV/Maxessameafessmgramm in regard
to the SOCJLITIA program. .
2. 1111111621fflanir-3 prec__ _ psyctintrist tovalloommas
and � faculty nemner of the 11111Meggpagaftiggi s 7,,:
positiems have ineluded Chief 17eureysycn1atrist et05116111120.111/
:tier ol the Psychiatric Section at 1111.11MMIEnsgalla,
and OSS experience during Wend War U. Sc has been of
vall.e in the general NRCLOA field aa an overall advisor and
censultont, be has been of value in contacting individuals in the .
ares and In setting up projects there, and he has -
dece work hInself vtich has coetributed to the WS/TIC field. Si, OP -
professional set:cities and known connectines with the 1.11111111111i,
C- sUW
' "
3. Subproject 2 vssill include:
date
a. Xiscellameous research and testing services in the
genera/ field of MKUL7RA.
b. Services as a contact and cut-out for protects in the
Mr-TRA field, prtnartly these located in thmengalmainek
area.
e. Neuitering of selected pro.ects In the HX71TRA field,
when located in the central=aelp area.
d. Services as a general consultant and adviser in the
1000LTRA field.
4. The total cost of this project Is not to exceed $4,650.00
for a period of one year.
5. siggeg1119, Is cleared through TOP SOCRET on a contact
basis.
:77
96-4Do 0 - 77 - 8
...=acretridtram
e_
- Arlea21480-14:
� -
Chemloal Division/75S
A.P7RCVM:
esaa,'P'
�
=RAM AFT1407ED
AND =MENDED:
Date: Ma/ G 116-s
Attseh=ent: � _
ProPosal
Origital On17:
110
Chietorical Division/7.53
Arne= 'Pm
ostmax.-ion at" MUDS:
�
L'-tc.or
Date;
111
MS&
PROPOSAL.
^ _ �
,Objective: To study the possible synergistic action of drugs
which may be appropriate for use in abolishing consciousness.
Situation: There is reason to believe that two or more drugs,
used in combination, are more effective than single drugs.
The combined effect of some drugs, such as combiostioos of
barbiturates, are7kmown. With other combioations, the degree
of synergism is not known. If eonsIderalle synergism is found
to exist, two possibilities must be considered: (1) that ma
particularly useful combination may be found, and (2) that a
particular combination may be hazardous because of its effect
on respiration or acme other vital function. To minimize
hazards, animal experiments should precede blomam experiments.
Proposal: Allocation of $1000 for animal experinents, to be
drawn cm as needed. That experiments be conducted informalli
at 14=0 without a specific grant, and with appropriate cover.
actc,
IlaMealr
������
112
PROPOSAL
� Objective: To study metbcds.for the adninistratiot of drugs
without the knowledge of the Tstient. Preparation of a manual.
Method: A survey of methods which have been used by criminals
for surreptitious adzinistration of drugs. Analysis of the
psychedynamics of situations of this nature.
Proposal.: That $1000 be allocated for this purpose, rands to
be requested as needed.
11.
V
113
6
dale JUN 1-t. 13.8RArraugogIaliM
NIRCIIMIDOX ?CZ: US SW=
SUS.11CCf s Project IIIITLIMA, Subproject Si �
. -
secure and efficient means of exploiting
1. Subproject 211 is being initiated to a
----
C 40111111Miwith regard to the MELITLl progran.
C. 2. Ia � practicing psychiatrist in
C and a faculty umber of
C.---- He hes been of value in the
general MEULTAL project, earring aa an advisor and
sonsultant, contacting individuals in theallaRIOM
arca, and carrying out his own reimeareb prapon.
3. Subproject 2: votad include the followings
(a) iisoallsumwsUiremearch and testing earrings
in the general field of M1011111.
.(b) Services ass contest and cutout for projects
in the ME171:21 field prtri1,7 the.. located in
(e) *mitering of 'elected projects in the
ME171.11U. field, when located in the neutral
411111011111110
(d) Services as a general consultant and advisor
La the MKULTRA field.
(o) Be would act as medical advisor and consultant
tangialliarlanclAts 0111111111.11111 establinh-
4.411111111111Iswill be reimbursed for his services
end expenses upon receipt of an invoice at irregular
intervals. When travel espouses are incurred through
use of a cannon carrier, they will be documented and
reimbursed in the usual manner; that is, consistent with
standard Government allowances.
c.;:c
.1.1111. 1...8 �
114
MEMORANDUM FOR TEE ALEC=
o....remmommiemm
2 October 1953
SUBJECT: Project NEULTRA, Subproject 16
1. Subproject 16 I. a continuation of Subproject 3, vhich
involved the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the
realistic testing of certain research and development items of
interest to CD/SS and APD/TSS. The facilities vere at up under
Subproject 3, and Subproject 16 is intended to provide for the
continued maintenance of the facilities. .
2. Subproject 3 vas originally intended to provide funds for the
maintenance of the facilities for one year; but it turns out that the
costa of alterations, equipment, and initial 'supplies were under-
estimated in Subproject 3; hence the necessity to establish Subproject
16 at this time.
3. Subproject 16 vill be conducted bygallielli a '-�
-
INSUNNa Certain support activities will be provided oy CD/TES
and APD/T5S. �
L The estimated cost for a period of one year is B7,740.00.
PROGRAM APPROVED
AND RXO)9SNDED:
Date:
Maile_A"
Original Only:
�
a4IGCTI'L=B
� Chief
Chemical Division, TSS
APPROVED FOR OBLIGATION
OF FUELS:
gases.:. ...redo:
Date: /, Cti-
9
T
/::
-
r 7*_, ,
115
f - t..........::, ,........;:.-... t-�2:- .
� -;- ' ...:.-:: 1 �����. -,.-- . ., � 11/4.1.... .: ..,� ,...� !,.. '',. f. c�-.7.-
� 19,...� %. .x- ,..�
� -
� - ..,
,.: �
�.",-,�'?5-'1:11,111101iL.;- ����:���'-77.�::,.�-?!�..:�;'�;,������t:-.;."'.....i: ..
� _� - ..
� After our telemt,ne comversat...n
-E.: td
�..: 5%
: .. and oper.,ed an� seco,z_-t - - re:"...lar checkimg - -�is the aznunt .0;
!.?�:: wing the 'name 44100:112210 ..:.: -1' s� � ,�.- �'! � . - ' ' �.;' ����:- -
..
- � � ' "'
:
��
this .norrli.�:z. I vent � .
' � 1 ��.
.:;" � It accured tin.se that i sake at safety"- - if, for.-
� earthing should Inrrpen It leculd tters if
�;-.. I Enda this a joimt account betvee -,41�511411101111������� ttt 431:1==taallso
.citos of ny-abseare, d..2.1=0-ss or death /on co uLd rec:vt-r .th�
^ TitLisut :any legal difficulties ar monimyta'siness.
.. � _ .
- �
- :� � n.-' -the bank vas a little stic. opa -
' account in the absences of references" fras ether bank" , end
'also- found It bard to ur_deratand he-�1110:00 got by all there
oars 'yitbouta bunk .account: -However, I.affered to provide am �
referene in a Official, a iVIION/Serefflefdlvo
La thasINS=111;:e=20EMZN ntla;a4 and
:....;;.thot'se-.�:--.d. to 7.2.amste the ecrmey-lecders. M.zreartcr, I cc.m:.----cated
,��-�, vitt ggeia ar,d he irkedietely ib-rote a refci-ence zer CO
z'static:.-cry: - also klail,y said .be vas, Tell ac.7,m...tinted with
-.�����- and 1sta pleas 'to offer -for his's-sir-tit--
� -�'������ � � a
_
a � 7011 I s& good ^ -Idea, r surzest, you
the Jot Accc--It Ar,-.Tere2rst and the theee sicte cards
Z. enc.-lased: and rer..-..ra these to .
:-� - � Ant nov that tha iiecotsmt Li iipeind I suumst-
c.....you have rands deposited via Casta'er's ch�emn - or any other Tay
� !bat seems easiest -1- directly to4111611111111Caiken--m=t/ cr�
and base also cei 'stationery beartm,�s -_ am.-e. '����-
� � I ordered chres.s prin�ed vt...1�1111511=2Wa51.1nane - �:7��
. � .
I considered this alert. facilitate payment of. '0;14, etc.,. Dyson.
; 3" � � ��c-.1i � - 7,- M..' ��'.- '`� � ��
f�-'" ���-7 litat-vith.truerpicione banks, landlords;
.�:. ccepanies.', .etc., Ton viLl'auderstand that crentr...-4 the Jer24.-2,1 �
:-de personality in the form .ofsf,MV3Z3. ia. taking a little
�
, �
� ' .���
.-
: ' 7 See you .Monday; the 8th.
�
� �
�
116
MEM/WI= PCS TM NEC=
SITEZECTI Pro:sot 12711:2541, Subpro,!ect 23
�
LfD
1. The scope of this prolect is intetled/6 encorress all
those acti.:1ties nov ensa:ed in by the VIIIIINOMMMOIRONalarl
111111111111IMb in its own facilities under the ilrea:lon of_g_2_=, 041
. At t.:e Ir.rese=t tire the various pro!ects at this facilit:- (WINIMie
41111.6 and WNW are beine concluded and it is leer-ed testracle
from :he staz..."point of security and eV:Joie:ter to repliee these pro-
:eats vita a stall, pro:ect more central in its appoor44.
Cil
2. The attached proposal fron Do.1111.0011WL-ticates the
=teat of the imvestUations that his facilities v111 allow him to
carry out on the no:aerials developed in the three pro.:eota referred
to in paracraph 1, as vell as certato otier caterials of latereat to
ca/Ts. Dr. az:0 serves as a zereral corsultant to this
di-talon mn ,rovites cover ant cut-out facilities to toe Acenor.
3. The total cost of this project for s period of one rear viii
not exceed Ve2,70o.on.
-
4. So.111111011Whms been ;ranted a Top Secret Clearatce br
the 4.7eacr and is full:. t:tr..a'ile of :trotectir�; toe security of the
5ooernrent'e interest in such tatters as this.
?rs:csnl
AFFST.M:
APM077.D ?C2 OIL.1-1=C7
07 7=;:
iiirommKeSIPOMWIA
lft)
117
The present imeistigatien is concerned with chemical agents which
are effective in modifying the behavior and functima ef the central careens ersa.,
1 - It is proposed to reedy a variety of known drugs in this pharmacological class
that are in present day nee end to synthesise new chemical agents er to modify
aansnuag ones 1.1 oceanic:, may demand.
2 - The various chemical agents investigated or synthesised will be tested an
animals to determine their acute mad chromic toxicity. Their pharmacological
effects will be rtodied by a variety of assay technics, such as blood pressure
determinations, broachial dilatation recordings, endocrine effects, etc. One.
plots animal facilities will be maintained for this purpose and pathologic
seedy will be carried out an the affected ergs= ohm the animala are sacrificed.
3 Preliminery clinical investigation will be carried out am the MOTO premising
chemical agents, and appropriate laboratory procedures will be performed, such
as bleed =mats, urinalysis, etc. to detaxmine the effectiveness sod the aide
reactions of the drags umdar investigatien.
4 Adequate reports will be admitted of the findings at quarterly intervals.
S - Proposed budget:
211:Mg.
Systherie cuspate cismist
$7000.00
Research medical associate
4,300.00
Pharmacalogical assistant
3,300.00
Chemical assistant
4,000.00
Histology technician
2,400.00
Clinical technician
3,400.00
Chemical consultant
1.200.00
Total for
$20, 700.00
salaries personnel
Other Expenditures
Animals, anizal maintenance 4 facilities
4,000.00
Chemical b laboratory supplies , ccpendable
4,000.00
Miscellaneous permanent equipment
2,000.00
Travel, medical motings, etc.
2 COO CO
Total other eve:Wit-tires
12 000.00
TOW.
2
42,1430.00
118
aptamsatat roa Tim NEC. ORD
WAIT 11.11111111M
a October 1954
SUBJECT: � Incresee in the Scope of Subproject 23, Project HOLM
.7)
1. Due to a/conoiderable increase in the scope of the work under-
taken by 11111111111111118111111.at the direction of ?SS/CD under Subproject 23,
Project MKIZTRA, the $42,700.00 sum originally obligated for this work
is insufficient to cover the year's costa. It is therefore proposed to
add $15,003.00 to that already obligated under this Subproject.
2. The total cost Of this Subproject for the period 28 January 1954
to 28 January 1955 will thus amount to $57,700.00.
3. The increase in scope responsible for this proposal consists of
the development and partial financing of two new sources of biologically
active compounds of interest in the program TSS/CD is carrying out.
APPROVED PCB OBLIGAT/ON
OP YOXDS:
Beseerca Direc:or
Date: LI,
Original Ottly�
MMENES
.41sesatagrar A
7%;.. a.
Cbemicml i1iaion, TSS
AZPROVED:
Chief, Chi
eml DiYision, TSS
Z.41
119
MEMORANDUM FOR: US RECCRD
25 AuguSt 1955
SUSJECT: Authorization for Payment of Certain EXpenses Under
Project MKS/LIRA, Subproject 23
1. In order to carry on the work of the above Subproject, it
was necessary to test the effects of certain chemical substances
vhen administered to human beings. Certain of the anticipated
effects involved mental functions which precluded the use of mental
defectives for this particular study.
2. In view e; these circumstances the project engineer, with
verbal approval from his chief, authorized the contractor to pay the
hospitals expenses of certain persons suffering from incurable cancer
for the privilege of studying the effects of these chemicals during
their terminal illnesses. The total funds expended in this fashion
amounted to $65e.05 and full value was received. :.
3. It is requested that the Chief, ISS indicate his knovledge
and approval of this particular expenditure for audit purposes.
Crk.
APPRCVMD:
Znief, :SS
Distribution:
Orig. - TSS/CD
61:1111
TSS/Chemical Division
APPROVED:
Chemical Division
120
21 December 1954
1.7=11=1 FC7: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJICT : Project :=ITEA, Subproject 35
1. While the Director's statutory authority to expend funds
for confidential purposes is not united by law, we believe that
a gift of Government funds as such would exceed the intent of the
Congress in granting that paver. Eowever, where a gift is made
for the exr:reas purpose of producing something of value to this
AGency whic:1 cannot otherwise be obtained and there is a reason-
able expectation that the value may be received, the gift may in
effect be an expenditure for proper officio]. purposes.
2. In SUbproject 35, it is stated that the donation in
question would achieve certain ends desired by Ire:- There seems
to be no question that those ends would be advantageous, so the
main questions appear to be whether they could not be attained
by =ore direct, normal methods, and4 if not, whether the return
is necessary and reasonable in relation to the donation.
3. We are in no position to review the requirements of ISS
or to ap7raise the advantages that would result from this project.
We do not com=ent, therefore, on the value received if the
project results in the benefits foreseen. We feel we should
eorr-ent on factors affecting the prob.,bility of achieving those
ends. In a legal sense, there is little or no control. Once
the funds are donated, the individual, his foundation, or the
hospital cculd conceivably refuse to work for us or allow us the
use of the facilities.
4. Practically, the control seems to be established as well
as circumstances pernit. Certainly, as long as the individual is
alive and in his present position, we have every reason to expect
his co=plete cooperation in the future as in the past, unless
through =AO act or fault of our own he is alienated. Even in the
event of his death or incapacity, there appear:: to be a reasonable
by nuthority of: 187475 ...1%
1D77
. J:-; a. lj7475
�
Copy * 1 of 1 copy
121
cr conzir.I.ZrA t!to :rcZect. .1.1- theta VrcLottlItie: erpzrtr
ZurrZeten: ZD Ct)t-DInu auequate rciurn far tet oxten:iture, there
can be no legal obeotion to tt:s aspect of the prolect.
5. It should be noted that there are two eircu:sstances which
require consideration in a final deter:inn:ton. As stated in
Eection V, our contr-"-n, by appearins to be fro= a private
source, would increase the r.atchinn Covernrent cor-r"--"-n by a
si=ilar amouat whica would not be the case if it were %now= that
this vas in fact a Co-tem:sent contribution also. Secondly, it is
the statcd policy of t'e he,p'-al to charE: the Covernmenl end
comrerciel or:, ' ,L5 EC per cent overhead on research contracts,
whereas nonprofit fountation tay only direct cots but r.c ovarhcad.
Because of the ostensible source, our pro,;ects will not be charEed
overhead. This could be eonstrued as nbray wronefUl to the
hospital, as normally we would pay the ec per cent overhead
,or prolects perfornei directly for us, but I bnlicve
this can be offset, at least to the aicount of our donntion, and
pernaps by the further auount by which the other Government contri-
butions are increased by our donation. In nny case, if the
proz:eet is a proper one and must be poi-fol.-nod in this manner,
security dictates these circu=stances and the;., therefore, do
not ;resent a leaal obstacle as stxt.
6. We raised the question whether funds for the hospital
construotion c:culd not be cbtoined from otzer norral charitable
sources. It apseared :.hat thcre was a strOnz; rossilsility that
the individual concerned could raise adequate fl:nds from private
resources, but it was the position of TSL that if this were the
case we would not obtain the-co==it=ent fro= the indivad.aal and
the deGree of control which this project is desizned to aohieve.
/
1AwR72::: H.
General Counsel
Is:
:horlt7 cf: 1E-4-5 -
---___-
Nrr:-.nec.1 t:: 7,;:iciewiret
'Y c?; 1-715
Copy 0 1 of 1 copy
122
8 April 1955
=2:viz= FCR: Chief, r:/p/izz
=J�CT : Anendmeni-to Zub7r-Ojeet 25 of Project :=7.21nA
W2 htve noted rotr ater.crantum of 6 April 1955 to the
l'Arettor tn inerthse c4: t25C,OVD for the TZS
FLD but for this 7rct. Ti.. rezuezt dceo not afoot
in any -zay th.! co�.ments in :ny
of 21 recemlaer 1954.
General Counsel
1,,,cncraded to:
outhority of: 167475
JI:=2 1!,77
112PDET;.CL BY 167475
� �
Copy II 1 of 1 copy
123
LRAM'
Wag. 14
5 Hey 1555
A portion of tte Roeserch end De7eloplennt Prezren of
TS'S/Chemical Divizice is C./voted to the diseoeery cf the
fe1l:74N; naosrinls and maths.is:
1. Zubstances which will premota
and inpulsivemess to tta point W.:aro the recipient would be
discredited i uh=c.
2. Substances which increase the efficiency of manta-
tion and psrception.
3. ratarials vhith will prove:A or cteract the
intonicatin; cffht cf alconol.
h. Estrials which udll ;remote the intoxicating ef-
fect of alcohol.
. 3. Matorie.ls which vial prod-Joe the Sil:E5 Lad cynstens
of reco=ised dicassos in a reversible way to that they nay
be used ie.:. malaus�ring, etc.
6. %stet-Lola which will render the induction at hypnosis
easier or otherwise enhance its uzefulness.
7. Eubstansoo which will enhance the ability of in:11- .
vidunis to with:tared privaticm, tcrnure and coercion 42ring
interroziti:n =:d vo-c/..Llod r.brain-usshine.
8. Yatrials end physical nethods which will produce
mntesia for events preeeding end daring thair use.
9. Physical etthods of prcEueing ehoet and cenf:xien
over =tended periods of tins and napable of surreptitious
use.
10. Substenees which produce physics1 disable:tent such
as paralysis of the 1e3s, acute anemia, etc.
124
-2 -
U. Substances thich will produce wpurercuphoria with to
cubsosuest let-dcvn.
12. Substances uhl:h alter prrsonality structure in sub
a uty that the tendency of the recipicat to become dependent
upse =other person is enhanced.
13. I. materill which uill eaulle mental comfusicm of such
a t7pa that the individual und:.: its tafluonoe vill in it
difficult to maintain a fatricatica =ler questicsing.
14. Substances wt.:eh will 1:ver the em7z.itica and
general varseinz efficiency of men when adminis4.0red in
undetectable amount*.
15. Substances uhich prcmsts veemese or distortion
af the eye:rht or herring faculties, pr-ferably without
pert:an:at of:esta.
16. A knosk:ut ::ill which can surreptitiously be
aste'inie--ed in cis, food, ell-arettes, ts an tercet',
etc., waion will ba sa:o to use, provide a Larimun of
=masts., cad he saltal.1: for non by tzsat type: on tm
sd boo basis.
17. A ratorial which can be surreptitiously
toped by the sicove routes and which in very stall 8=u:to
ulll ma'ne it it.rcszibis fcr & man to perform any physical
activity whatever.
The development of materials of this type follmts the
st=d-rd practice of rueh ethical drug houez: as
lam It is a relattroly routine procedure to devo.:p a crug
uo the point of on tcatiag. Cr:as-wily, the druz, h..uses dtpend
117,.on tie servicos ef Trivata phrsicions for the final clitictl
tectIhr. The physicians tro to assame the ro.Tonsibility
of su:h tosts in crd:r to sive:ace the scioace of medicine. It
is diZfi:-ult sad sometimes ir7ossible for TSVCD to offer such
an inaucLz:at with r:spect to is products. In practice, it bats
been possible LO %la out:ide closed contract,rs for the re1s-ainsa*-7
phases of this wsrl:. 1:svavor, that part whiz...4 involves human
tortlag at eff:otive dose levele presents sesurityproblems which
cannot be hamdied by the ordinary ccntractor.
ta:411:1111111
." of:
1-7
._ 1 .: 12-.%
s,
�
125
. -3-
.0**
The proposed facility 4102201111befor3 a unique opper-
eutity for the strare 3-4�01"; ric,1 clitical tostim; it atii-
tie= to the :say ctruntagee outlined it tho project pro:tosal.
The security preacts tsatictri above ars elititttsd by the fact
that the rot7on3ibilit7 for the tostia; re at ecntictoly
upon t'ae rbyniciat tti ths
will olZcv rar.7.--atii to
su.747:1Js t.te c-cacly to =tie cur* that cal torts trs
eonduct4,2 accor6.ir4 to the sect:pi:0d practices tad cmhtiy
gotta eafteusrda.
9f- 4n8 0 - 77 .
126
10 May 1933
SUSPROtTECT 35 OF PROJECT MAULTRA
1.. Subproject 35 as approved by the DCI on 15 January 1955 contemplated a
financial contribution of $125,000 to the 11111012=11111MMICIMICIP to � 13
participate in the coostruction of a new eeeee rch wtn; to cost 000
exclusive of furnishings and equipment. �Agency funds will be transmutted
through the entIZEZINMSratagariummina. as cut-out which � �
will result in one. o: 1.1e s ace ut the new resea.r.. wing being made
available for Agency-sponsored research involving covert biological and
cherrucal techniques of warfare.
2. At that time (15 January 1955; 411.111012111CMMINUMMIlb with CIA �
encouragement indicated a willingness to contrtbut: Si, CII to the construc-
tion fund. The buildtng fund was to have been raised as follows:
$1,000,000 - Contributed by � 8
250,000 Donation fro= aggloonmilinge..: wnich �
$125,000 to be supplied by Z.;:i�
1,250,000 . Matching finds under Public Law 221 equal
to the arric..nt of t:,e two above contributaons
500,001 - iffiraggari B
$3,000,000 - TOTAL
a
3. Sine: it now appears that the expected contribution ls;- will not be
forthcoming, permission is requested to increase the Agency's contribution
by $250,000 which will result iu a financial situation as follows:
$1,000,000 - Contributed Isl. � /3
500,000 . Donation fro=
$375,000 supplied Oy
1,500,000 - Matchin: funds under Public Law 221 equal
to the amount of the two above contributions
$l. 000,300 - TOTAL �
4. 'The Agency's contribution would thus total $375, OCO. This investment,
to:ether with the equal sum resulting from matched funds, is F.:1!" :usttfied
ir.�'�� ::::nton of TSS for reasons which will be explained 4, 11111111111. � C.
IMO1ef, TSS, and Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief, T1S/Clieretical Division.
Tim scope of subproject 35 has not c:ianged since the Director orilinally
approved a request by TSS for perrnis�ion to spend $123,000 of available
e "5-4:7 -.41111/M
���������� ����..� �� A .�
�
B
a
127
t4
r�to 011* �Airnose through the control� and Procedure� established
:.�..;:1-71t.A. :it the time subproject 35 was set up within the scope of
n mu rm, security considerataons and cover arrangement�
vire: illy reviewed, and the Office of General Counsel assisted in legal
i. rir-nations. With the exception of funclIng arrangements, no changes in
t t rogram have since been made.
F vide to cover "Es previously approved sum S125,000 are available
in the TSS pud;et for FY 55 and have 0/en set aside. The TSS
however, tanks funds with which to co r the supplemental Sum of
000, and it is requested that the TSS 411111101-4;et be increased by this
Supplementary funds available fur tutpro.ect 35 can definitely be
obligated by the end of FY 55.
or;
kite: 1,77
/2 1: Y. �21. W1
128
11.01111111=1Mw
AMENDMENT TO St121PROJF-CT 35. PROJECT KULTRA
For the Purpose of Establishing a Cover Organization for Highly Sensitive
Projects in the Field a Biological. Chemical and Radiological Warfare
I. Background of Subpro:iect 35.
In January 1955 approval was given by the DC1 to Subproject 35 of Project
MK ULTRA. The documents which lead to this approval (including comments
of the OGC) are attached herewith as Tabs Z. A and 3.
Project MKULTRA is the framework of procedures and controls under which
research projects in certain highly sensitive fields are carried out by T$S.
A description of the background of Project NOCULTRA may be found on
pose 1 of Tab A.
Subproject 35 establishes under which the Chemical Division of
DD:P/TSS would conduct certatn sensitive projects in the fields a bin!oe,e.al
and chemical warfare and consists of a proposed arrancernen: whereby the
Agenr�.� covertly contributes funds to assist theallIMISSIBMWMiamp � R
1111111111.11 the construction of a new research wIng. Contr of these
funcs is to be made through the 1'- r--- � a
Mb as cut-out so that the lagellECOMMUIEMOINI remain _
unwItting of Agency participation In the pi :am. Projects would
later be carried out by the Chemical Division using the facilities of the
new research wing, and Agency employees would be able to participate
in the work without the University or the Hospital authorities being aware
of Agency interest. Subproject 35 contemplated the contribution of Agency
funds to assist in the construction of fat:lit:es, Future rch work
would be carried out through the 1110=1.111Miellidi zs cut-out and would be �
separately funded under existing procedures and controls.
110,101111113.1MSIMIS3:02:310111111 and the back2roand of
111114aMital2M2Vallir are descrized or. page 2 of Tab A. Cr. thr
sant 7.3.2e Mc re is,� t,e found a further description of the logimmagg
quallimatianueliensarsgralmefr
12, Building Fund.
The University will require $3.000,000 for the stx-story addition to the
hospital exclusive of the cost of land, heating and power supply which :.re
being provided by the University. Under Public Law 221, Subappropriation
7�
0::
� : .*:.r? 2 "
129
663, dated 26 August 1954, funds are available to match funds raised for
thss purpose by the University.
When Subproject 35 was first prepared, it was hoped and expected that the
ficr:ds requtred would be provided as follows: The University has allocated
51,000, 0 to this project and will assume upkeep and staffing obligations.
C agreed that if the Agency would provide - B
..iin a grant of 5125,000, the Fund would match this amount and
make a total donation of 5250,000 to the University Buildin; Fu.nd. At that
time, e:ituss:ons with alediZialan=t1215InatMSOMONNESSID 4-
111anaraidanaP :ndlca:ed that 110111111.111 xouid contribute 5530,003
to the g project on the basis that radi �fiscal research would be
conducted in the new wing and that the constru tion of the new facilittes
was of int to that Agency. In summary, th financial situation was
to have been as follows:
$1, 000, 000 - 11
250,000 - Donation from 111233M111101111;of which "23
*125, 000 was supplied by CIA;
1,250,000 � Matched Funds under Public Law 221
500,000 -11111111.6 � a
" $3, 000, 000 � TOTAL
'�����
� 7:
�
, C ... c- ...- 8
The origin.il informal commitment on,t'S'e paait' of MOMS was first obtained
throuch verbal discussions with 1111111.0.1111011111.11111. which sere fcllowed
up by an exchange of pordene e between the. DC: and BilliMaliae � C. ,
Unfortunately at that timeasi.fully occupied with the centre-
ver th
ss concerning ei and continued contact with 1111 - C
8110116,ordinates resulted in a decision thatigillia7ould not or
*0..1.: not contribute to the Building 'and. but would be ssbi,,kgz to swpport
an annual
is program amounti g to $50,000 to S75,0 It is not
.r . ! . � , iirommasinlib
11 . � B
Copy I 1 of 1 copy
It was recognized that the Federal contribution 9PSl,250,000 under Public
Law 221 would be seemingly inflated by reas of the inclusion of the CIA
contribution in that of 1111011=65111=1". It was felt that the value to
the Agency was such that this inflation of the Federal contribution was more
than justified by the importance of the over-all project and that furthermore,
the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of aligNISIMINIMIND was the
best means of matmairung security.
�
SIONIMMINP � 8
130
-
known whether this change In policy was suggested to IIVZONMED or
whether it originated with him. De that as it may, when the change in
policy became apparent. it was evident that additional funds would be re-
quired to complete the hospital construction.
IV. Su:;cited Funding.
It is now suggested that the $3,000,000 required for the hospital wing be
provided as follows:
� �00. 000 -IDS,T11 f rilloilr-1.1. 411=21111111.1a( including
$375,000 supplied by CIA)
1,500.000 - Matched Toads from Public Law, 221
17,11-0.000 -TOTAL
&
The donation from SWIIIIIIMMIliallapwould thus consist of the original
1125,000 to be supplied by CIA plus the sum of $125,000 lobe provided by
the Fund and a supplemental CIA contribution of $250,000. Originally
Subproject 35 requested permission to make a contribution of $125,000 to
the building fund and approval was given. This approval is enclosed
herewith as Tab Z. The purpose of this amendment to Subproject 35 is to
request permission to contribute an additional 5250,000 to the building
construction fund through 44111116/110Menap It should be noted that �
the total Government contribution to the hospital fund still remains
unchanged at $1,1175,000. The increase in the size of the contribution
by the Fund is not out of keeping with other operations of 01011.111 and will � ft
not undue comment because of its magnitude. The originally approved
contribution has not as yet been transmitted todia10111$ and neither the � 4
original contribution nor the supplement would be paid to elaYM/Pentil
funds adequate to complete the project ar� made available. Thi� condition
was specified by the DC1 in approving the original contribution,
V. Source of CIA Funds.
Funds to cover the initially approved sum of $125;000 are available and have
been segregated for this purpose within the TSS FY 1955 tud;et for P.
and Development. Insufficient funds remain in the TSS budget to cover the
supplerni-ntary sum of $230,000, and it is therefore requested that the TSS
bud,:et be ut d by this amount and that the increase be made available
to Subproject 35 of Project MICULTRA.
- �
Copy I 1 of 1 copy
�
�
�
131
VI. Comments by the Office of General Counsel. �
Tab 3 is a memorandum from the General Counsel to the DC/ dated 21
December 1954, commenting on Subproject 35, and stating in part that
there are no fundamental legal objections if the probable benefits are con-
sidered a fair return for this expenditure. The amendment to the Subproject
contemplates only an increase in funds and in no way changes any other
aspect of the project. The project has been referred back to the OGC even
though no change in its structure is contemplated, and Tab 4 contains his ,�
comments.
VII. Justification.
The advantages and benefits accruing to the Agency outlined in Tab A are
felt by TSS to provide adequate and complete justification for the expenditure
of the additional sum herein requested which brings the total CIA contribu-
tion to S375,000. The most important of these advantages and benefits
may be summarized as follows: (Fuller explanations may be found in Tab A).
a. One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be
available to the Chemical Division of TSS. thereby peoviding labora-
tory and office space. technical assistants, equipment and experi-
mental animals.
b. Agency sponsorship of sensitive h projects will be
completely deniable.
c. Full professional cover will be provided for up to three bio-
chemical employees of the Chemical Division.
d. Human patients and volunteers for experimental use will be
available under controned clinica! cord :tiers within the full
supervision of ;�=2E;imicammessulpgr - a
Subproject 35 was originally conceived in October and November of 1954,
aid the ensuing six months have indicated that increasing emphasis and
importance are being placed on the Chemical Division's work in this field.
The Licilaic* of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experi-
merte under safe clinical conditions using materials with which any Agency
cannectIon must be completely deniable will anment and complement other
programa recently taken over by Tn. such as IIIIMMPII1
r � 2
Copy 4 I of 1 copy
.1 1:7.-5
132
�ALIIILIMInspop
It was orizinally thought that at least 18 months would elapse after the
_ building furds had been raised before the facilities would be finished and
could be oc:,eied by TSS. This lenvity delay has ne, `eer overcome.
W Olt etIMSSIMPOOMMeleal5"2100021121143.111111
amwasasas ca � s,ri his Fund ostens:L.;y contriliute,
he wil; tnen be allowed to use existing space in the present hospital in
order that he may build up the organisation which will later occupy the new
wing. This mean, that TSS will be able to begin to take advantage of this
cover situation within a matter of months instead of waiting for a year and
a hall,
-
S,..c�Irity.
Security matters and details are being co-ordinated with the TSS Liaison
and See.irity Officer. Security of transmittal of the funds and cover arrange-
rnents are described in Tab A and remain unchanged,
IX. A;reernent wit?. elanCSICOOR:-.; C
C
The agreement with. 4111111MEMO is described in Tab A, and the extent
of his co-oreratson and the control over his actions remain unchanged.
X. Resultant Financial Saving,
The total contribution of 5375,000 by CIA will result in an additional
S3,S,OCO in matching funds provided under Public Law 221. It is felt that
the expenditure of these total funds is justified by the importance of the
programs which will Be pursued at the new facility. Even though the CIA
contri*.iution is increased under this amended project, the total of Federal
funds rema.ns unchanged. The use of this facility will allow work to
procecd under conditions of cover and security which would be impossible
to obi-in elsewhere without an expenditure of equivalent or greater funds,
In ad,2.,,or, by f.ndilig individual projects for this facility through the
alleM7121M1 chcr.!e cull be incurred for overhead expense. U
rese�fzn ,,rojecis l.ire openly sponsored by the w.
U. S. Government, it .1 c,s:orn,:��� to pay an overhead rate equ:vi�-�
to i of salaries.. However, if a non-profit fund, such as linilei2:31111k - 3
SIB* sponsors eeeee rch, the funds granted for the work are customarily
utd on:y to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies, but not overead.
The A .ency thus buys considerably more research througn 11110:211112211116 � r,
COP .11, would be the case if no cut-out were used.
r� ��
. .
�
� ers :�5
Copy I 1 of 1 copy
a
�
�
133
"ere-zit:: the file on =1:7A, Stlb-
project 35, with or ct=entn on the 127,1
arc. While.thtre is no 1tr:;s.1 control ani
thert nre cert7tin conside1nt4cns,
th2re iz no f;r:::nmen.tal 1e7e1 enZ'otion if -ch-
prohn1:1,1 btrif:fitz are conz4.-",-e4 a fair r2t= -
for thir. exreh:liture.
General Counne
pr, Inc?,
(DATE)
FOAM $0. 10.. 101 .im� .111 S 2
(471
0..�����
134
wwWwiwnlonalp
SUBPROJECT 35 - PROJECT MKULTRA
For the purpose of establishing a cover organization for highly
sensitive projects in the field of covert Biological, Chemical
and Radiological Warfare
I. Background of Project MXULTRA.
In 1953 the DCI approved Project MKULTRA which established procedures
and controls under which h projects in certain highly sensitive
fields could be carried out by TSS without the necessity of signing the
usual contracts. The approved procedures apply
over-all F. h and Development budget, and no actit.iicna.r.incs
are required. Controls established in the Project Review Committee
approval of the R. h and Development program (other than the
signing of a contract) remain unchanged, and special provisions for
audit are included. All files are retained by TSS.
These procedures and controls were approved since it is highly un-
desirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts be
signed indicating Agency or Government interest in this field of en-
d . In a great many instances the work must be conducted by in-
dividuals who are not and should not be aware of Agency interest. In
other cases the individuals involved are unwilling to have their names
on a contract which remains out of their control in our files. Experience
has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of physio-
logical. psychiatric and other biological sciences are very reluctant
to enter into signed agreements of any sort which would connect them
with this activity since such connection might seriously jeopardize
their professional reputations.
When Project MKULTRA was approved, it was not contemplated that �
it would be used for the establishment of cover. Over forty individual
research and development projects have been established under this
framework and have been carried out extremely successfully, both
(tom technical and administrative points of view. The experience
gained in handling these projects has emphasized that establishment
of better cover both for the projects and for associated Agency scientists
is of utmost importance. Subproject 35 would establish such cover.
ro:::::!r:::!od to: ffiti.zomior
t.�ity on
� 11.nrGiai4 U.AafrissMoRs
' .tittnority 1Z-475 .
-
:1""
Cs S:
r . -.2:d to; ef.wwilliswitilm
1 'erfty of: 10 4-.1
0.�ir 1.7-1
135
- 14
_ a
Theassesmamoonsgratmesuk. was incorporated in -
litealliablia=agnalig. It has a Board of Directors of six
members, one ot .norr..suiljalieleigialla who acts as Executive -
Director of the Fund. 111011.60 hws solicited funds from various - a
izidjvtduati to finance a program of basic h in the chemotherapy
of cancer, asthma, hypertension, psychosomatic disorders and other .
chrOnic di . Since 145: 4/NBRIO�a.a.so...oparate4 with,the
Chemical Division of TSS and acteu smoothly and efficiently, both as
a cut-out for dealing with contractors in the field: of covert chemical
and biological warfare, and as a prime contractor for certain of
biological h. Projects presently being handled for the Agency
by the Fund are administered under the controls and procedures
previously approved for MK ULTRA.
Ill. Background of
111111116.1013.11121101111111p :s internationally annum as a iggigaggens ����
in the field c:slifitINOW.esearch and -
gallasifirimismilagelarei In th- cast Pie n.s .e-. a sit c :a: ed
a resea.-,h capacity with both the lellealienaMEMERMIENall. - a
1111M1.11D.ing the war 1.11111111101111.111 served as sigatgagallgs -
in the Bureau of Medicine and S.agery iii the lilavy. Since then he has
maintained a consulting relattonship to the Navy medical it pro-
gram. 16011621001111 TCP SECRET cleared and witting of Agency - C
sponsorship of toe programs carried out by the Fund as are two other
members of the Fund's Board of Directors.
.� enzazeo in a camraiin to raise tunas
r � of erecting It clinical research wing on the existing
The s wing will emstst of a �
bui:d.ni, �ix stories nigh, 32C feet lung and SO feet wide. Two-thirds
of the space will be h laboratories arid off.zes while 100
rch beds will occupy the remainder, falligiegregg parties-
pal&oi in the fund-raising campaign outlined below w res..: in his
having control of one.siwth of the total space in addition to the base-
'
�
Cory I / of 2 c.ples
�
136
41111M61111M
rnent and general out-patient facilitie�. In this effbrt, lanilen=
has secured the enthusiastic support of the medical faculty and toe
officers of the University who have carried the preliminary arrangements
forward to the maximum extent of their resources.
V. Financial Situation.
The University will require about $3,000,00C for the eit story addition.
This sum is exclusive of the cost of land and the heating and power supply,
which are already available II the site At the present time under Public
Law 221, funds are available to match funds raised by the University.
The University has allocated $1, 000, 000 to th:s project axle will assume
upkeep and staffing obligations. INIIMMOIMIND n-ss-agreed that if CIA C
will provide. grant of 5125,000, 11.101111.wi1l 8
match this arr.7=i-an-., donation of $250,000 to the University
Building Fund. This Agency's contribution will be made under the con-
dition that it will be refunded if construction does not take place.
TSS has discussed this situation with aglailigaZ,===1:221111116 -
41/115EMI=545=pplin and has encourager. glegiCia !�a . -
V- '3 to toe z.:1 Ging project on the basis t�..a: eintagempalaies 6 .
will be conducted in the new wing, 111111MMICal thou;h aware of our w- 8
interest in the building, is unwitting of our spec.fic fields of
--and individual projects. In summary, the financial situation would be as
follows:
$1,000,00C -
250,000 - Donat.on frorr,
(5125,000 suppl:ec, e..v CIA)
1,250,000 - Matche:l frorn Public Law 221
500, CC''
53,000, COO - TOTAL,
Although it is recognized that the Federal contribution of SI, 250,000 under
P. L. 221 is seeming', inf.atPd by reason of the inclusion of the CIA contri-
bution Ir. Oat of Inglailltiallilintalla actually the value to the CIA is
$250,010 and not just 5125,003, the amount of CIA's contribution: further-
more the inclusion of the CIA contribution in that of 111001.1111011001M -
islip.s the best method of maintaining security,
Co -rrrndoi to: farialsailliab
,..uthert7 el': .1t7475
�.f :
:..:;
Copy � of 2 copies
ra
137
11111111111Milems-t
VI, Difficulties Faced by TSS.
it has been g
fly recognized for some time that the external re-
search activities of the Chemical Division ol TSS in the field of covert
biological. chemical and radiological warfare are sorely in need of
proper cover. Although Project MK ULTRA provides excelltnt admini-
strative and financial cover for projects, it does not afford cover for
scientific or techniral personnel. MISULTRA has been used for
dealing through 11101M111 as a cut-out and for working '�
directly with ind:viduals os�private companies. The use of 410311:11;5211106 _
the future will be increasingly limited due to
(a) The increasing number of people who, albeit
properly cleared, are aware of the Agency
connection with 11.11111111111110111101111110 � a
(s) The feeling by 41112611.aggalli that the Agency C
employees contact...1s hirn (Drs. Gottlieb,
delpia etc.) have no cover of any sort and � C
consegaently expose him to unneoeseary e.rd
highly undesirable personal risk; and
(c) The widespread intra-Agency awareness of
the nature of the relationship between the
Fund and the Agency.
Another serious problem faced by TSS/CD as a result of lack of suit-
able cover is the difficulty in planning careers for technical and
scientific personnel in the biological field. A loni-range
concept of activities in this field inevitably includes proper cover for
the individua concerned. The availability of research facilities
ataleggle==BESCUIESINI800011111�.:11 offer an excellent opportunity r�
to solye many of toe above problems, and 011=11121111. :s willing � C
and able to make any reasonable arrangements to suit our needs. Up
to three Chemical Division employees can be integrated into a. c
7rogram for work in the new hospital wing on the
A;ency's research projects. Although planning was not a
consideration when plar-hing the procedures and controls established
by Project MKULTRA, nevertheless this particular subproject, in
addition to its primary objective, will be of very great secondary hely
Z.:To:fir:teed to: fjeerrilrib
1- at-it-art:7 or: lft'�73
.Copy / of Z copies
' 1...;:t c, t'f 137,17j
138
M11111111111111111. -
in simplifying and eliminating many of the very awkward and dangerous
conditions facing certain Chemical Division employees.
VB.. Advantages and Benefits Accruing to TSS.
The contemplated arrangements willeesult in many advantages and
benefits. including the following:
(a) One-sixth of the total space in he new research
wing is to tre available to4IMINalingali and � C
in turn, will be available to the Chemical
Division of TSS. This will provide laboratory
and office space, technical assistants, �quip-
meat and experimental animals for use of Chemical
Division personnel in connection with specific
future projects.
�
(b) The cost of Chemical Division projects which are
to be tarried out under this cover will be
by funds made available through Project MKULTRA,
and projects will be subject to the procedures
and controls established for MKULTRA. The
funds will be passed through 1111011VMMOs
8
�
has been done in the past. tOMISMOINS
in turn will either pay expenses directly or
transfer the money to the University for this
purpose. Each project will be individually
funded based on its particular budget, and there
will be no other continuing or recurring charges
for items such as space, facilities, etc..
(c) The Agency's sponsorship of sensitive
projects would be completely deniable since no
connection would exist between the University
and the Agency.
(d) Excellent professional would be provided
for up to three bio-chemical employees of the
Chemical Division of TSS. This would allow open -
attendance at scientific meeting�, the advancement
of personal standing in the sciptific world. and
as such, would constitute a major efficiency and
. .
lrncte to:
ef : 17473
:
Copy / of 2 copies
�
139
morale booster.
(e) Human patients and volunteers for experimental
use will be available under excellent clinical
conditions with the full supervision of Ilgolgoop
VINtliegenetWOM
(f) There would be available the equivalent of a
hospital *alehouse.
(g) It is expected that the output of useful results
of the Chemical Division in the bio-chemical
field will be greatly improved through the more
efficient use of technical personnel who would
be able to spend more of their time on actual
laboratory work.
(h) 14flialege:1211281
(i) Excellent facilities would be providcd for
recruiting new scientific personnel since
members of the Chemical Division working under
this cover will be in daily contact with members
of the Graduate School of the University.
(j) The regular University library and reprint
service will be available as a source of
technical information.
-
VIII. Funding.
It is proposed that $125,000 be granted to Iffnafgralgignief If �
approval is granted. TSS will arrange for payment to be made under
the procedures and controls of NCKULTRA. These funds would come
out of the presently approved TSS P. h and Development budget
for FY 1955 and no new funds are irvolved. The funds would be
transferred as a grant tcealliggetgainlellOSIP :n turreding �
dews kill match these funds with an equal amount and donate a total
of S250,000 to the University as outlined in paragraph V. The sum of
1125,000 would be entirely in the nature of a grant and would in due
I tor thigigill!
-....!larlty of. 1ST:75
�: 7.17,
; :2. g 1371 ; 5
�
Copy I / of 2 copies
140
IgaNINIEDisio
course be merged with the entire $3.000,000 raised for the construc-
tion of the wing. The Agency would retain no residual interest in the
building or title to any equipment or facilities purchased with this
money.
This single grant will constitute the Agency's entire participation in
the r.ew hospital wing, and there will be no recurring obligations in
the form of annual support of the hospital or additional grants. Trans-
mission cf Agency funds toolaalranarlegraM will be made _
h previously established coven.channels set up by the ANS
4111064*::: similar transmittals in the past. The donation or � tt
Vim s will be shown as having been received from 4011111.1.1mgom, 6
nealitgaffiCKSIft�
� In the fiiture when TSS sponsors sensitive research projects which are
to be carried out it OW� project ... g
will be individually financed througr. `MIN. ��� I as it has
been in the past in accordance with previously established procedures
and controls using allotted portions of the annual R h and Develop-
ment budget. The University will be totally unwitting of Agency
sponsor:0.1:p, and the projects to every outward appearance will be
sponsored bye6280=11111111M. ��� C
c
In the event of 112.12313=1330 death. MailiPwill continue in
being and any activities under this project will be continued through lab - 6
fillah.and will be unaffected by his death.
IX. Memorandum of Agreement.
A memorandum of agreement will be signed with 11112galeMentli C-
outl.ning to the greatest ext,nt possible the aaaa niernents under which
the hospital space under his control will be made available to Chemical
Division personnel and the manner in which cover will be provided and
other benefits obtained. No contract will be signed since gaganglagglealf � _
would be unable to reflect any of the Agency's cnri,,etiia! t, rrns in his
arrangements with the University when agallagralanalig makes the �
denation in question. The memorandum oi agreement wiii be retained
in 155.
X. Securitv.
All security meters and details are being corordinated with the TSS/
1.13:S.Zil and See�.? . �
����� ���"�'-� t:�ww .r.r.T."!!""sw
1374-5
_
;
Copy If / of 2 e:wies
141
XI. Resultant Financial Saving.
The S125. 000 to be contributed by CIA plus the S125,000 in matching funds
provided under P. L.. 221 to the Building Fund will be more than offset
in a few years by the savings which win result frern use of this non-profit
fund. If a research project at laSSMMZZarr other educa-
tional non-profit institution is sponsore y tne S. Government, it
is customary for the Government to pay for salaries, egi.ir.ment,
sup''.es, etc. and for overhead as well. In the case of leen2ON � 6
MIMI, the overhead arnctsints to 80% of salaries. However, it a non-
prri.t ic-ndation such as INISIMerialganegaglhaponsor s research at a �
non-profit institution, the iuncis granted for the woe'e are customarily
used to pay for salaries, equipment and supplies but not for overhead.
The Government dollar thus buys considerably more research through
41111=MENgebthan would be the case if no cut-out were used. � g
XII. Legal Matters.
if This matter has been discussed with the Cffice
of General Counsel, and be is fully aware of all details s.rrountling this
grant.
'7rntrd tc : atissaigosgrapa
or
! C.. �13":".;
Copy I , of Z copies
uc-40. � 77 -to
142
SUI-..T.T CT
9 .4r11 viTir
TOrt: Ttrz r.= cc:1J
t � Trip Report. Visit to Iliegnak.
7 Apnl 1?J3
1. The ,,urpos� of this tn. wes to mines arsao;ements ior
clueing 041 t1-;" tr.; :m.. gala Leen ova.% at:pie previews
notice tt.at �311 LO Ii in4 .10*632 al Me visit, an� he pre.
pireu tuansell azcerein;ly.
Z. It was exploited to.111.01/thit it would nut be
posuih14 to carry over funds bema., ch3 of the rarest: isseal
rehr. Therefore all work would hove to be completed bad all pay.
meats made prior to 35 i/re. s a...peered acc...iael� to
him, xed4 waa agreed tilt I Ireful.: inai.a my visit last?. to
receive report] and atte3G to final tetoils on It. ;she. 111.11.d not
have � curter: finxectol report but he satiatel that tunes currently
CO hone watt::: be shout si'Jiiicient for re.mai:.�hg =pandit � . L�
aseoed to see] We .ieezziy tv.:Ain the eur.1 10 e:.ys a more e]ilet ecate.�
me,t cf curr....nt balance ehie estimothe r expend:auras. /
tried to impress cot him strongly 1111.1 transfer at attitional funds and/
Or return of u.emepenciee fonds must be Completed k.atzr� tit� eud
Cl the fiscal year.
S. Of the 30 cases called for id the ericinal deei4n 13 Imre
been eeratr etel (but oely 4 have tem transersoce from the tadee). In
ael...itian there are 8 Catie� in rm.:rem (of welch two are alrezoy In
intzrvtee. and 6 are worked up to the point of hiving the lists of questions
prepared). It was a;reel LIU to meet to� deo...line we wo.ila have to
/wait the desists to these Z6 cases.
4. It la �pparent tiut IMO is so isivelved in the administrative
problems of the project that he is z.vt paying any aeter.tiou to th� reaults.
dinc� to uote only � cages hav� beeo transeriited t5cre ii no way of
w.iatt is cer....i.mg out of it. 1 assure ther� were no eramntie reactmete.
cause tee int.:tv.ewers o..lci have 1..t nun Lao., about the= Lt;... they maer..4.1.
It is pozsihle. box�v�r, our era' �aalyozo etf to. deta may dredze co
somethio8 of vol.... �uhious on this petnt.
m� his ucual ten; inve1ve4 telk no the .:...fliculties
be had :ncounteree which aecour.: :or to� delsys. if. else tr.V..cd at senie
�
143
length s4out tits "asperLos,Nts** With bypno�ls. sosn� aspects of whisk
&TS !Li It bair-ral�uss. I aa.Uy be ccao.� gult� � pitch aor cootioulas
Store� such project as this poet year. "wit:a realicic. specific deadliaes.�
I told him we would Ji posalt.ilitle� wadi, toe prroiatt project wag
complet:d aaJ we bad a. clia-ice to closely cadmium toe tails.
Distribution:
41.011111aft
144
July le, 195e
Dear Mr.gliellgrASIOXIMPS
The experiment designed to test the effectiveness of
certain medication in causing indivtluals to release guarded ln-
fornation has been comp.tted in accoroance with the original ex-
perimental design, with m.e ecoeption that 2! Instead of 3C cases
were used. This matter was dlsoussed in more detail in my letter
.71.14 15. Abstracts on all 25 cases, trtnscriptions of the in-
terviews, Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Tests ;1,,er at n'e
pital and previously given at this clinitt, post-expertmettal
rankings and evaluation meets, and a scheddle covering the drug
administration have all been submitted to you under separate
cover.
Enclosed Is a financial statement which rep? cents the
final acco.hting of the funds allocated by you for use in this
project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detailed sum-
mary of wnat specific professional services were performed or
more detail with reference to travel expenses or any other item,
kindly let me know.
You will note, in this comnedg.ion, that Er.4111, was
compensated in an amount exteeding tna: paid to :r. 111/11110�. :his
was occasioned by the fact thot .efnt Ing
the files and records at theillineftWagglill_:-.1
Mei ''rison se:toting cases =a: =-,-: fc:
pose. It was from the eases selected by him taat the suhjects
used in the experiment were finally chosen.
I have been instructed to write a check to the Society
for the balance in the account as o today. I would like to
Mr. (Makitgitharialb
145
Pace Tvo
celay tnis matter for a few days. Several che:ss have been writ-
ten rn r.:sys, and L wcu.ie. lige to be sure they cleared
the t..ns 1,4111110111 before clCsing cr..: the account. You will
receive � cnecs in the amount of Sl356.25 early nest wees.
--------
/f there is any additional information required, I wtll
be happy to cooperate.
-xeC=Vo -.:o;147
41160221,
Enc.
41,:, 147473
1:17
. ;t.137
146
1
Therozaccc% :%-clicat trill Lc ccrriod est at t* � --
13
-t 1111.1111=116 lo a
�unasmassonstaaelazzommoim. :ho --
.:0:71tra Lc, t1....uoand, (no hun:.:c. tCtrtr-f:To
At t2A. proomtt thcro :so one th4 nca-
7cychstiou as-act:led to c1-:=c1 ohycnor.tt":. :2-3 four
�
rsi:J.:trizt: cad virr,'-a; of totorr.:; tts
=c: tht
c: ta 11111111300=222r, ,0tct.c.7 rt?-.cer � C.
of th: re=crIc ortcr. th: of
Zocrcicr; of :412 Ltat4 ...c7=tment cf N.cclth
_ .
air; 1.0 elm:. :-7.-::?ct 1.2 r.errAl:I' a:7=1nd c:
of tha o: algEGEMP C
411111=3110. T7..:.00 :t is
L41 Z1,C:, th.. otrr:tc:
thstr
dt.1.1 ho ::od frrn t!.."
on tc.r.- th,re ct :reTtscs
rollca rorti-tr,
tt-c*::411:rta :n2 Lt....ica. 2.: :f tho
- - ismoomA.
::. I
147
ccte r;t74 �o nn..1 %lure .1., �. -
etica c: ::mtL1
r-- _
ren wit 7.1z..:3ccd for t!-o rc:Jdrch ter.:a
AinalailMal, a rc:.c-elc:ist v.ohao Lad eme:.ssee
ex7ericaen in exa:aainz eri-irslafT:ii777rEtte =ter-siva;
p.r7enea:t..ic ec�-ael &seta:lanes is an gather:1.7 an pay-
craph and intcrre:ation methods.
liarerwigmosaalwaft
- c.
OM. rar rc-o ttar:7 :mare. a it.o has
ererd. his lir, in t tryciriet. ef :ha Anasna aral
.rriintatas tin ca2v inscitu:lan .0112absi:cr ea.-s --
and treatt!xt (cr thc m-initt.1-acraca psyel.ctssih.
C.
alleraStaa a :tr:cLiairist uho ha: a 2zrze r.rivate C-
;ractics. Al the nrczent Lira ha I: etelusilm3:rd:Tatla:
Itio tine to pcd�haana.1.7aia. ft has had extictzive emnericnto
criaicila. As ;:ers ao Las had
extensive c=7crtenee in 411002021011WIMMEM
idaseramp:.. thc mad e =urn cultusta, Oricntzl
traimsminz, cl,e� 4lehe362.:ocior.zstrucir.tar.
mozation utth crirdalrat an.: has ena.:od in aareonnalyila
end
,d to: ammumpr
�
1,77
a: C. :4 Itt-i-5
-2.
148
197:75� _
451Vaninalail. en ths-C
": 026114111/QaaVEVCISSIMEVratill. -
faggfir Trivn :.raczice
a.Ccr;�e..i..-.tr. ININIOMPIP:zo in - C
tan:: =nu: vanni7-rivo
c.
ignEratano
yannz, ',.7un
c fcr the rar.t.
mabecridarc--_,Alitielaterime
4111112011131460a0432:131=1 hzt cr..Grzlva
c: c. a4 ant 14.5 onza;od
;v." � --, c'-'se
a axinnto t ccncril
-
�
�c
112023Xft Cnn irczn -
visf: uns ;z1t hnz us:0 La t t-
nazi nr patients cnd uGct L77.ncziz ntZh mnn:c1
pc11:nts. rczanrc.: s;:nntt nowt noz icon G..:lociftd
to tut ri-t Cr now
tc cecznst.:.r.71.-= - 6
ersEaw
secr:!�-rn.7 tz:e It:to t.::: r.ec.en- - C_
cox7 v.:7r:: in n :n 1.:r ;.-rwiont
2
I
1
G.: cz,en ko zslactca.
r.?leve.1
%"" ne:In a
e
149
- -
bl =374-5
asetn�-c 4'47::te3tivn. on =other
zro-rp c: r..b.;cctz 11:.� strt.14.t, Intcrre.7atiol,L. :ith .1-1terro.:stica
� s tctr....;Nrcenr..-ultincl .ecer.:.to .1:r:entire nne ir.-..erro23ticn. later- -
the 1CI tetn na:ther ou...tec.* nso n_tht interro-
-.
cz.taaa =L.'. C3 tnI L and a te.r.tictl.ocarcrzi;oinal acetate
derirr.1.1*.y.
A creti.-z of all tr.* re.f..nrs of t.o rcnr.:--ch nre:ect4 be brie:Ca
Oa tn.* 0.ruz,* to 'lee 0.1.3. at t'.3 3.0j.t."..1 and =Ilea
� :;ci1 so L.: in the usa of thzne ttrt:s.
cf rutects for eryriteeintica, the fr.11:71.-s;
Li Co ecu,lit:
1) tab,!ectsi.U.1 te solettcd u.'".o have dnr.led ollc741.4.4,ns
of 9,1�Ziat:5 Linea V.szt one be cl.oc:.:ect or strcr-417 nann.=d
the basis cf prerlcunly estarlteaod :vomits.
2) Ls fz.r se pensitle, the Act:In.1 rezonrch
dru:s will not co nunre of thn &-az, be is c1stertz;
pincetes be inter:I:cc-yen utth ctru: aictratica3.
3) Pre:auticns Lc ts..-= to noutralino.csm. inte1.11-
,;:ace, #4r..letc3
et)---.r. control-24as fa:tor in coacctinz ,7cur.s.
r.:Lr..1.1trztion of tru:3 ijtll be e. a-se both or.enly and
rarreptitioucly.
racor41.-e of the 1..terre7ntico
....rt. ten rc-orts tt out -,:ta in er encc.z.
� 't t P. 461111.01711illnii:
rt. --It- of. -5
. 1..77
�
150
:��
:.)
C of
f. t. cz.^. '�
or
ACC=ra:c
7t. !T.:Z:77:7TM: will Le =4:-
cri i.reczz
151
nattr7,1=Wion
30 january.1561
MMORANDUM nit TIE RECORD
SUBJECT: Project MKULTRA, Subproject 42
1. Subproject 42 is to be continued for the same purposes as
�
when originally-established: to support ageierniftt covert :11,
and realistic field trials of certain research and developsent items'
of interest to TED, and to maintain the physical facilities required f:r
these trials.
2. In the past year � number of covert and realistic field
�
trials have been successfully carried out. The results of these
experiments have provided factual data essential to establishing
protocols for a number of contemplated operations. A continuation
of covert and realistic field trials are necessitated by the production
of nev material] in TED programs, particularly in areas requiring
detailed knowledge of the effectiveness pad efficiency of deliver7
systems. Additional trials are also necessitated by the need for
better controlled "field-type" experiments.
3. The estimated cost of the project is $5,000.00 for a period
of six months. Charges should be made against Allotment 1125-1390-3902.
4. 'Accounting for funds and equipment under this subproject has
been established on a detailed basis with the auditor and will continue
as in the past.
152
-0"�'"e'
j� *Mit is sporoved for TOP STTRET by the Agency sod
operates under cover for pur7osem of this subpro4ect.
APFEWTD FOR OBLI:ATION OF FUNDS:
,�-�( .31 -
rt�'443..--$21N--''''"-�;41:7-.---'44 4
Date:
Ari,.1
�
Dist:tbtifiora:
Orizfraal only.
4414:427.X47:"...%211-
TS:41iesesrot Branch
1--
153
iorb.14111ftlid.a. .,),
Y.T.:ECRANMM FOR THE RECCRD
SUBJECT: Project MULTRA, Subproject 42
1. Subproject 42 is_bt2:_!ILLIIblO.shed to provide fcr the
continued suppert of theati_acilities, and as such,
is a ccntinuation of lte Under Subprcject 42, it
is intended that thatZLM35;k._-_,:i_e moved frcm %Us
vanallaftealtc These facilities,
in tte new locaticn, will continue to prcvlae a means for the
realistic testing of certain R and D items of interest to
CD/T55 and APD/T5S. C.
2. Subproject 42 will be conducted by Kr. alefall*
a seaman. Certain suppert activities will be prcv:.iea ai
CD/T55 and 4PD/155.
3. The estirated cost for a period of one year is
seonc.00, startirg 1 March 1955.
Ai�PRCVMD PLR ORLICZICN
CF FUN:5: �
Researen ..rector �
Date: ,2 7
Original Only.
GTTL:=B
Chief
T35/Chemical Division
APPROVED FOR ADDITIMAL
ORLICATION CT FO=:(42,089.34)
Date:
154
2.1 Pierew 1-777;
1,e1MANOZN FM: 7Y.E xt:zn
SUB:EOT : Project-MITEA, Subproject 45
1. The scope of this project is ictettdm! to en:Dn.:ass
...-C. all those activities pow fa in med in by th....wzgraseaczwitgek.
.77' NII.,,...42=2505=1:Zago. its con fail cit th ies under e
d.rection of CZO, Cheoloal %vision. These activities trill
take the form of three lines of biochemical investigatioo;
namely, the curare-like effect of certain. thiols, the prepare- .
tioo of hydrogenated quimolines and iodole alkaloids, sod the
coctinued study of diphenclic compouods. In addition to the
above investigations, the present biologioal testiog sod as-
saying techntomes will be elaborated sod broadened to include:
cardiovasoular sod anticarcinogeoic effects of compounds re-
sulting from the above programs.
2. The attached proposal fro: 411Z=SSTMISIRriodicates
the extent of the investigatioos that his facilities vilL: allow .
him to carry out on the materials develolied io the three Lines
of researoh referred to in ptragrach_1�.11_ycil as certaim o'..her,..----�,
materials of interest to TSS,CD. ---"�-�also serves ( ('', ; �
as � general emelt:Lot to this Divtsion and provides cover and ��="..---
cut-out facilities to the Agency. _
3. The total cost of this project for a period of cos ye=
vill tot emmeed $110,00O.00. At the present tie, the stos of
$4C,00C.00 is being cc:matted, the balazze_of the total to be
commi.tted at a later data.
4.4111?"4.116""Whas beer. granted a TO? S.T.TIZT clearatcle
by the as is fully capable of protecting the security
of the Cover:me:it's isterest in this matter.
OF=CMC FR CB=C47:ON
cr
,01,-,�!,aZIr-*.7krZ-tri,sz.f;`
Resesrot C.-rector
Date:
Attachments:
Proposal
Original Only...
t;Tzs--7
TS, Chemical Division
�
,0462Hie, TS5,:nen-oal Division
�
LPFT.= rat 412:ancmc. A,r:. :rs.:Arsc
OF $2-..,OCO:
440eWlec-.41::'1/4-4":"1�. . sairwl..4.-.---;,1 � Researri Oirectcr .
�
taus
155
20 Januar, 111114.
MEM21.43DI4 FOR: TL-
SUBJECT: Propirrler-Mki, Subproject 45
�
1. The scope of this project is :intended to encompass all tt.2,!_21,_
0 activities now engaged in by the ISOOMOOMINNONMIEBMWADOMNIEW
*OD under the direction of TSS/CD. These activities take tae form
of three lines of biochemical investigation, namely, the Curare-like
effect of certain thiols, the preparation of hydrogenated quinolines
and indole alkaloids and � program of investigation of -toxic cerebral
- rotes. This last investigation will include bio-assay and chemical
-
analysis of various body fluids of aninals in which cerebral toxemia,
have been produced. It is the this program to endeavor to
understand the mechanism of such states as toxic delirium, uremic -
6.-
..
..% coma, and cerebral toxicity from poi4s La order order to continue the
CV -established "cover* activities of thilrgband ''..7 make available �
N pool of rut'eets for testing purposes, tteagetZkoplawarieft
i IIIEMSZVereets of compounds resulting from the above program will
Nit evaeted.
cc)
(c)
2. The attathed proposal fr=1111011911/21012indicates the
extent of the investigations that his facilities wil.l ellov his to
carry out on the materials developed in the three lines of research
referred to in paregremb one, a ...LI as certain other materials of
interest to TSS/CD. 'so serves as a general consultant
to this Division and provides cover and cot-out familitiee s'o the
'Agency.
3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year will
not exceed $100,0Ce. Charges should be mode against allotment
6-25C2-1C-001.
� - -
(C2:1.14 or a copy of t:-....tebfgrawursal audit report be sad. available for
I.. 11111105024F-es been requested to submit a susess--1 account-
(;�) the sponscr's ins-ectto.t. Also, it has been requested that an7 unex-
pended funds shall be returned to the Agency.
Tttle to any per equipnect purchased by funds rranted
be retained by the VargaaPMEME=Nagglib
CC)110404614.24 .ft lieu of higher overhead rates.
- �
other than its activities as a cut-out
:=T
Decogrc, to: rn:77-
by..: of- 475
JCZ CL ST 1117475
156
6. It woe mutually agreed that documeotation and acconrtior for
, trasv: expenses which are normally reimbursable a by thlgaMEROMow
Of/ sUll conform witrae.accepted practices of UMW&
require U ets of 7. creed to comp-y with m' st
(1) legaaktallnwa �
to.Mamorandum of Agriament.
'&P747=
FS:
�
(4) 911'11-.7'sail43-.41kors
-
hesearcA Director
itt,�:
Attse=ent:
Proposal
Distribution:
Oricinal Ctly
�11"3.11.
151, .a.. Olvlsic:
. .
APP!:
Chnef. '7,5/.7.tem1ca: Division
L
C. .:1112335310
157
2960
111
-
. - � _
She research to be undertahen during the twelve onth _
period for which financial support is requested ut21-be 44;ottTe
to the continuid analysis of the neural and endocrine mechanism
Of stress and the chemtcal agents that tf2uenee it. Tree screening
-
proced4res are based largely upon a further ana/yete 01 phases of
stress and the influences of this phystologic behavior complex
upon both body and skin tr.:per:tures as detailed tn the accompany.
1414 report.
The cheniv:: synthesie of new compounds utll be continued
. the
15 ";ervtston c:41111111110
at
at the 7 L.nder the supervcsvon
These chemtca2 agents utll be screened for
their cap:cf.:it to provoke stress or to suppress the stress reaction
. �
in Its acute or chr:ntc phases. Antma2 testing ut21 include ;Mama-
cologte screentn; and proper tomtetty st:.dtes of thwse compounds as.
heretofore. ---
Chemics2 agents that hare bee: found active and utthin a
suivable toxiciiy? range will be sbjected to clinical screening on
approprtzte pattents, the tnt:tal screentn; bet; carried out on
adocnced czncer pcttents. :he amount of money devoted to chemical
synthests, however, has bean :tir:hir red...ced. Chettca2 cotpcunds
austicbIe frat c2:;:c so:.rces as well Os those synthesised in e)
project will be screened, partvc...2ar:y those that are active In
either rctstn; or lowering body tenpersv-re.
heretcfv-e an agents shtch ;rope to be of interest
� . aar.a a.o01...a.eavo .o....!.h.mn_transclant
..f.�4014 ti. 77
158
Psi. 2
torMet.T.N
- �_ '"": --*.1����R
ontool tumors and on Gamier pattente. Pas cancer jphase" Of
-
. ' project mill be cOnstdpred a by.product of the 'major ebJeettee,:-
_
sehteh will be dt roe ted to the problem of stress.
4 _
AVARNING NOTICE
SESkillItirtf.TE:ChSESCE "
SOUSICES;040 mrrgoos Invomo
159
MEMOPANVeN4 FOP: �TriK nEcorto
ST:B:ECT
COntiouation of MY.ULTP.A. Subproj�et tee. 4,6"`""
-
1. The scope of this subprodect includes all those activities
now engaged in by
under the direction of rss-,-r..n. with the exception of those cutout
functions specifiiially mentioned in connection with other MKT:L.7P,A
subprojects'. In general. the research effort under this subprcect
will continue along the lines laid down in previous years. Thes�
involve the syothes!: and pharmacological. and clinical evaluation
of compounds of those cheical families known to have application
in the peychgcbernical and "K" fields. During the past year important
progress has been made in the area related to stressor compounds
and the relationship of these materials to the physiological pathways
through which both stress and the reactize to it are mediated in
human beings.' (As is indicated in the attached proposal, the 7asori7 -
of the past year has progressed to the point where more definitive -
experiments on the stress reaction can be carried out. Prim:arily
this was brought about by the characterization of several new
materials which produce stress reaction in humane and the applica-
tion of scrne new clinical rnetmods of measuring the extent of the
d:st.orbance produced. During tne next ?ear proportionally more
effort will be expended or. the problem of the development of pew
160
" fffff .essoft!do otos. f %M. booft �/������� imam
is desirable in this .direction and because � new approach to the
problem has been worked out.)! _
C.
1. elleManedggil, also eeeeee as a generai consultant to
the Agency, provides services of a sensitive nature on an ad hoc
basis, and serves as a cut-out in procurement problems.
3. The total cost of this project for a period of one year
.0
will not exc-eid $71. SOO. 00. Charges should be made against
Allotment 052S-1009-490Z.
4. alairsaMISMINIM has been requested to submit a summary
accounting or a copy of the Fund's annual audit report for the
sponsor's inipection. Also, it has been requested that any unexpended
funds shall be returned to the Agency.
S. Title to any permanent equipment purchased dy f..inds
granted IIM=610:101Pg shall be retained 1,9111Me
1111=131WICE2020gESICM. in lieu of higher overhead rates..
. 6. It was mutually agreed that documentation and accounting
for travel expenses which are normally reimbursable byggiu
freiliC:Astiall conform with the accepted Practices of the
Fund.
C3.- .1 to: rannia
e..t1..trit7 or; 1O-475
Cat:: :,1977
Cr. IT 137:75
161
=caw �7
MDCaufane fOn: 211
SMOVi : Continuation of MICOL=A, Silbiraject po. hp -
1. the seise of this subproject includes all those activities
toe engaged in by
under the direction of TEC/R1 sith the.ezeepilin of those eutout---
Magartirg
aikalUii -
functions :meet:1=14 mentioned in connectioe vi to other MCI.TRA
subprojects. rn general, the research effort under this subproject
vill captious along the lines laid dawn in previous years. These
involve the synthesis and pharmacological and clinical evaluation of
compounds of those cheaical families koovn to have application in the
peychochemical and "1"' fields. During the cosiag year it is pleased
to concentrate more directly op the more practical aspects of the
Inechout. problem. Inoue: rico potent subsunces have become availahle
lately to mmke mach a change ineephasis vorthshals. c cocueo,....on
vith this change it should he anted that certain r-odings mode in
11111.112111.1 project atillivtich emanot be furXler exploited at
that facility vill be pursued at lannalip in the future. For sass
reason it may be necessary to suppleeeot the &dings of this subproject
fres time to time during the year due to increasers of scope.
2. ANNOPM.1.1.1 also serves as 1640=ml consultant to the
Agency, provt.les services of a sensitive nsusre en an ad hoc heels,
and serves es a cutout in procurement problems.
2. 1Y 187473
Mr
162
2. tee Imssmia owe. of Wale prejerea Tar � porta& et ems year w1.7.1
sot esreed 21.0,000.CC. Charges *Scold be made agoinet Allotment
2125-1390-39C2.
45. INISOMS/Maaluse been requested to submit a sumer/
. �
accounting or a eopy of the Fund's annual audit report for the
sponsor's inspectice. .Also, It has bees requested that any unexpended
funds shall le returned to the Agency.
5. Title to any permanent equipment purchased by funds granted
C SMECIONNED shall b. fatainsd 117 1114311======16 Is
5 410=110__. in lieu of higher overhead rates.
6. It vas seiroally agreed that documentation and acclimating or
travel expenses ettich are normally reimbursable by ginglaMMEM2=10..:
shall conform with the accepted practices at the P.
AMMO FOR OBLICA:TON OF FUNDS:
-. Resew.= Director
Data
Attachment: Pr,oposal sod budget
Distribution: Originel only
�
Chief
/Research Drench
19.
-4
24 January 1964
iws)44:1",
HEMCRANTUM FOR : THE RECORD rr:444"1�4,AL,;..V
SW3JECT : 100.71-111A, Subproject 149/ 174 ot-Li--
1. This subproject is being established for the purpoie
of supporting realistic tests of certain development items and
delivery systems of interest to TSD:1311. / _/.. --j
2. During the course of development it is sometimes
163
DRAFT
found that certain very necessary experiments or tests are not
suited to ordinary laboratory facilities. At the same time, 4
it would be difficult if not impossible to conduct such tests
as operational field tests. This project is designed to pro-
vide a capability and facilities to fill this intermediate
requirement.
3. The activities under this subproject sill be con-
ducted by Ur. 46111001111119. an individual in the import and
export business, inmegaikageOly Y.r.11116101919 holds a TOP
SECRET Treasury Department clearince and a SECRET Agency
approval. He is completely witting of the aims and goals of
his activities.
( 4. Mr OW 7ossesses uninue facilities and personal
abilities which makes him invaluable in ttis kind of testinz
operation. Mr 1.10b bccauwe of his p-eculiar-ialeuts and
,o
c_ _
164
-5-
capabilities as well, as his excellent connections with all of
the local law enforceilent agencies, will provide a unique and
essential capability. Because Mr.fillaille Is no longer re-C.
sident of thele0110110 area, it is necessary that a
suitable replacement be provided in order that � capability
for continuance of our activities be maintained.
5. The estimated cost of the project is $10,000.00 for
� period of one year. Charges should be made against Allotment
Number 4125-1390-3902. Reimbu aaaaa nt sill be sad, for services
rendered.
S. Accounting for funds advanced and any equipment under
this subproject will be in accordance with accounting proce
ures established by the6...-�"'s-,,,,7:13,40.�r-4.1
� 'ttzfL:.
7. A memorandum of agreement along lines estab shea by
previous audit recosmendations in like situations will be
executed.
TSD/Biological Branch
Distribution:
Original only
165
31.32M:r: Request for Support of Research or the Mechanise of Brain Concussion
�
1. This is � request for financial support for research on the mechanism of
brain concusslon for the period 1 Feb 1956 to 1 fen 1957.
2. The resonance-cavitation theory upon which this research is te be ba!ed
has been presented in the proposal submitted to thi=gaiSaMagIRMS,
dated 27 March 1954.
3. The program as origimelly submitted estimated the duration of the program
tc be from three to five years requesting a total of $72,109 for the inttial
year.
n. At the request of the
.-man�aorawanr--441�....,
a reduced budget was submttted.
5. .,,ihal=tliair",.-%.. arenting to $24,925, was then awarded to the
sup;.0:-t this pr gar from 1 Feb 1955
ttr77-�ez-7,44.
�
6. The progress made to date under the above contract can be summarized as
follows:
.5
A. RESZABZH FaCILIT:25
The following research facilities have been established for the
investigation of the very diverse acts of Cie proLlems
studied:
13
6
r� ""--���
LLC
invc...vra
a . 3533the=2:,
Atetal of -; c,iiare feet of laboratory and office space
equi;ped with mlIch of the diverst?led machinery and apparatus
necessary for roscarcll in this field.
b. Blast Range
A blast range .-. ..en eatetlished at located
apprcsinately raffrirottfri_f the m-in .acsr.;:;ry. This
area is owned by tne ii.dar;=ard is closed to the public.
Three blast tect-series have been run to date.
c.',==.11*-1501L,,,=2kereat
A7r tEen wtth th.
irgiar4r0i11131122214211111"Tha0111011ff:c.r use of tneir
c.--z,vers. A tect Aires hi s been airicned for this
13,
166
11. PER-SO:WEL
Both full-time technical personnel and part-time professional
research personnel have been acquired and indoctrinated relative
to their specific function.
C. TICHNTCAL ?BOOBIES
Following is the technical progress made under the current
illaeontract:
a. Specialised instrumentation and numerous testing techniques
have been developed to obtala the desired dynamic data.
b. Conriderable data has now been obtained supporting the
resonance-cavitation theory of brain concussion.
adua--. � c. Preliminary acceleration threshold data has been obtained
for a fluid-tilled glass simulated skull.
d. /MU lias been obtained on the nature and the magnitude of
press...re fluctuations within a glass simulated skull suklect
to either impact or sound waves propagated in air.
41. Initial studies have been made an the simulated glass skull
attempting to establish the cavitation patterns for various
types of impact.
7. The � sed nethod and program plan remain the same as stated in the
ortglmal proposal, except for the temporary deletion of the immersion
blast study.
8. The current level of activity on this peoject can be indicated by the
most recent billing to the for the month of November. which amounted
_13 to $4,0:44.61.
9. In the interest of efficiency and economy it is requested that at least
this level of activity be maintained for the coming year.
WARNING Nr`-
-
� �Li..t.,GC.:.:CE
�J rEMO:IS 11:.OLVE
167
110.0 1a ats,fl.a OI IMO 011iaidbm,� VILNWIWO
10.1 T W. deriAt, brain COMCW.liOM el: an essentially
transient state due to hiltad tr.jUry WnICh is or tnatantanious
onset. manifests wldeipread syrptnns of purely paralytic
kind, does not as such comprise any evidence of structural
cerebral injury arm i: al,.-, fol:,uot f:rte
actual moment of the accioemt."
10.2 The implication of the underlined portion of the above statement
is that if a technique were devised to inC%.:e brain concussion
without giving either advance warning or causing external physical
trauma, the person upon recovery would be unatle to recall wnat
had happened to him. Under these ecntiticns the same technique
of prod6oing the concussion cold be re-used many tines without
disclosure of its nature.
10.3 First, considering the possibilities of direct impact to the
head. or body. it shc...id be possitle rron the finding:. of this
researzn pr:gran to determine the following:
a. optimum design of impacting devices.
b. Optimum points of impact on r;c4:1 or body
for the specific effects desired.
c. intensity of the blow for the effect desired.
10.4 In regard to the potential impacting devices, there are certain
design reousitesathat are apparent at this time!
a. The impact should be delivered without
advance warning.
b. The area of impact and forte distribution
should be such that surface trauma does
not occar.
c. The intensity of the impacting force and
its duration shou:2 be Such as to obtain
the desired effect.
d. The devt:e shout; be as small and as silent
as possible.
1C.5 The specific impacting devices might tale the form of any of
the following:
a. A pancake type black-sack giving a high peak
irpa:t force with a low unit surface pressure.
b. Concealed or cars...f:aget sprirg-loaded impacting
device: that trigger upon contact with the head.
(origina: And sole copy ,c;g)
168
o. � projoetilo typo &op...or ovum op on our
using � email _shot CiLlod (took for, � proj
d. An explosive pad detonated in contact with the
head or the body.
to.6 Let us now consider the possibilities of exciting the resonance
cavitation directly without impact. There is considerable evidence
that resonance cavitation can be induced directly in the following
mays:
s. A blast wave propagated in sir. (Blast Concussion)
b. Physical excitation with � meehanical driver
or horn, tuned to the resonant frequency of
the heed.
10.7 A single blast pressure wave propagated in air must have considerable
intensity in order to produce brain concusston. however, there is
considerable evidence (Carver & Dinsley) that modification of the
pressure wave can produce profound effects.
10.0 EXcitation of the resonance cavitation by using a tuned drtver
at this time appears to be well within the relm of p' v.
The neurotic-like manifestations noreally associated with blast
concussion could possibly be induced by this method. Use of
this method.bowevr, would require actual psitsl uu.-.1.act with
the drivers.
10.9 2xcitation of the resonance cavitation by tuned sound waves also
ap;cars to be a reasonable poss'"ty. Concentration cf the sound-
field at some remote point could be effected with accoustical lenzes
and reflecters. The blast duration would be in the order of a
tenth of a second. Masking of a noise of this duration shod not
be too dificult.
11.0 It would possibly be advantageous to establish the effectivness
of both of the shove netnodr as a tool in brain-wash they.
A full knowleoge of the ncthod and the rfsulting sequela should be
of aid to any person forced to submit to such treatment.
12.0 Possibly the most significant potential aspect of this Study would
be in the de�cloprent of practical means of gtving a person immunity,
oven thc..4h tenrorary. to trAin cznc.zSsion. One technic, that appears
to have potentialities involve: the introduction of a small quantity
of gas, approximately 1 CC, into the srinal cord. This gas bubble
would then nornally migrate to the ventricles located at the centrum
of the hrain. The ability of this buttle to expand uniter dynanic
loadi% would be most effective, in preventing resonance cavitation
from occuring.
(Original and sole cory :AMC)
96-4C8 196 ,(
�
MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
NINSEARCH. OF"FEN,CHICKIITI
511iS1-:.�ItIll was the MIMI.Vol! to tliP cootitomfjoo (11.. miKurruA pro_
gram. Funding r"IllIOPliwell in FY 1966. and ended ill FY 1972. Its pairiN.M. Was to
deVelOil. 11.S! 4'r:1111a, 4. capabilities in the 4-overt use of biological. chemical,
and radioactive material systoles and 1.4�1111iiior% for it. a. lug iiredietalde human
behavioral and or idlysiological changes in suititeert of highly sensitive taieerational
?elven rentent
OFTEN/1'111f 'KW IT
Jut 191;7 tbe tare of Researt ii and 1 levelopuient a MI1 e and the Edgewood
Arsenal Rem-arch Laboratories underitpok it iireegrant for dieitig reseatrele oat the
identitit�at ion and characterization of drugs that could influence 1111111811 behavior.
Etigeweeeed had the fa.'ilitit.s ft �r flee full range of laboratory and clinical testing.
A ieleas4s1 preegrain as tenvisititieel that ��tetilil centsist of alwiplisitioo of drugs Ellid
etimispunds believed to have effects gm the belaavieir itt humans. and
testing and evaluating thes4� materials alit.engla Ittleteratory preil.rdures and toyi-
cological studies. Compounds believed promising its a result of Its Oh animals
were then tie be evaluated clinically with limmen sillijtm'as at Edo:ewes/ed. Substances
of potential Use %%nub) then Ilf. analyzed st ran-aurally its a basis for identifying and
$311( tw,izi lig possible lieu derivatives of greater utility.
The in A% al, hat', twit Projeect 017 EN Was to deal with
testing the to�teological. tratesinisivity and helm vieeral effects � 4' drugs in animals
and. ultimately. Intnia les. Projeet villt'li1V IT MI- concerned-with acquiring infor-
mation on new drug developments tit }:tirtepe and the I trient. and with acquiring
multiples
There is a discrepancy between the testimony of 114011 and 11.k regarding the
testing al Edgeu (moil .1rseital in June I973. While there is agreement that human
testing occurred at that place and time. there is disagreement as to who Was
resietelesilele for flint nci ttg attil sIgitaseership. f Si'.' hearings beftere the Subcommittee
on Health and Scientific Research of the Seller 11111113111 Resiairees Committee.
September 21. 1977.1
(169)
I � !'
a
�
Office of legislotme Counsel
170
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
wASNINGT024 0 C 20905
23 December 1977
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
hashington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
During Admiral Turner's 3 August 19-7 Letimully
before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked
whether any Agency employees had been terminated because of
their participation in MKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral
Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had
been terminated, but would have Agency records searched
on this question. Our records have been searched and the
results confirm the Director's testimony that no such
actions were taKen.
Sinc rely,
GeoiQc L. Car
egislative Counsel
171
QKIIII,I,T01) DEFINITION
QKHILLTOP was a cryptonym assigned in 11054 tll a project to study Chinese
Communist brainwashing techniques and to develop interrogation techniques.
Most of the early studies are believed to have been conducted by the Cornell
University Medical School Human Ecology Study Programs. The effort was
absorbed into the MKULTRA program and the QK HILLTOP cryptonym became
obsolete. The Society for the investigation of Human Ecology, later the Human
Ecology Fund. was an outgrowth of the QKIIILLTOP.