SOVIET MENTAL CONDITIONING, INTERROGATION FOR VERACITY AND FORCED CONFESSION TECHNIQUES & OTR "BRAIN WASHING" REPORT, JUNE 1955, ATTACHED

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00184363
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 21, 2025
• Document Release Date: January 15, 1983
• Publication Date: July 21, 1955

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SCVII:T FOR VhiLY.,'..I.TY
AND FORCED CLINFESSICLI Ii�011iactUES
I. This title Implies three Soviet activities z.,.nd objectives:
A. Lentai Conditioning
1. Of Conrunist agents and iiUitary personnel.*
2. Of prisoners in general
To facilitate interrogation to obtain information rather
than false confessions
4. To obtain forced .c.onfessions with conviction the objective
5. For propaganda purposes
B. Interrogation techniques for obtaining truthful inforn:at.ion
in instances in which confession is not the objective.
C. Techniques for confessims iucludinr, mental conditioning:
interroration, and rental and physical duress for obtaining true or
false confessions.
11. The Comrnunists arear to be very realistic in meetirw their
objectives in
. The selection of victims for specific purnoses
P. Util izing ef feet', ve rethods and nroduc rnsults in accordence
. wt 1i dHff r"nce ht:iunceptibi tr ni: the victims
C. The +Arc f-"tor inproducine, results
D. The selection of different methods accorrii!tc to the desired
objective, particularly the differentiation bet/eon forced confession
techniques and methods for obtaining information.
4111.
111. hental conditjeoin- coverer' 'n this rovieff doe'; not include
psycholory usnd by the Russians in the control of nations, large
,,eneral manses of civilians, or psychologioal. warfare.
A. Lents1 conditioni_ng is-pre-eminent in theory, concept and
pract4ce 5n Russia and has rermeated the entire ;ovirt sphere. It is
in_colsonance with .Favlovis ph:rslolorical teaching, their most recent
research work on conditioned reflexes, and Soviet ideolory.
B. Although rqycholcvy hat.bden relerated to the field of
pcdacocy, the emrhass Tlacrd cr lesearch jn leui-ovitic,cy, psycho-
physiology, and neuropsychiatry indicates that hussia cmsidrrs these
fields of practical importance. They are adept in the application of
the results of their research in these. fields to mental conditiLning,
'ncluding the handlin of rrisoners.
C. Lental Conditioning of Communists
No details are available in this office on the mental con-
ditioning of -Communist agents and military personnel. The routl.ne
rereated loyalty indoctrination of w0rk0r3, Russian ideoloric!t1 teach-
in7 in all schools, vilftary includinr loyalty traininr even in rlodical
lchools ane cnstant loyalty, security and intense oneNy hatred
trainin in the armed services dicate the Importance attached to
nental coildIti.nnIn by the Communists. urely, tu.ssi is not this
thoronrh �litout special security rcld 3070.1.7 Leachin,. or their 4rents
and insixuetiens r every Imo-n .:..hod, device and trick to t.psist
enemy attempts to obtain infomation from their agents.
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D. liental Good' tj ()Ili nr or Irisonors
1. We have. not received an analytical survv of the reasons
why thousands of Chinese and i:orth Korean troops want to return
to their homelands or why thousands of others have no desire to
return . Chinese and. ussian env i ronmental condi t i on s , ether
fretors and lental condi tionin- are not the sae: therefore, an
ana17sis of .3hinese prisoners would not show the sane results as
in Russians.
2. The Corruni sts NWT ha.-: thousands of ori sooers . and years
of exnerience ;n the development of methoOs for the mental con-
d'tionin of prisoners. These include their own rolitical
nrisoners in camps : pri sone rs held for court trials : German,
Japanesn and other soldiers: suspected and actual spies of various
nationalities thousands of Anerican and 3outh Korean militar
pri soners of war now n their hands, and Arericans arrested for
suspected espionage. lie do not know how many ;unerican prisoners
will be susceptible willincly or by force.
.
Cue of our requirements, not yet solved is the det-...ils of
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the ConlYmnist hnndrng of prisoners. Interrogation of i;oirmunists
clptured the P �!% troops as revealed li ttle iiiforiiati on, and
the Conumni sts have not :,met released knov3adgcablo U. .
prisoners.
4. There were ps7chological reasons including favorai:le
proparrtndn. rmd e.,re of the vvondc0 early in Mt lorelo
for the Chinese release .of American priSoners to the U. i. lines.
5. There. hay., been some reports on Communist nental condi-
tioning of prisoners in general, such P-s- the comon practice of
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handling pamphlets On Co:Ainism.to :,risoilers, followed by the
delivery of tnli-s en the advantayea of CoheiunisM. They sell
Communism. to many prisoners by daily repetition even three times
a day-at rerular intervals.
6. They carefull select their victims for specific purposes,
such as those he for sore reason decide to cooperate with them
arrinst their own nations. The Covvunists select those who will
male an impression for propaganda purposes, such RS the American
pilot who arporently cooperated as a propa7inda dupe in the pro-
duction of the sound -icture to help the Comunists convince the
world that their chars es were true. Frobably the reasons for
the pilot's apparent cooneration will not be known until there is
an opportunity to debrief him and the other persons directly in-
volved.
3eme of their victis are easy prey, not by direct threats
and mere drastic duress, but by another approach such as tellinr
theL they will 13e well trated and returned to their ho.-teland in
mood :ental and physical condition if they cooperate.
a. 3ome prisoners are well aware of the Past stories on
handling or erisoners, such s sl)bjectim to en'i5bItion for
ridicule, traumatism, and even death by public hmbs: physical
duress: never retnrnn- hoTie� and even beheadinr, shootinr
or other penalties b-7 their captors.
The fear cowrie:: produces rany submissive persons. Thev
know open defiance of captors is not healthy and have not had
adequate training to save themselves and protect security.
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p.9. American-Counista such in Shaw:hid
help in conversion and other Amerj.c..7.n Gommunts help convert anti-
Communist prisoners..
10. The time factor is important to the Communists as shown by
early- release of returned- prisonere in Yore a:te timely produc-
tiTt of the Di,motien ricture: the use of dru!,, etinulants Pnd-
mental duress: exhaustien-in rushine throu!lh sol11 court cenvjetions:
and the long-ter mental coneitioninr; of prisoners, shewn in the
pro-Comnunist Japanese prisoners vhich were mentally conditioned
for years by the aussiaqs.before they were returned to Japan.
!any were never returned.
� 11. Because of the effect on world opinion, we cell expect that �
the Communists will use conventional p3ycholor,ical interrogation
techn:ques on any prisonecs, and treat them in accordance with
Geneva agremonts. This has and will be done with pri-ioners they.
willingly return.
12. They will use their educational techniques repeatedly to
win over the easy victims.
13. They may return some of the more resistant rrisOners which
heve been subjected to a rtated deEree of vental r,uress, low
diets and persistent repeated interrogation under varies conditions.
-.IV. 1ental condition3n7, to facilitate 'interrogatiei o;
resistant prisoners inclndinr espiQnael suspects for oUtajninn truthful
information rlther than false confessions presents a difficult problem.
� A. There is no reason for not believing that the Connunists can
readily obtain confessions without, as they claim, "old-feshioned
torWre," or :.,he use of dru7s. Ho 'doubt they have in.mind mutilation
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end ether ancient er-ctieee of ehes'cal torture, ''rld de not cons4der
that torture :4.ncluden emntal rturess, starvation diets nnd other rethods
of exhauetien to the degree of submission.
B. There are sould releoes for believine that ,:ru7s would to a
certain derrec accelerate obtainine confessi nn, but no reasons for
bel-!eving-that confeesio cannot Le o:-teined easily ae3)thont drues,
thet drugs are reliable in obtainins truthful inforL.etioe. lerorte are
quite conviocinr that the Germans, hussians, an JeLellitee have used
drve experimentally teeny yeersubut no authentic evidence from any
country that drurs of any hind...are reliable in oUteieune truthful iefor-
metiel. Reports of the use of drurs for some confeesieee, a-eparently
have led -:cople in varioun countries to 1.elieve drues can be relied
upon for veracity of prisoners' etatemente. There appears to have been
consir'erable confusion in the methods used for meetine the objective
in cenfese3 e.1- for coavictiene, and. 3aterroratiol for truth.
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Comunist rental conditioning covers all eethod.e, fro:- i!er-
eietent education and. W10 persuasion to techniques for forced transient
eefteeine or comelete breakdown of the mental faculties of the vi.ctim.
D. The open 3ov5.et literilture furnishes convincinr evidence
hat. -the euseians ere u-to-dt ii the use of the neuropeechiatric
techniques used in this country on patient., and that the el7fecte vary
conliderably.
There are l!euey. documents (referred. to in paot repocte
which ind'cate thet the Uo:euniete eerlornd t'ee u �e of druge t
least 25 different preparations) and other eLethode sufficieetly to
.kno:: their lieitations in effectiveness in. the interrogation and con-
victien of ernonere:
F. .:teports us to balievP that t:e Cornmuni sts do not usc
sti drur:s or narcotics routine]; .as supplements to interroration-:
therefore, vre assume that they have come te the conclpsion that these
preparations are unreliable and at times a detrL.tent in obtainin7, truthful
information fror rr I soners.
A number of roports lead.us to 12cli.eve the;-
�have used erurs prArious to :if:MO court trials.
G. The usual technieue against rnaistant prisoners appears to be
clever convenUonal psychological ir,Iterroration follol,ed in some caes
b. iiiethods of exhaustion, particularly of the nervous S3 eri, without
the use of eruca.
H. Their vast experience aurely has convined them that somewhere
Illonr the line of increasinr;ly drastic reasures that the resistance of
arry ran will brea, but not always tell the truth. 1so, that the
Lental rcssLnicc, ncluf'iar subconscious resistance of 7,;PC rlen,is
ellou�h to w'ohhold secret inforuation. The 'creolin': point In
ten would not be reached uatil their 1,enta1 iaculties are so abnomal
that the information they give Liay or mar not bc the truth. The Com-
munists probably have 'oeca successful in Oi_tninin,7, 1:xuthful inforration
fro-! --,n7 men j their !!ehoes because riDs,, ren :cpuld tell Lhe.truth
!:-,for- they reached thc 1rIter 7,tirets oF ent1.1. duress.
1. ititlYmit ir hPvc rio e-ridnnce that the Corinun ts 0r)one1
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the u3e or: on- drug or crmal.ing.tig-n of products .or 0 .v...;cel rcutinely
in iitc :To ;�� Li ns, tre:! trten t of .��_: r:: -iye:
-:v e;7pycl; Lhe1 to 1.13":: atle other tinconv,,:nts1(�iLi
products, ,dev:i ces and methoda�uncier certain circu3t.ncc Li espicnte
and as hopeful supplements in the handlinL. of prisoners they ;lave no
intent:ion of releasing.
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V. Communist techniques in espionage and suggestions for defense.
A. Among the Communist activities we can expect them to use all
kinds of trickery, drugs including toxic substances, electric and other
applications to induce shock, the polygraph and hypnotism.
B. Primarily we can expect mental and physical duress, to break
down resistance in interrogation of prisoners. This method of breaking
the will to resist can be practiced anywhere bat the other measures
to supplement interrogation probably would be applied to prisoners at
special centers only.
C. They may use drugs and other supplementary techniques, not that
any one method assures veracity in any one individual, bat because
any means of loosening tongues such as the effects of alcohol or other
methods for inducing speech in subconscious states may give them true or
false information from a number of persons. By an analysis of the com-
bined statements from a number of prisoners they might be able to delete
the false statements.
D. Before the Communists use nerve stimulant drugs, they probably
would first try other methods to break down mental resistance, such as
persistent repeated interrogations, bright lights, starvation diet,
� � barbarous quarters, not allowing sleep and strained positions in standing
or other postures. They are not likely to use the stimulants and in-
-terrogition only, because very resistant prisoners are not likely to tell
the truth under this treatment.
E. They may use narcotics and other nerve depressants, highly
toxic substances or electric Shock to incapacitate or even liquidate an
enemy victim before or after capture.
F. In subversive activities they are more likely to devise methods
for tricking the victim to ingest drugs than by injection or inhaling.
Administration to prisoners would be by ingestion or injection rather
than inhalation. They ma) use narcotics to facilitate hypnotism, but
hypnotism requires special training and even with a narcotic some per-
sons cannot be hypnotized, and the most resistant would not reveal secret
information if hypnotized.
G. Defense against all actions should primarily cover the selection
of agents who have the greatest resistance before assignment, and then
thorough conditioning to resist techniques without supplementary materials
which they might carry.
H. Inasmuch as ingestion would be more widely used in the adminis-
tration of drugs than by injection, agents could carry an emetic such
as apomorphine for use against ingestion of too much alcohol or suspected
enemy doses of other substances.
I. Other defenses against enemy actions should require more study
including suggestions for concealment, such as the use of matched
moulage patches ingestion and recovery .of materials and offensive de-
vices to prevent enemy actions before and after capture.
J. We cannot expect equal mental reactions to artificially induced
.alterations of the mind, therefore for certain purposes we probably can
spend time more profitably in utilizing techniques, devices and materials
which are available than in the more remote and unrealistic approaches
such as exploration of plant products in Mexico. Sufficient information
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is available to show that exploration of the Mexican products is not
likely to produce the results desired.
K. Our main security defense should be mental conditioning of
selected agents to resist enemy actions to obtain information.
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Chief, Security Research staff
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0Th ofIrnin Walking* Report, June 1955, Attached
12 July 1955
11 6. - 1. Attached is therelort which uus prepared by We
ri, under in the training Lriviaion. Aa
far as I latow, most the. actual work was done by. . who is a
good scholar and I think a capable yeunc man.
2. As you know, the Sectirity Office did not receive, as far ss
I know, a copy or thin report although we ehould have inee we have
been active in brain washing problems for years and are fully repre-
sented on the Mater committee and were preemit when this was brought
up. I cannot understand why we did not automatically receive this
report and I protested this matter. Whether you wish to do eomething
about it or not is up to you.
3. In my opinion, this is I very good report and although does
not extensively go into the matter it touches the highlights and covers
the field very well. The Training people Should be congratulated on
this report and their suggestions I believe are worthwhile. BOCaUSO
it is Good and fairly brief I an recommending it to you for your stieti
and I an trucesting that you offer it to
for their readinc.
Ii. As you know we were aware come report was boinc prepared but
I do not believe Security was consulted in the distribution of this
report. , . -..asked me numerous questions about it and I (per
your instructions) gave him information but I do not believe anyone in
recurity had the opportunity of studying it before its distribution.
Since the naterial is irportant and some of it is quite .hot I am
somewhat.concernodaVaut the distribution of the report and I suggest,
if possible, Security obtain tram t list of all to vim it
has been dietributed. The report contains eeveral rentions of
exporimonte and that is one of the items that does not boar wide dip-
tribution.
5. I en setting out below a series of random obr,ervations in
connection ulth this report which I think are pertinent. ialother or
not we dhould surest these to the Training tdvision or take them up
in any way is simply a matter for consideration.
a. This report contains no reference or discussion of the
treatment, activity and probleee encountered with the
Chicoms and North Korean POW's in our camps during the
Korean War. The writer wonders whether we have learned
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any lessons nom thoze fiascos or whether eoRsomtea,
studies, reports were cede of them situations.
b. The writer lum not yet on and can find no reference
to in this reports4-reportFon the Pal activity of the
Tunics, Dritish, Canadianc, etc. while Nella in North
Korea. These studies should be important.
c. The writer often wontiers whether or net we are attri-
Luting too ruch to the Gizicoms in their PQ W control.
The writer wonders whether or not their handlellaf PM's
vas deliberate and based upon exceptional training or
something else again.
d. Thin in very importcnt end cchould be ono of the highest
priority itmie for the operations people. Every effort
thould be earb to find out Idtat instructions or training
are given Chic= as interrogators. Every detail should
be studied. lie ohould make positive efforts to pick up
a Chicon interrogator either by =latching or defecting.
We should certainly bend every effort to get intonation
an their training and their oral cud watt= instructions,
etc.
e. efor Witmer pnip 6-This interacting point has
occurred to the writer rem time. Why don't lawyere
for the moo who are tried plead tervorary insanity?
It seems you could foul up any trial this way since
you can get reny psychiatrists andpsychologiata who
would scree on this to testify as experts. Also see
page 72a and 72b.
f. In the writer's opinion, some of the training aids
pet up on paces i.-66 right be helpful or of abaolute
ansiotance to people having h1401 ig but the writer wonders
whether this would 'work at the lower intellectual levels.
g. rho writer nettle thLt techniques (rerr7-03-
round technique) nit be a very ueefuleyperience for
pone. Ceo pace 06, section 6a and aleo note page 07,
5ection C.
In addition to the obviously sound training /done ad-
vs.:melt in this report for defensive measures, the writer
would like to aucgest perhaps eme of the follcwing richt
well be considered in training Igetr.poople defensively
to roast. brairataahings elicitation, etc.
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4111.
(1) now to asamme the appearance of stupidity.
(2) What can be done to maks a person of high in-
telligence appear mediocre or uninteresting to
enemy interrogators:
(3) Closely related to (1) and (2) above would be
certain minor tricks of ectinG or playing the
role of a etupid or dull type.
(4) BAB anybody done a study of laughter, humor or
derision as a weapon?
(5) How to simUlate physical defocta or pretend to
be deaf, ill, naueented or suffering from very
poor eyesight?
(6) What are counter harrneement nossuroe?
(7) How best can you annoy or frustrate Chinese or
Commanist interrogators vithout suffering undue
consequences?
(8) Can practical jokes be worked out?
(9) rho writer noted in his brief natociations with
re.VIs thet eccret societies even Ka activity
flouriehed and worked succesafully an a mnrale
booster and actual weapon againet the enemy.
The writer believes emphatically a study should
be mnde of this type or activity.
(10) Certainly Lana activity should be studied and
taught. Planning escape in the opinion of the
'writer would be a etrom.; morale booster and a
cohesive for in PO. activity (study Britith
techniques, etc.).
(11) The ever present problem of the informer or "rat"
should be very carefully and scientifically studied
not only to counter against this evil but to die-
carer ways and mans for trapping informers, ex-
pelling informers and defecting their efforts. The
writer knows of no effort along 'these lines.
(12)
An a rule a senior officer tnlens command in a POK
canp.but the Korean 1;ar clearly indicated that ono
of the main efforts of the Chicane me to upset
any leadership talents displayed by Individuals,
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to segregate renks and reduce all PU.Its to a
atandard level except in certain instances.
Mourner is of the opinion that any group
who nay or may not fall isto.onony hands should
have a pre-deterriped system of.leaderShip or
connond authority. Certainly thic problem
should be studied.
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'r.
The Chinese or North Korean Mils clearly
demonstrated mane activity and rasa protost.
This phonomena appeara to have been rare in
allied rai camps. This t4untld be very care-
f4lly studied and its value as a defensive
mechanism should be examined.