ARGENTINA: RENEWED TERRORIST VIOLENCE - 1975/04/16

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: ARGENTINA
• Keywords: ARGENTINE
• Keywords: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
• Keywords: SOUTH AMERICA
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00639290
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: April 16, 1975

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April 16, 1975
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ARGENTINA: RENEWED TERRORIST VIOLENCE
Summary
Terrorist violence aimed at undermining the government
of President Peron has been renewed in -the last two months.
In previous months, pressure from security forces had led
to an abatement in guerrilla activity and fostered the
impression--partly because of heavy publicity--that the
Peron administration was gaining the upper hand over
terrorism. Subsequent events have made clear, however,
that the terrorists retain their capacity for violent
disruption, even in Cordoba Province, where they supposedly
had suffered defeat.
The renewed terrorism will embarrass but by itself ,z
will not topple the government. Sustained, high-level
political violence will favor:
--a shift to the right, with conservative
Peronists exerting more influence in
government policies; and
--an increase in military influence in
policymaking.
Evidence that the government does not have terrorism
under control will also adversely affect foreign and
domestic private investment, aggravating the government's
economic woes.
For the US, the most ominous note in the recent
violence is an indication that US citizens and property
may become primary terrorist targets. The murder of US
SECRET/NO FOREIGN D /CONTROLLED DISSEM
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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
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gathered thereafter, and a number of other incidents
point in this direction.
Maw",
Prepared by J. E. Buchanan
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The terrorist problem confronting President Peron's
government has revived, over the past two months, with the
kidnap-murder of US Consular Agent John Egan, the kidnap-
ransom of an Argentine judge, and multiple political
assassinations.
Despite repeated government claims of. success against
the terrorists, subversive groups--especially the Marxist
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the nominally-
Peronist Montoneros--retain their capabilities for violent
disruption./ Fears persist that the most recent spate of
violence may be the spearhead of a concentrateitterrorist
campaign aimed at bringing down President Peron's govern-
ment. Whether or not such an offensive materializes, the
fate of Consular Agent Egan indicates that foreign business
and diplomatic personnel are again considered prime targets
by the terrorists.
'V)
The Illusion of Control
Between October 1974 and February 1975, the Argentine
security forces scored notable successes against the terror-
ists, carrying out frequent raids on safe sites, arresting
hundreds of suspects, and confiscating caches of propaganda
and weapons. Coupled with these police actions has been a
series of government initiatives:
--The appointment, in September 1974, of Retired
Air Force General Raul Lacabanne as chief
executive officer in violence-prone Cordoba
Province. Lacabanne, who is notorious for his
rightist politics, set about destroying all
vestiges of leftist influence in the province.
1/ For background on the ERP and the Montoneros, and an earlier
analysis of the terrorist problem, see INR RS-31,
"Argentina: Terrorism--A Spectacular But Not Fatal
Challenge," October 29, 1974 (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM).
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At theend,.,94maoyembie_19,4...clt.Presiden-eo-
that the situatron was under control.
,NomPer
--The November 6 declaration of a state of siege,
following the murder on November 1 of Federal
Police Chief Villar.
--The attempt, in December, to upgrade the govern-
ment's counter-terrorist capabilities through a
National Defense Law, which provided for badly
needed coordination among the intelligence arms
of the Federal Police, the armed forces, and the
State Secretariat for Intelligence (SIDE).
--The appointment, also in December, of an active-
duty naval officer as head of SIDE.
--The launching, on February 8, 1975, of a major
counter-terrorist sweep in Tucuman Provnice, an
ERP stronghold. This step was particularly
significant because the assignment of 5,000 army
troops to the operation marked the military's
acceptance of an overt role in the fight against
subversion.
--The elimination of leftist influence in the
nation's university system, especially in-the
University of Buenos Aires.
Separately, none of the government's initiatives would
have seemed highly significant. Cumulatively, however,
they created the impression of a government campaign that
had the terrorists on the defensive, if not under control.
The media, cowed by the threat of prosecution under the
state-of-siege provisions, contributed to that impression
by emphasizing the successes of the security forces while
ignoring or according scant coverage to guerrilla activities.
A Maximum Effort?
Egan's murder, which received heavy publicity, and
political assassinations at the rate of one or more per day,
have served shocking notice of the resurgence of the
-terrorists. Renewed terrorist violence has reached at least
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doubts about the goVernmentiS�ablIff to protec 11 p an
property.
An even more intensified effort may be under
consideration by the ERP and/or the Montoneros, but their
course of action is not yet clear. Since last September
the Montoneros have displayed a preference for spectacular
but relatively isolated acts, rather than a sustained
campaign of violence. The September 1974 kidnapping of
Juan and Jorge Born, two of Argentina's wealthiest
industrialists, and the murder of the Federal Police Chief
illustrate this tendency.
Egan's murder may fall into the same pattern. If so,
the Montoneros' objectives in the Egan case probably were
to:
NEN.
--Reaffirm their "revolutionary" credentials.
--Embarrass the government by exposing its
inability to suppress the terrorists,
particularly in-the province of Cordoba,
where Lacabanne had claimed victory.
--Demonstrate to the government the
consequences of the continued torturing and
killing of leftist prisoners. The Montoneros
demanded as a condition for Egan's release
that the government display their cohorts in
good health, not that they be released.
--Test the government's ability and willingness
to respond to stepped-up guerrilla activity.
Although inconclusive, the Egan episode may be ominous
evidence of an opening wedge of a major terrorist offensive:
--After Egan's abduction, Montonero leaflets
distributed in Cordoba warned that similar
attacks would follow.
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economic and political problems have the
government on the verge of collapse, and 2)
they will pursue violent tactics to exacerbate
the current tensions and contribute to the
government's demise. (Yet
noted, on another occasion, that despite
murder, the Montoneros were not focusing
diplomats as primary targets )
3 3 b 1
Egan's
on US
a
Montonero leader in Cordoba referred to Egan's
death as a: "first step" that was "nothing
compared to what the; Montoneros are now planning."
3.3(b)(1)
--An ERP member stated that the ERP had partici-
pated in Egan's murder and would continue making
US citizens primary targets in a new abduction
campaign..
--Over a month after Eo!an's murder,
while the Montoneros do not
believe Peron's government is near collapse,
they will continue their violent tactics,
including attacks on US Embassy personnel':
3.3(b)(1)
On balance, terrorist violence is unlikely to escalate
much beyond its present level very soon.
--The guerrillas lack both the manpower and the
firepower to win in a massive confrontation
with the security forces.
--Only serious miscalculation could lead the
terrorists to conclude that President Peron's
government or, more importantly, constitu-
tional government, is in immediate jeopardy.
Domestic Impact
If the ERP and the Montoneros are intent on contributing
to the government's downfall, at least two other time periods
would appear more propitious than the immediate future for
the unleashing of a maximum campaign:
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--later this year, when, if the experts are
�mmimmmvm..mqopxrect, Argentina's economic situation:-
� will deteriorate; and
--mid-1976, when the pre-election process for
1977 generates momentum.
Meanwhile, terrorist pressure does not have President
Peron's government on the verge of collapse, but it is one
of several serious political and economic factors
influencing the struggle between moderate and right-wing
Peronists within the administration. Sustained, high-level
political violence would favor:
--A shift further to the right. Right-wing
Peronists, who are led by Social Welfare
Minister Lopez Rega and advocate a hard line
against subversives, would increase their
influence at the expense of moderates led by
Interior Minister Rocamora.
--Increased military influence. If, as is likely,
the army is forced into an increasingly
important interrial security role, army generals
will seek to protect their institutional
interests by demanding a say in counter-
terrorist policy formulation. Given the
general dissatisfaction of the officers with
Prsident Peron's performance, a military
policymaking role in the fight against
subversion would probably lead to pressures
for military input in other policy areas.
Argentina's economic woes will also be complicated by
sustained terrorism. A case in point involves the serious
need for private foreign and domestic investment. Efforts
by Economy Minister Gomez Morales to attract new capital
will be to little avail if the government cannot guarantee
the security of lives and property.
Implications for the US
In a setting where political violence occurs with
numbing regularity, spectacular attacks against diplomats
and wealthy foreign businessmen have appeal for terrorists,
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�oth to-a ra e at en mo ey ee e ma .ge' an
to eliminate the "imperialist presence'"ff-OmmAtgdntina.
Foreigners, US citizens and property in particular,
may again become regular terrorist targets. Egan's murder
was followed by the vague threats noted above, an abduction
threat against US Ambassador Hill, suspicious incidents
involving other Embassy personnel, and a grenade-throwing
spree against the Chrysler-Febre plant near Buenos Aires
timed to coincide with the arrival in Argentina of
Assistant Secretary Rogers.
The security implications for US citizens resident in
Argentina, especially diplomatic and business personnel,
are evident. More now than at any time in the last year,
all must be considered potential targets for abduction
and/or assassination attempts. Even if the Egan murder
was not the first in a planned series of attacks on US
personnel and property, the terrorists might attempt a
repeat performance if the circumstances were to offer
maximum propaganda value.
'V)
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