THE CRISIS USS/CUBA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00692673
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-02757
• Publication Date: November 9, 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
Information as of 0600
9 November 1962
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
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9 November 1962
SOVIET SHIPPING FROM CUBA
Information available as of 0600 EST indicates
that at least eight of the nine ships designated by the
Soviets to carry missiles and missile equipment back to
the USSR from Cuba now are under way.
We can confirm that five of them are caruing a to-
tal of 26 or 27 canvas-covered missile transporters, but
Information on the rest is not vet available.
The latest positions of six of the Soviet missile
carriers puts them outbound from Cuba, headed for the
North Atlantic. Two other ships left Marie' yesterday
afternoon, having loaded missiles and related equipment.
The ninth ship was still in the vicinity of Casilda late
yesterday, probably loading missiles and missile equip-
ment. At least one other ship not identified by the So-
viets as a missile carrier appears to have loaded missile-
associated gear and left Cuba for the USSR.
The Soviet passenger ship NIKOLAEVSK left Havana on
6 November,
indicates she is carrying a full load of military personnel.
The ship has a normal capacity of about 350 passengers.
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Low-altitude photography of 6 November showed a large
number of personnel also embarking on one of the missile
carriers, the FIZIK KURCHATOV. It seems likely that
some of the other ships removing missile equipment from
Cuba are carrying Soviet military personnel.
Photography of 8 November showed that the two partly
assembled IL-28s at San Julian airfield were not being
worked on. There was no change in the status of other
IL-28s or crates at either San Julian or Holguin. Evacua-
tion of the Sagua La Grande MRBM area was continuing on
7 November.
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TO RET
SOVIET SHIPS REMOVING MISSILES FROM CUBA
(b)(3)
(as of 0600 EST, 9 November)
Cargo Implied
in Soviet Phone
Ship
Status
Confirmed Cargo
Conversation
LABINSK
Under way
Associated equipment
2 missiles
METALLURG ANASOV
Under way
8 canvas-covered mis-
sile transporters
8 missiles
BRATSK
Under way
2 canvas-covered mis-
sile transporters
2 missiles
DIVNOGORSK
Under way
4 canvas-covered mis-
sile transporters
4 missiles
VOLGOLES
Under way
7 canvas-covered mis-
sile transporters
6 missiles
IVAN POLZUNOV
Under way
6 missiles
FIZIK KURCHATOV
Under way
6 canvas-covered mis-
sue transporters
6 missiles
LENINSKY KOMSOMOL
In port,
Casilda
Mi� 4M, eIM
'6 missiles
ALAPAEVSK
Under way
Associated equipment
2 missiles
ALMETEVSK
In port
Associated equipment
not cited
ALEKSANDROVSK
Under way
Associated equipment
not cited
27 missile transporters
42 missiles
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(b)(3)
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THE SOVIET POSITION
The USSR now seems to be hardening up a general po-
sition based on the following premises:
1. The IL-28s are not part of the bargain.
2. Any inspection in Cuba will be tied to "U Thant's
plan" for a UN presence in the Caribbean--including the US,
Cuba and other Latin American states--which will monitor
the US commitment. (We have no clear understanding of this
plan.)
3. The US will have to be satisfied with the pres-
ent "alongside procedures" for verifying missile evacuation.
4. Now that all missiles have been evacuated or "are
about to leave," the next step is to eliminate the quaran-
tine and to negotiate the US guarantee.
Last night's meeting between top US and Soviet offi-
cials at the UN reflected Moscow's apparent conviction that
the quick withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba
will serve to frustrate US demands for effective UN veri-
fication of dismantling and removal. The conversations al-
so disclosed that the USSR will continue to press for a for-
mal declaration from President Kennedy guaranteeing Cuba
against invasion by the US and other Western Hemisphere
countries.
In his 8 November talks with US representatives, Kuz-
netsov took the position that the USSR had complied with
its commitments on the withdrawal of offensive weapons from
Cuba, and that it was now up to the US to live up to its
own commitment on the question of guarantees for Cuba. Kuz-
netsov, outlining his view of US obligations, listed seven
points comprising an elaboration of Castro's five demands
together with what Kuznetsov referred to as U Thant's pro-
posal for a UN presence in the Caribbean, including the US
and other American states as well as Cuba. By claiming to
endorse an U Thant proposal, the USSR probably hopes to
put :;'self in a stronger position on the question of a "UN
presenca" in Cuba in case the US declines a formal guaran-
tee to Cuba on the grounds that the USSR has failed to ful-
fill a commitment to UN verification.
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Kuznetsov again took advantage of Castro's opposi-
tion to any form of UN inspection in Cuba to reject
Ambassador Stevenson's contention that the USSR had not
fulfilled its commitment. The Soviet official main-
tained that implementation of verification procedures
depended on Cuban agreement, which had not been forth-
coming. Kuznetsov also rejected any speculation that mis-
sile warheads might have been left behind in Cuba, and
added that warheads were taken out of Cuba immediately
after the decision had been made to remove the missiles.
He carefully limited his statement to warheads for mis-
siles, and did not comment on Ambassador Stevenson's re-
mark that Kuznetsov had said nothing about nuclear bombs.
On the question of the IL-28s, Kuznetsov rigidly main-
tained that these aircraft were never included in a defi-
nition of offensive weapons.
In an earlier conversation with U Thant, Kuznetsov
tried to pin down the precise relationship between Red
Cross inspection personnel and the United Nations. He
questioned the purpose of Red Cross inspection of incom-
ing Soviet vessels inasmuch as all Soviet missiles were
now on their way out of Cuba. U Thant stated that the
ICRC had told him that it would not be responsible for
the control or command of the operation. Thant then
raised the suggestion of eliminating the Red Cross en�
tirely and allowing the UN to assume complete control of
the inspection machinery. Kuznetsov made no reply, but
agreed to forward the proposal to his government.
Soviet officials continue to adhere to the position
that Red Cross inspection can last only until the with-
drawal of the missiles is completed, and have assured US
officials of Moscow's desire to put the operation promptly
into effect. They have attempted to place the blame for
the delay on the US for its failure to accept the offer
of Soviet vessels for the Red Cross inspection personnel.
There has been no information on Mikoyan's discus-
sions with Cuban officials and no word as to his departure
time. On 7 November, a Soviet embassy official told a
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member of the British Foreign Office that Mikoyan
plans to leave Cuba in a few days for New York where
he will write up agreements with the US. The Soviet
diplomat added that Castro may be willing to give up
one or two cf his demands.
In its effort to placate Castro and overcome
his intransigence, Moscow may be taking the unusual
step of according Cuba "observer" status at bloc eco-
nomic meetings.
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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION
The official silence on the Mikoyan-Castro talks
continues.
The Havana correspondent of the French AFP news
agency reported on 8 November that according to "a gov-
ernment source," after four formal meetings negotiations
have come to a "complete standstill."
A clandestine source who returned to his Havana res-
idence on 6 November after a three-day trip 'Co the east-
ern end of Cuba reports he found the populace restless
and still "expecting something." On the other hand, a
Cuban in Havana, in a 5 November telephone call with a
refugee in Miami, called the atmosphere in the capital
normal, and said Castro regime authorities, no longer
so concerned about the chances of an internal uprising,
are not making mass arrests. The refugee believes the
regime feels it "erred gravely" in rounding up all sus-
pected dissidents in April 1961 and is acting differently
this time. This information is generally borne out by
other reporting, including clandestine and press reports
from inside Cuba.
He had announced that Cuba had no of
missile bases and would welcome UN inspection. He
may be one of the ten Cuban envoys reported by the press
on 6 November as being recalled for such mistakes.
LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS
Venezuelan President Betancourt is apparently con-
cerned over rightist military plotting against his re-
gime. On 8 November he ordered the despatch of two Ven-
ezuelan navy destroyers to part.. ipate in the quarantine
of Cuba.
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The Chilean government is considering whether to
break relations with Cuba. Present indications are that
it will not break unless some or all of the other four
OAS governments maintaining relations do likewise, or
unless Cuba makes some new move infringing upon Chilean
sovereignty. Chile's commercial relations with Cuba are
evidently deteriorating.
Nicaraguan President Somoza probably expressed the
views of most Caribbean and Central American governments
in his press conference of 8 November by saying that he
believed Castro would continue his efforts to undermine
his government to the point that collective military in-
tervention in Cuba might still prove necessary, with or
without US participation.
BLOC MILITARY FORCES
General: There has been no significant change noted
in the status of the bloc armed forces. The level of
activity is still low as a result of the holiday period.
Air:
Ground: There have been no indications of abnormal
activity involving Soviet and satellite ground forces.
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Naval: Soviet naval activity is generally at a low
level, probably reflecting the 7 November celebration.
The TEREK continues on a northeast-
erly course toward the Azores, about a day behind an F-
class submarine. The tug PAMIR also continues its ap-
proach to the Azores from the opposite direction.
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