THE TET ATTACK ON SAIGON
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
00758639
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
April 27, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 30, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 2, 1968
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758639
� � � IX ar 1101111i nr511110
ig?
INTE,R( o.atoNi REPORT
.8\U
THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED
BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (WIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES
OF THS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT, 6,
6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF),
r)
-
K I N
1 WwiStgfrieE
APR 11 1966
DATE,OF4NFO'
: South Vietnam (SVN)
Attack on SAIGON.
: January 1968
DATE AND PLACE : 14 February 1968
�- - ---------------------------------------
, OF ACQUISITION Vietnam, SAIGON
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team 114 February 1968 in
SAIGON City, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further exploitation.
- ---------------------------- ------ -
the TET
NIC REPORT NO :251/68
NIC CASE NO :PET
DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/68
NO. OF PAGES : 2
REF: None
-
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
*as assigned to Viet Cong (VC) Company 213 between January and October
1967. Its mission was to. build and repair a district base in a thickly forested
area of QUANG DA District, QUANG NGAI Province. The base consisted of ,5 f,.,-;-,
411(21
thatched houses for the district unit of 20 in. Although DAO was trainwu .4,, i
fire a carbine, he had no practical experience in combat. District women carried
rice, vegetables, pork, salt, and salted fish to the troops every three to five
days. DAO occasionally went to a Government of Vietnam (GVN) strategic hamlet
to visit a relative there.
plASSIFICATION
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FIDEN AL
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DECLAS!;12ICATION
ATTACHMENTS:
None
SOTICEI TS MAITIONE ComINSTis INFoNMATION
AFFECTIN THE NATIEMAL SEOSINSE OF THE UNIT!
STATES vs, HIN THE :AEON'S'S Of WE ESNONASE
LAWS. TIT E SECTIONS 74I3 AND TES.
THE MIN HMV& ON NIIHELNITON fNIHON at
NOT MAN N TO AN weatrosiewne
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pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758639
Approved for Release:. 2019/04/17 C00758639
K / N NIC IMPORT NO t2.51/68
CONFIDENTIAL Page 2
After Company 213 merged into Battalion 21B in October 1967, it moved to another
base where it remained until 24 January 1968 when the company went to SAIGON.
Commander NAM THU told the troops to prepare for eombat. They walked night and
day led by NLM THU who knew the liaison route.1------Idid not see any other units 3.3(h)(2)
moving south. Company 213 reached a large =amt. grove on 30 January where
they were met by a liaison cadre who said that other groups and units had
passed through the area. Source did not know in what area or province he was in.
After resting for three hours in the coccnut . grove, the unit followed the
liaison cadre for two hours and at midnight came to a wide river where the �
soldiers boarded two wooden boats containing 10 persons each. Each boat was
rowed by a boatman and no engines were used, thought that the trip took two
hours. Before boarding the boats the soldiers were told that they were going to
SAIGON to support friendly units who were attacking the city. If the friendly
units suffered casualties, the soldiers of Company 213 were to evacuate them,
following the same route as they did to enter SAIGON. They were not given a
specific location to which the wounded were to be carried. The 20-man group
carried four carbines with three magazines (15 rounds) each; 15 AK rifles with
3/4 magazines (number of rounds unknown) each; and one B40 with three rounds.
NAM THU parried a pistol. A nurse aecompaning the unit carried a small package
of medicine.
'After.,the.group:disembarkedmear a. large concrete roads,
Tealhed. a,-bridge' crossed, walked about 200 meters, and
orders. At approximately 0600 hours, 31 January"Company
aw.'NAM THU told the soldiers to ive t e. wee
was' a member of Cell 4),
it walked: along Until it
lay down to wait for
213 was ordered to
,ad received no briefings about what to expect from the population in SAIGON,
017,3.enthis,unit was to remain there, his unit's military objectives, or any
future,attaeks planned by the VC. His unit had carried enough rice and sesame
for Oven days from QUANG NGAI to SAIGON, and had not been told when food would
be resupplied. The unit had been given to special training before leaving for
SA/GpN...
interrogator found him to be cooperative although he did not respond well
ing requeetionel on some points.
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758639