NEW VC TACTICS IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE - 1968/01/19

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00758681
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758681.
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.THTF REPORT IS THE.MULT LF THE INTMRCOATTON ACTIVITY CONDUCTED.
'TO' THE NATIONAL INITTWXLATION CENTER (NT'...FDER THE JOIM' AUZiPICES
OF THE CENT:RAL. INTELLIG7,NcE ORGANIZATION (co) AND TRE U.S. C'ENTRAL
INTELLIGENC AGENCY (CIA) WITH TES PARTICIPATION 1...)F DFTACT2FNT
6499TP .',PtCIAL ACTIVITIES G'01.517' (TSAF).
COUNTRY � SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
SUBJECT : New VC Tactics in KHANH HOA Province
'DATE4OF INFO : August - November 1967
LATE AND PLACE 6 January 1968 (U)
OF ACQUISITION : NHA'TRANG, Vietnam
NIC REPORT NO : 088/68
NIC CASE NO : FET
DATE OF REPORT : 19/1/68
NO. OF PAGES 3
REF: CIO Report 076/68
NIC Report 085/68(PIR)
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 6 January 1968 in
NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for
further exploitation.
SOURCE-
SUMMARY: 3.3(h)(2)
) 4' 4
A /.1a.w VC tactic that was explain'eet'cOWNVkitroCps in KHANH HOA Province as being
, part :of Resolution 13, involved the" employment of platoon size units (sometimes
larger) to attack secure GYN villages in the lowlands in order to influence the
local people and inspire confidence in the VC. At the same time, the VC would
establish the infrastructure in these villages which would later support the VC
in the "general uprising". The tactic.was used in areas of DIEN KHANH District,
KHANH HOA Province, in October and November 1967, and was lauded by VC cadres as
an effective means of combatting GVN troops, but not so effective against Allied
forces.
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CON
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NIC REPORT NO: 088/6$
ENTIAL Page 2
In approximately late August 1967, Company 2, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B,
Division 5, was indoctrinated on Resolution 13. The company was then located
in the SONG CAU area, DIEN KHANH District, KHANH HOA Province. The part of
the resolution on military operations indicated that the VC/NVA regular and
main force units would be employed to attack important GVN bases and to make
deep thrusts into populated delta areas which were considered secure by the
GVN. The purpose of these operations was to influence the people and inspire
confidence in the VC, and to take advantage of the resultiig confusion to
establish infrastructures in the villages. These infrastructures would support
the VC strongly in the forthcoming "general uprising". To implement this
goal, the VC organized appropriate military training for various units so they
would be able to fight in the lowland areas.
The n tactic was called "sticking to the target tactic" (QUAN BAN TRU) and
was almost like the tactic of close quarters combat, except that people's
honses and the people in them were to be used as shields when the VC fought;
this would place the GVN and Allied forces in a very difficult position. In
using this tactic, the VC would normally use a platoon size unit because a
platoon could fight independently and have mobility. In addition, a platoon
WRS usually sufficient to attack a village where there were only a few :
self-defense or militia troops. After Occupying a village, the VC would stay
close in, and dig trenches at important approaches to resist GVN or Allied
forces if they attacked. At each such emplacement would be one to three VC
soldiers armed with one AK47 and two CKC rifles. The platoon would be armed
with a B40 antitank rocket. During the action, all cells had to move
freqmently so the enemy would not know their real strength. The VC would use
the center of the village as an axis from which to run between houses. The
idea was to scatter and assemble quickly, to fight and retreat from house to
house in order to hold the enemy'attack. By applying this tactic, the enemy
would have a difficult time to determine where the front line or main front
Was so they could concentrate their power, If the tactic was properly applied,
one platoon could remain in a village from one to three days in the face of
a company-strength attack. The same tactic could be applied by a battalion to
hold off a regimental-size attaak.
Beginning in October 1967, Battalion 7 of Regiment 18B employed this tactic
in an operation in the southern part of DIEN KHANH District, KHANH HOA
rrovince. The attack on NGHIEP THANH Hamlet, DIEN BINH Village, was an
experiment which they would use in the future. According to the unit cadres'
observations, the tactic was very effective. Battalion 7 stayed at WHIM'
THANH Hamlet for one day and two nights.
In November 1967, after a period of continuous operation in the southern part
of DIEN KHANH District, Battalion 7 organized a meeting to discuss the effect
of the tactic. The VC cadres made the following observations:
a, It was a perfect tactic to fight against GVN troops because the GVN
-troops that came to drive the VC from the village did not know the VC
'strength and therefore did not dare to attack. Whenever a GVN unit
-came close to the village, the VC would simply need to open fire to
stop them, then quickly move to another place. The GVN troops would
face a very difficult situation and dared not call in aircraft or
artillery to support them for fear that the local population would be
'killed. Consequently, after a period of freedom of action in a village,
the VC would withdraw with only slight casualties.
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I N. NIC REPORT NO: 088/68
CONFIDENTIAL Page 3
The tactic could not be employed properly to fight against Allied
forces, because the Allied forces would call in artillery and aircraft
support to attack a village; in that case, the VC unit had to leave.
Villagers had already complained of the VC remaining in their villages
because they were affected.
Battalion 18B cadres observed that the tactic would be employed although
they knew that two-thirds of their strength and one-third of the village
population would be sacrificed. They said that only by doing so could they
occupy villages and create influence and prestige; in the future they would
aim at the villages along the coastal area of IMAM HOA Province.
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