(EST PUB DATE) CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY: THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 23 OCTOBER - 4 NOVEMBER 1956 VOLUME 1 OF II

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01144179
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-02464
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958

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CS Historical Paper
No. 6
CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
AND
PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE
23 October - 4 November 1956
VOLUME I OF II
Controlled by:
Date prepared:
Written by :
SB (b)(3)
January 1958
(b)(3)
17,
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I
FIELD AHD HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITY DURINOTHE.HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
(23 October to -4 November 1956)
-A. How the Crisis was met inllen44
On 23 October there was no'linngariapOperationd Section in
the Vienna Station and there were no Hungarian speakers among the
� case officers in Vienna. On the agentroster there was one Hungarian
Before 23 October his activitiee:Were.notdirected towards (b)(1)
(b)(3)
the Hungarian target. During the months just previous' to October 1956
only a small number of the total reports received by.tLI agency on the
: intellectual and political ferment of Hungary originate in Vienna.
At the outbreak of the revolution, the Vienna Station, 'ta sum, was not
facing in the direction of Hungary. On the Station lint the Hungarian
target Was relegated to the next lowest priority i a class with the
other Balkan satellites, which were not properly Eital!gets.
' Hungarian Section Was finally formed at the statics' on 13. December 1957;
the RMD, putting Hungary in first priority, Was reriSe . at headquarters
during December 1957.)
The period 23 October o 4 November, the o;ly period under con-
sideration here, was too short to effect e:etation,mrganization to
-meet a erisi3I whose exact nature, duration and fina significance
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'could not be rightly judged at-Anrtiaie during that period. To have
.taken time to reorganize would have meant to lose time from the job..
of finding out what was going On. Hesideslduring the original crisis
r:there could: be little concept of missionandobjectiveaon which to
. base a reorganization. The station readted::to'the suddenly fluid and
frenetic Circumstances of the situation the only way it could, which
was by throwing everyone available into the job of covering the crisis
on a hit-or-oiss basis, somewhat the wara newspaper. office does, when
. suddenly confronted with .a catastrophic evOnt. In this the station
was sorely ltmited from the outset (or: as soon as it became apparent
that the border was opening up) by
116,
visiting the border area..
could be despatched to the border area were
of whom there were'fortunailly many in .Vienna,
Since none Of these except
prohibition on
The only personnel who
apoll Hungarian the first
top-priority action was to'mova Huiagarian-spe(king.
Vienna. This was dons with relative. alacrity considering that no
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(111C11
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(h)Cll
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
ku)k )
(b)(3)
tovm )
(b)(3)
plan
.. for the uae of Such personnel previously existma And that the magnitude
and outcome of the crisis was uncertain 'clUr'Llfi the earliest days.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
� .region --
personnel
pleased. .
, As far as can be ascertained
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Viennals only Hungarian speaker,
into the melee;
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1
(b)(3)
was naturally thrown fulltii(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Altogether by 31 October Vienna had a pool of w-wen or so
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Hungarian speakers, of
(b)(1)
varying capabilities and past experience none of whom belonL,:d. to (b)p1).
(b)(3)
therefore coUld appear in the bwder
(b)(1)
these in addition to the non-Hungarian speaking (b)(1)
(b)(3)
who could also be used as the sta,1.-
.(b)(1)
.(b)(3)
there was and Could. have been nc.
:plan for the specific operational deployient of this personnel, for the
same reason'that a general crisis-plan or reorganization within the
station was impossible 77 no one knew enough Of what was happening to
place personnel or assign tasks, The sole operating principle was to
find out as much as possible and for this reason personnel 'Ore sent
to the border artyls and' were spread out so that there was epme coverage
;on an on-and-off, aasis of all points which hed been reported open.
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In -4
There was no, Plan for personnel, at different border points to get in
touch with each other,i.e. there was no team. Each border visit was
an independent probeand-the observer, in case of an operational
opportunity or a piece of,information,:coUld either phone Vienna or
return there to report.
' In Vienna itseif,Chief of Station succeeded, immediately after'
the scope of events in Hungary became 'apparent, in arranging for agency
personnel to take over All Off-hour duty
week-ends) on the assumption that by this arrangement
woulA secure immediate and only access to.the Hungarian freedom
righters
(nights
and (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
While this no
(b)(1)
doubt seemed to be an excellent Way to assure ourselves of maximum (b)(3)
coverage in the face of the chaos Of the MoMent, Vienna case officers
-later felt that it was an unnecessary measure which succeeded in
exhausting the station personnel and in rendering them less efficient
and vigorous for their strenuous daytime duties without substantial
:benefits.
(b)(1)
Add to (b)(3)
this the fact that the already much reiterated lack of Hungarian
speakers
-unless the Hungarian spoke German or unless
de communication difficult �
(b)(1)
an interpreter were presIODX3)
This isl mentioned in passing, since it is a good example of the kind
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of well-intentioned sacrifice And hardship which personnel is ready
to� undertake in time of crisis, but whichHaccomplishes little and is
no substitute for the management of those elements
which really count.
Because no Hungarian section existed in the Vienna Station
at the time the revolution broke cut, bemuse the Chief of Operations
was new to the scene and because the day-to-day mission was never
predictable, Chief of Station Vienna appears to have functioned as
captain of the troops. All case officers reported to him personally,
� the despatch of persons to the border was cleared through him, and
� the station functioned as a pool of activists each consulting in turn
with Chief of Station, with little attempt made by 4 November to
separate functions and delegate responsibilities )with the result that
many potential activities, whatever their value, were lost in the
shuffle. A typical instance is
borderlbUt was howeVer forgotten in the
the day standing by.
The fact that Staff members. \were prohibit('
(b)(1):
from going to the border area was not So great a loss from the inforM00)
of the situation
(b)(1)
ho was told to stand by in his Oar for word to proceed to the(b).(3)
(b)(1),
general excitement and spent(b)(3)
tion-collection point-of-view (since they aacked the lecessarY
language) but it complicated the management of the pc'sonne1 who were
,
:despatched to the border, most of whom stoo4 in need .it daily guidance.
Each time one of the latter returned to Vietna to meek with someone
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(W(1)
(b)(3)
contact, to lay on foolproof meeting.arrangements, to procure safehouses,
etc. Had the
staff members
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*
it was necessary to make secure telephone
"been allowed, to approach .(b)(1 ) -
(b)O,3
the border-area'and set up field-posts as close to it as possible, they
: could have Worked the border0operators more efficiently and could have
let them stay at the border, i.e. the staff members should have done the
commuting, not the few agents who could be useful at the border. Thus
this prohibition undoubtedly contributed further to the complicated
state of affairs within the station and to the already inherent diffi-
culties of organizing personnel and operations efficiently.
Mhile a few freedom fighters with worthwhile information were
(WO)
seen by our personnel in Vienna the majority
(b0)
contacts with persons coming out of Hungary were made at the border. Ode
are not speaking of refugees here, very few of whom hti begun to come
out at: the time in question, but of persons domiciled :.n or near the
border regions who crossed into Austria for a vatiety of purposes connected
� with the revolutionary cause and returned to the scene as quickly as
possible.) In focusing on the border-contact x.tuaticl� which was the
heart of our operations, it should be recalled Vat 1Te were only, one of
many parties trying to work the border among hordos W.' Western observers,
newsmen, Austrian welfare people, tourists, agent3 of other intelligence
services, etc., etc., that there was therefore conpetiton for news,
that nothing preverred an excited Hungarian lookig fox contacts and
assistance from talAmg to anyone besides ourselvis and telling the same
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this wouli have been no way
to run efficient Operations at a time like this, Litt turned out,
although there were plas with some eq4dte frog it to meet again,
no repeated meetings tcok place wit4-0�sane personJuring the period
23 October to 4 NovemOr.:
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III
-story he had told.up .and.above.41, that there was no guarantee that
one would ever see the same person twice.. .Much of what we picked up
at the border on a.one.time.basis watgood.intelligence since it came
from eye-witnesses. one of what we picked:Up was any better or any
worse than what any good newsman could. or dicipick up, except that we
had a central office. in Vienna with fvlarge staff who could try to put
the pieces together, compare incoming infOrmation with radio, State
.Department and liaison material, etc.,
At no time in the period 23 'October November if one looks
at the situation realistically, did. we have anyhing that could or should
have been mistaken for an intelligence operation. In the case of the
few contacts from inside who promised to stay in-,',)uch with us (i.e.
get in touch with us:when they came out again) it as naturally impossible'
to guarantee either when the inside man could come mxt again, and worse,
when our man could be found again at the same place although telephone
numbers were given out. It was not likely, even h: the =moons out
again and called the nuMbe and not been waylaid b5 SOMA other party on
the scene, that he would ia
e Waited around until Onebody could dome
:down to see him from ,Vienna anY-Pe,Pes
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During the period in question, personnel attached 'to the station
and working in the border area had made contact with and picked up
information from various persons from West Hungarian towns, many of
whom claimed to be members of the local revolutionary councils or to
have close contact to such. Most of these could give eyewitness accounts
of the revolutionary take-over in their own and nearby communities4of
the activity or lack of it of Soviet troops stationed in their regions
of the political intentions of the revolution as Ssen from where they
stood. In some cases (depending upon the date) they (1,;!sired medical
supplies or weapons or radio equipment. In some cases tAsy had been seat
Out by their councils to give the news to the West. In tht. few outstanding
� cases they had reliable news from other sectors (received via i telegraph)
particularly on new movements of Soviet troops into Hungary. What \hey
did not have was any reliable news as to what was happening in Budape3
(and they were as anxious to find this out as we were.)
The information which came from these people made up the bulk of
our cabled intelligence on the Hungarian revolution and, what is more
interesting, directly or indirectly influenced policy and planning
messages sent from Vienna to headquarters. (see below) The fact that we
were not getting news from the storm center of the revolution at Budapest
or on a country-wide basis meant not only that our intelligence was
one-sided but also that much of our planning which was based on this
intelligence, was one-sided.
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For the record, Our main contacts were with people picked up
- at various border points from the following placest KOESZEG,
-SZENTGOTTHARDI SOPRON, GAR and VESZPREM. The 4-5 contacts in question
here not only delivered hard intelligence but were all Momentarily
engaged with us in some operational plan:(however impromptu) which
involved future contact and action. The first three towns are all
immediately adjacent to the Austrian border; Gyr is about 50 kilometers
from the border and Veszprem about 1po kilometers. These operational
contacts, Most of which took place between 30 October and 3 November,
came up with the following propositions:
a. .request for redios, and arms (if possible) (GA. Sopron)
b. request that a powerful transmitter at the Austrian
border rebroadcast and monitor resistance radios, so that each
town would know what the other was doing (Gyor)
return to Koeszeg and bring hack member of district
council,
d. send out trained signals mi,a for briefing by us (Veszprem)
Although journalists from all over &urope streamed down to
Budapest soon after the revolution bloke mt, (and their reports were
the only information received from there) t is noteworthy that in the
under consideration very few rieople came up from Budapest to
.the border or to Vihnna, except for locasional -,:ruck drivers who had
been sent for supplies and who were isturally ii a great hurry to return.
Everyone else in Budapest was much tco busy or ibo keen on watching
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developments to bother about the outside world or even to bother to
any extent about what Was going on in other parts of Hungary. What
:little information on the massive and Confused events in Budapest did
trickle out via hurried truck drivers or official travelers was of
little use. A typical instance took place on 30 October when two
officers of the American Legation in Budapest arrived in Vienna and
stated that at 1000 A.N. that morning, when they had left, there was
no fighting in Budapest and all was quiet. A Hungarian truck driver who
came out the same day stated that at 1000 A.M. there was fighting in
various parts of the city and went on to describe some spb:.ific incidents.
During the period 26 October . 4 November two contract ,?.gents
of the Agency did go into Hungary both of them,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
who took a spin around Hungary and came out and wrote an excellent
report on what he had seen. He had no, Operational mission and little
intelligence briefing, except of the most general sort. His experience
showed how easy it was for someone, who had partial use of the language
and sufficient coul"40 and imagination, .to get around even in chaotic
and to 'make Cantacts
without difficulty, especially under fair.
WM)
The other was who visited his mother in (b)(3)
Hungary during the early days of the uprising and later went in again ,
,ODX1Y-
to o see whatwes going 'on aMong the:students who were playing(b)(3).
a prominent part on t:b local revolutionary Scene. He was still there
when the Russians re-44ered but succeeded in returning to Austria safely..
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The issue of despatching.trained.,personnel of 'many possible'
' kinds into the revolutionary area is of course, the key to the. problem
,
here under consideration and will be analyzed in great detail in a
later section. Suffice it to say at this point, that the experience
of our opei'Stions people at the border and of the few who went inside,
and the whole picture we, 4w have of the mentality of the revolutionaries
shows that almost anyone from the West, of whatever nationality, color
or purpose would have been received with open arms by any of the
revolutionary councils in the cities of Hungary during the period in
question.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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(b)(1
(b)(3
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(b)(
(b)(
The other of the two elements with Ihich Vienna had to contend
� was the U.S. military. This is naturally a big subjects since the
whole problem of agreed activities is behind it There is no intenticn
of analyzing it here: In principle one can say that if we were in no
position to ar,:t efficiently and according to plan with well-placed assets
on the spotjthe military is, was and always will be even worse offjif
for no other reason than its inherent structural inability to maneuver
rapidly in intelligence matters. In the instance under consideration
� a special situation obtained which I hope need never be considered again,
if the Agemy plane properly before the next crisis looms. The army
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1)
3)
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(b
(b
The lesson learned during the Hungarian revolon is that if
we do not have our own assets and our own plan, no one elsk_\,s assets
or intentions will serve us. On the negative side of the lOger� the
responsibilities during a time of crisis, with or without a r)-Ins are
so great that all other parties who are always going to want 1... get
into the act, must be kept at arals length from the main operati�g
personnel of our bases, if their energies are not to be aiverted Irom
the main task. A single liaison officer with no other najor resp'Insi�
bilities should be assigned liaison with the military in time of ci\sis
to keep them happy and do for them or get out of them wh2Leveris
possible. There is no doubt that. the tie Chief of Statien Vienna l'ead
;
to waste on conferences with ranking military intelligence people
during the Hungarian revolution was a sizeable additional train on hi
already strained services to the rest of his station.
991
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0 gzsifa_stlasaanninasthecrisis_s1_veveled:Vienna.,
headquarters, other stations.
The purpose of this section is to show, especially in the light
of the foregoing, what were the chief observations, hopes and intentions
� of both Vienna and headquarters during the period 23 October to
�4 November and on what these were based. The material which follows
� immediately below is taken almost entirely from cable traffic between
Vienna and headquarters. The further purpose of this section is to
compare or contrast, as the instance may warrant, what we were thinking
and planning, or in some cases doing, with the true state of affairs)
and to point up some of the opportunities for possible action which we
might have takenj had we been differently informed and better organized.
(In the items below certain statements are underlined which constitute
the crucial points in field or headquarters thinking and which bear the
brunt of later comment.)
Between 24 and 26 October heacluarters sent three cables to
Vienna, (one each day) asking for a re"ort on the Eungarian situation,
� , � � ..." �'� �� � �
since Vienna had not been heard from ti loughout th opening phase of
the crisis. On 27 October Vienna sent Iwo cables which reported fully
on the situation to date as far as it was known Provious to this they had
had no information which was not likewiEn available in the U.S. through
radio and newspapers and had beer engared in ma;shalling their forces
and attempting to ori;nt themselveN to a situatioi for which, as has
already been pointed out, they were compLately ungreparedy
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Viennals cables of 27 October informed headquarters Of the
!31.36) various local
43640: duty
personnel movanent, etc., intentiolito despatch
arrangements mentioned. in the previous section (off-hour
personnel,
restrictions on
personnel to the border), They contained the information that the
cities in Northern Hungary seemed to be in the hands of the rebels,
tt
who had taken over the local radio stations at Gvor and Miskolc. They
further stated that Vienna would try to identify thi:: leaders of the
revolutionary action through operations at the border ansked for
� headquarters advice on what action the station should take, 01-1*.i.5.
� policy, particularly in regard to sending arms and ammunition ship, ...mats
into Hungary,
In answer to thi7� headquarters replied briefly on the following
days 28 October, that we must restrict ourselves to information collection
only, that agents sent to 'the border must not get involved in anything
that would reveal U.S. intorest or give cause to claim intervention, that
Vienna should try to get tilt, identities of activists, and that there
might be the possibility of passing in radio equipment a little later.'
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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IN .081.7) On 29 October Vienna had no new plan 6 or thoughts but observed
that the revolution, judging by border reports and broadcasts from the
border townsk.was tending far from communism*: The Station also deplored
the lack of action or the taking, of any stand on the part of the U.S.
Government0-
OUT 37295) Headquarters on 29. October gave further answer to Vienna's cable.
of 27 October emphasizing the need to find out about leading personalities
4759)
in the revolution and stating that the idea of using
for suppoP)(1)
(b)(3)
to resistance elements inside Hungary was good bui, thai it was not
permitted to send U.S. weapons in. (At this date no one had -:ht..-0,red
precisely on the exact location and nature of U.S. or other weapons aNn.1.1-
able to CIA, This was done finally in early December.) Headquarters saia
further that it was reviewing the rosters of dropped agents from old
illegal operations who had had WIT trainin who were located both in
Europe and in the U.S.A. (Among others)headquarters attempted to find
the exact address of a former agent who had been resettlec(b)(1)
(b)(3)
it was thought, This was a little like the scene.
(b)(3)
in an old comedy where in the frantic search for a missing person, people
begin to ransack the bureau drawers.)
By 30 October Vienna had begun to collect and transmit some of
the intelligence garnered from border contacts described in the foregoing
section* Cn the basis of this and other material available in Vienna,
broadcasts of local rebel radios and rumors trickling up from Budapest,
Vienna sem two think-pieces on 30 October and 31 October which deplored
19121
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� the lack of unifiedl_eadership in the revelution� debated whether the
� Soviets would or would not interfere with What was going on in Hungary,
� stated that the revolution was losing momentum, that Lure Nagy was
discredited is a future leader and proposed that a national.leader must
forth
could be soliOified, Vienna warily, suggested that might be ("1)
(b0)
the right man and raised the question of getting in touch with him, Vienna
further pointed out that the Northern Hungarian border cities represented
a more or less unified bloc in their demands and in their disagreements
with Budapest, but were not really unified otherwise (i.e. organizationally),
gy this date (31 October) Lure Nagy had publicly announced the
formation of a cabinet to include the leaders of the most prominent
outlawed Hungarian political parties, and each of these leaders had
already (30 October) spoken over the Budapest radio to announce the re-
formation of his party; Tildy (Smallholders), Erdei (Peasants). Bela
Kovacs did not speak on the radio but was interviewed by a reporter in
Pecs, which was written up in the Hungarin papers )n 31 October. By this
time also the news had come out in Budapett that He;edus and not Lure Nagy
had called in the Russians the first time, and that Nagy was daily gaining
in stature and was acceeding in giant step3 to the Increasingly. radical .
demands of the various councils and commiftees who uere sending representa-
tives to him, Mindszenty had been release.: and had already made a public
statement, At the same time the first omlious-sou:ding reports of the
apparent re-entry of fresh Soviet troops on,HungarLan soil were being
received.7
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DT 97127)
On the same date as the second of these two think-pieces
(31 October) Vienna. sent another cable Obviously based on information
'And 'requests picked up from a border contact)Which emphasized the lack
of communications between free cities in North Hungary and proposed
that a transmitter be brought up to the border to rebroadcast the trans.,.
missions of the radio stations in revolutionary hands so that by this
means they could stay in touch with each other. This notion obviously
suggested a topic which Vienna had raised earlier azA which it now
reiterated more specifically in the form of a propose. to send in RS-618
for rebel use so that we could be kept informed of tin latest developments
from the centers of action. Vienna pointed out here lur the first time
that its only information came from travellers, border cntacts and the�
press. Vienna stated it was screening border Contacts fi use as WIT
operators and requested policy clearance, and 'dispatch tc0Tienna of
signal plans and of a W/T trainer,
On the same date (31 October) a-cable from headqual ers crossed
the aboVe Vienna cables and was concerned chiefly with the ,rantic attempt
.to create communications with people inside Hungary.
Headquarters also seconded a schena which had shortly befor( COMB out of
Frankfurt and which proposed that certain defectors
who had
volunteerad to go back into Hunga7 be allowed to go, .especis'.1y those
with N/T experience. In this saie vein, headquarters sugges-,!d that..
04
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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III - 20
Vienna screen their contacts to the rebels for possible W/T types.
By 1 and 2 November, while events were actually moving in many
disparate directions at once, the world, for that short period, was
given the impression that the Hungarian Revolution was over and had
succeeded in its major aims, Nagy had made his declaration of neutrality,
he was negotiating with the Russians for the withdrawal of troops, etc.,
etc. This breath-taking and undreamed-of state of affairs not only
caught many Hungarians off guard, it also caught us off-guard, for which
we can hardly be blamed since we had no inside information, little outside
information, and could not read the Russians! minds.
On 1 November Viennal in its main cable of that day, took up the
problem of new relations with the kind of government which might now come
forth in Hungary and considered at some length the necessary revision,
in the light of recent events, of the Agency's whole program for the
European satellites. On the same day, headquarters, which had not quite
settled down to the new Hungary, was collecting and restating objectives
in its daily cable to Vienna: collect intelligence, use the fluid border
Situation to lay on support mechanisms for future operations, (b)(1).
�.0DX3):
establish contact with rebel leader's in the interior, Closing
(b)(1)
the usual ukase: BUT NOTHING MUST HAPPEN *CH. WOULD JUSTIFY CHARGE OF(b)(3)
INTERVENTION0
Puri.ng the few remaining days (14 November) of partial euphoria over
the unexpew:ed-accomplishments of a revolutionary mob and partial confusion
over reports that the Russians were agreeing to leave on the one hand
[95j �
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and sending .in fresh.troops on the other); the major Vienna cable traffic
was-directed�to.
rather than to headquarters and was concerned.with(b)(1)
(b)(3)
proposals for the setting.up.of a coalition government for Hungary, and
-talth the position. and disposition of Ferenc Nagy Who was at that time in
Paris trying.. to get into Austria.
There is no seriouS warning in Vienna cables of these days as to
the imminence of the second Russian intervention, Although certain reports
transmitted by Vienne gave clear indication of what, might be coming'. -Station
personnel reported verbally at a later date that until the night of
3 November none,pf_their contacts had predicted this intervention. On
that night one border contact stated his conviction that the Russians
were ready to attack.- By early morning., of 4 November this was already--
a fact and was known to the world. On 4 November headolarters cabled
Vienna that it should try to line up escaping resistance leaders for
appearance before the UN, and that measures Would be takeu to hasten the
entry of such into the U.S. On -6 November we were already talking about
:the mechanics and methods of exploiting refugees. And lhat was that.
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CL. Reporting during the Hungarian Revolution
A listing and analysis of sources of reports on the Hungarian
situation during the period covered by this paper (23 October to
4 November) shows at a glance the relative uselessness of conventional
clandestine sources as against unusual and unconventional sources in 4
crisis period.
Main sources used by Vienna:
1. Freedom fighters, revolutionary council members, etc.,
coming to the border (in a few instances to Vienna). These
constituted the
sources for the
2,
most numerous and in most cases most reliable
areas in queStion.
For the most part
(b)(1) �
inform(b)(3)
cake likewise from border contacts and therefore represented
further coverage of the kind received under I above.
was obviously
than we were.
3. Other
and contacts as
capable of wider and' easier access
For further special
coverage, see
persons or Organizations using the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
to such sources
(b)(1)'
be.Lo-o0130).
same (mods
ourselves (border contact)but having the advantage
of being on home territory and 4, having legitimate reason for
C oWta. Ct 11�24.11, N4ke 3..C).
closer
14.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
'
(b)(3)
(Many persons engaged in official
O*1).
action and also volunteer:, managed to enter and leaw(b)(3)
Hungary without difficulty during the period in question. By
chance, chiefly, we were able to talc to a few such at the border.)
1971
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- 23
Travellers (legal)t diplomats, (American and other), journalist
(American and other). These were the people Who went down to and
came out from Budapest. We-had.next to no contacts to the
journalists, but Some to American diplomats who came out.
Secondary sources ''�.
10 Hungarian Railroad Station personnel using teletype.
Hungarian railroaders all over, the country, without any apparent
organizational direction, but simply on their own initiative,
teletyped information, especially on Russian troop movements and
local hostilities in round-robin fashion to various revolutionary
centers and in so doing inadvertently constituted the one
systematic combination of intelligence o�,)server and communications
facility available during the whole periA.0 Some of the people
we talked to at the border brought with i.h.en reports received in
their towns via railroad teletype from otter areas. (W(1)
(b)(3)
likewise picked up numerous reports receiled in this manner.
2.
monitoring of Soviet troop .cuts.
monitoring Soiiet
in Hungary,
haste and disorganization frequently
and thus revea1edomovement8, p:sitions,
The major collection of such material tool place, however,
'.after 4 November,
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was (W(1)
. (b)(3)
The latter in theirkuW)
(b)(3)-,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
morale, etc. (W(1)
ODX4
chiefly
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,
III
Reporting sources used in other areas.
1. RFB - Munich - RF8 with its highly efficient and
technically superb radio-monitoring service was able to pick
up, record and analyze and quickly put into reporting channels
the material broadcast by the various rebel radio stations. For
the record, it should be stated that this was the only source of
intelligence reports put out by RFE during the time of the
revolution proper. (RFE also rebroadcast the transmissions it
had picked up in an attempt to keep the various disconnected
components of the Revolution informed a service which some of
, the people who came to the border from GyOr had l'squested and
which was the subject of one Vienna cable.) (see ITI B)
, However, RFE needed no prompting to do this. While tL reports
put out on the basis of radio monitoring were of value in Washington
and were in many instances cabled to Vienna, it is clear tivt our
competence to judge the course of the revolution and to plan
expeditious and alacritous moves would have been greatly advawld
if the radio-monitoring capability had been in the same hands aL
the operational capability, namely in Vienna.
2, Liaisona In a time of crisis neutrals play or can play,
as in time of war, a most outstanding part as reporting sources
in that taeir political neutrality and their traditional engagement
in welfarn and medical actions allows them to remain cn the scene,
more or loss respected and needed by both sides during hostilities.
(99)
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It is no surprise that during the crisis period reports ..cam to
us from both
and
(b)(1)
both through their diplomat
organizations and more or less unsolicited.
the reports themselves, in the large melee of information accruing
from all sides during the Hungarian revolution, were of no great
importances they point up the potential of such liaison sources
and the fact that an action plan for criAs.periods should call
for the attempt at least in neutral countlies for the local station
to put all possible pressure on liaison fo: reports from the
disturbed area, which in many cases will be ls biased than those
coming in from partipants in an insurrection and \loler and less
A
hysterical then those from Western diplomats and joonalists.
3.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
they were in the same position as ourselves s a result(b)(1)
\ (b)(3)
Their coverage was negligible and aLahown in
of the lack of previous planning. Their few representati ts in
contributed
(b)(1)
orrespondingly.less information than oyown. (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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III - 26
with a radio and for a time managed to send out eyewitness reports
of the situation in :Budapest. (This:kind of action will be
'further discussed in Section iy.)
4. Reporting from Budapest itself consisted of telegrams
from-the American Legation (which was interrupted for a considerable,
period during the most exciting days at the end of the revolutionary
period by a communications failure), reports from journalists,
American, British and other,. and reports from persons going from
Budapest to Vienna. The latter for reasons already put forth,
were of little value. Between the Anerican Legation and the
journalists, the latter understandabl take the prize, although
in many instances the receipt of thei reports was delayed. While
both Legation personnel and journalisti braved. the city fighting
to find out what was going on, the late ):- did and could do something
of great importance which was denied tha ..ormer and that was to
see and interview all kinds of persons taLng part in the revolution,.
from freedom fighters on the streets to rttel leaders and politi-
:cians. Some Persons actively engaged in ie revolution did come
into the American Legation End tell tbeir dories, but these were
naturally not of our.choOsing and in many c;ses Were justifiably
open to some suspicibn. Reporting from th!American Legation was
at best sporadic an laced with premature ax lysis and assumptions
(of the sort that d:Olomats feel their goverylent stands in need of).
.(b)(1)
M(3)
101]
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HoWeveri even if the coverage of the
.American Legation had been.a.hundred,times better than it was, future
planning for crisis can and should not by any means include the
American diplomatic installation as a baser.point since it will
always be impossible to predict what the situation of that Mission .
. will be what its chief of fiCer.:ifill impose uppKt his subordinates,
. etc.
Other sources:
\:
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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ni:� 28
the case. It was noted during the. Poznan uprisings, which in no
. way disrupted the basic function of the central government of Poland,
that the Foreign Office staff was either Much too busy trying to --
figure out what was going on andyhat'stand the government was going
to take, or simply saw no reason 'to brief its bureaucrats in foreitn
places. Whichever, certain Polish foreign installations had little
to go on but the same rumors everyone else in the outside world
was receiving. While it was interesting to note what stand the
various diplomatic officers took towards the events at home, (for
the sake of possible future approaches and the like) this did not
constitute intelligence on the situation At home. During the
Hungarian crisis the Foreign Ministry was severely disrupted and was
for long periods of time in no physical communication with its
� installations, or when it was had little time to give news reports
on events.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
During any '
..widespread insurrection it would eem logical to expect this
generally to. be. the case, and there is some question whether such
reportslusually of disproportionae length (station analyses tending
to fill the information-gaps) sho04 be permitted to have priority
precedence. And Clog up communicatim channels to the detriment of
the expedient passage of Other mgr urgent information.
R03 I
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The break-down of significant subject-matter on the Hungarian
revolution can be expressed as follows:
1. Progress of revolutionary fighting.
a. Budapest
b, Provinde
2. Consolidation of the revolution in political and
governmental measures.
a. Budapest
b. Provinces
Warning of and progress of the second Russian intervention.
:3.
III�- 29
Our station in Vienna can be credited with having picked Up a fair
view of l-b and 2,-b above, all dealing with the provinces. They
did not realize the degree of latent and flHsome. cases actual working
solidarity which had come about in Some Tzltnedanubian Areas in a
miraculously short time or the relation be:ween these areas and
Budapest, e.g., that the province of Borsoc had sent a delegation to
Imre Nagy to see whether he would accept thlir demands, He did,
and they agreed to drop any ideas of an indipendcnt government, They
had no solid information on either 1-ia or 2,a (BLiapest) except for
the generally confused material belated.27 tAckang out, Their
views on the Hungarian revolution, their reportiz,g on it, the actions
they proposed and their whole posture dmng thi:1 period was
influenced tr certain chance contacts wittpersms from the border
towns. AS for 3, it can be said that no cle in lungary or elsewhere
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Ill -30
(except perhaps the Russians themselves) had a clear composite -
view of the movements of Russian troops which were gradually
deploying into positions of attack and Adege all over HUngary.
At many points, especially Miskolc, where the most blatant and
-courageous of the free revolutionary radios was located, the coming
treachery of the Russians Seemed to be foreseen. All in all, there
were many isolated indications and many cries for help in advance_
of the need. While Vienna only picked up a few. such reports,- these:� -
happened to be among the most clearly- indicative of what was likely .
to come and were based on eyewitness (Iservation and sent by
reliable communications. As early as October an
working with bold
who
passed it on to us, that a radio operal:On in Sopron (near the
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
kLiA I)
(b)(3)
border) reported he had picked up the nbel radio at Nyiregyhaza
(Northeast Hungary) calling fpr help agiinst the Third Soviet Army
which had crossed the Soviet/HUngarianlorder at 0123 hours on
29 October at Zahony. (Nota bone: We poked this up fourth-hand.
Good radio monitoring by a unit in VienILL co Ad have picked up a
broadcast from Nyiregyhaza as easily as ome one in Sopron could, .
which is even farther We than Vienna.) On 30 and 31 October
revolutionaries from Gygr reported to
at the border
(b)(3)i
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
extehsive information on Russian milita!r movennts in the Northeast
corridor of Hungary (Zahony-NyiregyhazE: which had been received
at Orgr via the railway teletype systeir from the stationmaster
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III �3l
� at ZAHONY, NYMEGYBAZA, and other towns in that area. These
described in exact numbers and exact directions the movements
of Russian troops, leaving little doubt of what was about to
happen. To have believed at the time of these reports that the
Russian's were merely safeguarding their lines or preparing to aid
the evacuation of their previously damaged troops and material
seems now, on looking back, the extreme of wishful blindness. In
the days following these reports we were, however, dickering in
rather long cables
on the proposed make-up of a
coalition government and were revising our program for the
satellites.
In summary, our rerorting was good on local events in West Ifmgary,
and on the atmosphere and make-up of the local Revolutionary councils :a
that area. We knew littn of what was happening in Budapest or of the
encircling movements of wiet troops and we had no composite picturo of
the status of the Revoluton in the period between its first victory Ind
its suppression by the RLisians. We did not have the kind of informadon
on which quick deft move of our own could have been based either in he
nature of support to the evolution or of improved intelligence coveragi.
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