INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 1969-1972
• Keywords: FRUS
• Keywords: NORTH AFRICA
• Collection: Fall of the Libyan Monarchy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01202663
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: September 16, 1969

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Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, September 16, 1969
The CIA produced a paper on the implications of the Libyan coup, suggesting that the
moderation of the new regime was likely to be temporary.
[CIA]
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1239, Saunders
Files, Libya, 1969. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central
Intelligence Agency. It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research, who were in general agreement with
its judgments. In research memorandum RAF 18, September 10, Denney furnished
Rogers with information on the leaders of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council.
(Ibid., RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 15 Libya.) (declass.) Another Central
Intelligence Agency Memorandum released in September, ER IM 69-125, assessed the
importance of Libyan oil to the United States and its allies. (Central Intelligence Agency,
OER Files, IM 69-125.)
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MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Implications of the Libyan Coup:
Some Initial Thoughts
et
16 September 1969
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
01,1Cg OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
16 September 1969
SUBJECT: Implications, of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial
Thoughts*
The Nature of the New Regime
1. The identity of the rulers of the new Libyan govern-
ment remains unclear and no authoritative statements of their
objectives and priorities have been made. Nonetheless, they
appear in control, and continue to show a posture of moderation
and caution. Though avowing
It
socialism no Libyan leader has
mouthed the extremist slogans typical of Arab radicals. To the
contrary, such themes as the protection of foreign lives and
property, the fulfillment of international Obligations, and
the elimination of corruption and favoritism at home have been
stressed. "Social reform" has been emphasized far more than
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of
the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of
Economic Research, who are in general agreement with its
judgments.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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socialism in Libyan broadcasts. In private conversations with
US officials, members of the ruling Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) have gone even further, and have given the
impression of seeking very close relations with the United
States.
2. Such statements may be deliberate dissimulation,
designed to reduce any threat of foreign counterrevolutionary
Intervention. The RCC probably feared US/UK intervention; in
such circumstances, conciliatory reassurances made good sense.
The UK did put Idris in power and signed a mutual defense
agreement with him. At the time of the coup, there were some
1,100 British troops near Tobruq, along with an RAF base close
by. In addition there was Wheelus, with some 5,000 American
personnel, and the Sixth Fleet was not far away.
3. Whatever the case, the moderate posture of the Libyan
regime is probably temporary, though there are no very good
grounds for predicting just when or how this stance will change.
We base the judgment that it will on the general tendency of
Arab politics over the past two decades: other military-
dominated revolutionary regimes have tended, almost without
exception, to become more leftist and extreme with the passage
2
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of time. In Egypt's case this has come about under one leader.
In Syria and Iraq, it was the result of successive military
coups which brought ever more radical regimes to power.
4. Libya could follow either path, or both. It has already
declared itself in the Arab revolutionary camp, and will quickly
be receiving advice from its new brethren. While the RCC members
the ultimate power in Libya -- remain shadowy figures, we know
that at least some civilian officials of their new government
will be highly susceptible to this type of influence. So in all
probability, will be the RCC itself, not wanting its image tar-
nished by accusations that it is less than sincere or ardent.
The FUture of Libyan Politics
5. Beyond this, the coup -- as did the July 1958 one in
Iraq -- has probably created a precedent which will not be for-
gotten. Most observers inside and outside of Libya had long
believed that a military takeover was unlikely in Idris' lifetime.
The little army of 8,000 (with only 200-300 officers) was greatly
outnumbered by the royalist police forces; it lacked that essential
instrument of Arab revolution, the tank.. The still powerful
tribes in Qyrenaica were loyal to the King, who in fact was
generally respected by most Libyans. The task of secretly
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planning and carrying out a coordinated takeover of the
principal population centers separated by hundreds of miles
of desert seemed insuperable.
6. But the RCC, with some armored cars, proved it could
be done, and this lesson is not likely to be lost on other
Libyans in the future. We do not know how many officers --
apparently mostly captains and lieutenants -- are in the RCC,
but suspect the group is small enough to maintain secrecy and
security and large enough to assure adequate direction and
command a coup -- perhaps 50 to 60 people. Nor do we know how
cohesive this group is, or how susceptible its meMbers might be
to possible Algerian or Egyptian influence and intrigue. In
the years ahead, the Libyan army will almost certainly be
expanded (the old regime had already embarked on a program which
would upgrade its equipment and nearly double its size). In the
new and more heated political climate of Libya, small clandestine
officer groups of Baathist, Arab Nationalists and the like will
appear; over time, some may succeed in seizing power.
Western Nilitary Facilities
7. The US and the UK will likely be in for some sticky
times in the years ahead. An overriding theme of the new
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government, and of any conceivable successor, is an aggressive
and militant anti-Israeli posture, and American support of
Israel will cause serious problems. For the moment, the new
government has said nothing about Wheelus and the British
military facilities in Libya, or made any move against them.
As it consolidates its hold on power and seeks to get more and
more into the mainstream of Arab nationalism, it will probably
do so. It might permit them to remain until the respective
treaties expire: for example, it could, under the terms of
the Base Rights Agreement, formally give notice to the US in
December 1970 that it must be out of Wheelus within a year.
But pressures both internal and external, for earlier removal
will be strong, and we would give Wheelus only a 50-50 chance of
survival until late 1971 -- and virtually no chance at all of
remaining after that. The British, already disliked as the
patrons of the old regime, are unlikely t) remain all the way
to 1973, when their mutual defense pact expires.
Petroleum Policy
8. Relations with the oil companies will be a more
complicated matter; in this field, such radical tendencies
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as the new regime may have are likely to be tempered by practical
considerations. Idris' government had already initiated nego-
tiations aimed at substantially raising Libya's share of oil
revenues. These will of course continue, and Libyan demands
may increase. The new regime may follow the course of either of the
other two Arab radical oil producers, Iraq or Algeria. The former
has left current operations pretty much alone though it has
prevented the US-UK-French owned Iraq Petroleum Company from
expanding into new concession areas. The Algerians have been
much tougher. Indeed at the time of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli
war, they took the extreme step of putting all American companies
(which controlled only about 10 percent of total output) under
Algerian management and forbade the repatriation of any earnings,
an arrangement still in effect. With the French companies, which
produce the bulk of Algeria's petroleum, the government has been
less harsh, but it has not hesitated to engage in harassment in
the quest for more revenue and more output. The new Libyan
government is likely to make similar demands on the US and UK
companies which produce nearly all the Libyan oil. We doubt,
however, that they will be treated as rigorously as American
producers have been in Algeria, though such treatment cannot be
ruled out, especially in the event of another major Arab-Israeli
war.
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9. There are some rather persuasive reasons why Libycn
oil policy appears more likely to resemble that of Algeria.
Like the latter, Libya holds some high cards; its oil comes
from west of the Suez Canal and is of a very low sulphur
content. Hence, shipping costs to Europe are lower, and so are
those of refining; the process of removing sulphur to prevent
air pollution is a fairly expensive one. FUrther, the sheer
magnitude of Libyan output, now over three million barrels per
day and rapidly climbing, will give the regime strength in dealing
with the oil companies. Even the implied threat of a sudden cut-
off of these supplies which meet about a quarter of Europe's
demand would have disruptive effect -- even though alternative
but more expensive -- sources of supply would be available. Thus
the Libyan government is in a position to get progressively more
demanding with the oil companies. How far and how fast it
might go will, of course, depend on how far and how fast the
present regime -- or a successor -- moves in a generally radical
direction, though in the last analysis the Libyans will not
wish to risk losing their oil revenues, on which they are almost
completely dependent.
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Consequences in the Arab World
10. The institution of the Khartoum subsidies, the main-
tenance of a united front against Israel, and the ending of
Nasser's subversive efforts and hostile propaganda lulled the
conservative or moderate Arab governments -- including Libya --
into a false sense of security. We believe that the governments
of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and Morocco and Tunisia) may -- to
varying degrees-- be more susceptible to overthrow than they
were before the Libyan coup. There is evidence of substantial
popular discontent in each country. Their regimes -- like
that of Idris -- are viewed by many of their citizens as too
friendly to the US, soft on Israel, corrupt, and unconcerned with
the welfare of the ordinary citizen. The lesson that a handful
of obscure junior army officers can successfully pull off a
coup against a conservative regime in very difficult circumstances
will not be lost in these countries.
11. If in the next year or two, one or more of these
moderate regimes were overthrown, this would not mean that some
new and more effective stage of Arab political unity, under
Nasser or anybody else, would be in the offing. For the most
part, Arab unity has been a myth, but there has been a fairly
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consistent unity amongst revolutionary Arab states on the
subject of Israel. It should be remembered that, in the
aftermath of the June war, the Arab radicals -- Iraq and
Algeria included -- strongly urged using Arab oil as a means
of pressuring the US to change its pro-Israeli policies. The
refusal of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya to join in killed
that project. Libya might not be so reluctant again. Were
new revolutionary governments to appear in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, this could mean very difficult times for American oil
companies throughout the Arab world. In any event, the Libyan
coup represents one more step in a process of polarization in
the Middle East, which could see the Arabs all aligned on one
side, confronting the US as well as Israel on the other.
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