CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/01/05

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02000168
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RIPPUB
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U
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18
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August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
January 5, 1961
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#' .,r ''Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Vile -TOP-SECRET- Nile / / 4 3.5(c) / 5 January 1961 / / / 3.3(h)(2) t,opy IN 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 �Talo-SEeRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 TOP SECRET viol v.iso � 5 JANUARY 1961 I. SPECIAL ITEM Situation in Laos. II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC III. ASIA-AFRICA Turkish cabinet resigns; President Gur- sel may select new cabinet members with view to increasing government's populari- ty in Turkey. 0 Syrian dissidents still plotting to over- throw UAR regime in Syria with s includine weanons from Jordan. Apparently as a reminder to US not to take Pakistan's cooperation too much for granted, Pakistani press, probably with government approval, calls for reduction in ties with West and improved relations with bloc. Burmese General Ne Win reported under Increasing pressure from army leaders to resume control of government. Situation in the Congo. IV. THE WEST �French Army attitudes on government's Algerian policy may hamper any new De Gaulle initiatives following 6-8 January referendum. �Ecuadorean foreign minister has commer- cial talks with Soviet ambassador in Washington. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 j,v�z� \\N\ ' \V \� X \\\ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 tow TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF P I. SPECIAL ITEM OK *Laos: Formal approval of the Boun Oum government by parliamentary vote on 4 January will probably be viewed d_at_i, by the Communist bloc as illegal. Souvanna Phouma, who ip is still in Cambodia, had declared that he would formally step down as premier if the Boun Oum government were in- vested by constitutional procedure. Airlift flights into Laos continued on 4 January with all ten Soviet IL 14s active. The five Soviet MI-4 helicopters are scheduled to arrive in Hanoi on 5 January. Moscow statements dwell on alleged differences among Western allies over means of solving the crisis in Laos, While North Vietnam has issued a new appeal for another Geneva Conference and reactivation of the International Con- trol Commission II. THE COMMUNIST BLOC III. ASIA-AFRICA Turkey: The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet 0 ,e on 4 January appears to have been pro forma, preparatory ,ce to the convocation of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 Jan- uary. Those who resigned will continue in office until a new 1A-6 4.-c4e-cz cabinet is named from among the members of the new assem- bly, probably sometime next week. President Gursel may use this opportunity to increase his popularity among the Turkish people by selecting ministers who have political influence rather than primarily professional experience. The two pre- vious cabinets, made up mainly of technicians, have failed TOP SECRET \ � \N. N \\NN \ \.\\ \sk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 -\\ , � Approved for Release: 20s)20/08/11 CO2000168 Nue --TOP�SECRET� � to attract popular support to the new regime. Some of the key ministers such as Foreign Minister_S2mPv_will prob- ably remain in the new cabinet. (Page 1) UAR (Syria)=Jordan: Syrian dissidents are still plot- ting to overthrow the UAR's regime in Syria and have again sought support, including weanouR. frnm Tnrelart Li conspiracy is said to include some of the high- ranking unit commanders in the Syrian Army and to have the support of most of the inhabitants of the Jabal Druze. Amman has asked for more details and promised that aid will be provided if the nlnt 10 uniiti �ma s wo o Pakistan's leading papers, probably approved by the military government, have C)k called for "gradual disengagement" from Western alliances and for improved relations with the bloc. While President A2,4-.-(A-11- Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains committed to its alliance with the US and strongly supported Western posi- tions during his recent Middle and Far Eastern tours, the government probably hopes such press comment will serve as a reminder to the United States that it should not take Pak- istan's cooperation for granted and increase aid to India at Pakistan's expense :1 (Page 3) /2� Burma: /General Ne Win is under increasing pressure from army leaders to resume control of the overnment, Ne Win agrees MAL� Lne situation in me country "has reached serious propor- tions" and asserts that Premier Nu's continued misrule might force him to act "very soon." Meanwhile, Nu is having trouble in his own Union party. Nu is expected voluntarily to relin- quish formal leadership of the party at a conference in Feb- ruary but will continue as the dominant political figure in Burma. He is planning, however, to back a minority factionT3 5 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO � Gemena Coquilhatville , Kongolo uabout; k,kwanga Albertvil put& Manni,o K mav lisabethvi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 \S � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 �11"` TOP SECRET DINAR .of the party for party leadership and, should his efforts fail, he may lose control of his partyq (Page 4) Congo: an IL-14 aircraft whicn landed at Liemena on 1 January, ostensibly car- rying spare parts and welfare supplies for the UAR battalion in Equateur Province, included money, arms, and presum- ably, technical personnel for the Gizenga dissidents. Gemena, about 400 miles northwest of Stanleyville, is the location of the UAR's Congo battalion the UN "is not to be notified" of the names of persons aboard the plane, who were to be described merely as technicians. IV. THE WEST France-Algeria: lowered army morale since the government's decision to hold the referendum on its Algerian policy and the pro-rebel Mos- lem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 December visit. d Marshal Juin's open letter explaining why he will vote "no" in the 6-8 January referendum is having repercussions among. of- ficers in Algeria. Widespread military disapproval of De Gaulle's policy will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt fol- lowing the referendum if the over-all majority is slim, and par- ticularly if there should be a negative result in Algeria:I sEMinister of State for Algeria Lous Joxe is said to have commented that "serious troublej 5 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iii \\,� ,\\\ , Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 414\ift,x,mkal Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 ` were dies ahead in Algeria and there will probably be a major up- rising just before or during the referendum. both Moslems and Europeans in Oran are planning a general strike today--.1 (Page 5) Ecuador-USSR: Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Jose Chin- boa "Yesterday I had the opportunity of discuss- ing with the Russian ambassador future visits of a commercial A nature." Chiriboga came to the United States in late December " to discuss US economic assistance to Ecuador. Ecuador dur- ing the last month re- tastahli sh pd cwtivP dinlriMatic relations with Czechoslovakia. (Page 7) V. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS rA. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the imme- diate future. B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future. e, C. With continuing substantial bloc logistic support,particular- ly airlift, the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces have achieved a tactical capability of bringing substantial pressure against government forces in a number of areas throughout Laos. In the event of a Pathet Lao move against such major points as Luang Prabang, Vientiane, or Pak Sane, the Boun Oum Lgovernment will probably ask for overt outside assistance. though the bloc probably prefers t a-h7t-Th-e-iaotian con lict not be expanded beyond its present scale, it apparently is-3 5 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 \ A \\ � \ \ � "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 \\.\\ � � %IS -T-13P-SECRET 1 , �\\ Getermined to maintain such military pressure as is required !\ to achieve at a minimum a "neutralized" Laos. The bloc is probably prepared to increase its military commitments with- in Laos to the extent required to counter such outside t\ sunnnrt s rnicrht hn nrcluitiarl i forces.n *.k� :10 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, would omit the last two sentences for the fol- lowing reasons: 1) The content of these two sentences is esti= mative in nature and thus beyond the purview of the Watch Char- ter. 2) The statements prejudge conditions which may not ac- tually arise. 3) There is insufficient intelligence information to justify the statements made in the next to last sentence, and there is no intelligence information to support the assertion t sentence. he Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, is in agree- ment that the bloc probably prefers that the Laotian conflict not be expanded beyond its present scale but does not believe sufficient evidence exists to warrant the conclusion that the minimum bloc objective is the achievement of a "neutralized" Laos. The Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, further be- lieves that the conclusion that the bloc is probably prepared to increase its military commitments in Laos to the extent re- quired to counter such outside military support as might be provided to the Phouzni forces cannot be supported by avail- able information. 5 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF \ \\N\\ � , � \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 N.? SECRET Resignation of Turkish Cabinet Prefaces Convocation Of Constituent Assembly The resignation of Turkey's 18-man cabinet on 4 Jan- uary appears to be pro forma, preliminary to the convoca- tion of the new Constituent Assembly on 6 January. Despite rumors in Ankara of a cabinet shake-up, there is no indica- tion of widespread discord within the government. Finance Minister Alican resigned on 24 December, ostensibly to gain political freedom of action but in reality because he disagreed with the plan of the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) to raise military salaries substantially. The resignation may reflect the concept, not clearly de- fined in Turkish constitutional law, that a cabinet should re- sign when a new government is established. Some of those who resigned, such as Foreign Minister Sarper, Deputy Pre- mier Ozdilek, and Minister of Defense Ataman, will probably be included in the new cabinet. The Ankara Home Service announced on 4 January that the cabinet had submitted its resignation in order to permit Pres- ident Gursel full freedom of action "at a time when our dem- ocratic development has entered a new stage. . . " The for- mer cabinet ministers will continue in office pending the for- mation of a new cabinet. The CNU may have prompted the resignations to clear the way for broader political represen- tation in an effort to win popular support. The two previous cabinets were made up primarily of technicians who lacked both political appeal and political comprehension. President Gursel may also hope to promote his own political future by selecting men who are more loyal to him. The new appointees may indicate the political leanings of the CNU; some of the sug- gested ministers are strong supporters of the Republican Peo- ple's party (RPP). Preparations continue for the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Several prominent figures have been selected, 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 NimwSECRET including the leaders of the two main parties, several former deputies, and at least two former cabinet ministers. The RPP is rumored to have strong support in the nonpolitical groups to be represented. In a move probably designed to gain added support from the minorities and attract international good will for the regime, Gursel has included in his personal selections representatives of the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish minorities. Nonetheless, there continue to be undercurrents of resistance and potential unrest throughout the country. SECRET 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page.? Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 NISIFCRrT.4%.; Pakistan Taking More Independent Position Gn recent editorials probably approved by the military government, two leading Pakistani papers have called for Pakistan's "gradual disengagement from the role of a com- mitted nation" and for improved relations with the bloc. President Ayub has recently expressed concern over the flow of news articles that the United States would concen- trate its aid on India, adding that Pakistani reaction to these stories was a problem for his government. The military re- gime probably hopes the recent editorials will serve as a warning to the incoming American administration that it should not take Pakistan's cooperation for granted and in- crease aid to India at Pakistan's expense.'3 CPresident Ayub has made it clear that Pakistan remains committed to its alliance with the United States and strongly supported Western positions during his recent Middle and Far Eastern tours. During his visit to Cairo in early November, Ayub reportedly told newsmen who asked for his views on non- alignment: "I don't understand positive neutralism. You should ask President Nasir; he's the expert on neutralism." In Tokyo In mid-December Ayub told reporters that Pakistan stood ready to send troops to Laos if SEATO decided to intervene there-.3 CWhile Pakistan plans no basic change in its commitments, It has moved to make a show of independence in its foreign pol- icy, starting with its decision in the summer of 1959 to adopt a tougher line toward Afghanistan. Pakistan's current negotia- tions with the USSR for oil-exploration assistance are part of its more recent efforts to improve relations with Moscow. Rawalpindi probably considers Moscow's silence on the Sep- tember border clashes with Afghanistan north of the Khyber Pass an encouraging sign. In addition, Ayub apparently hopes to persuade other Afro-Asian nations that it has a "flexible" foreign policy. SECRET- 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Burmese ,pprovea for Re-lease: 2020/08/11 do2tiob-isse-rnment �5ECRET�Thie CSenior Burmese Army officers, long discontented with administrative deterioration under Prime Minister Nu have obtained assurances from General Ne Win that he intends to do something about it. Ne Win told his colleagues that if the lack of govern- ment discipline continued, "the army would have to act very soon." , an army takeover may occur in February or March [Since Nu resumed the office of prime minister last April, Ne Win has opposed persistent demands from his army subordinates for a return to army rule, insisting that the elected civilian government be given an opportunity to prove its worth. It now appears, however, that the continued de- cline of law and order in the country and the deterioration of the economy since he resigned the prime ministership are convincing Ne Win that he should resume office. He told his staff and brigade commanders that he had hoped the present leaders would "step up the pace of managing the government, but they were too busy fighting among themselves," and he reportedly added, "The' Burmese people have again shown that they are not ready for democracy and self-rule. [here have been persistent reports of dissension with- in Nu's Union party and indications that he cannot control its actions. Nu considered the party poorly organized, with many "wrong" people in power. A national party conference is scheduled for February, at which time a showdown for party control is possible. Nu intends to step down from the party presidency, but will remain the dom- inant political figure in Burma. However, he is backing the mi- nority faction against Union party Secretary General Kyaw Dun, a political hack whose party role was the immediate cause of the 1958 breakup of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Should Nu lose this struggle, his organizational backing and control of the government may disintegrate completely. There has been one report suggesting that because of the dissension within his party. Nu would welcome the arm SECRET 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 *we .1JULUEWIcLL1116 y .I.V/VrcLW r'oses Threat to De Gaulle's Algerian Policy lowered army morale since the government's decision to hold the 6-8 Jan- uary referendum on its Algerian policy and since the pro- rebel Moslem demonstrations during De Gaulle's 9-13 De- cember visit. The air force is described as similarly af- fected, though to a lesser degree. The unity of the army is reportedly endangered by cleavages between junior officers and older generals and by differences between various units. The recent open letter by Marshal Alphonse Juin, France's highest ranking military figure, explaining why he will vote "no" in the referendum has reportedly stimulated "consider= able thought" among French officers in Algeria. Repercus- sions of the Juin letter have also occurred among the military in France itself, where 16 reserve army generals who had previously held high commands in North Africa= including former chief of staff Guillaume--have publicly endorsed Juin% appeal in even more vehement terms:3 CWidesprea,d military, disapproval of De Gaulle's policy will pose a threat to any new initiative he may attempt fol- lowing the referendum. De Gaulle expects to gain about a 65-percent majority in France; a narrower over=all major- ity or especially a negative result in Algeria would serve to stiffen military opposition to a new offer to negotiate with the rebel government. Extensive Moslem abstention, as ordered by the rebel Algerian government, or further pro-rebel dem- onstrations in Algeria would probably also be interpreted by many French officers as evidence of the failure of De Gaulle's policy and of the impossibility of keeping an independent Al- geria from rebel domination (Meanwhile, there are signs that some French officers now feel Algeria is lost to France and the West and are adopt- ing attitudes of bitter resignation or indifference. If such sen- timent spreads, it will probably lower the army's efficiency in) --SEGREZ- 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Nue SECRET Controlling settler and Moslem extremists after the referen- dum. Minister of State for Algeria Louis Joxe is said to have commented that "serious trouble" lies ahead in Algeria and that there will probably be a major uprising just before or during the referendum.] both Moslems ana Luroneans in Oran are n1 nning a ctiznperal Cl+rilrea --SEC-RE-T- 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 TOP SECRET Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Reports Meeting With Soviet Ambassador Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Jose Chirihnfra on the previous day he had had "the opportunity of discussing with the Russian ambassador future visits of a commercial nature." Chiriboga arrived in the United States in late December to discuss US economic assistance to Ecua- dor and the Eleventh Inter-American Conference which is scheduled to be held in Quito this year. Ecuador has indicated increased interest in relations with the Soviet bloc in the past six months. The conserva- tive Ponce administration which preceded the incumbent administration of President Velasco permitted the Czech= oslovak minister to Brazil to be accredited also to Quito last summer. Ecuadorean-Czech relations had been inactive since the closure of the Czech legation in Quito in 1957. Under the Velasco regime, the leftist minister of education traveled to Prague where he entered into a preliminary agreement to pur- chase about $630,000 in technical equipment for schools and received a Czech offer to provide a $10,000,000 credit. The contract for technical equipment has now been signed, accord- ing to a press report of late December. Ecuadorean represent- atives have recently talked with Frantisek Mares, key figure in Czech arms deals, about the exchange of Czech small arms for Ecuadorean cacao, cuador has given Czechoslovakia permission to reopen its legation in Quito, and a Czech rep esentative WAR Rehelciuled to arrive there on 27 December. 5 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 Igoe CONFIDENTIAL *se THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Detense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army �The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000168 " dr" ZI 1�41ZZTOP SECRET- rt/ eg1Z412