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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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January 10, 1961
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 3.5(c) %.0 ol7GlioRi I 10 January 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 TUP 5ILI;KL I �Tale-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 110012-SE-C-RE-T- . 10 JANVARY 1961 I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China--Food shortages re- sult in popular discontent. Communist China to grant large credit to Burma. II. ASIA-AFRICA Situation in Laos. Situation in Congo. III. THE WEST Majority of OAS members appear will- ing to discuss multilateral break with Cuba. Watch Committee. evaluation of report Castro to attack Guantanamo Naval Base. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200017144 OP SECR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC N No TOP SECRET Communist China: ,Food shortages on the Chinese main- land have become so severe that popular discontent is now taking the form of open antiregime activities in some local- ities. In late November and early December anti-Commu- nist slogans were written on public buildings in both Dairen and Hainan Island food riots took place in Harbin in mid-December. with 70 persons arrested and summarily shotg (Page 1) *Communist China - Burma: Following successful set- tlement of the Sino-Burrnese boundary question, Commu- nist China is embarking on a major effort to expand its eco- nomic and political ties with Burma. As a result of Chou En-lai's trip to Rangoon, where the instruments of ratifica- tion of the border treaty were exchanged, Peiping has agreed to extend large-scale economic aid to Burma. A Joint com- munique. issued on 9 January announced an economic and technical cooperation agreement under which the Chinese will provide an interest-free credit of about $85,000,000-- the largest amount ever granted by Peiping to a non-bloc OK C.) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 -1443P-S country. The Chinese will undertake the construction of un- specified industrial projects in Burma. The new aid pact, as well as a trade agreement signed in October 1960, will pro- vide the basis for a much greater volume of Sino-Burmese tvarla a anal the ChinesP have been seeking for some time. II. ASIA-AFRICA *Laos: The Communist airlift into Laos continues. Nine flights possibly to the yang Vieng area, were confirmed on 9 January; eleven flights to Vang Vieng are scheduled on 10 January. Four -6 aircraft were scheduled to arrive in Sava.nnakhet on 9 January, and are to be flown to Vientiane on 10 January. The T-6s will lve the Laotians a capability of interdicting the Soviet airlift. Supplies for transshipment Laos are Probably being moved into North Vietnam by rail. the North Vietnamese refused to permit the ICC to inspect a train possibly transporting military equipment from Communist China on 23 December. This train was at Lao Kay, the North Vietnamese entry point on the rail line from Kunming to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese denied the inspection on the grounds that the train was a "local." allegedly *Congo: Indications that the Gizenga dissidents are continu- ing to extend their control of areas of the eastern Congo have coincided with reports of uncoordinated countermeasures on the part of the Mobutu regime. An emissary of Mobutu is in Elisabe vine for talks with Katanga President Tshombe concerning the possibility of Katangan financial support for Mobutu's forces. In Leopoldville, however, Mobutu's commissioner for finance re- portedly assured UN representative Dayal on 5 January that the 017 In Tnrk nAlT V lAR(EF TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 economic blockade cf Orien o v cf.'s, a should negotiate with the Stan- kyvilk regime, including Gizlnga. Some 600 Lumumbist troops have entered northern Katanga and more are reported on their way in a move apparently aimed at establishing an "independent" enclave within the province. Tshomb4 has given the UN until midnight tonight to disarm the invarj3rs or he claims he will c:der his troops to occupy UN- controlled neutral zones alo IIL THE WEST Latin America: Officials of a number of Latin American countries have stated that, while their governments could not now unilaterally break with Cuba without beimg sub- ' jectA to the charge of too closely following US footsteps, they maid support multilateral acUon severing diplomatic ties with VI? Castro regime. A majority now appear ready to begin looking toward a multilateral break and the imposition economt- --,nctions, although the necessary two-thirds support r such a,t..e.Ja by the OAS is still not certain. Two key countries-- nexico and Brazil--are in doubt, and Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic appear at this time reluctant to ata themselves with moves for strong action against Castro. (Page 2) Cuba: 10 Jan 1 DAILY BRIEF Iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 4,proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20001,70;010 - today that Fidel Castro intends to. save his Cuba by launching a simultaneous air-ground attack on Guatanamo Naval Base before the Kennedy inauguration, claiming publicly that the US inttiated the action. The Cuban' ambassador in Prague, who reportedly has been very nervous in the past few days, allegedly left by air for England today, ostensibly in response to a British Council invitation to his wife to inspect the English school system." Members of the Watch Committee of the USIB have indi- vidually examined the above report and have evaluated it as probably false. In reaching this evaluation, the committee members note that the Mexican ambassador, who professed to have gotten the report from a Czech official, is notorious- ly unreliable. In any event, the Cuban first secretary would be unlikely to have been informed of such an operation plan by his government. Moreover, Castro is not considered to have the capability, at least in the air, to succeed in such an opera- tion, and a failure of this order would have disastrous conse- quences for the Castro regime. It is unlikely that the Soviets, whose advice would have some weight with Castro, would fa- vor such a course of action in view of their current professed conciliatory policy toward the President-elect. The Soviets would probably estimate that an attack on Guantanamo would result in the defeat of the Cubans at the hands of the US and would show up their own unwillingness to honor their vaguely worded promises of military support for Cuba.* The Committee members further note that the report may possibly reflectsan attempt by bloc elements to cause reactions in US armed forces whose nature would support the internal Cuban tension-building propaganda that a US invasion of Cuba Is imminent. There is no information from other sources to corroborate this report. Nevertheless, the possibility of mil- itary action against Guantanamo by Castro, given his rashness and instability, cannot be completely discounted. 4.v.kiteAssiptp#,Q00.-01pAlcor.Intelligence, Department of the Army, would omit this sentence for the reason that it is esti- mative in nature and thus beyond the purview of the Watch charter. 10 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Food Shortage Stirring Up Discontent in Communist China ascontent strong enough to take the form of antir,egime manifestations is reported in Communist China. The prin- cipal cause is the effect of protracted food shortages--now going into their third year, "Bad" living conditions and grow- ing discontent were reported in late November on Hainan Is- land. Anti-Communist slogans were painted on the walls of official buildings in Paso, one of the island's Dort cities. stevedores there could no longer carry heavy loads because of undernourishmene.3 CA similar report has been received from Dairen, where signs believed to have read "More Food" and "Down with Com- munism" were being erased from public buildings in mid-De- cember. An unconfirmed report states that food riots occurred last month in Harbin and that 70 persons were arrested and summarily executed. There is considerable dissatisfaction among civilians in Dairen over the army's favored treatment GiThile the regime's controls appear more than adequate to cope with the present scale of popular dissatisfaction, the near- famine conditions may have resulted in organizational changes in at least one and perhaps two provinces. According to the Peiping press, the north coastal province of Shantung was the hardest hit in last summer's drought. People's Daily announced on 8 December that four neighboring provinces were organiz- ing a major relief campaign to assist the people of Shantung. Two weeks earlier the local press noted the ouster of the Shan- tung first party secretary, Shu Tung. His replacement de- clared that twi cadres should overcome the high and mighty bureaucratisrn and habit of excusing themselves by pleading special circumstances." The American Consulate general in Hong Kong reports that there is also some evidence of a shake- up in the Kwangtung party provincial committee. The number of refugees fleeing Kwangtung into Hong Kong because of the food shortage is increasing despite stringent border controls-:-/ -GONRDEN-T-M-L- 10 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Latin American Reactions to Cuban Situation als of a number of Latin American countries have F�CIffil'stated that, while their governments could not now unilaterally break with Cuba without being subjected to the charge of too closely following US footsteps, they would sup- port mtatilateral action--1. e., through the 21-member Or- ganization of American States (OAS)--severing diplomatic ties with the Castro regime. Six governments had already broken or suspended relations with Cuba prior to the US ac- tion on 3 January. A majority of OAS members now appear ready to begin discussions looking toward a multilateral break and the imposition of economic sanctions, although the neces- sary two-thirds support for such action by the OAS is still not certain. Colonabian Foreign Minister Turbay told the US ambas- or on 5 'January he felt the time had come for collective S action and urged the United States to make special efforth pers.,: -de the three "doubtful" governments of Mexico, Bra- arti. I.,!cuador, since he considered that unanimity was es- _tidal for collective action to be effective. Mexican Foreign rinister Tello had already advised the US Embassy that his ,;overiunent would feel obliged.to abstain on any OAS action en under the Caracas resolution against international Com- � Al1SM, but implied that Mexico would not actively oppose :.ch action. In Brazil, where policy making is virtually suspended nding the President-elect's return from Europe and his in- uration on 31 January, there is pressure for an attempt to Liiediate US-Cuban "differences." The Ecuadorean Government, � preparing to play host to the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled to open there in March, appears anxious to avoid any action that might jeopardize its plans. Three other countries-- Chile, El Salvador, and the Dbminican Republic�appear reluc- tant to associate themselves with moves for strong action against Castro. In Chile, the government hopes to keep the Cuban 10 Jan 61 ; ' 4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 002000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Nad problem out of the congressional election campaign during the next two months, fearing a further swing to the left if emotions are raised over the Castro issue. Demonstrations by pro-Castro groups protesting the US break with Cuba--in Uruguay, El Salvador, and Panama thus � far--have been relatively ineffective, a fact that may encour- age some regimes that have been reluctant to support anti- Castro moves for fear of strong domestic reaction. Argentina, whith has been the sharpest critic of Cuba among the major Latin American countries, would probably support economic sanctions against Cuba but would be reluc- tant to break diplomatic relations at this time for both hem- isphere and internal security reasons. The government be- lieves it should maintain a listening post in Cuba, where a number of important Peronista leaders reside, and Cuban or:position leaders have requested Argentina to maintain its embassy in order to furnish assistance to these seeking asy- lum. The foreign minister has said that relations with Cuba could definitely aot be severed before the 5 February local and senate elections. The Cuban situation is not now on the agenda for the Inter- American Conference, which was prepared some time ago. *t Uruguay is seeking to en- large the arcenda to include "Communist penetration of Amer. Some governments, on the other hand, are giving thought to convening a special foreign minis- ters' meeting to deal with Cuba, and Panamanian Foreign Min- ister Solis told Ambassador Farland on 4 January that Panama would be happy to host such a conference. The US break in relations coincided with intensive prep- arations within Cuba to resist "imminent aggression" and with a drastic tightening of police state controls, leaving the majority 10 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Pais 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 the people in Havana in a stit of frightened cxpectany. the US "had a conoiellrable impact upon the general public," -.717.1c1a had already bw t fool isolated from the rest of hem' ere. carmAL nfrimucinrcz BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 . � THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 000/r/Zdedfj/dr,,,,,," ',Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000171