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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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January 21, 1961
_Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 3.5(c) vr *C%�Itc, 3.3(h)(2) TOP SECRET 21 January 1961 CENTRAL L\TELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 -701)-SECRET -1-pp SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 ipproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 4100 21 January 1961 CONTENTS THE COMMUNIST BLOC 1. Khrushchev speech on world Communist policy, (Preliminary analysis). (Backup, Page 1) 2. USSR central committee plenum on agriculture. (Backup, Page 5) ASIA-AFRICA 3. Situation in Laos. (Backup, Page 7) (Map) 4. Congo: Indications that Moroccan forces will withdraw from UN operation, (Backup, Page 9) (Map) 5. Current elections in Iran. (No Backup) 6. UAR and exile groups map campaign against Jordanian monarchy. (Backup, Page 11) THE WEST 7. Dominican Republic - Venezuela: New Trujillo plot against Betancourt, (No Backup) --sEc-RET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 , Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 -,\ V TOP SECRET -\' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 21 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF ii THE COMMUNIST BLOC *World Communist Policy: Khrushchev's speech of 6 January to a group of Soviet party functionaries, published in the Soviet party journal Kommunist on 17 January, is a vigorous reaffirmation of Soviet positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy, including the view that Communism can triumph in the world without general war, primarily by demonstrating its economic superiority to capitalism. In effect, Khru- shchev serves notice to the world Communist movement that the recent Moscow conference of Communist leaders has not altered the views of the Soviet party, He avoided, however, the use of sharp language which could provoke the Chinese Communists into a revival of polemics. In terms of Soviet foreign policy, Khrushchev provides authoritative confirmation of previous indications that the USSR intends to continue its aggressive anticolonial line, while at the same time pressing a eamnaien for nego- tiations with the West at the summit. (Page 1) *Soviet Agriculture: The proceedings of the 10-18 Jan- uary'meeting of the hierarchy of the Soviet party in Moscow, including a lengthy and sometimes vitriolic speech by Khru- shchev, confirm that Soviet agriculture has made but little progress in the last two years and outline in detail Khrushchev's program for a major effort to solve the USSR's chronic agricul- tural problems. The proceedings imply an expansion in the resources devoted to the improvement of agricultural pros- pects but not in such quantity as to modify the basic orienta- tion of the economy toward the expansion of heavy industry. Portions of policies earlier imposed by Khrushchev on Soviet i� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200017T V TOP SECRET agriculture, notably those concerning the "new lands," the corn-for-fodder program, and the substitution of incen- tives in place of coercion and Communist enthusiasm as motivation for the Soviet farmer, have been very forcibly restated. (Page 5) ASIA-AFRICA *Laos: Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces on 20 January are reportedto have taken Tha Thom, the government's last Important post in Xieng Khouang Province. Garrison com- manders had shown little disposition in recent days to make a strong stand and apparently intend to resort to guerrilla- type operations. The government troops recently forced out of Phou Khoun at the junction between the Vientiane- Luang Prabang road and Route 7 are being reinforced for an early effort to retake the key junction. Soviet transports continued airlift operations into Laos through 20 January and additional flights are scheduled. (Page 7) (Map) *Congo: There are indications that the Moroccan Govern- ment is moving to dissociate itself from the UN Congo opera- tion. The 3,000-man Moroccan unit in the country reportedly has beerrdered not to fight against the forces supporting Lu- mumbatand the Moroccan crown prince recently stated that /At- - he had undertaken to begin the withdrawal of his forces by 5 February. Harnmarskjold has told US officials that, with Kasa- ii)/ vubu having made public his request for the removal of Dayal, /At ..2_/.2., chief UN representative in the Congo, he cannot now appoint a new representative. Hammarskjold implied, however, that Dayal's contract would not be renewed when it lapses two months henc% The situation along- e border betwee Kivu Province ana nuanda-Urundi re ? - ? portedly is explosive4 pith Congolese authorities expecting an �7,1_�() 21 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii -117P-SEGRET N N Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 �4.1 TOP SECRET Imminent Belgian attack. The UN appar- ently has plans to move the UAR battalion from Equateur to Kasai Province, but the battalion's commander has objected to an early move,even by a part of his unit. (Page 9) (Map) *Iran: The Shah, faced by chronic financial difficulties and persistent nationalist opposition, is trying to strengthen his position with a new round of rigged parliamentary elec- tions, now about 20.4percent completed. The elections started in rural areas about a week ago and are scheduled for Tehran about the first of February. The Shah apparently has hoped that the elections, besides fulfilling constitutional requirements, would produce a favorable impression on the United States, on which he continues to rely for financial help. Although the Shah will obtain a reasonably, docile parliament, the electoral meth- ods and the disorders which may still result from them, particu- larly in Tehran, will maintain the breach between the Shah and the people, and the possibility of a coup against him continues. In an effort to moderate Soviet propaganda the Shah plans to send a "good-will" mission to Moscow in March. Khru- shchev accepted the mission in principle on 8 January. Iran= Ian Foreign Ministry officials feel, however, that the USSR will continue to press for a prior agreement on some points which could be announced in Moscow on the occasion of the visit. The USSR's aim is a political accommodation which would at least begin to weaken Iran's ties with the West, but the Shah insists he will agree to nothing which would compromise Iran's obliga- finnA to thp Central Treaty Orcrani7atinn and thp TTnitpd Statps UAR-Jordan: Prominent Jordanian exiles in the UAR and UAR officials, including Nasir, have agreed during recent dis- cussions in Cairo that inherent dissatisfaction within Jordan should et) be supported and exploited with the aim of eventually overthrow- ing the Jordanian monarchy and "freeing" Jordan from Western control, according to a fairly reliable source. Abdullah Rimawi, 21 Jan 61 TOP SECRET N DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 % CO2000177\ NO TOP SECRLE-T- 1111.1ii former Jordanian minister of state for foreign affairs, and All Abu Nuwar, former chief of the Jordanian general staff, reportedly are to continue efforts to develop separate capa- bilities for revolutionary action in Jordan--Rimawi among civilian, especially Baathist party, elements and Nuwar among Jordanian army personnel. Meanwhile, Jordanian agents have t resumed terrorist activities in Syria similar to those which fol- lowed the asTsgination of Jorrian'an Prime Minister Majalli last August. [ (Page 11) THE WEST Dominican Republic - Venezuela: Trujillo is reported as "impatient and upset" because a plan to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela had not had "results" several days ago. There is other strong evidence that Trujillo's specialist in clan- destine operations has been concocting another attempt against the Venezuelan Government or against Betancourt personally. The Venezuelan Government has been concerned since Novem- ber over evidence of renewed plotting by Venezuelan exiles in the Dominican Republic, which supported an abortive uprising of dissident Venezuelan military officers last April and the as- sassination effort against Betancourt in June. Any further at- tempt against the Betancourt government by Truiillo could pro- voke armed retaliation by Venezuela. 21 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET LI Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 .Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 yr ack.,su...1 two Khrushchev Speech on World Communist Policy (Prelim- inary Analysis) Most of Khrushchev's 6 January speech to a group of Communist party functionaries--the full text of which is now available in the current Kommunist--is devoted to a confident reaffirmation of Soviet positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy. Reporting on the November 1960 conference of 81 Communist parties, Khrushchev in effect notifies the rank and file of the world Communist movement-- more clearly than did the often equivocal declaration produced by the conference�that Soviet global strategy is sufficiently "militant" and that Moscow has not b een pushed by Peiping any further than it wishes to go. Khrushchev clearly intends this speech to stand as the definitive interpretation of Soviet policy following the conference, complementing the short and formal resolution on the conference passed by the central committee on 18 January. The Balance of Power. The Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy has centered on the assessment of the balance of power between the bloc and the West and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. In reaffirming his rejection of Chinese positions, Khrushchev begins from the proposition that two facts must be recognized: that the bloc is becoming the "decisive factor" in world affairs, but also that the West still has "great strength." Under the cir- cumstances the bloc cannot undertake the extremely militant revolutionary program which Peiping advocates, but it can con- tinue to make steady and substantial gains. Questions of War. Khrushchev reiterates his contention that the bloc's strength deters the West from general war and that it increasingly deters the West from local wars, such as Western military action against an anti-Western regime like Castro's. He rejects the argument, which,the Chinese reportedly have made that general war with the West will be necessary for a Communist global triumph. In this connection, he reaffirms his belief that long-term economic competition with the West will be "decisive," that the USSR will move ahead of the United States TOP SECRET 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 L71 %L I11110 in per capita industrial production in or about 1970, and that "to win time in this contest (for both economic and military power) is now the main thing." In supporting his claims for progress Khrushchev redrew selected comparisons between the Soviet and US economies to support his prediction that Soviet industrial production, although only 30 percent of the US in 1955 and 60 percent in 1960, will exceed the US in 1965. The Soviet leader reaffirms Moscow's view--which Pei- ping disputes�that the consequences of general war could be disastrous for the bloc as well as the West. He also reaffirms that the USSR is ordinarily opposed to local wars owing to the danger of their expansion, a risk which Peiping minimizes. As for one category of local wars however, i. e. "liberation" wars such as the current Algerian rebellion, Khrushchev states his view (in this case, in agreement with Peiping) that such wars are indeed inevitable so long as imperialism exists, and he affirms that the bloc will give aid to "liberation" forces. The speech reinforces earlier indications that Moscow will pursue a more aggressive program in all "colonial" area,s� among which Khrushchev specifies Algeria, the Congo, and Laos. However, the speech evades the question--on which the Chinese have charged Khrushchev with timidity�of whether bloc support to "liberation" forces will go so far as to risk military clashes with the West. Similarly, in distinguishing a fourth category of wars, "national uprisings" such as Castro's, and in stating his expectation of and favor for such uprisings, Khrushchev declares that such wars must not become wars between states but evades the question of what risks the bloc will take. Coexistence and Negotiations. Khrushchev reiterates his adherence to the concept of "peaceful coexistence"--that is com- petition and conflict with the West by all means short of delib- erate engagement in war between states. The Chinese have ar- gued this militant interpretation of "coexist- ence" impedes the "struggle" with the West. On East-West relations Khrushchev reaffirms his belief in the existence of elements in the West who are interested in peace, TOP SECRET 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 311A.AIL %of *440 and he asserts that it is necessary to "strive for negotiations and agreements" with the West and to develop personal con- tacts with Western statesmen �a line which Peiping has de- � rided. He makes it clear that the German and Berlinquestions remain the cardinal issues in negotiations with the West. His threat to conclude a separate treaty with East Germany car- ries forward his recent private effort to create a certain sense of urgency on this issue without precipitating a crisis. Other Tactics. Khrushchev defends at length his policy of wooing the nationalist leaders of underdeveloped countries, even at the cost of sacrificing the local Communist parties there. The Chinese have accused him of exaggerating the importance of the neutralists (e. g. Nehru, Nasir, Sukarno), and they have urged less Soviet aid and more of an effort to bring these leaders down. Khrushchev seems willing to move a little faster toward making pro-Soviet "national democracies" (e. g. Cuba) of the neutral na- tionsy but still not as fast as Peiping wishes. 45 for the tactics of Communist parties in the West, Khru- shchev reaffirms a gradualist program for these parties, envis- aging lengthy preparation through "democratic" movements for eventual revolution. �The Chinese have argued that "revolu- tionary situations" exist today in Western Europe and should be exploited. Discipline of the Movement. In the latter part of his speech, Khrushchev� discusses the question of the discipline of the world Communist movement, which all along has been the underlying issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev insists that the "unity" of the movement is of "foremost importance," and he reiterates that the Soviet party recognizes the "equality" of other parties and does not regard itself as the "center" of the move- ment. He follows this, however, by making clear that the Soviet party does indeed wish to be regarded as the principal party and as the spokesman for the bloc, and he in effect advises the other parties to get rid of those who sympathize more with Peiping than with Moscow. Several parties at the November conference had supported the Chinese on some issues, and many other parties were neutral or split. � Khrushchev in conclusion addresses himself directly to the Chinese, whom elsewhere in the speech he condemns (without TOP SECRET 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 %ar0- is naming them) for persistent "dogmatism and sectarianism," i. e. rigidity and obstructionism. He reminds the Chinese that Sino-Soviet "unity" is necessary to "disappoint" and con- found their common enemies. Here and elsewhere he indirect- ly admits that the Moscow conference did not resolve Sino- Soviet differences and may actually have made them worse. Moscow has continued to criticize the Chinese "leap forward" and commune programs, has almost certainly continued to re- sist Chinese requests for nuclear weapons, and has evidently maintained its economic pressure on Peiping. Although following the conference the two parties were reportedly to discuss the return of Soviet technicians all of whom were withdrawn last summer, with serious conseauences for Peiping's program of economic development as of early January none of the techni- cians had returned to China. Khrushchey's speech does not suggest, however, that there will be a break between the Soviet and Chinese parties. The prospect is for more frequent meetings of the two parties and other major Communist parties. In these meetings the Soviet party will probably continue to command a majority, but the Chinese will have enough support to keep Khrushchev on the de- fensive about his strategy. For example, Ithrushchey will be under pressure from Peiping and others to take a hard line in any summit talks, and, if he fails to achieve substantial gains, he will be open to charges of having slowed down world Communist momentum for nothing. 21 Jan 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 SIO104CONFIDENTIAL Y4010' USSR Central Committee Plenum on Agriculture Proceedings of the USSR central committee plenum on agriculture which met 10-18 January in Moscow confirm that Soviet agriculture has made little progress toward achieving the 70-percent increase in output called for by the Seven- Year Plan (1959-63). Agricultural production in 1960, as in 1959, remains below that of the 1958 base year of the plan. According to the resolution adopted by the plenum, in- vestment in agriculture is to be increased to "make up for lost time." Programs were outlined for increasing the farm machinery pool, expanding irrigation, and increasing the pro- duction of mineral fertilizers--all requiring substantial amounts of additional capital. The amount of increase was not disclosed, but an earlier report suggested that it may be as much as 15 percent greater than originally scheduled under the plan, a sig- nificant increase, though small in terms of the total investment program which overwhelmingly favors heavy industrial develop- ment. The role of the Ministry of Agriculture is to change. Until now the ministry was responsible for the entire agricultural op- eration--about 6,500 state farms,,which are state enterprises similar in operation to industrial 'enterprises, and over 50,000 collective farms, which are profit-sharing enterprises operated on state lands and under state supervision. Under the new set- up the ministry was charged with improving agricultural re- search and its application and the training of agricultural per- sonnel, The extent to which the ministry is to be divested of its administrative role is not yet known. A new agency is to be created to supply farms with indus- trial products and to maintain farm equipment. Khrushchev described the agency as an association with a hierarchical administration composed of representatives at each level from the republics down to the farms themselves intended to give the farms a 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 II 1 it Sis0 greater say in the kind of agricultural supplies to be pro- vided by industry. � The system through which the regime procures agricul- tural products for state use is to be reorganized. This is intended to give the state better control over sales at the lo- cal levels and to do away with such practices as the purchase by farms at state-sale outlets of products which were then sold back to the state as part of the farm's production quota. The proceedings of the plenum suggest that the regime intends to increase its pressure on farmers' markets, the last principal vestiges of free enterprise in the USSR. While the administrative measures should improve the efficiency of Soviet agriculture, the efficacy of Ithrushchev's program in fostering renewed agricultural growth will depend primarily on the size of the additional resources and the speed with which they are made available. Khrushchev repeatedly reaffirmed many of his pet agri- cultural measures. These included programs to increase drastically the area sown to corn, cultivation of the marginal lands of Central Asia and Western Siberia�the "new lands" program�and the emphasis on material incentives as moti- vation for the Soviet farmer in place of earlier emphasis on Communist enthusiasm and coercion. CONFIDENTIAL 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 C H Ssu mao. N A go-chin. o..ns.,,� ... ,.. .\ -I. (.1 '0'1',1.'11 \ .\ ) . .., /....1. ) t. � I ( P 0 ti� ..."....' ' ( ' i- r �-, .. ,) , ....-- -,..J . , iNAM-TA !Oa -an Sop Min \ LUANG - Savab slitiaradit Vluang Ph.1,an,,o4c ang Prabang ZJONOng Khai �Uclon roan, THAILAND Ni; 'fa v, wig m ����. \ Muartp. LAOS 21 JANUARY 1961 Government advance ""'""��� Government Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations 411111.4Kong Le/Pathet Lao thrust Main route number Road Trail O 25 50 75 100 Miles F, 25 50 15 160 Kilometers 10117 �Sur \ 1 \el-ao Kay NORTH Thai OW yen. VIE,TNAM Hoa Eltral nnu Ly; ae. �Bak Sao 4'1 1.1 LI L S N t';';+pil:11) A Chlng.50 Ca" Bang� 07.rar CHINA EN. Kano (. 0Pl.ng,mmg Lang Son0 t.. oPhu LaPg Thoong a. Duong' oHa,phong CAP MA aon \.. Dong H 4 sv,�,DEMARCATION LINE Soong I4' Ya � Mon CaY iLF OE NE BOO ILE CAC BA SA-KHET,-frk SOUTH Mueng Ct.', C.. �warn Chamrap C AM BO D Boundones and aro nee necasmItiv CO. U.S Gopammene -(VIETNAM A 0 ',lung Prang Approved for for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 SECRET '40�4 Situation in Laos or--� With the apparent capture on 20 January of Tha Thom-- the government's last strongpoint in Xieng Khouang Province-- the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have completed the disrup- tion of Laotian Army General Phoumies planned operation to retake the strategic Plaine des Jarres. Phoumi's plan had called for government troops to advance north from Tha Thom simultaneously with a drive east along Route 7 from the junc- tion at Phou Khoun, which antigovernment forces seized on 17 January. Phoumi hopes to retake the junction soon, with the aid of reinforcements now arriving in the area, but the antigovern- ment forces retain the initiative. The dispersal of the govern- ment's forces in the Tha Thom area puts Kong Le and Pathet Lao in position for a choice of actions--to move south against Pak Sane outflanking Vientiane or to regroup for a drive in strength westward along Route 7 for a possible attack on Luang Prabang or on the government columns advancing north from yang Vieng. The antigovernment forces are keeping the Laotian Army off, balance by a buildup of other potential striking forces north of Luang Prabang and in southern Laos. Following the fall two weeks ago of a government blocking position 55 miles north of Luang Prabang, reports have been received that the attacking force of about 700 Pathet Lao are maneuverine for a possible assault on the royal capital. Meanwhile, I a marked in- crease in antigovernment guerrilla activity in the south. Lao- tian Army headquarters announced on 19 January that Commu- nist bloc transports are air-dropping supplies to Pathet Lao forces in Saravane Province near the South Vietnamese border, but this has not been confirmed. The serious morale problem among government troops in the face of the deteriorating military situation is reflected in the refusal by the Tha Thom garrison to make a determined stand as ordered. Under the circumstances, the government commander in the Tha Thom area is turning to harassing tactics, using prin- cipally some 1,500 Meo tribesmen who are adept at guerrilla warfare but are poorly armed and equipped. Soviet IL-14 transports continued to airlift supplies into Laos on 20 January and additional flights are scheduled. Since SECRET 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 11owe the airlift of military supplies to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces began on 13 December, Soviet transports have flown about 216 confirmed sorties into Laos, Most of these sorties have been to the Yang Vieng area and more recently to the Xieng Khouang area. Most of the eighteen Soviet LI-2s which arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR during the past sev- eral days are now at Haiphong. Soviet aircraft in North Viet- nam now include 10 IL-14s (similar to the Conv 18 rfaimirto the C-47), and 5 MI-4 helicopters. A recent unconfirmed report indicates are now armed. there were about 120 North Viet- namese�mostly artillerymen�with the Kong Le forces defend- ing the area but that they had withdrawn prior to the attack on Vang Vieng by Phoumi's forces. Military equipment captured from the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces at yang Vieng included artillery and munitions with Soviet markings and medical sup- plies from Bulgaria. Although there is ample evidence that significant numbers of North Vietnamese personnel�mostly artillerymen, technicians, and probably combat advisers�and Communist bloc military equipment havebeen supplied to the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces, there is still no evidence that regular units of the North Vietnamese Army are operating in Laos. 21 Jan 61 -SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Brazzaville Luanda Atlantic Ocean Republic of the Congo �Gemena StanleyvIlle Coquilhatville Lake Albert (J Usumbura 21 JANUARY 1961 UNCLASSIFIED STATUT! MILES , Port Francqui Luluabour; Luput 40,0 31534 Bakwanga .Kamina Kongolo Albertville Manono � Eflsabethville Lake Tanganyika Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 %sow TOP SECRET *IS Situation in the Congo There are indications that the Moroccan Government, whose 3,000 troops constitute the largest national compo- nent of the 20,000-man UN force in the Congo, is moving to dissociate itself from the UN operation. Moroccans re- portedly have been ordered not to fight against the forces supporting Lumumbarand Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, chief of staff of the Bro-roccan Army, told the American charge in Rabat on 17 January that he had recently under- taken to begin the withdrawal of his forces by 5 February. Hammarskjold told American officials on 19 January that Morocco had officially asked for the repatriation of 2,000 of its troops and implied that he thought Ghana and the UAR might follow the Moroccan lead/ Dlammarskjold also stated that public pressure has made it impossible to replace Rajeshwar Dayal, his personal rep- resentative in the Congo. However, Dayal's contract expires in two months, and Hammarskjold implied there would be no attempt to renew it. He stated that it would be ex ficult to find a renlacement accentabie to all sides. The situation along the border between Kivu Province and the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi reportedly is ex- plosive. Congolese authorities have sealed off the border, stranding 800 Europeans. The Congolese apparently expect a Belgian military incursion to rescue the whites; on 18 Jan- uary the head of the provincial government, who is loyal to Gizenga, told a border post to "take position for the eventual attack by paracommandos." Atrocities by Congolese troops seem to be increasing, despite efforts by some arhorities to bring the army under control. the UN has plans well developed to transfer part of the UAR battalion from Equa- teur to Kasai Provinc! TOP SECRET 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 a member of the high command in Leopoldville told the battalion commander that the entire unit might eventually be transferred. The commander objected to the proposal that part of the battalion be sent to Kasai in the near future, stating that this would cre- ate "administrative nroblems:' protesting the transfer of Lumumba to Elisabethville and reiterating the need for speedy bloc and UAR aid to his re- gime. Gizenga charged that a,force of 500 Belgians had already invaded Kivu and that Tshombe, Mobutu, and Kalonji were pro- posing a "military conference"--presumably a reference to the February round-table conference in Elisabethville--whose pur- pose would be to plan the overthrow of the Gizenga government. TOP SECRET 21 Ja,n 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 SECRET AR Encouraging Development of Revolutionary Capabilities In Jordan Abdullah Rimawi, former Jordanian minister of state for foreign affairs, and All Abu Nuwar, former chief of the Jor- danian general staff, returned to Damascus from Cairo on 5 January after spending "about six weeks arranging further plans" for activities against Jordan, according to a fairly re- liable source. Throughout their discussions with UAR officials, including Nasir, there was general agreement that dissatisfac- tion within Jordan should be exploited with the aim of eventually overthrowing the Jordanian monarchy and "freeing" the coun- try from Western control. Rimawi and Nuwar, who fled to Syria after the abortive pro-Nasir coup in Jordan in 1957, reportedly are to continue efforts to develop separate capabilities for rev- olutionary action in Jordan�Rimawi among civilian elements and Nuwar among Jordanian Army personnel. Close contacts allegedly are being maintained between Rimawi, a former leader of the Baath (Socialist) party in Jordan, and Jor- danian Baathist groups loyal to him. Reorganization of Rimawi's group in Jordan�which he claims is progressing satisfactorily-- is being countered by activities in Jordan of the Baath party's pan-Arab leadership under Michel Aflaq in Beirut, which expelled Rimawi and generally opposes his aims and activities. Rimawi is said to believe, however, that the influence in Jordan of "the Aflaq group" is declining, no mention of the status of Nu- war's efforts among .orcianian military personnel. Rimawi reportedly complained that Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, the UAR Minister of Interior for the Syrian Region, has made things as difficult as possible for him and Nuwar. Rimawi said Sarraj had separate plans regarding Jordan and could not be trusted. Jordanian agents, meanwhile, have resumed the kind of ter- rorist activities in Syria--bombings and other. sabotage--which 21 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 SECRET *04 marked the period following the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli last August. Lebanese authorities deported seven Jordanians on 17 January and later arrested 24 others, along with 14 Syrians, on suspicion of engaging in such activities from Lebanese territory. 21 Jan 61 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Nue CONFIDENTIAL '440e THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIALT Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 7.14W/Z Apot, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177 Fm." ;0$1 -TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000177