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January 25, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 l aC�KL I New 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 25 January 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL - INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 oak Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 TOP SECRET 4-131P-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180'\, SECRET 25 January 1961 CONTENTS 1. Laos: Prospects are dim that bloc will accept Britain's plan for reactivating International Con- trol Commission. (Page t) 2. Situation in the Congo. (Page t) 3. Nasir, deeply involved in aiding pro- Lumumba elements in Congo, may be drifting toward great- er dependence on Communist bloc. (Page tt) 4. West Germany urges continued NATO restrictions on East German travel until Ulbricht regime ends Berlin pass requirements for West Germans. (Page ti) 5. Salvadoran ruling junta has complied only in part with army's demands to curtail Communist activ- ities. (Page itt) 6. Agitation by leftist extremists impedes Western economic aid plan in Bolivia. (Page ft) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180, �111 TOP SECRE7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: There seems little prospect that the bloc will accept a British proposal to approach the King of Laos directly with the aim of reactivating the International Con trol Commission. LL 441J__e_2 v and Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong states that the Brit-a-"' North Vietnam's Premier /?p.. ish proposal was unacceptable because the Laotian King "is not considered to be independent." the Communists would accept an ICC only if it "recog-, nizes the Souvanna Phouma government." In addition, the ( Boun Oum government has expressed strong reservations about. the ICC's return. LGovernment forces, meanwhile, are said to be within three miles of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao strong point at Muong Kassy on the Vientiane - Luang Prabang road, and have called for strikes by T-6 aircraft to reduce expected enemy, resistance. Government and enemy forces facing each other on Route 13 north of the Phou Khoun road junc- tion have sent out reconnaissance patrols, but no engage- ment has yet taken place. Fighting continues in southern Xieng Khouang Province, where government forces still re- tain the Tha Thom airstripd (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Congo: The UN is moving speedily to implement the 0 r UAR's request that its troops be withdrawn from the Congo. ff4eanwhile, the Ghanaian foreign minister, who is in Cairo attending a meeting of representatives from states which sup- a j port Lumumba, reportedly has put further pressure on Sudan to permit passage of clandestine shipments to Gizenga, so far apparently without result. In another development, France apparently is joining Belgium in allowing army officers tst" -TOP-SEGRET bid Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018& TOP SECRET aerve as military advisers to Tshombe's fnrces in Kntancra Prnvinera:i *Morocco's announcement yesterday of a decision to with- draw its troops from the Congo probably will put Ghanaian Presi- dent Nkrumah under increased pressure to withdraw Ghana's 2,400-man UN contingent, despite his personal belief that the African neutralists could wield more influence if their forces remained in the Congo. (Backup, Page 4) UAR-Africa: On 23 January President Nasir--address- ing the UAR National Assembly�again attacked Western "imperialist" policies in Algeria and the Congo, claiming they are designed to divide and suppress the people of Africa. Nasir also called for the end of "imperialist maneuvers" in the United Nations, which he described as the proper instru- ment for accomplishing African freedom and prosperity. He repeated previous warnings on the alleged role of Israel as one of imperialism's tools in Africa, diasir's continued interference in African affairs is bringing him into sharper conflict with the West and contributing to a drift away from his avowed policy of "positive neutrality" and toward a greater dependence on the C and material support. Cairo is giving c a assis ance o many ra ical African nationalists, and Nasir has personally tried to pressure African chiefs of state into following his Doliciei-1 west uermany: A West German Foreign Ministry official told American officials in Bonn that the East Germans are con- tinuing to require passes for West Germans entering East Ber- lin, but that Bonn expects a de facto relaxation of the pass requirement probably by the end of January or early February. Such a relaxation was one of the major points of the agreement 25 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 ;Noui0 on 29 December which allowed West - East German inter- zonal trade to continue. The East German negotiator has claimed the delay is a "face-saving" device of the Ulbricht � regime and implied it would be only temporary. Neverthe- less, Bonn is still urging that NATO restrictions on travel of East Germans to NATO countries be continued pending clear evidence of East German compliance with the terms of the agreement. The Allied restrictions and Bonn's can- cellation of the trade agreement last fall were precipitated by the East German imposition last September of new con- trols on the travel of West _ermang fn orirl withir, El Salvador: The Salvadoran armed forces, gravely concerned over the steady Communist gains since the 26 October coup replaced the weak administration of President Lemus with a six-man military-civilian junta, may oust the junta if convinced that it does not intend to implement the commitments extracted on 16 January. The military leaders are reportedly receiving only partial compliance with their 16 January demands that the governing junta curtail Commu- nist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The military leaders appear to have resolved at least partially the differences among themselves. Many officers, ( however, still fear taking any, drastic action that might lead to bloodshed and the assumption of unpopular political re- sponsibilities by the army. Meanwhile, the Communists are steadily strengthening their mass support for any showdown with the military. Since October, Communists and pro-Communists have been appoint- ed to important posts throughout the bureaucracy and have been permitted free rein outside the government. Their drive to organize the peasants is progressing rapidly throughout the country and they are increasing their infllitannp in lahrvr student groups. 25 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iii -T-OP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 00 Bolivia: Agitation among tin miners led by Communists and extreme leftists threatens to disrupt an arrangement whereby the US and West Germany are cooperating with Bo- livia to reorganize and re-equip the tin mines on which Bo- livia's economy depends. The West German Government may withdraw its technicians, who are essential to the project, should the present unrest lead to the violence which is char- acteristic of Bolivia's mining areas. An increase in extrem- ist agitation has been brought about in recent months by So- viet overtures concerning economic aid, including a $150,- 000,000 credit offer. (Backup, Page 6) 25 Jan41 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 TOP SECRET Situation in Laos Prospects seem poor for early reactivation of the In- ternational Control Commission in Laos. Both Premier Boun Oum and Quinim Pholsena, spokesman for the Com- munist-recognized "government" of former Premier Sou- vanna Phouma, have criticized Britain's compromise pro- posal of 21 January to Moscow that the ICC be activated through the agency of King Savang as "head of state," there- by avoiding the question of recognition of the competing re- gimes. Boun Oum has expressed a preference for the es- tablishment of a commission of neutral nations. Quinim claimed, in a statement rebroadcast on 24 January by Hanoi, that the Laotian King is a prisoner of the "pro-US reaction- aries," and that all administrative details must be handled by the "legal government" headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma. North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong made the same points in terming the British proposal unacceptable," The USSR has made no formal reply as yet to the UK proposal, but is unlikely to accept any imme- diate Western proposals which would stabilize the develop- ing military situation while Communist forces in Laos con- tinue to make substantial gains. The Communist bloc, while calling for the return of the ICC, has recently placed empha- sis on convening an international meeting along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Conference to deal with the Laotian crisis, ouring the past week, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have clearly expressed to various Western diplomats Moscow's preference for such a conference_. An ICC, composed of an Indian chairman and represent- atives from Canada and Poland, was established in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam under terms of the 1954 Geneva Conference--chaired by Britain and the USSR--which ended 25 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 MAP ON REVERSE OF PAGE Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 s..71;al...11.1.4 WWI � ',. l'AT A ?Ban Sop Nal; LUANG %..? ABANG Muang PLan. oMoang Phrae .iittarecht 0 Ddn Set o, 'awing Phrlaanulok infTErananaL. ... ,,,....,,-- FOIVIS , Plaine 'IT'. \.�'\ jarlr:' K A N G .\ an I BLitt% c �...1 \ Chan nAfl mng.ns? � 0 Goang Cao Bang� NORTH TN A A4 14IE N TLAL'4E ;:���:j' " i�e; av (IdNong Kha .11don Tharo THAILAND � -Pak Sane co--- STak Sao �Pa".-, KHA\IMOJANE Neeo=eo)4;-----' Ping 000 o CHINA Ingarang Lang Son� oPhu Lang Thatong oHeiphOng ILK CAC BA Muang Salton Nakhono LAOS IANIIAQV 10, lre* Government forces Government Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations VI* Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces Main route number Road Trail This map shows only the principal military positions and actions as reported in the accompanying article. 25 190 1.1.1es 25 50 75 100 K 1012 5 _eat...6716.1 5-58 0Moangtarirc ban o �Wan oSunn Charmalact ./, jCH LaM ASSMC) IC OE PE BAT "\'�, .\.\?..,..,-.17FAIARCATION LINE Ho Quang Tr Hue o Pala lOnh CAP 1.1111 RON N KHET ���)---1 SOUTH VIE T NAM ( A VA NE a CAMBODIA or* noe noce.s.ar boson, �FJ el.. U5 G.,,,ernmene SECRET . � Stung Treng Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 'gal TOP SECRET the eight-year Indochina war. These three separate but in- terrelated commissions, responsible to the co-chairmen, were charged with maintaining the armistice and supervis- ing implementation of political terms that varied according to country. The agreement for Laos provided for the inte- gration of the Pathet Lao fighting forces into the national community and the subsequent holding of country-wide elec- tions. The government claims its obligations were fulfilled by the short-lived 1957 "Vientiane agreements" under which the Pathet Lao agreed to relinquish military control of Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces in return for a legal status as the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) party and two portfolios in the cabinet, and by the supplementary National Assembly elec- tions held in May 1958 which resulted in a sweeping leftist victory. In July 1958, under increasing pressure by the Lao- tian Government to get out, the ICC adjourned sine die on a Canadian proposal which was carried over Communist objec- tions. Then, as now, Vientiane resented the ICC's presence because it tended to equate the Pathet Lao with the royal gov- ernment and hampered military efforts against the insurgents. C-The Indian chairman, on technical and legalistic grounds, fre- quently voted with the Polish representative against the Cana- dian:3 con the military side, government troops advancing north from Yang Vieng on the Luang Prabang road are about three miles from Muong Kassy, where a combined force of Kong Le - Pathet Lao troops is expected to make a determined stand. The commander of the government forces has called tor strikes against Muong Kassy by T-6 aircraft to soften the position, but operational plans also call for an at- tempted flanlincr trinvPmpnt in void enemy, holding positions on the road. A temporary shortage of food and 105-mm, artillery ammunition has delayed the govern- ment's advance, giving the enemy more time to organize de- fenses. About 15 miles north of the Phou Khoun junction a government force consisting. of two infantry battalions faces a Kong Le - Pathet Lao force presently estimated at about the] 25 Jan 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 '1%*0 TOP SECRET Gtrength of one battalion supported by artillery. No contact between these forces has been reported as yet, although both sides have sent out reconnaissance patrols. Meanwhile, fight- ing continues in southern Xieng Khouang Province, where gov- ernment forces are attem tin to re ain Thom airstrip. Tha Thom was under heavy attack and might have to be relinquished. Government control of Tha Thom is essential to block an enemy advance south to Pak Sane, Tha Thom is also a point of departure for any future drive to retake the Plaine des Jarres, which Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces have held since 1 Januari:3 Soviet and North Vietnamese aircraft continued airlift op- erations into Laos through 24 January and are scheduled for flights on 25 January. TOP SECRET 25 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 `41104 TOP SECRET Situation in the Congo The UN is moving with alacrity to implement the UAR's request of 23 January that its battalion be withdrawn from the Congo. A UN official stated on 23 January that the evacuation was scheduled for 1 February and that all the battalion's equip- ment would be airlifted at the same time in order to give Cairo no opportunity to renege. India, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Iran have been asked to furnish replacement troops. [The announcement yesterday by Morocco that it also is withdrawing its troops from the Congo is a further sign of Rabat's growing ties with the militantly neutralist African bloc which includes the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. The an- nouncement said the UN was being asked for return of the troops to Morocco "before the end of this month," but the Moroccan Information Minister indicated a realization that logistical problems could keep this deadline from being met. Guinea's 700-man force in the Congo is already scheduled for withdrawal early next month. Mali now has no forces in the Congo. The Moroccan decision pre- sumbably will mean increased pressure on Ghanaian President Nkrumah to withdraw Ghana's 2,400-man UN contingent, despite his personal belief that the neutralists could wield more lab ence if their forces remained in the Cong6:3 [Meanwhile, Lumumba's international supporters apparent- ly are stepping up their pressure on Sudan to permit passage of clandestine shipments to Gizenga's Stanleyville government. Ghanaian Foreign Minister Ako Adjei, who recently visited Khartoum on the way to Cairo, reportedly joined the ambassa- dors of the USSR, Communist China, and the UAR in a plea to Sudanese officials to permit overflights by UAR aircraft. These efforts have so far been unsuccessful. However, pressure is likely to increase as a result of the consultations among Lu- muniba supporters at the recent meeting of the Afro-Asian Sol- idarity Organization's executive committee-.) &ranee apparently is joining Belgium in allowing army of- ficers to serve as Militnry ndvisPrc tn thp fnrePR nf Katancra President Tshombe. 25 Jan 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Wise ETshombe asked Colonel Roger Trinquier to become an adviser, and the French Army has granted him a long leave of absence for this purpose. Trinquier reportedly is attempting to recruit other officers. The French Government apparently was pleased at the opportunity to send Trinauier, a rightist plotter, out of the country Gizenga apparently remains fearful of an attack by Mobutu, although such an attack is unlike- ly and Gizenga's forces and his allies have extended their control throughout Orientale and Kivu provinces and into northern ICatanga Province without meeting serious resistance. Both he and his representative in Cairo appear to have little understanding of the difficulties confronting any attempt to supply large-scale aid to Stanleyville, and their apprehensions are likely to grow as dela s in the delivery of assistance continue. Liizenga's government has received $400,000 from the USSR, $250,000 of which has actually been delivered to Stanley- vine. In addition, a small quantity of Soviet arms reportedly has been smuggled to the Congo in UAR aircraft, and Commu- nist China and the UAR are providing substantial financial sup- port for Gizenaa's mission in Cairo TOP SECRET 25 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 V44.1 *fteif Agitation by Leftist Extremists Impedes Western Economic Aid Plan in Bolivia Agitation ledr by leftist extremists is impeding a triangu- lar US - West German - Bolivian plan to reorganize and re- equip the tin mines, which are the basis of Bolivia's economy. The government has just settled a strike,which began on 17 January and prevented an initial survey of the mines, but con- tinued agitation may prompt West Germany to withdraw its technicians, who are vital to the project. The triangular plan is West Germany's first substantial venture in economic assistance to a Latin American country. The Bonn government is backing a private firm's offer to pro- vide financial, technical, and managerial skill for the mines, where production has declined since 1945. The United States has supplemented the German offer with a $10,000,000 credit for mine development. The five-month-old administration of President Paz Es- tenssoro is under strong domestic pressure to make demon- strable progress in economic development, especially since Paz is the leader of the party which won the sweeping leftist revolution of 1952 but has since been unable to improve living standards substantially. Extremist agitation has been increased in recent months by Soviet overtures concerning economic aid, particularly So- viet offers to construct a tin smelter in Bolivia and to extend a $150,000,000 credit. Previously the largest credit offers by the USSR in Latin America have been $100,000,000 each to Argentina and Cuba. A press report on 21 January stated that President Paz has announced Soviet offers of aid for hydroelectric power and lead mining, probably as projects under the proposed $150,000,000 credit. Earlier this month a Bolivian government spokesman an- nounced that Czechoslovakia had decided to offer to install an antimony smelter in Bolivia. �eONRDEN�TIAL 25 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 CONFIDENTIAL 4toi THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000180 1-(z