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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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January 28, 1961
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 I %or acmtc Noy 28 January 1961 Copy No. C &y(f,i1 CF.\ TRAL t YT ELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 �Ter�SteRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 X\\\\X WX\� X TOP SECRET '*01�9 28 January 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Soviet anti-ballistic-missile test activity. (Page t) 2. Laos: King Savang is willing to receive chair- man of International Control Commission. (Page t) 3. Congo: Pro- Lumumba forces from Kivu Prov- ince reportedly have invaded northern Kasai. (Page it) 4. USSR reportedly to ship to Indonesia an additional $244,000,000 in military equipment during next three years. (Page ti) 5. Albania, supporting Chinese Communist ideolog- ical positions, criticizes bloc parties. (Page it) 6. Iran: Some protests and demonstrations against the government's rigging of current parliamen- tary elections. (Page tit) 7. King Saud is attempting to bolster his internal sition and dissipate Nasir's suspicion. (Page iit) 8. Tunisia's President Bourguiba appears ready to end his isolation from the Arab League. (Page ft,) 9. Negotiations on Greek link to Common Market near decisive stage. (Page tv) 10. Portuguese Government still concerned over the seizure of the Santa Maria. (Page v) 11. Venezuela, faced with pressing economic problems, Is seeking financial aid from US. (Page v) -TOP-SECRET \\\ \\\\\\ \\\ \\X \X \ \\X Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 ILl I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 %601-1--01 sru-1cr-i- *Ivro CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 28 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR:Zviet missile activity in mid-January at the Sary Shagan Test Complex (SSTC)--including one or pos- sibly two firings into the complex is a continuation of anti-ballistic-missile research and development. The type and quantity of equipment present in this complex provide part of the basis for estimates that the USSR has an extensive and high-priority program in the field of warning and defense against ballistic missile!! )7, (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Laos: (Government forces north of the Phou Khoun road junction of Routes 7 and 13 have apparently made 0 /1'- contact with elements of the Communist forces control- ling the junction; however, a concerted effort to retake this key position will probably await the arrival from the south of another government force now at Muong Kassy. I/ s In southern Xieng Khouang Province the government gar rison at Tha Thom is said to be bracing for another enemy - attack which is expected to be stronger� than two previous attempts to take the village Two So- viet AN-12 heavy transpoil ts which left Moscow on 24 January reached Peiping yesterday, and today Ow on to Canton They may continue to North Vietnam from Canton. King Savang's willingness, announced by General Phou- mi, to receive the Indian chairman of the International Con- trol Commission for Laos removes one obstacle to its re- activation; nevertheless the USSR continues to show little inclination to accept the British compromise proposal on the ICC. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sobolev recently reiterated to the British ambassador Moscow's support for the Cambodin proposal for a 14-nation conference. (Backup, Page 3) (Map) --TOP---SEGRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 \\ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183, . klisi TOP SECRET %10, ,' \ ,-\\ ,� from Kivu Province has been in progress for several days. , The invaders, who appear to be heading for areas inhabited d'he" vasion of nor ern Kasai Province by pro-Lumumba forces ' Congo: Two independent reports indicate that an in- 0 Z/2-61:: rn by Lumuba's supporters, are meeting little regi stnnee ip,j , from the local police o7 the civilian nopulationT1 ) i : N, Belgian military officials, with the aid ot tne .uetense 1V1111� �, ks\ istry, are purchasing large quantities of munitions and mil- l\ itary equipment, including bullet-proof vests, for shipment to Tshornbe's regime in Elisabethville. In Leopoldville, a rapid rise in retail prices will probably lead to further unre y and among the large num- \ ber of unemployed. (Backup, Page 5) (Map) N \ USSRIn.donesia: signed in Moscow on January, reportedly calls for the de- - rc.I'he new Soviet-Indonesian arms deal, _� 6 e livery to the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air Force of more than $244,000,000 in Soviet arms and equipment during the next three years (1961-63). Although official Indonesian statements claim that the January agreement provides for ' \ the supply of a wide variety of Soviet equipment, the inclu- sion of certain items, particularly high-performance jet air- craft, suggests the listings probably reflect requests as well ance, including the reported new arms deal and a naval agree- mentassist- ance,. of $277,000,000 signed late last year, amounts to almost $750,000,000 since 1958, and the addition of economic aid \ would raise the total to almost $1.250 billion, making Indo- nesia second only to the UAR among non-bloc nations in the amount of bloc aid received) (Backup, Page 7) (Charts) ...-i Albania: Albania's vigorous renewal during the past week of its thinly veiled public attack on Moscow's foreign policies and ideological views is the best indication to date that Moscow \\�x '& 'i , \'\�, 28 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii --TOP-5E-GRE-71 K Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 � /IS TOP SECPE7 has not succeeded in bringing this Eastern European satellite back into line. A lead editorial in the Albanian party daily, Zen i i Popullit, on 20 January reaffirmed Tirana's contentions on the question of revisionism, pub- licly condemned bloc leniency toward Yugoslavia, and im- plicitly criticized Khrushchev and Soviet foreign policy. Thus, a little more than a fortnight before its party con- gress, the Albanian party has restated the deviationist position which its representatives, supporting the Chi- nese Communist positions, upheld at the Moscow confer- ence of World Communist leaders. (Backup, Page 8) Iran: The Iranian Government, as a matter of policy, is giWriF little publicity to the current parliamentary tions through either the local press or radio. there have been some protests and demonstrations against the government's rigging of the elections. Meanwhile, radio propaganda from Moscow and from the Soviet-sponsored clandestine National Voice of Iran, beamed from East Germany, has been stepped up sharply after a five-month lull. The basic theme has been electoral cornIntion and the Iranian ambassador in MOSCOW was instructed to protest the broadcasts. (Backup, Page 10) NI Li P e E T \\\ .\& Saudi Arabia: King Saud seems to be trying to bolster his position and dissipate Nasir's suspicion of him. Saud, who has long feared Nasir's capabilities for subversion in Saudi Arabia and whose withdrawal from active leadership of his government in 1958 was a result of a controversy with Nasir, probably feels uneasy and hopes to avoid Nasir's opposition at this time to his new exoerimert with a relative- ly liberal cabinet. CI"he "liberals," whom the King adopted in order to dis- place his brother, Crown Prince Faysal, as prime minister ) 28 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 g\\ IWO TOP SECRET last December, favor political reform and economic de- velopment. Several of the King's advisers have warned that he must move quickly to improve the lot of the gen- eral populace in order to prevent the growth of opposi- tion. Some elements in the bureaucracy and merchant class, who are dissatisfied with recent developments, are reported to have adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward Saud's new government; some dissident officers in the Saudi Army and Air Force, however, are probably continuing their plotting against the reg1me.1 Backup, Page 12) Tunisia - Arab League: Responding to initiatives of Iraq, President Bourguiba appears willing to explore means of ending Tunisia's self-imposed isolation from the Arab League. Bourguiba now apparently feels that this policy, adopted when .UAR President Nasir support- ed Bourguiba's radical opponents, is no longer profitable in view of Nasir's growing influence in Africa--particu- larly in Morocco, Tunisia's rival for North African lead- ership. Bour- guiba has asked that the Arab League foreign ministers' conference presently scheduled for 30 January in Baghdad be postponed in order to allow time for negotiations for Tunisian participation. , _ ) (Backup, Page 14) 0 k *Greece: Greek association with the six-nation Euro- pean Common Market (EEC)--under negotiation for nearly sa-) two years with American support--may hinge on the out- come of the 30 January meeting of the EEC's Council of IL Ministers. Of the few remaining obstacles to be clearedinLam, `6-�-� c- up, the most important is Greece's refusal to promise eventual settlement of its external debts an issue in which ALI; outside interests, particularly British bondholders, are al- ,P 4_ 4 CLI-4-41-1--e legedly intervening. Collapse of the negotiations would be 28 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv -T-OP-SEC-RE-T Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Nio TOP SECRET .q,:cheavy blow to the Karamanlis government, and Greek officials have previously warned that, in the absence of EEC association Greece will ely even more on bloc trade:: (Backup, Page 16) Portugal: Portuguese Government circles continue u/< uneasy over the seizure of the Santa Maria. The Foreign Ministry fears Henrique Galvao may try to set up a "Cas- tro-type government" in Portuguese Guinea or Angola, Z- where the possibility of defection among white Portuguese Is beginning to worry Lisbon. 'agr'he regime is also said to fear Galvao's move will encoura e cleavages among its sup- porting factions at home, which are reported already plan- ning to present candidates in next October's general elec- tions to end the monopoly of the 120 seats in th Assembly enjoyed by Salazar's National Unio?..D (Backup, Page 18) Venezuela: The Venezuelan Government apparently failed to reach an agreement with the major oil exporting nations of the Middle East on prorating of export markets and oil price stabilization during a 16-21 January meet- ing in Caracas. Without guaranteed markets for its pe- troleum exports and facing strong competition from Mid- dle East oil, the government may review its restrictive policies toward the key foreign-owned oil industry to en- courage reinvestment and bolster oil revenues. However, the government is proceeding with the costly long-range project of developing a "competitive" national petroleum corporation to engage in all phases of industrial opera- tions. President Betancourt, who is committed to moderate leftist reform, is faced with pressing economic prob- lems which both rightist plotters and the pro-Castro op- position have already exploited. illietancourt is seeking sizable loans from the US--apparently $300 million or more which the minister of the treasury has frankly stated shoulf. 28 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF 0 k. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved raleaged,00/11 CO2000183 100 e on a "political" basis�to reverse the three-year conomic declin2Z Although serious financial diffi- ulties were inherited from the excesses of the for- mer dictatorship and interim junta regime, they are also partly attributable to Betancourt% reluctance to risk politically unpopular corrective measures, his uncertain economic policies, particularly toward the oil industry, and the frequent political unrest in 1960. 28 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 riri"-%ri Cv ,f, r T ,r 41" �Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 amp Moscow. Si, ling rad. - 1n yor. Rangehead wudimurn�k, ' MISSILE TEST RANGE FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Nscfronyy Instrumentation site possibly --loo associated with ABM progrart.5 ICBM Impact Area-�, Kapustin Yar missile test range Down range launch points associated with Sary Shagan test complex operations . Ty ura Tam ICBM /Space launching facilities Impact Area 1-1 Sary Shagan test complex ry Shagan Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Noe Soviet Anti-Ballistic-Missile Activity Soviet missile activity in mid-January at the Sary Shagan Test Complex (SSTC)--including one or possibly two firings into the complex--is a continuation of anti-ballistic-missile research and development involving SP-5, a launch point about 500 nautical miles (n. m.) away. There have been four periods of activity of this type: earlier periods occurred in late 1958, late 1959, and the summer of 1960; the latest be- gan on 26 October 1960. During these periods, firings from SP-5 are controlled by an organization at Sary Shagan which, among other possible in- terests, is believed to be collecting re-entry data on missiles fired into the area and developing components of defensive systems. TOP SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183� '400 TOP SECRET '4901 /- The Sary Shagan complex is known to contain a number of electronic installations, including six interferometer-type instrumentation sites, several large radars, and two launch complexes, one of which contains two surface-to-air (SAM) sites:I The type and quantity of equipment present in this confplbx provide part of the basis for estimates that the USSR has an extensive and high-priority program in the field of warnine and defense agningt miccilac The continuation of research on the problems of defense against short- and medium-range missiles�together with the limited number of ICBM firings to Kamchatka (a total of 21, including 9 since the summer of 1959) which would pro- vide re-entry data--suggests that the Soviet anti-missile test program uses the 1,100-n. m. missile as the primary target for research and development purposes. The shorter range missile fired from SP-5 may represent a target for research and development of a system fnr tiPfensPcfarnimd_frvb.,.c. units. TOP---SEC-REZ_ 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 1' � ../ /1)( t ' 1... � i . FIHONG -4'r-���� ��, r �g- �,.) / , ,--1 tt:;,,Ir. ../ 7 - ss' ����� ....., - - --4 r?� �7 - \ -IA. \ E 1 ..., s-- -- . v�-� . 1 NAMT,IIA ?Ran Sop Aien , r r ' -�,._ N...- / ) I � ii .). L) / (.1 o00n S Nu* LUANG Say PRABANG LAOS 21 JANUARY 1144 Plano Jar H ANG To Yang Government forces Government Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces Main route number Road Trail 0 25 ' 50 75 100 MIMM 0 25 50 75 100 KHomelers Bssa 26716 1 5-58 ptguartYlosatAs,rt \ C AMBOD i A SeNNIN4N. anr. not wassail), thee. narrar..+-4 by the US. Govern en..t Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Alan Cat. Kt MAO I1E CAC BA MK ,DEMARCATION LINE ET k SO)UTI-I AVANE �-ire , ls Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183. SECRET Situation in Laos A two-battalion government force north of the junction of Routes 7 and 13 has apparently begun probing the Communist defengeg around this key position. , government troops are in contact with the enemy near the road junction, but the initial skirmishing is said to have resulted in a standoff, with the Communists making liberal use of 105-mm. artillery fire. Communist artillery fire was advanced as the main reason that the government was forced to abandon the junction on 18 January. Meanwhile, there is a report that the Kong Le - Pathet Lao joint command is sending reinforcements to the road junction from the Communist base area at the Plaine des Jarres-.) The government column which took Muong Kassy, 25 miles south of the junction, on 25 January has apparently de- piripa tn cltnv there for the time being. (lis column had established defensive positions. A government effort to retake the road junction will probably have to pumit the arrival o the column presently at Muong ICassy. The Communists in the past few days are reported to have launched two attacks on the government position at Tha Thom, in southern Xieng Khouang Province. The Tha Thom garrison expects a third Communist attack at any mo- ment, and Laotian sources anticipate it will bp pf greater severity than the first two. Earlier in the week, General Phoumi had evinced considerable pessimism about his ability to hold this last remaining government position of any im- portance in Xieng Khouang Province. Phoumi announced on 26 January that King Savang was prepared to receive the Indian chairman of the International SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 NOI Control Commission for Laos, in line with the British pro- posal of 21 January that the ICC take preliminary soundings, through its chairman, on whether it could perform a useful role in Laos. The USSR, however, continues to show little disposition toward supporting the return of the ICC, at least until some sort of international conference is held on Laos. eplying to the British ambassador's comment that Prince Sihanouk had withdrawn his proposal for a 14-nation conference on Laos, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Sobolev remarked that this was not his government's understanding and that the USSR still favored the Cambodian nrnnrmal without US and Thai participation his proposal might have to be withdrawn. Soviet leaders probably feel that Sihanouk's plan has provided valuable non-Communist sup- port for the bloc's diplomatic position and has given the Com- munists an opportunity to delay any international action or negotiations on Laos by prolonging East-West exchanges over the timing. comosition, and agenda of a conference} The two Soviet AN-12 heavy transports which left Mos- cow on 24 January reached Peiping on 27 January, and today flew on to Canton. They may continue to North Vietnam. Soviet AN-12s--which are heavy four-engine turboprop trans- ports capable of carrying between 15 and 20 tons of supplies-- have been involved in Laos-associated airlift operations on two previous occasions. The first group consisting of three AN-12s arrived in Canton from the USSR on 18 December. Their cargo was off-loaded and ferried to Hanoi aboard the Soviet IL-14s which had been engaged in airlift operations since early December. A second group of seven AN-12s, two of which were part of the 18 December group--arrived in Canton on 24 December. Three days later six flew on to North Vietnam--five to Haiphong and one to Hanoi. One remained at Canton, apparently because of mechanical difficulty. By 29 December, all six of the AN-12s which arrived in North Viet- nam were returning to the USSEtz the one delrayed at Canton returned on 13 January. -SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11_CO2000183 Brazzaville Luanda Atlantic Ocean -ub ic of the Congo �Gernena Congo Coquilhatville pso/ 28JAN UARY 1961 UNCLASSIFIED STATUTE MI/ES Port Francqui Luluabour; 400 31534 Luput Bakwanga .Kamina Kongolo Albertville Manono � Elisabethville rt. t Albert Lake Toriganyilm Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 NatiSECRET*Ampl Situation in the Congo An invasion of remote northern Kasai Province by pro-Lumumba forces from Kivu Province apparently has been in progress for several days. According to two independent reports, the invaders, vilio crossed the border from Kindu, have taken two large towns. They reportedly are now split into two groups, one heading toward the provincial capital at Luluabourg and the other trying to reach pro.T mmurnba territory in eastern Leo- nnlrivill P Provincel most of the area's civil- ian population supports Lumumba. The police are divided in their loyalties, although the local military commander and the provincial government are pro-Mobutu. The invad- ing force reportedly is meeting little opposition from either police or civilians. This is the first offensive operation by Lumumba sup- porters since the invasioiLof_IKataiie In the intervening period, the invaders of Katanga were consolidating their gains. The new. incursion probably is subject to only tenuous con- trol by Gizenga in Stanleyville; however, the continued mil- itary success of forces associated with him is likely to in- crease Gizenga's following among the Congolese population, to the detriment of the position of Mobutu and Kasavubu. Belgian military officials apparently are purchasing munitions in Brussere ime in Elisabethville, immediate shipment of large quantities of rifle and machine-gun ammunition was being arranged. the Belgians were shopping for rifles, grenades, SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 - SEC�RETT--- "NS smoke bombs, and bullet-proof vests, and that Belgian Defense Ministry officials were helping to supply gre- nades, cartridges, and fuzes. Aid on this extensive scale, coupled With the current effort to provide Belgian military advisers and to recruit white soldiers in Bel- gium and elsewhere in Europe, would add greatly to the military capability of Tshombd's forces. In Leopoldville, a recent study has shown a marked upswing in retail prices at the beginning of 1961, and in- formed observers expect a sharp inflationary spiral. Prices have risen only gradually heretofore, and eco- nomic activity in the Leopoldville area has continued, al- though at a greatly reduced rate. Half the city's labor force of 120,000 is unemployed, but the needs engendered by the slowdown in the money economy have largely been met from the subsistence sector, which has been relative- ly unaffected by the political turmoil. However, Mobutu's blockade of the upper Congo River, while it has effectively cut off supplies of gasoline to Gizenga, has also dried up the source of about 40 percent of the exports by value which previously were being shipped through Leopoldville. With the foreign exchange from these exports no longer available, and with revenues from export duties reduced, the Leopold- ville authorities have meager reserves with which to com- bat inflation. SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 MAJOR BLOC ARMS SUPPLIED INDONESIA (THROUGH 1960) AIR IL-28 jet light bombers 20 Other bombers 32 MIG-17 jet fighters 62 Other fighters 24 Other aircraft (including 98 trainers and helicopters ) LAND 130-mm. truck-mounted rocket 12 launchers 85-mm. antiaircraft guns 25 37-mm. antiaircraft guns 25 NAVAL Skoryy-class destroyers 4 W-class submarines 2 Submarine chasers 8 10116 2A 28 JANUARY MAJOR BLOC ARMS TO BE PROVIDED INDONESIA (1961- 19631 AIR TU-16 jet medium bombers 20 IL-28 jet light bombers 5 "MIG-21F" jet fighters 20 MIG-19 jet fighters 10 LAND PT-76 amphibious light tanks 80 BTR-40 armored personnel carriers 130 100-mm. antiaircraft guns 86 57-mm� antiaircraft guns 182 122-mm- field artillery 72 DL-10" landing craft 131 NAVAL Light cruiser 1 Destroyers 2 Submarines 4 Submarine chasers 8 Minesweepers 6 Motor torpedo boats 10 Armored landing vehicles 60 Amphibious tanks 60 122-mm. artillery 22 10116 26 961 28 JANUARY 1961 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 %...4 TOP SECRET 'Details of Soviet-Indonesian Arms Agreement In the latest recent $244,000,000 Soviet-Indonesian arms deal, the Indonesian Army's purchases, apparently made un- der the direction of Chief of Staff General Nasution, consist largely of light armor, artillery, and infantry weapons. The purchases underscore the army's efforts to develop its capa- bilities for antiaircraft defense, as well as for amphibious and air operations, and constitute--for the first time�acceptance. of large-scale bloc military assistance by the Indonesian Army. Clpdonesian naval purchases under this agreement are limited to miscellaneous equipment, presumably because a separate naval agreement for the supply of more than $277,000- 000 in Soviet--and apparently Polish--ships was concluded late last year during Admiral Martadinata's visit to the Soviet Union. The reported purchases of the air force�apparently made by Air Marshal Suryadarma, who accompanied General Nasu- tion on his visit to Moscow in January�seem to be excessive for Indonesian Air Force needs, suggesting the listing may re- flect the air force's requests as well as actual Soviet commit- ments. Although Moscow may be willing to supply some MEG- 19s, it appears unlikely that the USSR would agree to provide such aircraft as 1111G-21s and TU-16s, which have not yet been rs_unnliff to the European satellites in quantiti3 In the summer of 1960, Indonesian r ques s or high-performance aircraft were parried by Moscow with claims that Soviet Premier Khrushchev hvc fn an- prove prove of their delivery to Indonesia. 'TOP-SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 SECRET Albania Criticizes Bloc Policies In an editorial in the Albanian party daily on 20 Jan- uary, First Secretary Hoxha spells out in explicit terms what he meant when he said his party would never com- promise on questions of principle. Albania last took public issue with bloc policies on 25 October, when Premier Mehmet Shehu criticized Bul- garian and Polish disarmament proposals and implicitly criticized Khrushchev for meeting with Tito while at the UN earlier that month. Since then, except for restating its major deviationist positions at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties last November, the regime had contented itself with defending its views rather than attack- ing Soviet ones. Albanian opposition to the USSR first came into the open at the Bucharest conference of bloc Communist lead- ers last June, although differences have existed for sev- eral years. Since that meeting, Tirana and Peiping have frequently exchanged public expressions of mutual support and admiration. A high-level eight-man Albanian delega- tion now is in Peiping, apparently for the purpose of rene- gotiating existing trade and aid agreements. The Zen i i Popullit editorial indirectly criticized recent Soviet statements, particularly Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech last month to the Supreme Soviet indicating Moscow's readiness to cooperate with Belgrade and maintaining that Soviet and Yugoslav positions on "fundamental international issues coincide." The editorial warned of the dangers inherent in reaching a "rapprochement" with Tito just because on "cer- tain basic foreign policy questions. . . the Yugoslav position is identical to that of the socialist countries." The editorial also criticized Yugoslav--and by implica- tion bloc--condemnations of "dogmatism and sectarianism"- 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 SECRET %NO labels that have been applied to Albania. In a probable reference to such criticism of Albania�for example, East German party boss Ulbrichtts public attack last month on the Albanian leaders--the editorial stated that many people, including Communists, had been misled by Yugoslavia. 28 Jan Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 tlia, TOP SECRET isso Progress of Iranian Elections .n the current parliamen- tary elections a deputy was elected "with a majority of 4,556 votes" but "against the wishes of the people." This reflects the favorite technique of switching ballot boxes. The same report adds that this caused "an extraordinar- ily undesirable reaction and shocking propaganda against the government." Other reports show protest demonstra- tions and violence, with occasional nongovernmental can- didates winning. The current Majlis (lower house) elections in Iran are for 200 deputies from about 154 constituencies. These elections were originally held in August after wide pub- licity proclaiming their freedom. The fiasco which re- sulted from the inept rigging produced such a volume of protests that the Shah was forced to cancel the whole elec- tion. Prime Minister. Sharif-Emami has told an American diplomat that in the present round of voting about 50 dep- uties have been elected thus far, with government "influ- ence" being used to assure the choice of 25 of them. The remainder were elected from a list of government-ap- proved candidates. Sharif-Emami's estimate may be op- timistic, as he apparently has not been an active partici- pant in the rigging, a job the Shah has given to the corrupt and venal minister of the interior, General Alavi-Moqadarn. lections in key urban areas, including Tehran, have not yet been carried out. Wide demonstrations and violence are possible in these more volatile areas if the rigging is as obvious as elsewhere. Although security forces can prob- ably control any violence, they may have to use force to do �TOP SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 %01�Ted;)�SEeRET so, and this would widen the existing breach between the government and the people. Iranian parliamentary elections for the last four, dec- ades have normally been rigged, if not by the central gov- ernment then by local authorities. The parliamentary representatives usually have represented the most influ- ential person in the constituency, the local landlord, tribal chief, or military commander. Often the same results would have been achieved if a genuinely free election had been held, simply because the people could not have found anyone more capable of holding the office. With political awareness spreading to the grass roots, however, tradi- tional electoral chicanery is becoming more difficult to carry out. Soviet propaganda, which was toned down after the appointment of a new Iranian prime minister in August, has resumed its hostile tone, apparently to encourage Teh- ran to make moves toward improving relations with the USSR. The USSR has sought since 1959 to extract polit- ical concessions from Iran,such as the prohibition of for- eign military bases. The renewed Soviet propaganda, keyed to the rigged elections, is probably designed to exploit pop- ular dissatisfaction with the voting, Moscow also probably hopes to force Iran's projected good-will mission to Moscow to cantPr into nolitieal neantiafinnA Iran's ambassador to protest the propaganda bar- rage, which is "wholly at variance with the talks of recent months d the good will of both sides." TOP SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 tliseTOP SECRETWIle King Saud Courts Nasir King Saud, who fears subversion by Nasir in Saudi Arabia, is attempting to improve his relations with the UAR leader. Immediately after reasserting authority on 21 De- cember, Saud sent a secret emissary to assure Nasir of the "progressive" nature of the new government. The King hoped that Nasir's brotherly friendship Would last forever." Saud withdrew from active leadership of his government in March 1958 after exposure of his clumsy effort to break up the UAR by attempting to bribe Syrian internal security chief Sarraj with over $5,000,000. Sarraj denounced the at- tempt and backed up his charges with photographs of the ac- tual bank drafts. The fiasco shook Saud's prestige so seri- ously that Crown Prince Faysa.1 assumed the premiership upon the insistence of the other Saudi royal princes. How- ever, Faysal's policy of severe financial retrenchment, al- though it repaired Saudi finances, became very unpopular within the royal family and the merchant community. Over the past two years Saud has thus been able to rebuild his political stature within the country by favoring the tribes and siding with the princes who opposed any curtailment of their purses. To oust Faysal last December Saud obtained support of Saudi Arabian "liberals" by naming four of them to cabinet posts. Now for the first time more than half of the Saudi cabinet is drawn from outside the royal family. While it would appear that the King has enough backing among the tribal leaders and within the royal family to sup- port his new policies, a group of dissident army officers in late December reauested UAR support for a coup against Saud, This group planned to set up an independent state in the western part of the country. --TOP�SECRE_T_ 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 While the UAR may not commit itself to any extensive sup- port for this roup at this time, it may give assistance for a move later. jisgrunt1ed army officers in Riyadh approached American military personnel last summer regarding the US attitude toward an anti-monarchist coup, and educated ele- ments of the civil population have lone felt that a radical change of governmeht is needed. TOP SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 13 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 'TOP SECRET Tunisia May Resume Seat in Arab League Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba withdrew his repre- sentative from the Arab League in October 1958�subsequent- ly breaking relations with Cairo�culminating a long period of acrimonious exchanges with UAR President Nasir. Bour- guiba, although under pressures from other Arab states to re- turn to the League, has refused to do so without significant concessions from Nasir�notably an agreement that Bourguiba's rival, Salah Ben Youssef, will no longer be harbored in Cairo, and a full-scale review by the League of Tunisia's dispute with the UAR. Now at odds with the King of Morocco, who excluded him earlier this month from the Casablanca conference of certain African and Asian chiefs of state, Bourguiba senses his r Isolation as Nasir's influence expands in Africa. Consequently Bourguiba has apparently become more receptive to recent approaches by Iraqi Premier Qasim and Jordanian King Husayn proposing that Tunisia attend the conference of Arab State foreign ministers which convenes in Baghdad on 30 January. Mokaddem is slated to re- main in the tamale bast tor two weeks, ostensibly to chair a meeting of Tunisian diplomats, and could easily sit in on the foreign ministers' conference should Bourguiba consider it expedient to be represented. TOP SECRET 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 14 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 %Is-TOP--SECRET Cthe Iraqi foreign minister and Arab diplomats in Bagh- dad are reported confident that some compromise formula will be worked out to permit Tunisia's attendance, if only as an observer":1 Any improvement in Tunisia's relations with the UAW .-Wwever, is likely to be superficial since Bourguiba will probably remain suspicious that Nasir desires to under- mine the Tunisian regime and will continue to fElary hirrmPlf as Nasir's rival for influence in the Arab world. -T0P-SEC-RE-7' 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 15 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 -�aeCONFIDENTIAL Negotiations on Greek' Link to Common Mai(ket Near Decision Cit its meeting on 30 January, the Council of Ministers of the European Common Market (EEC) will probably take crit- ical decisions on the associations of Greece with the EEC. Com- promises, which are still subject to council approval, appear to have been reached on most outstanding issues, but final agreement may yet founder on Greece's refusal to promise a settlement of its external debtil The proposed association arrangement, the result of near- ly tw �years of bargaining, is generally advantageous to Greece. Greek industrial exports would receive the same tariff reduc- tions EEC members extend to each other, and special provi- sion, has been made for its major export item, tobacco--prob- ably to the disadvantage of American tobacco exports. Mutual escape clauses have been provided, but these appear to favor Greece, and most advantageous of all, Athens would receive at least $125,000,000 in development loans from the new European Investment Bank (EIB) The EIB insists, however, that these loans not be made un- less Greece agrees to indicate within two years how it proposes to settle its prewar debts--a condition Athens says is "political- ly unacceptable." The EIB as a new institution feels it must protect its credit position, and it has been pressed to do so by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Greek officials allege, however, that the debt issue is a subterfuge for those EEC members�notably Italy and the Netherlands--which are least enthusiastic about Greek associ- ation and have charged that British "bondholders" are respon- sible for the pressure from the IBRD, presumably because London is reluctant to see the Common Market extended? The ICaramanlis government has committed its prestige to securing Greek entry into the Common Market on "acceptablO 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 16 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 kowl erms," and collapse of the negotiations on the debt issue would be a serious blow to it. Athens' relations with its West- ern allies would also be weakened generally, and Greek of- ficials have warned that in the absence of a relationship with the EEC, Greek trade with the bloc would probably be accel- erated. The Common Market would probably also be hurt politically, because agreement with Greece is widely regard- ed as a necessary prelude to the opening of talks with other potential associates such as Turkey, Israel, and Tunisia, and to renegotiation of the existing association arrangements with the former colonial areas in Africa-.) 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 17 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 TOP SECRET Impact of Santa Maria Seizure on Salazar Regime The Portuguese Government evinces growing nervousness over the political challenge represented by seizure of the pri-, vatelyAownedPortugueseluxuryliner Santa Maria on 22 January. It fears in particular that the 70 proclaimed opponents of Prime Minister Salazar, headed by former army Captain Henrique Galvao may get through to some port in Africa and try to stir up trouble among disaffected� groups. The government has alerted its armed forces at home and in its African provinces and sent two platoons of paratroopers overseas by air in the latest of a series of reinforcement moves. Galvao, who claims to act in the name of former opposi- tion presidential candidate Humberto Delgado, now residing in Brazil, is regarded by Lisbon as a determined and capable adversary. Portuguese Foreign Minister Mathias expressed apprehension to Ambassador Elbrick on 24 January that Galvao might take the ship to the Cape Verde Islands or Portuguese Guinea and try to set in a "Castro-tvne government" on the west coast of Africa, palvao's action probably foreshadowed a coup attempt against some part of the overseas provinces and emphasized the need for cooperat- ing with the milJtAry in order to prevent a surprise landing. Lisbon feels there is no doubt about the loyalty of the officer corps but is apparently less sure of the attitude of some sectors of the noncommissioned officers. � Galvao and Delgado have for many months been coordinat- ing antiregime plans among Portuguese exiles in Brazil, Vene- zuela, and apparently other areas in Latin America. Their primary objective reportedly has been to gain strong support from opposition groups in both Portugal and Spain and eventual- ly effect armed landings in either country to oust Franco and Salazar. The two men are said to have received financial -TOP-SECRE T 28 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 18 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 d TOP SECRET aid of unknown amounts from sympathizers in Vene- zuela. Delgado enjoyed considerable support at home in the African provinces during the presidential election campaign of 1958. Galvao also has been held in high esteem among opponents of Salazar in Portugal and even, reportedly, among some high-ranking officers. However, the US Em- bassy in Lisbon reports that local press disclosures that most of the 70 men involved in the seizure of the Santa Maria were Spaniards has already dampened what public admiration Galvao's "theatrical gesture" may have generated. The Salazar regime appears concerned over possible de- fections by white Portuguese in Angola who are in favor of Independence for the province and might work with African nationalists to secure it, e also probably fears that Galvao's move may encourage cleavages among its supporting factions which are reliably reported already planning to offer their own candidates for the National Assembly elections next Oc- tober'.3 Capture of even a small number of seats would end the Monopoly of the 120 seats in that body hitherto enjoyed by the regime's National Union. Another factor probably increasing the nervousness in government circles is the current partial incapacitation of Salazar. he 71-year-old dictator is regarded not to have fully recovered from the mild attack of pneumonia he in- curred early this month. TOP SECRET 2$ Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 19 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director --GONFIDEN TM L Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183 � e'z TOP SECRET ./5 s!':z �7 :*) ,t#4z e 0 �TOP�SECRET� .�% Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000183