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January 30, 1961
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I; Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 I%#1 saK�aliVE vapi 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 30 January 1961 Copy No, U CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN tt.LI �TOP�SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 TOP SECRET TO P-SEeRE-T-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184�- �� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 30 January 1961 1. Situation in Laos. (Page i) 2. Response to Hammarskjold's request for troops to replace those being withdrawn from Congo has been reserved. )(Page t) 3. Poland interprets November Communist manifesto as endorsement of its right to determine internal policies. (Page it) 4. Italy: Threat to Fanfani government increased by alliance of Christian Democrats and Socialists in Milan. (Page tit) N \\\ 1/4\ \\N � 5. Portugal warns that US refusal to intercept Santa Maria could lead to "most grave consequences for US-Portuguese relations"; Quadros favors Galvao. (Page tit) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 thid TOP SECRET CO2000181} CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 30 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: El: he crisis in Laos may be further complicat- 1:1 is( ed by the reported entry of at least part of the Chinese Nationalist irregular force which has been retreating in the face of a Burmese Army offensive. Chinese National- ist authorities on Taiwan appear willing to cooperate with.-. 3 44 5 Laotian authorities in attempting to keep the irregulars confined to enclaves just a few miles from the frontier. withDatl Burma; however, the irregulars are not always responsive � to Taipei and may penetrate deeper into Laos. Peiping could use activity by the Chinese Nationalists in Laos as a pretext for intervention-3 Edenera,1 Phoumi's efforts to advance the timetable of his projected offensive against the Plaine des Jarres are apparently being impeded by terrain difficulties and logis- tics problems. The progress of the column moving from ivluong Kassy to the enemy held junction of Routes 7 and 13 is said to be hampered by fallen trees, blown-up bridg- es,, ' es, and other obstacles_placed in the way of its advance by retreating enemy forcesL3 x-Premier Souvanna Phouma in Phnom Penh appears increasingly disposed to accept the invitation of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces to come to Xieng Khouang to head a crnararn ryi (ant in onnosition to the Boun Oum regime. va.nna has already agreea aria plans to ieuve Lur ^Len ang shortly. (Backup, Page 1) (Map` Sou- Khou- Congo:EResponse to Harnmarskjold's request to van- us countries countries for troops to replace those being rawn from the UN Command has been reserved. N TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Nif I Li ("Kt Nehru has iniormea tiammarskiold of his distress over the progres- sively deteriorating situation, and has said that unless clearer UN policy emerges it will be difficult for India to increase its Congo contingent. The Sudanese foreign minister, although reiterat- ing his government's support of the UN effort, fears that because of heavy withdrawals of UN troops,the Sudan might soon find itself almost alone among African states in the Congo, and his government has no desire to become involved in a civil war "next door." The Lualaba state pro- claimed at Manono by pro-Stanleyville forces on 9 January Is rapidly setting up a provincial administration among Balubas opposed to Katanga President Tshombe. This or- ganization may soon permit Balubas and Congo army forces to make attacks against the mining complexes and railroads of south Katanga,2 In Leopoldville, President Kasavubuis opening speech to the preparatory political conference was well received, but the conferees have not yet begun real ne- gotiations.H""-- (15acitup Page 5) Poland: Party First Secretary Gomulka., in his speech to the central committee plenum on 20-21 January, inter- preted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies. At the same time, Gomulka was careful to stress his sup- port for Soviet foreign policy, indicating that he did not feel this would preclude good relations with the West. (SECRET) (Backup, Page 8) 30 Jan 61 N N\ - TOP SECRET \ DAILY BRIEF ii 6J. ;NI Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20001%0 160-110P�SEreIRET IN Italy: The threat to Premier Fanfani's Christian Democratic government has been sharply increased by the alliance formed by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists to administer the city of Milan. The right- wing Liberal party has reacted strongly and may with- draw support from Fanfani if this alliance extends to the provincial government. The Liberals fear that the Milan alliance opens the way to a national government relying on Socialist support, which they may feel they can block if they f9ree early national elections by over- throwing Fanfani. , j (Backup, Page 10) Santa Maria: The outgoing government in Brazil, 6 k greatly disturbed over US actions in the Santa Maria in- cident, has informed Washington that the ship will be 4 seized if it enters a Brazilian port. However, Pres- 3 ident-elect Janio Quadros, who will be inaugurated on 31 January, has told newsmen that Galva� is an old friend and that he would not "hand over his ship" to the Portuguese Government. CA Portuguese Foreign Minis- try spokesman told Ambassador Elbrick that the US re- fusal to intercept the ship could lead to "most grave con- sequences for US-Portuguese relations?' While the im- mediate stability of the Salazar regime has not been af- fected, widespread domestic press and radio coverage has renewed awareness of the Portuguese public that the re- gime has active opposition, and suspicion has been aroused that the government is not so 7nfident as it says of the loyalty of Portuguese Africa( 30 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF -720P-SEGRE-T iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 TOP SECRET Situation in Laos E'Ex-Premier Souvanna Phouma appears to be on the verge of going over openly to the side of the Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces in Laos0 he has agreed to a proposal brought to him by Pathet leader Phoumi Vongvichit to return to Laos to assume leadership of a government in opposition to the Boun Oum government. Souvanna reportedly stated that he would soon fly to Xieng Khouang, where the pro-Communists have set up a provincial administration and whi h they may claim as a temporary national Laotian capital. The Sino-Soviet bloc has consistently maintained that the Souvanna government remains the legal government of Laos. This assertion, made both to provide a rationale for the Soviet airlift and to limit international support for the Boun Oum government, would become considerably more plausible were Souvanna to throw in his lot with the Pathet Lao - Kong Le combine. Phourni Vongvichit left Phnom Penh on 27 January aboard a Soviet IL-14 accompanied by some of the more leftist inclined of Souvanna's entourage. The most note- worthy of these was former National Assembly President Pheng Pongsavan, who last fall was the primary force be- hind the creation in Vientiane of the Communist-influenced Peace and Neutrality ,Committee. There are already indi- cations that this front group may be revived as a propaganda vehicle. A broadcast on 28 January by the clandestine "Ra- dio of the Laotian Kingdom" stated that an "expanded" ses- sion of the committee had been held that day in Xieng Khou- ang; among the participants were Souvanna's half-brother, Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong, Kong Le, Pheng Pongsavan, and Quinim Pholsena, Souvanna's information minister. Another broadcast stated that Kong Le has been named chairman of the recently created "Laotian National Military Committee," described as "the supreme joint command of the legal government forces and the Pathet Lao fighting units." [-The USSR apparently intends to delay its reply to the British proposal� of 21 January that the International Contron TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 %me �1-111-i- ommission (ICC) take preliminary soundings, through its Indian chairman, to determine whether it could per- nrai role in Laos. Soviet Deputy For- eign Minister Kuznetsov has n Ica ed that the USSR's reply would be delayed for a while. He pointed out that � London had taken .from 22 December to 21 January to re- ply to the Soviet proposal for reactivating the ICC and reconvening the Geneva.Conference:I The bloc leaders evidently believe time is working to their advantage in Laos. Their delaying tactics are � designed to provide the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces an opportunity to exploit their recent military successes and to secure control of as much territory as possible before international negotiations get underway. The Communists are also seeking to prevent any in- ternational scrutiny of their airlift activities. The Polish delegation on the ICC for Vietnam engineered a postpone- ment of a meeting of the commission scheduled for 27 Jan- uary in Saigon in order to avoid a discussion of the airlift to Laos. The chief Polish member pleaded "illness," and the alternate Polish delegate suddenly departed for Hanoi. The Canadian delegation told the Indian chairman of the ICC for Vietnam that these Polish tactics represent a blatant at- tempt to frustrate ICC activities, and he requested that this situation be "brought to the attention" of the cochairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference�the USSR and Britain, tin a further international complication, sources on Tai- wan state that Chinese Nationalist irregular forces have en- tered Laos at three points as the result of Burmese military pressure on the other side of the Mekong River frontier. The irregulars reportedly plan to establish new headquarters in Laos, following the loss on 27 January of their main base area in Burma, Keng Lap. Laotian authorities have called upon the irregulars not to move more than a few miles into Laos. Taiwan's security chief Chiang Ching-Iwo professed to agree with the Laotians that Communist China might use the irregulars' presence as a pretext for action in Laos] TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 ilk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 � 1. . ..,�. ! PtiONG KIM Lips 4.1...../, �,.) ( i � � .7:, -",-.4,... -v. f -1 Nan.,_2........4,....: .., \ v...zi .. fr,,,,- ,,, f 'I. 1. / ..." . I NA c.-Ir ocfMT Hik � 1 -u 11���,� .1 N .../ /. 1 '''.1,/: - ..., --: ./.. \--'i --''.-- LUANG ABANG I.T, /I t � i.� 1...- --.-z1.,._.,_../1 0 \ 13 / Aluang Plwq a Mg Rhttsamslok / t.. PIarn Jarres HO ANC, P NW AM %boo Than+ THAILAND 30 JANUARY 1961 IV Government forces � Government Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations III Will Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces Main route number � � �Trail A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars S A V 4LE _CA6 BA DEMARCATION LINE Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 `eitai TOP SECRET Chence, Chiang reportedly considers Laos to be only a temporary haven. Nevertheless, the Laotians are un- able to prevent the irregulars from moving farther into Laos. _J Burmese Army leaders deny that Chinese Commu- nist elements have participated in the present phase of the offensive against the irregulars. However, since 25 January three Chinese Communist military air trans- ports have flown from Kunming to an airfield in southern Yunnan Province not far from the area of earlier Chinese Communist attacks on the irregulars in Burma. Prior to early January, flights into this area were infrequent. A nonstop flight of "first aid plasm" wns made from Pei to Kunming on 27 January. General Phoumi states that the two-pronged advance from1he north and the south, on Phou Khoun, which com- mands the junction of Routes 'land 13, is being delayed mainly, by physical obstacles--fallen trees, rocks, and other impediments presumably left by the retreating en- emy. forces. A 20-truck convoy of reinforcements for the enemy position at Phou Khoun may by now have reached there from the Plaine des Jarres. Elsewhere in the fight- ing, a two-battalion enemy force is reported probing gov- ern7nt defenses at Muong Sal to the north of Lnanre ra- bang. stepped -up Pathet Lao activity in Attopeu, me country's southernmost province, and the government may soon send reinforcements, which it can ill spare, to the area. There appears to have b een little change over the week end in the Tha Thom area in southern Xieng Khou- ang Province. although Ph urni still expects heavy fighting there. The two Soviet AN-12s arrived in Canton on 28 January. One continued on to Haiphong but returned to Canton a few hours later, presumably after. unloading. The second AN-12 apparently remains at Canton. Airlift flights into Laos con- tinue to be scheduled. TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 %of 1U1- 3L1-111., 1 the IL-14s had been armed evidence that the airlift was continuing effectively and that enemy forces were dispersing supplies received to the extent that no worthwhile supply dumps have been detected. How- ever, the Pathet Lao are practicing cover and concealment against air observations. Although no Communist combat aircraft were observed, several airfields were noted un- dergoing improvement. TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018414 'IS TOP SECRET Situation in the Congo CHammarskjold has asked India, Sudan, and Iraq, among other countries, to furnish replacements for the more than 5,000 troops the UN Command may lose as the result of planned or threatened withdrawals of con- tingents from neutralist nations. So far the response has been unenthusiastic, owing partly to a general disillusion- ment with the UN's Congo operations rTrieliari PrirnA Minister Ne ru feels that the progressive- ly deteriorating situation amounts almost to disintegration. He has replied to Hammarskjold that the behavior of Mobu- tu's forces and the "shocking" treatment of Lumumba have aroused much resentment, while the more or less passive attitude of the UN has created an impression of ineffective- ness. Nehru feels that more tension would be created were India to replace troops withdrawn for policy reasons by the "Casablanca powers"--Morocco, Guinea, the UAR, and Ghana--and that unless a clearer UN policy emerges, it would be difficult for India to justify increasi ono forces beyond the specialist units now there. COther reports indicate that Nehru believes that UN pol- icy should include withdrawal of all Belgian military elements, disarming of "private armies" including Mobutu's, early re- call of parlia ent, and the supplying of all aid to the Congo through the UN. The. Sudanese foreign minister fears that unless the UN and the Western governments "do something" quickly in the Congo, the situation will deteriorate to the point where the Sudan would be faced with a de facto Communist-supported government on its border. Speaking to an American Embas- sy official on 26 January, he said that in view of the heavy troop withdrawals from the Congo�principally by the UAR and Morocco--the Sudan might soon find itself almost the only African nation with a force there. Its position would theij TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 *ftryTOP SECRET simpoi Cbe indefensible, he added, as his government had no de- sire to have its army involved in a civil war in an adjoin- ing c0untry7} ahe foreign minister vigorously denied reports that trucks from the Sudan had entered the Congo with arms for Lurninnba, and asserted that President Abboud re- mained adamant against any transit of the Sudan in sup- nort of Gizenga's regime0 some supplies are reachinp� Orientale Province by road and air through the smiqn El'he autonomous Lualaba state, proclaimed in the northern Katanga town of Almon� by pro-Stanleyville forces on 9 January, appears to be developing into a serious threat to the Katanga government- of President Tshombe". As this regime becomes entrenched--its pro- vincial administration is reportedly already collecting taxes�the F3aluba tribesmen hostile to Tshombe, to- gether with Congolese Army units loyal to Stanleyville, will be in a position to launch attacks against the mining complex and railroads which are economically vital to southern Kata,nga.. Offensive action by Tshornbe't forces, now being strengthened by Belgian aid, may soon be or- ganized to combat his threatD On 27 January some 200 delegates met in the first ple- nary session of a conference called by Kasavubu to prepare for a later round-table conference of all Congolese leaders. The US Embassy stated that the delegates were reportedly satisfied with the progress of the first meeting and are hopeful of achieving some concrete results. This hope ap- pears unrealistic, however, since none of Liiinumba's sub- nnrtPrS are attending the conference. the pro- Lumumba Iorces mere �TOP�SECRE71 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 %Nor TOP SECRET were on the defensive because of a shortage of arms and ammunition0 the transporta- tion situation was bad because of shortages of vehicles, gasoline, and spare parts. It was questioned dailyyby; local officials about the ar- rival of Russian supplies. These officials have known for a longtime, that such surolies would be "droroed from huge tranntinrt air(' aft;i r TOP SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 SECRET - Poland Gomulka used the 20-21 January central committee plenum of the Polish Communist party to reassure the people that he interpreted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an � endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies, including the relative freedom for � individuals which has characterized the Gomulka period In Poland. Gomulka, who has relied on Khrushchev for support since 1958, was careful to stress his support of the Soviet foreign policy line, indicating his belief that this would not stand in the way of good relations with the West. The Polish leader is hampered by the fact that his par- ty has little popular support and that many of its members are opportunists rather than dedicated Communists. He has felt it necessary to rely, on party militants who, while ef- fective as administrators, are opposed to his liberal inter- nal policies. The regime's avoidance of terror as an instru- ment of policy has permitted leading intellectuals and tech- nologists to be safely aloof from politics, and the masses to remain openly apathetic or opposed to Communism, although all concerned apparently believe that there is no feasible al- ternative to Gomulka. The regime's gradual encroachments on Roman Catholic influence are most recently illustrated by educational meas- ures substituting the study of Communist ideology for the study of religion and the humanities. This violation of a 1957 modus vivendi between church and state is bound to increase tensions and will add to the uneasiness already caused by the conflict over questions of birth control and confiscatory taxes on church property. In the economic field, individual farmers, who constitute over 52 percent of the population, fear that force will eventu- ally be used to collectivize agriculture, but they continue to resist "voluntary" membership in the regime's farm coopera- tives. The urban standard of living--particularly regarding SECRET 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 NovoSECRET housing and food--has not met the expectations raised by the Polish Communists, and the prospect is for con- tinued austerity, at least until 1.964 to hel ay for rapid expansion of heavy industry. SECRE 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 CONFIDENTIAL iiaid Italian Government's Tenure Increasingly Threatened The local elections in Italy. last November failed to give the four-party coalition supporting Premier Fan- fani's all - Christian Democratic government a majority in such key cities as Milan, Genoa, Florence, Venice, and Rome. The Christian Democrats are hampered in seeking allies outside the national coalition to form city administrations because their Social Democratic and Republican partners object to alliances with the Mon- archists on the right, while their Liberal allies oppose ties to the Nenni Socialists on the left. A minority city government's greatest weakness is the necessity to muster an absolute majority on the mu- nicipal budget. The only alternative, a .Rome appointed commissioner to take� the place of mayor and governing board, is a highly unpopular solution which was tried in Venice, Genoa, and Florence before the last elections, and apparently lost the Christian Democrats some votes. Socialist leader Nenni had originally indicated that he would participate in the Milan city administration only if the Socialists were also accepted in the government of Milan Province. The national coalition parties have suf- ficient seats to form the provincial administration,Cand Christian Democratic party Secretary Aldo Moro report- edly would rather have a commissioner appointed for Milan Province than risk a coalition including the Social- ists because he is convinced that Liberal party leader Giovanni Malagodi would then bring Fanfani down. While the Christian Democratic leaders in the province are sym- pathetic to the Socialists, they may not press the issue be- cause Socialist leader Nenni does not want a crisis now The Liberals threaten to repeat the policy they fol- lowed in January 1960, when they caused a lengthy cabinet crisis by withdrawing support from the government because they feared Socialist backing was in prospect. The current coalition resulted after Communist-led riots brought about the downfall of an interim cabinet dependent on neo-Fascist CONFIDENTIAL 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 %ow CONFIDENTIAL %me " support. When Fanfani was invested, the Socialists abstained instead of following their usual practice of joining the Communists in opposition during a vote of confidence. The Liberals expect that, when the Socialist party congress is held from 16 to 19 March, Nenni will have to have some quid pro quo to justify to his party's left wing his move away from the Communists. The Lib- erals may decide to dump Fanfani before March in or- der to discredit Nenni by blocking local alliances between Socialists and Christian Democrats. A repetition of the protracted cabinet crisis of 1960 would jeopardize the Italian parliamentary system, and if early elections re- sulted the Christian Democrats would probably suffer and the Communists gain. �CONFIDENTIAL 30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 ���� NV � M.A.' Ir. A& .E1 111111 THE PRESIDENT The ViCe President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman,' The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 ;11 TOP SECRET /7/ fo 0 04 ##:// /o. '/f4 r:7� --TOP-SECRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000184 1