Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 31, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815598].pdf990.26 KB
Z/zzi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 *asof�Fialr�arMIVG--1� 'caw 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 31 January 1961 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 jApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 SERE Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20001854 retr---5EC-44E-:P � ';\\\ \�. 31 January 1961 z\ � NN t\\ x'A\ N.� k\\\ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos: Since mid-December the USSR has airlifted an estimated total of 1,115 tons of sunnlies and equipment into Laos. 'Page i) 2. Congo: Nasir expresses willingness to give Gizenga all possible aid, but comnlains of Sudan's refusal to permit transit. (Page i) 3. High Chinese Communist officials reiterate Peiping's opposition to "two-Chinas� solution for Taiwan. (Page ti) 4. Japan interested in improved relations and more trade with Communist China. (Page tit) 5. Republic of Mali agrees to diplomatic relations with Mongolia. (Page tit) 6. The six-month-old Republic of Cyprus faces growing economic and political problems; strength of local Communist party continues to increase. (Page itt) 7. New Brazilian cabinet has generally conservative complexion. (Page iv) Ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 tApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000141 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 31 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF r Laos: taoviet airdrops have been reported in support f pro-Communist Laotian forces at the Phou Khoun iunc- ion of Route 7 and Route 13;( Government troops are coritinuing their movement from the north and south toward this strategic junction. Soviet airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled through 30 January. The US Air Force estimates that since mid- December 500 Soviet IL-14 sorties have been flown into Laos, -7)6_, carrying an estimated total of 1,115 tons of supplies and equip- mIztnt Corn- ,zy munist China this month has made available $8,750,000 in US currency for support of the pro-Communist Laotian forces. The allocation of these funds despite China's own pressing need for foreign exchange with which to finance grain imports points up the importance Peiping attaches to the Laotian crisis. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) *Congo: Mobutu's troops, which had penetrated to within 100 miles of s tanleyville, have, according to press reports, been repulsed by pro- Lumumba forces at Basoko. There are, how- ever, increasing indications that Gizenga's forces may be short of supplies. c12-- Nasir suggests Gizenga may have to take more arms from Mobutu's soldiers. ) TASS announced on 30 Jan- uary that the USSR has requested President Abboud to permit the Soviets to send food and medicine through the Sudan into pro- Lumumba portions of the Congo. In Brussels, the Belgian foreign minister has reportedly won cabinet approval to enforce a law forbidding Belgian cit- izens to serve in or recruit for foreign armies, which could TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 ^Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Republic of the Congo �Gemena Coquilhatville Brazzaville EOPOt OVIt t_ Leopoldville � Hatadi Thysville Luanda Atlantic Ocean 31 JANUARY 1961 UNCLASSIFIED STATUTE MILES 31534 Port Francqui Luluabour; � Luputa 4040 TALF Stanleyville KiVU Bukavu 1Kindu Bakwanga Kongolo Albertville Manono � G A Lake Albert Usumbura Lake Tanganyika Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 LI N N 11 1\1 31 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii\ r N,"A� Approved for Release 2020/08/11 CO200018-54r ,N \\I �c\N TOP SECRE T lessen overt Belgian assistance to Katanga President Tshombe. Unconfirmed reports state that Tshombe has purchased seven twin jet trainers from France, ak_t the UN, members of the UK delegation indicated on 27 Jan- uary that they favor the early establishment of a new Congolese government, and are prepared to accept Lu- rniimholg nrocnrinn 411 +1,4 r. 1/40 Vii1111Uillb viwuna: 1...ommunist China's leaders have seized a number oi opportunities to register anew their unyielding opposition to any "two Chinas" solution for the problem of Taiwan. Both Chou �En-lai and Chen Yi, the regime's top foreign policy officials, used recent press interviews to emphasize Peininiylg hoQiiiitr to such an ar- rangement. other Chinese leaders, in off-the-record comment, have been underlin- ing the same point. This flurry of expressed opposition may reflect a growing concern in Peiping over the possi- bility that world sentiment is developing in favor of solv- ing the Taiwan problem by giving some sort of separate international status to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. By re-emphasizing their antipathy to such a solution-- which is shared by Taipei--the Chinese Communists seem to be trying to head off efforts in this direction. The authorities in Peiping regard the US as the prime mover behind the "two Chinas" solution and have insisted that the US must withdraw military support from Chiang Kai-shek before any improvement of Sino-US relations could take place. The Chinese Communists also insist they will not change their stand in exchange for UN mem- bership. They have refused to sit in any international gathering along with Chiang's representatives and for this reason have already withdrawn from several, such as the UN-supported International Law Association Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 \43iroved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185t TOP SECRET Japan - Communist China: Prime Minister Ikeda's statement in a policy speech to the Diet on 30 January that his government will seek improved relations with Communist China this year reflects an effort to appear flexible on this issue. This will lend encouragement to recent steps which have been taken in� both countries to end the impasse which has obtained since trade was broken off in May 1958. However, Ikeda indicated that a rapprochement must not affect existing conditions in the Far East. Japan is concerned over its vulnerability to international economic conditions, and its primary ob- jective is increased trade; Peiping's motivation is prin- cipally political. Ikeda's stipulation that Tokyo cannot extend formal recognition to Communist China unless there is greater international acceptance of Peiping, how- ever, reveals one of his principal problems�how to satis- fy growing pressures within Japan for friendly ties with the China mainland without ieonardizing Japan's relations with the United States. (Backup, Page 4) of Mongolia-Mali: Mongolia and the Republic of Mali have agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the am- bassadorial level, according to press reports from Ulan Bator on 25 January. Mali is the fifth nation to recognize Mongolia in the past year, following Guinea, Cambodia, Nepal, and Cuba. India, Burma, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, ok and all Communist bloc countries also maintain diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Like the "other Asian Communist regimes, Mongolia is particularly eager to gain recogni- tion from the new African republics and Asian neutrals who might be expected to support its bid for UN member- ship. Mali's agreement to diplomatic ties with Mongolia provides an indication that Mali's "positive neutraliqm" may be taking on a Dro-bloc flavor. L Cyprus: Economic anct political problems are multi- f) t plying or the government of the Independent Republic of 31 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 \\Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018 low --T-OP�SEeRE-T Cyprus. A three-year drought has seriously reduced grain production, while general economic stagnation since the proclamation of the republic in August 1960 has led to widespread unemployment An ably led Com- munist party continues to increase its strength, and the Communist-dominated labor federation remains the only effective labor organization on the island. According to the US Embassy in Nicosia, President Makariosi party is weakened by lack of organization, and some former EOICA underground fighters are turning against his mod- erate leadership. Disputes over implementation of the six-month-old Cyprus settlement continue to foster dis- trust and ill will between the Greek Cypriot majority and Turkish Cypriot minority. (Backup, Page 6) *Brazil: Ja,nio Quadros, who becomes president today, has announced a cabinet which US Ambassador Cabot char- acterizes as chosen largely with a view, to ensuring polit- ical support in congress but including unusually able men in several key posts. The pro-US foreign minister,- desig- nate, Afonso Arinos, has been chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Finance Minister - Desig- nate Mariani, who will shortly be faced with a balance-of- payments crisis, is a strong personality capable of pushing needed economic reforms. The cabinet is generally con- servative, and some pro-Quadros circles have criticized It as too conservative to accomnithh the changes in Brazil- ian policy which they look for. (Backup, Page 8) 31 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF -TOP SECRET \ \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 NueTOP SIXRET Situation in Laos .EVurther strain has been placed on Laotian-French relations by the Boun Oum government's notice to French Ambassador Falaize on 29 January that Lao army units would shortly take over "required" portions of the French base at Seno, including the airstrip and related facilities. The note stated that Seno henceforth would be considered a Laotian base, although French troops might still be sta- tioned there. The French, who had parried earlier Lao- tian notes on Seno by assuring that the matter was under consideration in Paris, have been taken aback by the ab- ruptness of the Boun Oum government's action. The French counselor in Vientiane has claimed that the move is a viola- tion of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Laos--which specified Seno as a French base--and has speculated that France might call for reconvening the Geneva conference in prot!sti 'ate Seno military base, located a few miles outside Savannakhet in south central Laos, has the best airfield in Laos in addition to important ground installations. The 1954 Geneva agreement authorized the French to maintain garri- son forces totaling 3,500 troops to be stationed at Seno and at another base which never was activated. An additional 1,500 French troops were authorized in Laos for training purposes. Although France has never maintained Seno at much more than caretaker strength�the present garrison numbers about 300--retention of this base under French au- thority is of potential strategic value to SEATO. The vari- ous governments in Vientiane, however, have regarded French control of the base an affront to Lao sovereignty, and the present Laotian administration seems convinced that the French, far from providing protection for Laos, are in open sympathy with the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces] _ the IL-14 drops at Phou Khoun stated that the cargo appeared to be heavy and that a large number of open parachutes were discernible on the ground. the concentration as the heavi- est observed since the Soviet air drops in support of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao takeover of the Plaine des Jarres on 1 Jan- uary. This report would seem to bear out the expectations 20 -1717/3-SECRET 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Muang Nn� �Mining Phrom �Uttoroort LUANG ABANG Jres ,K1-1( ANC tNorfg Mhal %don Than, THAILAND LAOS 31 JANUARY 1961 Is Government forces --- Government Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations NW* Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces (7) Main route number Road - Trail Chinese Nationalist Irregulars 0 25 50 5 190 Mies 71 0 25 50 75 100 Ktometeis asa 26716 1 5-58 Chlimals 7 CHINA Coo Bang� J,./ AVANN HOT MM 0 'Nth ac-ong �Warm Cho*, 09urin CAMBODIA flaundon.n and nam.1 aN nal N., 4n,,a4 rn..,eco,,zed by el. US Goaa�,�nn.nt WM ROB AVANE AV/ETNAM ro- ASSAK`) SWA$ Trani' NO CRY 05 55 BAO ill CAC BA ARCATION LINE � )"..." SOUTN Elo Mum� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 litse ur azunt, Norl [Laotian military officials that the enemy would make a strong stand at the crossroads. A government column of approximate- ly 1,300 men coming from the north is said to be within about ten miles of Phou Khoun. To the south, the government force proceeding from Muong Kassv is apparently cautiously making �wav ard the junction3 The second of the two Soviet AN-12s which arrived at Canton on 28 January flew to Haiphong ndreturnedto Canton on the morning of 30 January. It appears that in large meas- ure the ability of the pro-Communist forces to maintain the initiative in ground operations has been the result of airlift operations. Although North Vietnamese .nd, indirectly, Chi- nese Communist transports have been involved on a relatively small scale, the airlift has been primarily directed, support- ed, and carried out by the USSR. The USSR began the airlift in early December at the re- quest of Souvanna Phouma, then premier of the Laotian Gov- ernment. Between 4 and 13 December, five Soviet 1L-14 transports flew 69 sorties to Vientiane, delivering gasoline and oil nd foodstuffs, and--beginning about 10 December-- 105-mm. howitzers, 120-mm, mortars, and other unidenti- fied cargo. Recently the airlift capability has been substan- tially augmented by the introduction of eighteen Soviet LI-2 transports and at least nine Soviet helicopters--five MI-4s and four MI-7s. In addition, Soviet AN-12 heavy four-engined turboprop transports have made 12 flights to South China and North Vietnam from the USSR in three separate operations-- the most recent of which is still in progress. The ten Soviet IL-14s have been flying most of the sorties into Laos, a large share of which have been airdrop missions. The Soviet MI-4 medium cargo helicopters app rently have op- erated principally within North Vietnam and in short-h ul small cargo resupply missions in the Laotian border area. The eight- een LI-2s which arrived in North Vietnam in mid-Janu,..try have been engaged in shuttle flights between Hanoi and Haiphong and may be flying into Laos, although this is unconfirmed. The tonnage of supplies estimated to h ve been airlifted to the pro-Communists in Laos during the p st six weeks TOP SECRET 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 TOP SECRET Noe appears to be substantially in excess of that required to sustain the current level of military operations. It is likely that caches of supplies vital to the conduct of guerrilla war- fare are being built up, thus indicating that the bloc is pre- ared to prolong military operations in Laos. �Ter�SE-C-RE-T 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 CONFIDENTIAL Nisof Japan Seeks Closer Relations With Communist China Japanese Prime Minister. Hayato Ikeda believes that the China question will be Japan's foremost international problem in 1961. Although apparently developing a pro- gram to promote friendlier ties with Communist China, the prime minister has stipulated that formal recognition must await a "general adjustment of East-West relations." In May 1958, after gradually improving relations had led to a total trade level of approximately $120,000,000 in 1957, the Kishi government refused to grant official sanc- tion for the Chinese Communists to fly their national flag over a proposed trade mission in Tokyo. Peiping retal- iated by breaking off trade relations, including several long-term contracts for exchanging Chinese industrial raw materials for Japanese industrial machinery and prod- ucts, and refused to resume them unless Japan made polit- ical concessions. In recent months, both Tokyo and Peiping have relaxed their positions without, however, making substantive con- cessions. Following the resignation of the Kishi government last July, Peiping lifted its total ban on trade with Japan to permit the export of small quantities of highly specialized foodstuffs desired by the Japanese, in the apparent hope of stimulating pressures for the new Ikeda government to honor the "three principles" Peiping still insists on. These are: ending Japan's hostile policy toward China; noncollaboration with the "US plot to create two Chinas"; and severance of re- lations with Taiwan and recognition of Communist China. Subsequently, there have been exchanges of various labor, economic, and nonofficial political missions, and in the past six weeks the Chinese have inquired about an exchange of "im- portant goods"--Japanese steel, heavy machinery, and ves- sels, for Chinese soybeans, pig iron, and coal. These in- quiries are probably intended to encourage Japanese elements interested in trade with the mainland to step up their pressures on Ikeda for concessions. That the basic Chinese motivation continues to be political is suggested by Peiping's refusal in mid-January to discuss Ikeda's proposal for postal, meteoro- logical, and other technical agreements unless a Japanese CONFIDENTIAL 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 CONFIDENTIAL I�we' cabinet minister is dispatched to Peiping for the pur- pose. Recent US measures to conserve dollars have aroused new concern in Japan about its need for ex- panded export markets to maintain the present stand- ard of living for a growing population. In addition, Tokyo is reviewing its position on the question of UN membership for Communist China in order not to be- d frm the roAs CONFIDENTIAL 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 111111t1 CONFIDENTIAL Cyprus Faces Economic and Political Problems The Cyprus government, under the leadership of Greek Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot Vice Presi- dent Fazil Kuchuk, continues to look to the West for friendship and guidance, but growing problems appear to be undermining its popular support. The recent arrival of the first relief shipment of some 50,000 tons of wheat and barley from the US, supplied under Title II of PL-480, received favorable publicity but is recog- nized locally as only a stopgap measure in alleviating shortages caused by the prolonged drought. The government, unable to find markets for Cypriot raisins in the West, concluded a bar- ter agreement with the USSR in early December under which the Soviet Union will take 8,000 tons of raisins in exchange for cement, lumber, and other products. Tourism--which was anticipated before independence as a source of foreign exchange --has not come up to expectations. In the Greek Cypriot community, Makarios retains much of his great popularity, but his own political party, the Patri- otic Front, suffers from a dearth of second-echelon leaders. The well-organized Communist-dominated Regenerative Party of the Working People (AKEL), which probably can count on the support of 35 percent of the electorate, continues to gain followers. At present, its leaders appear content to follow a program of "peaceful coexistence" with the Patriotic Front while developing new support from the government's inevitable errors. The Communists have been further strengthened by the recent arrival of the first Soviet ambassador to Cyprus, who is in a position to give guidance to local party leaders. The situation in organized labor is deteriorating. The Communist-led pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO) is growing more powerful, while the anti-Communist federation --never a real competitor to PEO- -apparently is on the verge of dissolution. Unless action is taken soon to reorganize the right-wing union, the Communists will dominate the entire Greek Cypriot labor movement. Makarios also faces increasing competition from a group of former members of EOICA, the underground organization 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 �1111.� CONFIDENTIAL ird against the British, and others who, disillusioned with the Cyprus settlement, have renewed the call for "enosis"--union of the island with Greece. Occasional acts of terrorism ap- pear traceable to fanatics among this group. The Turkish Cypriot minority has exhibited signs of a developing cleavage between the moderates, who follow the leadership of Kuchuk, and those who favor a more militant defense of Turkish minority rights. Recent actions of the pro- enosis Greeks have resulted in uneasiness among the Turks and a widespread insistence that the Cyprus agreements be carried out "to the letter." The newspapers supported by each commu- nity on the island have adopted highly critical attitudes toward the actions of the other community, and the spirit of mutual toleration between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was evi- dent at the time independence was proclaimed, seems to be dis- appearing. CO 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Nevi The New Brazilian Administration Janio Quadros maintained complete silence regard- ing his future government during his three-month visit to Europe after the presidential elections of 3 October, and only on 29 January announced his cabinet appointments. The choices reflect a variety of considerations, including Individual abilities and past association with Quadros, as well as geographical factors and the new President's lack of for- mal ties with any of the several parties of his sponsoring coalition, Besides Finance Minister Mariani and Foreign Minis= ter Arinos, the outstanding personalities in the cabinet are probably Labor Minister Francisco Carlos de Castro Neves and War Minister Odylia Denys. The new labor minister was Quadros' secretary of government in Sao Paulo and is one of the shrewdest politicians in Quadros' entourage. Mar- shal Denys was war minister in the Kubitschek administra- tion and was asked to continue in the same post. Denys reportedly agreed to stay on after Quadros prom- ised him a free hand in removing from the armed forces cer- tain officers he considered unreliable, including pro-Commu- nists and Communist party members. One of Quadros' cam- paign pledges was to legalize the Communist party--which supported the administration candidate, General Lott, in the October elections--but this pledge would not preclude his support for stronger anti-Communist measures if it suited his purposes. Initial reaction to the cabinet selections among the pro- quadros press in Rio de Janeiro has been one of strong crit- icism, with the cabinet termed mediocre, ultraconservative, and incapable of bringing the renovation and regeneration that Quadros supporters had anticipated. Indicative of the radical line some pro-Quadros factions expect of the new President is on what is looked for in the way of foreign policy. Quadros' pro- posals for a "bold new policy" will be published shortly after hi q inammratinn in an annrnnyinns newqnanPr artielP written by SECRET 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 SECRET *%,s Actions proposed in this article allegedly will include: establishment of diplomatic rela- tions with the USSR; a call for "understanding" instead of condemnation of the Cuban revolution; and an expres- sion of hope for better Latin American relations with Washington, but with an insistence that the nature of these relations must be changed. Quadros will also call for a conference of all nations interested in studying the problems of the underdeveloped nations, inviting countries from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, as well as from Latin America. 31 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 eTHE.PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman,. The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000185