Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 3, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815638].pdf937.26 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 lyr muwirr-- 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3 February 1961 Copy No, C CEVTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOVSEC-RET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 �Ter�SECINET� mg" TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018iOP SECRET 6 igloo 3 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS USSR: Launching on Tyura Tam Missile Test Range yesterday results in in-flight failure. (Page t) 2. Laos: Souvanna Phourna appoints "acting pre- mier" of his "government" in rebel-held Xieng , Khouang. (Page i) 3. Chinese UN Representation: Peiping's supporters may attempt to reopen the moratorium issue at UN General Assembly reconvening in March. (Page ii) 4. Congo: Gizenga suggests to Nasir that arms aid from UAR transit Sudan� under guise of "humani- tarian assistance." page it) 5. Iraq: Several reports indicate recent shipment of Soviet arms included MIG-19 jet fighters. (Page tti) 6. Arab League: Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan are at- tempting in current league meeting to curtail Nasir's influence. (Page iit) Ethiopia: Haile Selassie delays naming new gov- ernment; appears more concerned with pressing charges against the rebels. (Page tv) 8. Bolivia: President Paz Estenssoro believes ac- ceptance of bloc aid will not endanger further aid from US. Page iv) 9. Venezuela: Army units alerted against possible ac- tion by rightist Venezuelan exiles in Colombian bor- der areas. (Page v) �Ter SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 'OP SECRET IIle CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 3 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF *USSR:1 test vehicle was launched on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range yesterday at about 1400 EST and failed in flight a few minutes thereafter. It is not yet known whether the launching involved a test ICBM or a vehicle associated with the Soviet space program. The launchine from Tvura Tam and subsequent failure were confirmed A test failure is also indicated terday's launching activity, involving the entire Tyura Tam range complex and Soviet tracking sites, as well as the four Sibir-class missile-range instrumentation ships in the Pacific. These four ships, however, which since mid-January have main- tained positions in the Pacific similar to those assumed for the space-related activities in the fall of 1960, did not partici- pate in the last eight hours of the operation yesterday. This would suggest that the vehicle launched may have been a test ICBM intended for impact on the 'Kamchatka Peninsula, similar to the test ICBM launched successfully to Kamchatka on 13 January. Nevertheless, part of the protracted activity which preceded yesterday's launch indicated space-vehicle preparations, and we still look for a major test in the Soviet space Drogram to be attempted in the near future-7 Laos: Souvanna Phouma has designated Khamsouk Keola, who is in rebel-held Xieng Khouang, to be "act- ing premier, "according to a Pathet Lao radio announce- ment of 2 February. Souvanna is alleged to have named TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018%01 kaff-eP�SEreftEur two other members of his "government"--Quinim Phol- sena and Tiao Sisoumang�to assist Khamsouk in carry- ing out the responsibilities of the "lawful government of Laos." The broadcast asserted that Souvanna himself would return to Laos in the "near future" to "resume his administration of domestic affairs." Communist China's foreign minister told a Peiping rally on 2 February that aid would be given the "lawful Laotian government" of Souvanna Phouma if it were re- quested. (Backup, Page 1) Chinese UN Representation: UNIationalist China's po- sition in the United Nations is becoming increasingly precarious. Taipei suffered some of its worst setbacks during the first half of the 15th UN General Assembly. Although the assembly in October decided to shelve the question of Chinese UN representation for the duration of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin Taipei has received since 1951. In addition, for the first time Nationalist China will almost certainly lose its seat on the UN Economic and Social Council, although the five permanent members of the Security Council have tradi- tionally been re-elected when their three-year terms ex- pire. Nationalist China may also lose its right to vote un- less it makes a payment of more than $1, 000,000 toward its overdue assessments before the assembly resumes. Although it is difficult to overrule a previous decision of the assembly, all these factors may encourage some of Peiping's supporters to reopen the issue of Chinese UN representation at the General 4sscrnb1 session scheduled to resume on 7 MarcE (Backup, Page 3) Congo: he preliminary round-table conference of Congolese factions at Leopoldville is proceeding fairly well, in part because of prodding by the Ni erian chairman of the UN Conciliation Commission, Recognizing 3 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 kid�44F-5tetttr 1 LI Ii3 Feb 61 ahe difficulty of disarming rival Congolese factions particularly Tshombes force in Katanga, neutralization might be achieve by putting the Congolese troops in camps and initiating a program of retraining an at- tempt at the Security Council to seek a new mandate would risk a Soviet veto, and reports that Hammarskjold has indicated he is prepared to begin Congolese troop neu- traization without a new mandate:i Gizenga in Stanleyville has answered Nasir's recent mes- sage of willingness to furnish supplies if the Sudan's per- mission for transit rights could be obtained. Gizenga suggested that arms be sent in the guise of "humanitarian assistance." He also reiterated his warning that the sit- uation in the Congo was "more than grave" because of the "imperialists" efforts to unite the forces of Mobutu, Tshombe, and Kalonji for an attack on the Stanleyville regime. Gizenga stated that without assistance hispo- sition would become untenable within two weeks. (Backup, Page 4) USSR-Iraq: Several reports indicate that a recent shipment of Soviet arms to Iraq included 12 to 16 crates containing MIG49 jet fighters. If confirmed, this would be the first delivery of these high-performance aircraft to a nonbloc country. Although the aircraft have not yet been positively identified, If such aircraft have been shipped to Iraq, it is likely that a similar shipment has been, or soon will be, made to the UAR. Both countries have been seeking MIG-19s, and Moscow has conducted training courses in the USSR for Iraqi and UAR personnel on this type of air- craft. (Backup, Page 6) Arab League: The Arab League foreign ministers be- gan meeting in Baghdad on 30 January with the represent- atives of all ten league members present for the first time DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 ka %STOP SECRET in nearly three years. Tunisian participation in the meet- ings, ending the boycott imposed by Bourguiba in 1958, ap- pears to be part of an effort by Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan to make the league more effective and less of an exclusive instrument of UAR President Nasir's policies. Nasir, how- ever, holds important advantages in any contest for influ- ence in the league. His more strident anti-Western prop- aganda has greater popular appeal in the other Arab states, while the league's secretariat is located in Cairo, subject to all the direct and indirect influences the UAR leader can bring to bear. Most other Arab leaders will almost certain- ly feel compelled to echo Nasir's strong propaganda attacks on Western policies, especially concerning Algeria, Congo, and Israel, regardless of their differences with Nasir and their real attitudes on these questions. (Backup, Page 7) Ethiopia: The political situation in Ethiopia appears to be deteriorating further as Emperor Haile Selassie continues to delay naming a new government. The Emperor, preoccu- pied with security matters in the seven weeks following the abortive coup, has concerned himself more with pressing charges against those who participated in or sympathized with the revolt than in reconstructing the government or in attempting to alleviate the conditions which caused the up- rising. The American ambassador believes new disorders could break out in Addis Ababa if the military tribunal, which is reported ready to begin proceedings against the popular r Menghistu Neway, imposes the death sentence. (Backup, Page 8) Bolivia: '.'resident Paz Estenssoro believes that accept- ance of Soviet bloc economic aid will not endanger the US grant-aid program which makes up a substantial part of Bo- livia's domestic budget, according to American Ambassador Strom. Strom states that although Paz is aware the blo_cj 3 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 4 %IWO TOP SECRET Imo Gray score politically in Latin America through contributing "show" projects for Bolivia, Paz feels no obligation to im- pede such a development. A Bolivian economic mission will probably leave for the Soviet bloc on 1 March to explore a Soviet offer of a $150,000, 000 credit. (Backup, Page 9) Venezuela: army units along the Colombian frontier have been alerted against action by Venezuelan exiles--who are krinwn to he riehtist tPlotters--in the border area. the Venezuelan Government nas con- firmed reports of a "collo (-Petal. which can occur any time from today onward." President Betan- court has been concerned since November with evidence of plotting by rightists who apparently have the support of Do- minican dictator Trujillo. (Backup, Page 10) SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available During the Preceding Week) Ethiopian Prospects After the Abortive f Decem- ber 1960. SNIE 76.1-61. 24 January 1961. Supplements NIE 76-60. 3 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 NIS --SE-ME7- *iv Situation in Laos Arrangements for the designation of an acting premier under Souvanna Phouma were presumably made during the course of a recent visit to Phnom Penh by Phoumi Vongvichit, an influential Pathet Lao leader. Tonflicting versions be- tween the Pathet Lao leader and Souvanna have been received, Souvanna agreed to return shortly to rebel-held territory in Lao!) His return would considerably buttress claims by Com- munist countries that they are supporting the legal gov- ernment of Laos, as well as improve this "government's" competitive position for equal status with the Boun Oum government in any negotiations which might take place on the Laotian crisis. Meanwhile, the arrival of Khamsouk and Sisoumang in Xieng Khouang will give greater substance to the hith- erto rather shadowy "lawful government of Laos," for which Quinim had been the sole spokesman. Khamsouk, the new "acting premier," had been minister of health in the Souvanna government, and was identified with Quinim's left-wing faction in the cabinet. He is 52 years old and is a locally trained doctor, the equivalent of a medical tech- nician. In early December, Khamsouk fled to Rangoon at the same time Souvanna took refuge in Phnom Penh. He and his party returned to Xieng Khouang by way of Kunming and Hanoi. Sisoumang was a secretary of state in the Sou- vanna cabinet and was also identified with the Quinim faction. Sisoumang is a nephew of Souvanna and a son of the elder brother of the late King Sisavang Vong. He fought against the Viet Minh in their 1953=54 invasions of Laos and was captured by the Pathet Lao in 1954, remaining with them until the unification agreements of November 1957. Quinim will serve in the Xieng Khouang "government" as minister of de- fense, foreign affairs, and finance; and Sisoumang as min- ister of social affairs, economy and interior. Without encouraging any Laotian appeal for Chinese "vol- unteers," Communist China's Foreign Minister. Chen Yi never- theless has implied that the Chinese are prepared to step up 3 Feb 61 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 i�lis SECRET Nov the scale of bloc assistance to pro-Communist forcea in Laos. Souvanna, so far as is known, has never formally asked for Chinese aid. The ex-premier has expressed his interest in "friendly relations" with the Chinese and was planning a trip to Communist China before he fled to Cam- bodia. The two Soviet AN-12s which arrived in Peiping on 1 February left for the USSR as scheduled on 2 February. They are presumably en route to their home base in the Moscow area, from which they departed on 24 January. Airlift operations into Laos continue to be scheduled -SEGRET 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 %IS CONFIDENTIAL Chinese UN Representation: Taipei's UN Position Precarious _ffhile a majority of UN Members have supported the moratorium on Chinese UN representation since 1951, it has been evident since 1955 that Taipei would not be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority vote to sus- tain its position if its right to the China seat were formally questioned on a substantive vote. The 15th UN General As- sembly on 8 October "decided not to consider" the question, but only 42 members supported the resolution, while 34 op- posed it and 22 members�mostly African--abstained. Fol- lowing the balloting, various African delegates made state- ments indicating that the abstentions were grudgingly given and would not be repeated in the future. Many supporters of the moratorium agreed that it could not be upheld at any fu- ture session. One of these, the government of Pakistan, has recently asked the US Embassy in Karachi whether the United States would be prepared in the future to have its allies "fol- low their own conscience" on the question or whether it con- siders support of the moratorium a test of friendship with the United State/ aTationalist China, considerably in arrears in paying its assessed dues, would find it difficult to get the assembly to grant an exception which would enable it to retain its vote at the resumed 15th session. The UN Charter does provide that the General Assembly may permit a defaulting member to vote if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the member:9 Nationalist China faces another critical vote when the World Health Organization convenes in New Delhi on 7 Feb- ruary. If Peiping's supporters--encouraged by� Taipei's pre- carious UN position--succeed in unseating Taipei, this will be the first time Communist China has been formally admitted to an international organization affiliated with the United Na- tion CONFIDENTIAL 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 SECRET Situation in the Congo Neutralization of rival Congolese factions may prove impossible in view of the current reduction in UN troop strength and the opposition which could be expected from each major Congolese faction. The Leopoldville govern- ment would refuse to disarm its troops until all other Congolese forces had been neutralized, The Gizenga re- gime in Stanleyville would not abandon its military efforts unless assured of political dominance. President Tshombe of Katanga, who has concluded a military accord with Albert Kalonji of the South Kasai mining state, is likely to prove at least as recalcitrant as Kasavubu and Gizenga. Katanga appears about to tap new sources of military equipment; reportedly nine Fouga Magister jet aircraft have been purchased from France and South Africa has agreed in principle to supply fighter aircraft, some seven tons of military supplies would be sent to Katanga by spe- cial aircraft on 30 January, but that a shortage of money prevented the purchase of submachine guns in Belgium. Katanga is beginning offensive action against the Baluba tribesmen, who with Gizenga's military support have set up an autonomous regime around Manono in northern Katanga. Tshombe, in reply to UN protests against an aerial bombing of Manono on 30 January which endangered Nigerian troops, has warned of further land and air attacks. on 1 February Katangan armed forces began mov- ing northward along the rail line toward the UN military base at Kamina. The Katanga government claims to have information that Moroccans at a Baluba center in central Katanga have been instructing the rebels in the use of small arms and 81 milli- meter mortars. The Moroccans reportedly plan to leave large stocks of these weapons for the rebels when they leave the Congaj Gizenga, has asked Moscow if the bloc could refine Congo _I0P-sEGRE-T-- 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 P SECRFT gold. He asked that a plane be sent to Stanleyville to collect gold ore. This request suggests that Gizenga has been able to resume some production at the Kil- omoto mines in Orientale, which in past years pro- duced ore worth several million dollars annually. Pro- duction at these sites was interrupted last summer when the European staff left. Gizenga may also hope that the UAR and the bloc will make greater efforts to supply mil- itary assistance if offered payment in gold. TOP SECRET 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 iiiiii_art:CTCE 1 WY' Soviet Arms Deliveries to Iraq Moscow had agreed to supply to Iraq 16 MIG-19s an three Antonov transports. These aircraft were scheduled to be provided under the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement ne= gotiated earlier in 1960. At least seven shiploads of ma- teriel have been delivered under this agreement since November. Cairo asked the USSR to provide MIG-19s in mid- 1958, but Moscow apparently did not agree to do so until early 1960. 1 mid-1960, the UAR sent a group of pilots to the Soviet Union for training in these aircraftg UAR of- ficials claimed on several occasions in past months that they were going to receive MIG-19s. [The Soviet Union reportedly has also agreed to sup- ply MIG-19s to Djakarta under a major arms agreement negotiated with Indonesia early this year-) "CR 11E1 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 CONFIDENTIAL The Arab League The Arab League was founded in 1945 to promote unity among its member states, but it has made little progress toward achieving this goal. Its founders--fore- most of whom was the late Iraqi Prime Minister Nuni Said--professed a desire to work toward the sacrifice of sovereignty and special interest in order to attain such unity. The original members were Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen, along with Egypt and Syria, which in 1958 formed the United Arab Republic. Entry into the league by Libya (1953), the Sudan (1956), and Tunisia and Morocco (1958) brought the total membership to its present ten. Algeria, whose rebel government has a rep- resentative attending the current meeting, is not a mem- ber. In the 16 years of the league's existence, relatively minor advances in cultural and economic cooperation have been made, but political differences remain as pronounced as ever. The league attempts to set forth a coordinated Arab viewpoint on various issues and maintains information of- fices outside the Arab world for this purpose. This kind of display of unity is negated, however,by the almost constant propaganda contest among Arab leaders for position as the leading champion of Arab causes, At various times, for ex- ample, Cairo, Amman, and Baghdad have accused each other of promoting a policy of softness toward Israel or of lukewarmness toward the Algerian rebels. In recent years, Nasir's strong advocacy of his type of Arab nationalism and neutralism, which offends pro-Western Arab governments and many ambitious Arab leaders, has been the most constant irritant in inter-Arab relations. Jordan's King Husayn and Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim--well aware of Nasir's past sponsorship of attempts to overthrow their re- spective regimes--oppose Nasir's continued dominance of the League, but neither commands great trust or respect from other members. In such an atmosphere, the league is unlike- ly to increase its meager contributions to Arab unity, and ef- forts to form a bloc to undermine Nasir's influence in the or- ganization will probably grow only gradually. QN..F4DEN77XC 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 %Do El No. ,Situation in Ethiopia Deteriorating Haile Selassie's legal adviser had urged that trials of those suspected of disloyalty be conducted "in an open and dignified manner!' This the Emperor has refused. secret trials of civilians accused of criticizing the regime or of expressing sympathy for the aims of the rebels have been under way for over a week, with sentences of up to eight years pronounced. The Emperor has failed to reassert his strong personal leadership and the American ambassador has characterized the political situation in Ethiopia as a "state of aimless drift." Dissident elements are circulating antiregime rumors and distributing leaflets in the capital asking for support of the rebel cause. This activity, together with the widespread con- cern over the fate of General Menghistu, the former Imperial Body Guard commandant, has increased public support for the objectives espoused by leaders of the abortive coup. Western officials in Addis Ababa, aware that a continu- ation of the present trend could lead to further disorders, have apparently been unable to persuade the Emperor that prompt political and economic reforms are necessary to quell the dis- content. Addis Ababa had "the stink of Baghdad"--an allusion to the situation there preceding the revolution which overthrew the Iraqi roy- alty. The British Embassy, anticipating no constructive action v the eror, is formulating an emergency evacuation plan. 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20-50186 %IS C........3...5)1,44fIENTIAL, Vir ,Bolivian President Plans to Accept Both US and Soviet Bloc Aid alresident Paz has indicated to American Ambassador Strom that he is making plans to utilize both US and Soviet bloc aid. The United States has contributed grant aid in re- cent years to enable the Bolivian Government to balance its domestic budget. In a conversation with Ambassador Strom on 30 January, Paz conveyed the impression that he consid- ers American grant aid, contributed in recent years to bal- ance Bolivia's domestic budget, a part of ordinary revenues on which his administration can count:7 ijie USSR,which has offered a credit of $150,000,000, wants its aid to go to projects entirely separate from those where US aid is involved, according to an earlier statement by Paz. Paz has also said that he was consid- ering "reserving" for the USSR the opportunity to provide equipment for hydroelectric generating plants for the nation- alized Bolivian Mining Corporation because he assumed that such plants would not be included in aid to the mines from the United States, Germany, and the Inter-American Devel- opment Bank. If this assumption was incorrect, Paz said, Soviet aid could be reserved exclusively for the national pe- troleum compang ffhe Bolivian Government signed a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia on 23 January providing for relations between scientific institutions, universities, and cultural and sports organizations. The signing took place during the six- day visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Hajek, who had been in- vited by President Paz. Ambassador Strom notes that the pact is Bolivia's first cultural agreement with the bloc and that it provides opportunity for political penetratiod.) CONF TIAL 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 rNielp,,,SECIZET Venezuelan Government Concerned With Rightist Plotting Venezuelan military dissidents in exile are appar- ently plotting another attempt against the Venezuelan Government. Their plans might include an attempt on the life of President Betancourt, who was seriously in- jured last June by an assassination effort backed by Do- minican dictator Trujillo. Venezuela claimed to have evidence of Trujillo's continuing involvement with the plotters and presented charges against the Dominican Republic before the Organization of American States in November. Trujillo was recently reported "impatient and upset" at the delay or miscarriage of a new plan to assassinate Betancourt. The Dominican Republic also backed the abortive Venezuelan military uprising of 20-21 April 1960, which was led by exiles who crossed the border from Colombia. the Colombian Gov- ernment has been asked to cooperate in the surveillance of Venezuelan exiles reported to be in the border area. During two extended periods in late 1960 Betancourt faced widespread violence by strong pro-Castro elements which posed a serious threat to the stability of his mod- erate-leftist regime. On those occasions, and during the April coup attempt, the majority of the armed forces dem- onstrated loyalty to the government by taking prompt meas- ures to suppress the unrest. There is no evidence of seri- ous disaffection among the top levels of the officer corps. Another coup attempt is likely to aggravate the serious economic problems confronting Betancourt which both right- ist and leftist opposition elements can be expected to exploit. RET 3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Ld'LJI 1 1111.4 RRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000186