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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 4, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815578].pdf616.15 KB
41. 7,,,,Z7ZZZ/Z/ZZZ/Z.7777/7/7/ZZIOV777/77777777///7///, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 r e I %dr MET ivr 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 4 February 1961 Opy IN e cre CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 isfik TuP SECKti �TOP�SEGR-E-T-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 twi TOP SECRET 4 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. USSR: Earth satellite launched from Tyura Tam Mis- sile Test Range. (Page t) 2. Congo: Soviet bloc continues attempts to transit Sudan with "Red Cross aid" for Gizenga. (1,42ge t) 3. Albania: Peiping emphasizes its "inviolable" friend- ship with Tirana while rest of bloc criticizes Al- bania's "deviationism." (Page t) 4. Tunisia: Negotiations under way for Soviet assist- ance on public works projects. (Page tt) 5. Ceylonese Prime Minister, Mrs. Bandaranaike, plans visit to USSR in March. (Page tt) 6. Portugal: Some former supporters of Salazar advo- cate his replacement in wake of Santa Maria affair. (Page tit) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 kkaiiTizxr :11irf CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF Eurl_f>/psfo *USSR: An earth satellite was launched from the Tyura Tam giggle Test Range at about 2015 EST yesterday. The � period of revolution, apparently about BB minutes, indicates a low altitude orbit, and present evidence suggests this satellite will be recovered soon, probably this weekend. It is considered likely that a satellite larger than Sputniks IV, V and VI, which weighed in the neighborhood of 10,000 pounds, is involved. While such a satellite is probably part of the Russian man-in-space program there is no basis for concluding at this time that man or animal life is on board. `1) *Congo:a representative of Czechoslovak Airlines (CSA) reportedly made preliminary arrangements on 31 January with the Sudanese Government for establishment of CSA pas- senger and cargo services from Prague to Khartoum via Cairo. CSA hopes to continue the line to Stanleyville-.1 the Stanleyville regime expects a Czech flight via Khartoum between 6 and 15 February, as part of the Czech "Red Cross aid." The Sudan can probably stall in grant- ing transit rights for permanent service, but may find it diffi- rnir tn refuse transit of an alle7d1v humanitarian mission. �ththCzech and the Soviet requests of late January to transit the Sudan with food and medical sup- plies for pro-Lumumba areas of the Congo may be part of a plan to circumvent Sudanese refusal to grant transit of direct aid to Gizenga. / utiimunist unina' - Alban a In ecintraSt1Ot1Te oviet Un ion and East European satellites, which have publicly shown 70P�SfeRE-- 0 k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 %mod Ur SLUM:, I their displeasure with Albania's "deviationism" since the Mos- cow conference last November, Communist China continues to play up the "inviolable" friendship between Peiping and Ti- rana. On 2 February, Peiping announced the signing of six documents concerned with economic relations negotiated dur- ing the current visit to Peiping of an Albanian delegation. Details of the agreements have not yet become available, but a new Chinese loan to Albania may be involved. In discussing the agreements, the Peiping People's Daily on 3 February, In an apparent jibe at Moscow, emphasized the correctness of the statement in the Moscow declaration of last November that socialist countries "big and SYnn"" hnuP PrInAl rights and should "support each other." (Backup, Page 1) *Tunisia - USSR: President Bourguiba is negotiating for k Soviet credits for public works projects in Tunisia. Bourguiba cultic-) has been unable to procure enough credits from Western sourcer,,/ to carry out his ambitious development program. This step is � part of an adjustment of Tunisian policy intended to make it ap- pear more consonant with Asian-African nonalignment. Two Tunisian engineers went to Moscow this week to work out details of an agreement in principle made with the USSR in January to grant credits for the construction of three small dams in north- ern Tunisia and to finance an engineering school. This is the second Tunisian credit arrangement with the Soviet bloc; late last year Tunis arranged for an eight-year $8,000,000 credit from Poland, none of which has as yet been used. (CONFI- (Backup, Page 3) *Ceylon: Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government continues to encourage closer economic and diplomatic contacts with the bloc. The six-month-old government under Mrs. Bandaranaike is motivated primarily by an urge to demonstrate its neutralist position, while at the same time profiting from favorable trade and aid terms offered by the bloc. In addition to encouraging more ac- tive Soviet participation in development projects and "di- versifying" Ceylon's trade by allowing bloc countries a 4 Feb 61 TOP-SEeRET \\\\\\ N DAILY BRIEF Ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 41000I Lir JEA-ftE, I larger--though still limited�share, Colombo has fre- quently taken positions favorable to the bloc on major in- ternational issues, particularly in its role as a current member of the UN Security Council. Mrs. Bandaranaike plans to visit the USSR in March after the Common- wealth prime ministers' conference in London--her first official trip abroad and the first visit tn Mnsenur by a Ceylonese head of Government. (Backup, Page 5) '03ortugal: Some of Premier Salazar's stanchest supporters are reported to be shocked by his inability to cope with the situation produced bY the seizure of the Santa Maria and to have stated that he ust be replaced at some time in the "not too distant uture." No precipitate action is likely, but the various actions within the regime will probably make an early attempt to reach agreement among themselves regard- ing a successor. (Backup, Page 7) 4 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF lii -T-OP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2327/1711 CO2000187 New Economic Agreements Reaffirm Sino- Albanian Friendship The Albanian regime, which supported Communist China in its dispute with Moscow, has been under fire from the Soviet bloc since the end of the Moscow confer- ence in early December. East German party boss Ul= bricht on 18 December publicly accused Albania's Enver Hoxha of adhering to "dogmatic and sectarian" positions at the conference. This is the first such censure since the 1948 break with Tito. Other European satellites and the USSR also have slighted the Albanians on a number of occasions. Moscow's New Year's greetings to Albania omitted the usual introductory phase "dear comrades," � and its 11 January greetings on the anniversary of the proclamation of the "people's regime" in Albania, ad- dressed only to titular head of state Lleshi, mentioned only the Albanian people and not the party. On the same day, an article in the leading Bulgarian daily about Al- bania omitted the customary title "comrade" when speak- ing of Hoxlia. Tirana, however, has continued to hold to its devia- tionist positions, probably in large part because of its expectation of continued Chinese Communist support. In contrast with Soviet bloc treatment of Albania, Peiping in its 3 February editorial on the recently signed Sino= Albanian economic agreements, lauded the Albanian re= gime. It spoke of "the correct leadership of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) party headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha." Peiping, hoping to retain Albania's support, would prob- ably be willing to give Albania some additional aid despite serious economic troubles at home. Between 1954 and 1958 Peiping granted about $20,000,000 in economic aid to Albania to finance deliveries of Chinese goods and services. Under an agreement concluded in 1959, the Chinese extended another $13,800,000 credit to Albania for use between 1961 and 1965. The series of new economic pacts just concluded in Peiping 4 Feb 61 � CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 10111101 /*S probably has altered the terms of this agreement by boost- ing the total amount of aid. The most notable example of Chinese economic support to Albania during recent months has been the shipment of wheat at a time of critical food shortages in China. In 1960 these exports to Albania totaled about 105,000 tons, only a small part of which came from China, and the rest from Western Europe, Australia, and the USSR; all of it was shipped at the expense of the Chinese, however. Albania also is receiving at least 40,000 tons of the wheat Peiping currently is purchasing from Australia and additionaLde- liveries probably will continue throughout the yearLJ -ArRET, 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 m.o.% in ea Tr'," Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Tunisia Explores Soviet Credit for Public Works Project President Bourguiba's dispatch of two technicians to Moscow is in line with the gradual expansion of Tunisia's contacts with the Sino-Soviet bloc as well as with Bourguiba's policy of nonalignment. Within the past year, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR have established embassies in Tunis; a Tunisian am- bassador accredited also to Czechoslovakia and Poland has taken up residence in Moscow; several Tunisian secretaries of state have visited bloc capitals; and 32 Czech and Bulgarian technicians have been employed under contract by the Secretariat of State for Public Works. Moreover, Secretary of State for Information Masmoudi is scheduled to visit Peiping later this month, presumably as a prelude to Tunisian recognition of Com- munist China. These contacts have to some extent silenced Bour= guiba's domestic critics, who had argued that his former pro-Western alignment was hampering Tunisia's internal development and its development as a power. Bourguiba's long-standing quarrel with UAR President Nasir and his recent difficulties with Moroccan King Mohamed V have contributed toward the diplomatic isolation from which Bourguiba is seeking to escape. The American Embassy in Tunis estimates that the projected three small dams located on streams in north= ern Tunisia might involve foreign exchange costs of about $6,000,000. The estimated construction cost of all three is nearly $13,000,000. The Defense Loan Fund apparently had been approached for financing one of these dams, the Oued Kessab project. one of the Tunisian tech- nicians en route to Moscow plans to ascertain the nature of -TOP SECRET" 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 CY T!' eirrirf Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 %NO Soviet assistance to train junior engineers. Although discussions have been held between the Soviet Embassy in Tunis and the Tunisian Secretariat of State for For- eign Affairs regarding an engineering school, these plans remain vague. Present planning for a projected university In Tunis envisages an American contribution of some $2,000,000 over the next four years to a School of Law, Economics, and Business. As of March 1960, the Tuni- sians anticipated that France might contribute a faculty of sciences. -TOP-SE-eRE- 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 b02000187 *40 � Ceylon Encourages Relations With the Sino- Soviet Bloc The cordial relations established under the leader- ship of Mrs. Bandaranaike's husband, who was prime minister from 1956 until his assassination in 1959, have been revived during her six months in office. Work on development projects contracted for under the Soviet Un- ion's $30,000,000 credit of 1958 is being stepped up. Six Soviet experts arrived on 25 January to resume work on plans for the construction of an iron and steel mill near Colombo. Soviet engineers have also presented the Cey- lonese with preliminary plans for a flood-control scheme and an automobile tire and tube factory to be partially fi- nanced by Moscow. The Ceylonese finance minister, who plans to accom- pany Prime Minister Bandaranaike on her London-Moscow- Cairo trip, probably will discuss other projects available under the credit agreement as well as recent Soviet offers of civil aircraft, pilot training, and refined petroleum products. Moscow has offered petroleum products at prices considerably below those of the Anglo-American consortium, which is the sole local importer and dis- tributor of these products. Colombo's attempt to equalize its economic relations with the Communist bloc and the free world has resulted in new trade negotiations with various Communist govern- ments. Since last December, 'Ceylon has contracted for a total of 79,000 tons of sugar�chiefly of Cuban origin--from Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and the USSR; Ceylon in the past has relied on free-world sources for most of the 150,000 tons of sugar required annually. The government may also be considering the proposal made recently by a visiting East German trade union delegation for a trade agreement; Ceylon now has neither diplomatic nor formal trade relations with East Germany. A trade pact probably would be encouraged by the leftist minister of trade. Negotiations between Ceylon and Communist China con- cerning this year's protocol to their second five-year rice- -GaisiRDENT-f-A-t, 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Ana".�1 frqf r1.1-,11TFT9I A I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Nto, rubber barter agreement (1958-62), apparently are not final. It seems likely, however, that the substantially higher level of rice-rubber trade which existed prior to 1Qfl will e resumed under the 1961 contract. 7CONFIVEN1TAL-- 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 =.41,216= Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Impact of the Santa Maria Case on the Salaza,f Regime he Santa Maria incident has placed Portuguese Pre- mier Salazar in an unfavorable light in the eyes of some strong supporters who had expected vigorous guidance in directing governmental action. Salazar, who is almost 72, reportedly has lost physical and mental vigor since his early January attack of pneumonia. Since the end of 1958, some of his supporters have believed he has outlived his usefulness. Barring a turn for the worse in Portugal's re- lations with Brazil or unrest of threatening proportions in the African provinces, current dissatisfaction on the part of Salazar's supporters may, however, die down in the next few weeks. Furthermore, there appears to be no one in sight who, in the opinion of the various factions of the regime, could attract general support and carry through a viable successor governmerit.3 Among possible successors, Minister of the Presi- den y Theotonio Pereira is perhaps the leading contender, although the attitude of the armed forces toward him is not at prernt elPar, Others are Defense Minister Botelho Moniz and former Min- ister of the Presidency marcelio Laetamo, who is probably the most capable politician among the top proregirne civil- ians. e irritation shown by top-level Portuguese officials over the US position on the Santa Maria is likely to per- sist. The Portuguese still resent the US abstention on the UN resolution calling on Portugal to give information on non = self-governing territories. These factors are likely �to cause tougher bargaining on the extension of the bases agreement, which expires in December 1962. 4 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 Ic.tJp4r1LJL1iILtL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman,' The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary. of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director ��0N-F-tbErrT7AL� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187 App /47c, oilk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20001 8< J 04,/,r7 24?) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000187