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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 6, 1961
, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Nveo, yr ..16%�MC I v. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 6 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 -f-OP SECRET or ---TOP-SEGRE-T--____ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 \Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20%)1111;8' V 6 February 1961 � \ TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. USSR: Sputnik VII carries heaviest payload to date; if re-entry and recovery were planned. however, fnilyirP in this nhase seems indicated. 2. USSR: First Deputy Premier Kosygin reportedly says Khrushchev will attend UN General Assembly ses- sion. (Page i) 3. Laos: Government forces report they have occupied strategic junction near Phou Khoun. (Page it) 4. Congo: Support developing in UN for neutralization of rival forces; various factions in Congo likely to op- pose such an effort. (Page it) 5. South Korea: Chang Myon government, plagued with economic problems and corruption, failing to gain wide support. (Page tit) 6. Arab League: Surface unity of meeting which ended on 4 February covers continuing differences among league members. (Page iv) 7. Italy: Breakdown of talks with Austria over South T may threaten Fanfa,ni cabinet. (Page tv) 8. Dominican Republic: Government is reportedly bank- rupt as result of Trujillo's long-continuing transfer of funds and investments abroad for his own use. (Page v) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188- , Ito TQIN SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 6 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR: The mission objectives of Sputnik VII, launched from Tyura Tam at about 0115 GMT 4 February (2015 EST, 3 February) are not yet clear. If the primary objective was the demonstration of a more powerful propulsion system, the operation appears to have been successful in orbiting the heaviest payload to date. If in addition, however, a re-entry and recovery were planned, the evidence suggests a failure in this phase. The final stage propulsion system separated from the satellite immediately after launching. the satellite was stabilized in its flight, while the other piece was tumbling. Sometime between the 16th and 22nd or- bit the number of Sputnik VII pieces increased from two to at least three, and possibly six, although all pieces have con- tinued in essentially the same path. Tenuous evidence, includ- ing the continuation in a fixed position of the four Sibir-class missile-range instrumentation ships in the Pacific, suggests that another launching may be attempted in the near future. (Backup, Page 1) (Chart) USSR: The German ambassador to Moscow has informed k Ambassador Thompson that First Deputy Premier Kosygin told him in answer to a direct question that Khrushchev would attend the General Assembly session. presumably the regular session resuming on 7 March. Moscow had /P previously sparked rumors to this effect through the SudaneseAe-n-t delegate to the UN and the UAR ambassador in Moscow, and, \\ Top SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 TOP SECRET in discussing a possible date for the visit to Moscow by the � Ceylonese prime minister, the Soviet Foreign Ministry was vague as to Khrushchey's schedule for March. ) Although N Khrushchev would not return to New York, the USSR appears to be pur- posely holding the possibility of such a visit open perhaps with the final decision dependent on US reaction. ) (Backup, Page 3) Laos: ,Government forces have occupied 0 K the strategic junction of Routes 13 and 7 just north of Phou Khoun, guarding the western approach to the Plaine des Jar- res area. Kong Le/Pathet Lao troops, after several days of delaying action, apparently offered little resistance to the government's final move. the Chinese Nationalist irregulars who re- cently crossed the Burmese border into Laos may attempt some harassment of the Pathet Lao, President Chiang Kai- shek has reportedly ordered the irregulars to regroup and keep their strength intact so that they can survive either in Laos or in Burma. (Backup, Page 4) (Map) [Congo Situation: The generally favorable response in the O 1� UN to Hammarskjold's suggestion that the Congo crisis be "--c-- solved by neutralizing rival Congolese military factions has led to similar but more comprehensive proposals by several. UN members. Typical of these is a Nigerian plan which�in addition to neutralizing the Congolese Army and the fighting orces of the several "breakaway states"--would make the N responsible for law and order, permit the release of all ----' /7 4 olitical prisoners, including Lumumba, and provide for the stablishment of a new, broad-based government. This gov-74t ernment would then draft a new federal-type constitutio0 6 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET ii /Ps Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200018 104 TOP SECRET permitting a considerable degree of provincial autonomy and call for general elections under UN sponsorship. Reaction by the Soviet representative at the UN to the neutralization proposal of Hammarskjold has been reserved. The Congo- lese spokesmen at the UN, when apprised of specific neu- tralization proposals, strongly objected. Although Gizenga and Tshombe have not released statements on their reac- tions, a maximum amount of pressure would probably be needed to secure their compliance. The military situation in the Congo continues to pose difficulties for the UN forces, which have recently been weak- ened by� troop withdrawals. On 4 February, a UN Nigerian unit was ambushed by a pro-Lumumba force near Kindu in Kivu Province. Although an uneasy truce was called after an all-day exchange of fire b etween the two units, both sides have continued to maintain their battle positions. An improve- ment in the security of the outlying areas cannot be expected until more troops under UN control arrive in the Congo. Malaya and Liberia have expressed a willingness to supply additional military aid to the UN force, and the Republic of Too is scheduled to provide a "token" unit. (Backup,. Page 7) (Map) South Korea: The recent reshuffle of the cabinet, which brought five new ministers and four vice ministers into the government, is an attempt of the Chang Myon administration to rally more parliamentary support. Popular expectations were high following the ouster of Syngman Rhee last April, but the Chang Myon government, beset with factionalism and corruption and handicapped by a demoralized police estab- lishment, has not shown the dynamic leadership needed to gain popular support. Popular demands for reprisals against those associated with the Rhee regime has led to ex post facto legislation. Action under these laws could exclude from public life large numbers of the limited supply of trained personnel. With an assist from a heavy propaganda barrage from the North, the belief is spreading, particularly among younger 6 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 \Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188' ' 1410 TOP SECRET tfid intellectuals, that some accommodation with North Korea of- fers the solution to South Korea's chronic economic difficul- ties. Student elements, despite South Korea's continued strong friendship for the United States, are also beginning to blame their country's difficulties on its close ties with the US. (Backup, Page 9) Arab League: The Arab League, which ended its for- eign ministers' conference in Baghdad on 4 February, was again able to create a semblance of unanimity only by ap- proving:resolutions concerning opposition to Israeli activ- ities, support for the Algerian rebels, and agreed Arab candidates for UN positions. Five of the 16 resolutions were related to Israel. Continuing intra-Arab differences were reflected in the resolution, which again postponed ac- tion on amending the League charter to reduce Nasir's dom- inance. These differences are also reflected in the resolu- tion,which recommended that the Casablanca Conference resolutions merely be conveyed to those Arab governments which had not participated in that conference, instead of approving Nasir's role at Casablanca by endorsing the res- olutions. According to a report by Radio Baghdad, the Arab states renewed the oft-broken resolution to suspend radio and press attacks against each other. The important devel- opment of the meeting seems to have been the return of " 4-" " "4- 4 vs" s�%��� i.4-4 Mv����+; non Italy: The-Ffeakdown of Italo-Austrian negotiations over the status of the German-speaking population in the South Tirol area of northern Italy has resulted in some local vio- lence and poses a further, threat to the stability of the Fanfani,t, cabinet. Bomb explosions of anti-Italian tharacter have taken place in the South Tirol, while students in Rome�encouraged/7' 1 1 I by neo-Fascists--staged several days of anti-Austrian dem- onstrations which on 4 February took an antigovernment turn. Although Fanfani won parliamentary approval on 4 February 6 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF -TOP�SEGRET \\\\ iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 y1/4100 TOP SECRET Mr his handling of the dispute, the conservative Italian Lib- eral party has long been uneasy over the domestic policies of his government and may still be tempted to use Fanfani's allegedly "soft" approach on the South Tirol issue as a pre- text to dump him. (Backup, Page 10) Dominican Republic: Trujillo's continuing transfer of his own and the government's assets into dollars and invest- ments abroad has been on such a "fantastic" scale that the regime is now bankrupt, foreign ex- change reserves are now zero, despite recent technical ar- rangements with foreign banks to make it appear otherwise. Trujillo is probably expecting economic improvement from the current sugar crop.,- much of which he stands to sell at premium prices in the US market under the present legis- lative reallocation of the former Cuban sugar quota. (Backup, Page 11) 6 Feb 61 DAILY BIIIEF -T-eP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 1111� Aft, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 SOVIET EARTH SATELLITES 1960-1961 Sputnik IV Sputnik V Sputnik VI Sputnik VII Date of Launch 15 May 1960 19 Aug. 1960 1 Dec. 1960 4 Feb. 1961 Weight (lbs.) 10,011 10,143 10,050 14,292 Orbit Period (min.) 91.2 90.68 88.6 89.82 Apogee (statute miles) 219 196 164 227.5* Perigee (statute miles) 194 196 116 110.8* *tentative 10205 2 6 FEBRUARY 1961 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 002000 �ipd Launching of Sputnik VII The launching of Sputnik VII was quite similar in many respects to two space program launchings--both of which resulted in in-flight failures--made by the Soviets in October our ir-c ass missile-range in- strumentation ships were in the Pacific in about the same positions they were in last October. Two other Soviet ships, possibly range-associated, which are now in the South Atlantic, were also associated with the October op- erations from about the same general area they nrri nnui in. usoIb�ICBM booster system, but with an additional propulsion stage. This final propul- sion stage together with the payload made up a much heav- ier combination than ever before launched. Calculations indicated a Soviet capability to orbit a payload of 15,000 to 20,000 pounds, depending upon the degree of design sophistication made in the new final pro- pulsion stage. We have no reason, therefore, not to be- lieve the figure, 14,300 pounds, announced by the Soviets as the weight of Sputnik VII's payload. tne electrical system aboard the satellite m It is possible that the separation of Sputnik VII into sev- eral parts was planned and occurred on the 17th orbit. Dur- ing this orbit, the satellite passed over the area of the USSR where Sputnik V was recovered last August. The fact that all the various pieces of Sputnik VII appear to be in essentially the same orbit suggests that recovery of this satellite was planned, but that the retro=rocket system failed to operate. It is now anticipated that all parts of Sputnik VII will shortly TOP SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 002000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 411.04 re-enter the atmosphere and burn up, probably in about a week. Sputnik VII is probably the latest in the series of heavy Soviet satellites in the Soviet man-in-space program. This series began with Sputnik IV, which was launched on 15 May 1960 and which the Soviets subsequently tried but failed to de- orbit. The second successful launch in this series was Sput- nik V on 19 August 1960. Sputnik V carried a capsule con- taining two dogs and other biological specimens which was successfully recovered after being in orbit about 24 hours. The Sputnik V launching followed a launching on 24 July which resulted in an in-flight failure but which is believed to have been of an earth satellite vehicle, possibly part of this same series. On 1 December 1960, Sputnik VI was successfully launched, but due to some degree of failure during re-entry, only frag- ments of the capsule,which was carrying dogs, are believed to have reached the earth the following day. On 22 December, another attempt to orbit an earth satellite vehicle failed, but part or all of the payload is believed to have been recovered by the Soviets after an 1.800-mile flight. -70P-SEC-RE- 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 WIT) crrrovrr Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Khrushchev May Attend UN Session Since the US election, Soviet bloc sources have en- couraged speculation that Khrushchev would use the UN as a forum for establishing contact with President Ken- nedy. Last September, Khrushchev put forward a pro- posal for a special session of the UN General Assembly in the spring of 1961 to be attended by heads of govern- ment for a discussion of disarmament. The Soviet del- egation attempted to clear the way for such a session by pressing for an early resumption of the assembly after the holiday recess in order to complete work on all items except disarmament, which would then be considered by the heads of government. Although Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated this proposal for a special meeting in his foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet on 23 December, bloc propaganda has not stressed the idea. In- stead, Soviet spokesmen have indicatedr that Khrushchev would return to New York for e resumption of the assembly and would expect to meet with the Pres- ident. An Izvestia correspondent sufflYPStPC1 this nrnficallire. although such a meeting could be confined to a general dis- cussion, the two leaders might reach agreement to resume negotiations on Berlin; Shortly before the inauguration, the Soviet military attache in Turkey stressed to his American counterpart the need for an early meeting between the Pres- ident and Khrushcev. About the R2111P fitYtC77 Khru- shchev and the satellite leaders wlllnrobablvreturn to New York. Soviet of- ficials did r exuuae a meeting between Khrushchev and the President. Khrushchev's apparent desire to establish early contact with the President was also reflected in hisP lconver- sations with Western diplomats at the end ohieith,er and in early January. He made it clear, however, that his main purpose would be to lay the groundwork for a four-power summit meeting. While leaving open the possibility of his attendance at the UN, the Soviet leader may wish to avoid a firm commitment to return to New York until he has had more time to estimate the position of the new ITS administra- tion on specific East-West issues. Te.P 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Iry rt Fri Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 *toe IMO The Situation in Laos C-Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces are reported to be mov- ing eastward along Route 7 leading to the Plaine des Jarres following their withdrawal from the junction of this road with Route 13. Artillery fire probably was a major factor in the government's retaking of this point. � Some consolidation presumably will be necessary before General Phoumi's forces can press their apparent advan- tage0 govern- ment troops to "push on as far as possible toward Muong Soui" after Phou Khoun was occupied, leaving some troops there and at Muong Kassy to the south to guard against pos- sible enemy counterattacks. aubstantial numbers of Kong Le/Pathet Lao troops con- tinue to block the southern approaches to the Plaine des Jarres area in the vicinity of Ban Ta Viang, and the gov- ernment airstrip at Tha Thom has recently, been reported to be under sporadic shelling by 120-mm. mortars. C-Soviet IL-14s based in Hanoi continue to conduct supply flights into the Xieng Khouang area. Soviet LI-2s be- gan to fly supply missions into Laos on2 February. Eighteen of these aircraft arrived in North Vietnam in mid-January and have been engaged in shuttle flights between Haiphong and Hanoi. The 11-2 is similar to the US C-47 and has a slightly smaller cargo-carrying capacity than the IL-14. [-General I Fu-en, chief of staff for intelligence of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force, has said that the irregulars In the Burma-Laos border area have had long and excellent contacts with Laotian officials in the district adjacent to the Mekong River and in Vientiane, The general claimed that Phoumi Nosavan was not only friendly toward Taiwan but would be delighted if the Nationalist troops, pretending to be Laotians, caused e the Pathet Lao trouble. He reportedly planned to leavD 6 Feb 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 044'Approved for Release 2020/08/11 CO2000188 RIO chieeig� Stu. \ L....-/". .. � use: ir.. P 1 0 N 0 Keng Lap* o Phn P0 e* A ..-...�-, - ..-.),_., 4. i, r. , - , ....i...�i, ,-... .... t', a -,. 1' A r A ....-' Manna / 14 A ISA r t!..\ z 1 ,,1 i 1 i t ...) � 'kJ LUANG 'A t -Si A- � te- '-'�..../S.,,sf.. h...., Moan Nadi. 0 biluang Pore, hi '-" �udonjrrai Dan Sat THAILAND 111%15 LAOS 6 FEBRUARY 1961 Government forces Government Antigovernment fit Antigovernment cencenrrations In /RR* Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces A Main route number Road Trail Chinese Nationalist Irregulars o � 25 50 75 1006,1,, 1.1/.1 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers Bose 26716.1 5.56 r 61 640 .Chen Pro0 C .IL I N A _JAY - NORTH Van arr., it OE RE RAO _la CAC BA DEMARCATION LINE 'I SOUTH AVANE IETNAM ( 1 � LA - CAM BODIA Stung ldent Lebeedemea mid nom. tee not erroinso4 Mode rem, red by th� U.S. Government Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 ,. .... Approved fo7Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 (-Taiwan for Bangkok and Vientiane on 2 February to pro= mote closer ties with Phoumi in Vientiane:7 CAccording to one report, Chinese Communist troops supported the Burmese attack on the irregulars at Keng Lap and Mong Pa Liao but have withdrawn from the area and are returning to China. Peiping has made no public reference to the fact that Chinese troops have been in- volved in action against the irregulars, but the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported on 4 February that irregu- lar forces had withdrawninto Laos following clashes with the Burmese Army. The NCNA dispatch cited Hong Kong press reports to the effect that the irregulars, under Tai- pei's direction, plan to join the Bourn Oum government and fight against the Pathet Lao. Peiping could use the move- ment of irregulars into Laos as a pretext for more open intervention there but would be unlikely to do so at least until" the irregulars become actively engaged in the fight- ing._ _ [In Vientiane, former Premier Phoui Sananikone is re- ported anxious to undertake the formation of a more broad- ly based government under, certain conditions. According to one version, these conditions include approval of the Boun Oum government and the United States, participation of Sou- vanna Phouma, and acceptance of Pathet Lao representatives into the government at some future date. Phoui was forced out of office in late December 1959 as the result of pressure by the army, the King, and General Phoumi's now moribund Committee for Defense of National Interests. As a leader of the moderate, old-guard politicians in Laos, Phoui is prob- ably hopeful that he can emerge as a compromise premier in a broadened government. However, the group he represents has progressively lost ground to extremist forces of both right and left:3 [There are rumblings of discontent in the Laotian mil- itary establishment. Numerous ranking officers have been shunted off to relatively unimportant positions during the course of General Phoumi's purge of those officers who fai1 ed to demonstrate unswerving loyalty to him during the period) TOP-SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 rrnr� ore�nr,Pr Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 4taur 'WO C thi6 fall when he was in opposition in Savannakhet to the Souvanna Phouma government. Many of those whose careers are now suffering as the result of Phoumits shake- up come from the north and resent the disproportionate in- fluence enjoyed by PhoumPs and Boun Oum's southern fol- lowers. TOP SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 rim I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 %Kr' Nov Situation in the Congo LThe American interest in promoting a new approach to the Congo is meeting with general approval from many UN delegates. Latin American and Scandanavian represent- atives consulted have expressed general agreement, a UK delegate has recommended to London that the approach be supported, and the UAR representative has characterized It as a "step in the right directionr_I ThP French position is unclear. Paris probably would cooperate, but at the meeting in rang last week of the foreign ministers of the Community of Six, the French for- eign minister was quoted by his Belgian counterpart that the "UN effort had failed" and that France was considering extending "bilateral military and other assistance on an ade- quate scale to Kasavubu and his supporters73 [Most representatives of the neutralist Afro-Asian bloc in the UN have stressed the need for Lumumba's release at an early stage and indicated that they would tolerate Bel- gium's continued presence in the Congo only under strict UN contro1:3 __{Th 't ti confused.iva onin aan aconmues o e negotiations between representatives of the Leopoiaviiie and Katanga governments to form a common military front a- gainst the Gizenga regime had collapsed. Tshombe, after rejecting Kasavubu's final offer, announced his refusal to send a delegation to the round-talle talks scheduled for 15 February. since further approaches to Tshombe would prove useless, the Leopoldville govern- ment probably would eventually renew its attempt to elim- inate Tshombe by armed attack) Ctshombe, however, may believe that his regime will benefit more from Belgian�and possibly French--support than by becoming involved with the distant Leopoldville) -TOP�SECRET- 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 _ pm% A don tic Ocean Brazzaville Leopoldville Matadi .ThY"ille Luanda �Gemena Coquilhatville 6 FEBRUARY 1961 UNCLASSIFIED STATUTE MILES , /Pas.oko Port Francqui Luluabour; 31534 Luputa the Congo Stanleyville Bakwanga .Kamina Kindu Bukavu Kongolo Albertville Manono Elisabethville Lake Albert Usumbura Lake Tanganyika Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 tPtid **00 (f. orces. Hammarskjold implied to Ambassador Stevenson on 2 February that Belgian supply efforts to Katanga were of greater magnitude than those to Stanlevvilie hv thp TTAR and the bloc. Ha,mmarskjole. bdIU U1N personnel nag observed three Belgian officers aboard the aircraft which bombed Manono last week and had seized at least one crate of arms on a Belgian air- craft which landed at Kitona on 1 February. Five other crates carried by the ail-craft are to be inspected, -E--gaielj TOP SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 CONFIDENTIAL South Korean Problems Since his election by a bare� legislative majority last August, Prime Minister Chang Myon has gradually con- solidated power by easing factional opponents from the ruling Democratic party and the government, and has in- creased his support in the 233-member lower house from 118 to 127 seats. Although internal maneuvering against Chang is likely to continue, the new cabinet appointments are aimed at resoring party harmony and securing the pas- sage of the supplementary budget later this month. The public has been willing to reserve judgment until Chang has had an opportunity to prove himself. However, there are signs of growing impatience with the failure of the administration to satisfy the expectations generated by the April revolution against Syngman Rhee. An increasing number of South Koreans are coming to believe that only unification will solve their economic problems. South Korea, which has over two thirds of the Korean population but few basic resources, is dependent on the United States for more than 50 percent of its budget and about 90 percent of its imports. Cut off from the Commu- nist-controlled industrial North and saddled with a huge de- fense burden, South Korea is unlikely to achieve a viable economy soon. The Chang government, aware of the dangers, has un- dertaken a series of economic reforms. The effect of these, however, is undermined by factionalism within his party and irresponsible opposition attacks. Unless the administration can win wide public confidence before spring, when food will be in even shorter supply, students and others may again take to the streets. In the event of large-scale disorders, the army may not react with the same restraint and unity it displayed last April. -QON1DfNTtt 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 SECRET *10 Tension Over South Tirol Issue After years of inconclusive negotiation regarding Italian implementation of the Italo-Austrian pact of 1946-- providing special rights for the inhabitants of the former Austrian South Tirol--Austria brought the issue to the UN General Assembly last fall. In line with a UN recommen- dation, the two countries undertook new and high-level ne- gotiations on 26 January, but the talks broke down after two days. Italy had offered greater administrative powers for Bolzano Province--the heart of the German-speaking area�but Austria had insisted on a kind of local autonomy similar to that of the Italian region of Sicily. This would have required legislative changes. CAn Italian delegate who participated in the abortive talks has told US officials that Rome is in "no hurry" to admit that further talks "are hopeless." The government apparently intends to maintain a public posture of holding the door open for further talks while maintaining the status quo in the area Eif the Liberal party--which fears Premier Fanfani will form a center-left reformist government dependent on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support�withdraws from the coalition that supports Fanfani's minority all - Christian Democratic cabinet, the government will be brought down. Discussing the general outlook for the government a few days ago, the secretary of the Christian Democratic party said the situa- tion has become unstable. Although hopeful of saving the government, he spoke of its continued existence in terms of months and weeks-7,3 The neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement, with its pres- tige revived as a result of having been the sole parliamentary supporter of the Tambroni Christian Democratic government last year, is trying to exploit the situation. The neo-Fascists may provoke further anti-Austrian demonstrations in Rome and probably, hope that new clashes will occur in the South Tirol which will require disciplinary measures and draw Italian troops to the area. -9EeRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 11141!' �SECRET Thp Dominican Republic's Economic Situation The 24 January decree naming Generalissimo Tru- jillo "P resident of the State Banks" and coordinator of a wide range of institutions dealing with most phases of the countr 's econo reports that the dictator's financial manipulations had brought the regime to the point of bankriinte70 On 27 Jan-. uary, a cabinet minister said that there were virtually no funds left to run the government. Trujillo's tightened control over the country's econ- omy will enable him better to cover up his recent depreda- tions and mismanagement and to continue to siphon off the country's wealth. During the past 30 years he has amassed a fortune estimated at between $500,000,000 and $800,000,- 000 and gained personal control over a large portion of the country's agricultural and industrial enterprises. Over the past 13 years all but one of the top officials of the Central Bank have been denigrated and made scapegoats for the gov- ernment's economic and financial decline. Few knowledgeable Dominicans interpret Trujillo's fi- nancial moves as evidence that he is preparing to flee the country soon--though provision for such a possibility is one of the motives for hitaransferring large amounts of assets abroad. In fact, Trujillo's present political activities--such as his campaign to pressure the Catholic Church into con- ferring on him the title of Benefactor of the Catholic Church-- suggests that he feels confident of his position. The controlled press and radio claim to see reason for hope that the new US administration will reverse the previ- ous one's "disastrous" policy of joining in the OAS' diplo- matic and economic sanctions against the Dominican Repub- lic. Trujillo's lobbyists in the United States have been ac- tively promoting the contention that recent US policies have been pushing the country toward the Sino-Soviet bloc--a con- tention that the vindictive Trujillo has himself attempted to prove by instructing his propaganda media to engage in SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 'sae' SECRET pre-Castro and pro-Soviet diatribes and by actively seeking political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc. Trujillo's main hope of early improvement in the economic situation lies in the sugar crop now being har- vested and in the maintenance of existing legislative ar- rangements governing its marketing in the United States. Under a law which expires on 31 March, the Dominican Republic obtains more than 200,000 tons of the former Cuban sugar quota with its premium of more than 2.5 cents per pound over the world price, in addition to the same pre- mium on the long-standing Dominican sugar quota. US officials in Ciudad Trujillo report that both the re- gime and the dissident elements view congressional action on the "windfall quota" as the critical test of US policy to- ward Trujillo, and that the reaction of the dissidents will be strongly adverse to the US if the "windfall" is continued. Trujillo has met with at least preliminary success in his effort to circumvent the embargo on sales of petroleum, petroleum products, trucks, and truck spare parts to the Dominican Republic voted by the OAS on 4 January. Oil companies operating in the country have assured him that they can prob e obtained in Europe, though perhaps at higher prices. SECRET 6 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 12 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 Sr' THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman,* The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 tqe -GONFIDENTIA-t- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000188 17. 46 0 0 4. fr frZI WZ. 44,17. 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