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February 8, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 *I � I %or arunci__ 8 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL 80 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN "I tOP-SECRft z A Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 TOPRET The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. in this publication is based on all sources, including Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep- resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi- fication in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793,794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 SE (b)(3) 8 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1, Laos: 2. Congo: Kasavubu opposes enlarging the mandate of the UN forces in the Congo. (Page t) 3. India: New Delhi has reportedly purchased_____ engine IL-14 transport aircraft from USSR. age twin- ) 4. Turkey: Soviet ambassador arns government leaders that Soviet-American relations are improving rapidly. and Turkey may soon be "outside the club." (Page it) 5. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin ituation. (Page tit) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 P I teg � *. ' Mang PA do 4 ��.1"-"`--3 \ - r � H +IA . Muong Sate- g Li LUANG \17 II �ma nu 10208 .Udon Then, THAILAND LAOS B FEBRUARY 1961 Governinimi forces G ivernntlit Antigovernment Antigovernment romenirati ns Kong Le ll'athet Lao forces 7 Main route number ---- Road � Trail A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars 0 25 }.5/,1 ' 0 25 50 50 7,5 50 Miles 715 100 Kilometers &me 26716 5-58 Nt MO AN ARCATION UNE SOUTf-/ A AVANE c(f.1 Akiar4 Ube., nt,� Worm Cnareret � Lic C A M BO DI A F,`Stung Treng amen ore not nern.,san by th; Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 ' qui9 (b)(3) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 8 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Hanoi on Vrebruary broadcast a recent interview with �Kong Le in which he expressed his thanks for aid from "the Soviet Union and other socialist countries!' This is the sec- ond recent public reference to Soviet assistance for pro- Communist forces in Laos. On 2 February, Chen Yi, Com- munist China's foreign minister, commented that Soviet "support" was a "righteous action!' Chen Yi's remark may have been intended to Justify his own offer of Chinese Com- munist support= "If the lawful government of Laos headed Rniivninna Phatima" asks for it. ' Congo: Lpresident Kasavubu and Foreign minister Isom h - boko have expressed strong opposition to any plan which would enlarge the mandate of the UN force in the Congo. They reportedly believe that such a move would infringe on the Congo's sovereignty and feel that a UN attempt to neutralize the Congolese Army would interfere with their planned operation against Kivu Province' which Bomboko stated was imminent, At the UN, Soviet delegate Zor2.1.9 --SEGREZ Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 %NO SECR,F. reiterated Moscow's position that elimination of Belgian in- luence and the release of Lumumba were prerequisites for a solution of the situation in the Congo. He opposed a neu- tralization of the troops supRorting Lumumba until these conditions had been fulfilled. t Stepped-up political and mil- itary activity in Leopoldville- is coinciding with indications that Katanga may take a more strongly separatist line under the influence of Tshombet new French military adviser, who stated on 4 February that he believed a unified .Congo state is unrealizable. (Backup, Page 1) India-USSR: ew Delhi's determination to build up its airlift capability in the Himalayan frontier regions appar- entlyLakil led Indian officials to arrange for the purchase of Soviet IL-14 (Crate) transports. These twin-engine piston transports will apparently supplement theTC-119 "Flying Boxcars" andA14-12 (Cub) turboprop transports purchased last year from the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the AN-12s, which� are scheduled to arrive in India before April, the IL-14s are probably being purchased at bargai7 nriee and for rupees rather than hard foreign currency:is USSR-Turkey: jAs part of Moscow's effort to induce the Turkish Governmen to adopt a friendlier policy, toward the USSR, the Soviet ambassador has been warning Turk- ish leaders that Soviet-American relations are improving very rapidly to a point where agreement might be reached which would leave Turkey "outside the club." The ambassador also de- livered a note on 3 February inquiring if reports in the local) 8 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF 11 (b)(1) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 (b)(3) IrIS SEt+Ce.;.k ess that NATO IRBM bases are being constructed in Tur- key are correct. The note reaffirmed the USSR's desire for ,"good neighborly relations" and warned against any steps that might draw Turkey into "dangerous ventures." Soviet iiiplomats employed similar tactics following Khrushchev's t4risit to the US in 1959, accusing smaller NATO countries, "new Greece and Turkey, of being out of step with the .'new trend" in Ea,st-West relationi:! rkish Foreign Minister Sarper has described Premier Oursel as "furious' at the Soviet ambassador's action but he Also expressed some apprehension over the possible reaction to the latest ft ft officials in the iovernmelg '(Backup, Page 4 CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa- tion for the period 17 January 1961 through .6 February 1961. 1. We are currently in an interim period during which the USSR is intent on reaching an assessment of the new US administration and the possibilities of negotiating with the West on major issues. Therefore, for the next few months the USSR is unlikely to increase tensions over Berlin. How- ever, should the Soviet leaders at any time during this period estimate that additional pressure would be calculated to bring the West more quickly to high-level negotiations with the USSR, they may increase the threat of unilateral action in an effort to expedite talks. 2. The East German control practices on the Berlin in- tersector boundary havefl not softened to the extent that West 8 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iii gEeRF.,1 (b)(3)\ Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 (b)(V SECtik.k. Qermany had been led to expect as part of the price for rein- stituting the Interzonal Trade agreements. However, the West German Economic Ministry is "still not unhopeful" that action will occur soon in accord with earlier assurances. 3. There are indications that East Germany has begun on some of the necessary long-range moves in an effort to malte its economy independent of Western imports and thereby deprive the West of this leverage in future negotiations over Berlin. 8 Feb 81 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 CrictilErT Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 vt00 The Situation in the Congo President Kasavubu and Foreign Minister 130MDOKO, in a conversation with the American charg�n Leopoldville on 6February, expressed the belief that events are moving in their favor in the political and military fields and that a neutralization of the Congolese Army would reverse this trend. They also reportedly feel that the UN would use any addition- al powers to the disadvantage of their government and might eventually impose a trusteeship over the Congo. The charg� comments that Kasavubu is unlikely to consent to such a pro- gram so long as he feels time is on his side.! C"&cording to Bomboko, an attempt by the UN to bring the Congolese Army under its control would thwart the Leopold- ville government's plans to mount a military operation against Kivu Province within ten days. Bomboko and Kasavubu ap- parently believe that their chances for regaining control of eastern Congo are fairly good as a result of disaffection among Gizenga's troops. At the same time, Kasavubu stated that Congolese officials were attempting to form a "provisional" government which could be installed immediately.) Hammarskjold has scoffed at Western concern for Kasa- vubus position, stating that the Congolese President "has no prestige." He continues to believe that a military solution to the Congolese situation is impossible, and he reportedly feels that Mobutu and Bomboko are too closely tied to Belgium to have any future in the Congo. Hammarskjold feels that if they are removed, Kasavubu can be persuaded to form a constitu- tional government.) viet UN representative Zorin told Ambassador Stevenson on 6 February that the UN would not be able to deal with troops which are subject to colonial domination�presumably a refer- ence to Mobutu's and Tshombe's forces--in the same manner as those which support the "legitimate government." He ques- tioned whether the latter would lay down their arms until Lu- mamba is released and parliament is reconvened. Zorin also reiterated the Soviet charge that Hammarskjold has failed to carry out previous Security Council mandatesT! i_Colonel Roger Trinquier, the French officer who report- edly is to become the chief of Tshombd's Katanga armed forces, REZ 8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 "CrMan LIFT' Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 NIS '11111104 Gald a press conference on 4 February that a unified Congo state is unrealizable. Pressure from Trinquier, whom previ- ous reports had linked with separatist members of Tshombd's government, may weaken Tshombd's willingness to maintain his present tenuous contacts with Leopoldville and make it even more difficult to brine ICatanaa into a fricipratpd Comm state2 8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 "ZricqacT Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Indian Purchase of Soviet IL-14 Transports (9bjections by Indian military leaders to the purchase of Soviet equipment appear to have been overruled recently by economic factors, especially the gradually worsening foreign exchange position, coupled with New Delhi's desire to dem- onstrate its cordial relations with Moscow as a hedge against Peiping in the. .Sino-Indian border dispute. These same fac- tors, plus the desire for a high-altitude capability, led New Delhi to seek MI-4 (Hound) helicopters from the Soviet Union in late 1960. The failure of the demonstrator on its first proving flights in the Ladakh area has apparently stalled fur- ther negotiations for helicopter23 he reported purchase of IL-14s reflects also the Defense Minxstry's desire to relieve the mounting pressure on its fleet of aging C-47 (Dakota) transports, which have borne the brunt of New Delhi's logistic support of road-building crews and mili- tary forces in the sensitive and remote Indo-Tibetan frontier region. The IL-14 is capable of operating at altitudes some 7,000- 8,000 feet higher and carries about 2,000 pounds more cargo than the C-47. The USSR has substantial numbers of IL-14s in civil air service, but they are expected to be largely replaced by the newer, higher performance TU-124 and AN-24. Nearly 100 of, these aircraft have been furnished by the bloc to non- bloc countries. The purchase of IL-14s will provide New Delhi with a stopgap aircraft until it decides on a more suitable C-47 replacement to be manufactured in India. The cabinet is now considering prototypes designed by Lockheed and AVRO, a British firm.i (b)(3) L 8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 (b)(3) (b)(1) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 n v.+ rri Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 141md Spviet Attitude Toward Turkey ance the overthrow of the Menderes regime last May, the USSR has maintained a cautious but friendly attitude to- � ward the Gursel government and sought to encourage the Turkish leaders to adopt a more independent foreign policy. Khrushchev invited General Gursel to make the trip to Mos- cow which had been scheduled for last July by his predeces- � sor but Gursel refused. While expressing disappointment that the new regime was not going to return to Ataturk's policy of neutrality but was planning to remain in NATO and CENTO, Khrushchev indicated there was no reason why Soviet-Turkish relations could not be gradually improved. aoviet officials on a number of occasions have offered Turkey economic aid, including credits of up to $500,000,000. In a talk with Turkish Foreign Minister rper in New York last October, Khrushchev reiterated offers of Soviet assistance and asserted that Turkey's membership in Western alliances is not a major obstacle to better relations. He suggested that the two countries establish a demilitarized zone along their common frontier by withdrawing their forces "several hundred kilometers," and observed that the Black Sea could be turned into a "sea of peace." Shortly thereafter, the Soviet ambassa- dor in Ankar4 told a key Turkish government figure that the USSR is willing to demonstrate its good will toward Turkey by reducing its Black Sea Fleet and naval installations in the area and by guaranteeing to respect the present Soviet-Turkish borderj ame members of the ruling military Committee of Na- tional Unity reportedly favor accepting economic aid from, and improving relations with, the Soviet bloc, but such action would run counter to popular feeling in Turkey. Both Gursel and Sarper are committed to maintenance of Turkey's eloce lies with the WeEI9 et�iziEr 8 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 *eel THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Justice The Attorney General Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director CO JAL Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 oxy, trz,z/ xi/ z�i (zrzrzrz rzwzrzrzrzt Tv0i3W" 4 4Apprio ecl or Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190 .\\\\\\\\\\\\\N\ 1\\\* \ik4 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2000190