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February 9, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Nig *C�ICC I ,40( 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2 9 February 1961 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -MID-SECRET- /fre Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 ilk Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 -TOP-SEC-PET- mipm, -Top-sEeFiET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 V4VI 61164 %, V A NO' 9 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS Laos: Vientiane troops east of Phou Khoun are meet- ing strong resistance from Pathet Lao forces. (Page i) 2. Burma: Most of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars still in Burma may be forced into Thailand. (Page t) 3. Congo: Mobutu moves troops in preparation fqr of- fensive against Gizenga. (Page t) 4. UAR.-Syria: Nasir extending his control over Syrian economy through new foreign exchange limitations. (Page it) 5. Nepal: Exiled Nepalese politicians in India are com- pleting plans for resistance movement in Nepal. (Page it) 6. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 NINO b./ LA Mime CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: bovernment troops probing several miles east- ward along Route 7 from recently occupied Phou IChoun junc- tion are reported meeting strong resistance from Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. Airdrop operations have been noted re- cently at various points east of PhoulChoun'.1 [Soviet transports have been landing daily at the Plaine des Jarres airfield regardless of heavy cloud cover, sug- gesting the possibility that these landings are being aided by a radio homing beacon located at the airfield (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Burma: he only significant force of Chinese National- ist irregulars still in Burma--possibly 3,000 to 4,000 troops-- was reportedly under attack from Burmese troops as of early February. The irregulars will probably have to retreat into Thailand. This group is 50 miles south of the fortified area from which 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars were recently driven,, into Lao) *Congo:CMobutu is apparently moving troops toward the northwestern and southwestern borders of Orientale Prov- ince in the first stage of a long-planned offensive against the Gizenga regime. There is insufficient evidence available to permit an accurate assessment of the outcome of this opera- tion. The military moves, which seem designed to coincide with new efforts by Kasavubu and his followers to form a provisional government in Leopoldville, will be hampered by the general unreliability of the Congolese troops and by logistical difficulties. However, Gizenga's ability to meet an invasion has been weakened by Mobutu's blockade of Cong-o3 -77313-5E-C-RE-T Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 . Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 �sri (River traffic which has causPc1 A critical Ahnrtarre of gas- oline in Orientale Province:- (Backup, Page� 3) (Map) UAR-Syria: President Nasir continues to wrestle with the problem of making a reality of the three-year-old con- stitutional union between Egypt and Syria. On 5 February he took a major step in extending Egyptian control over the dgAtt,� relatively free Syrian economy through a decree establish- ' ing foreign exchange controls aimed at halting the flight of .20.4.,t, Syrian capital and conserving the UAR.'s dwindling reserves of hard currencies. Reactions among Syrian businessmen have been antagonistic and there has been a noticeable in- crease in statements ormosing the union with Eavot. a high degree of sensitivity to Syrian public opinion and are coupled with orders to assuage public concern. im- rile_m_Plation of the new decree has begun. (Backup, Page 5) Nepal-India: Ousted leaders of the Nepali Congress party, who have en conferring in India since King Ma- hendra's take-over of the government on 15 December, are completing plans for a "peaceful" resistance movement in Nepal. Their campaign will take the form of mass agitation and strikes to be staged in the near future. Nepali Commu- nists are also planning resistance activities, but their at- tempts to form a united front have been rebuffed by the Con- gress leaders. Nehru, while careful to avoid any overt ac- tion which would alienate Mahendra, has reportedly sanc- tioned Nepali Congress organizational activity in India. 'In Katmandu, increasing signs of opposition have led the King to make further arrests and shut down two newspapers; gov- ernment operations remain largely at a standstill owing to uncertainty and to the ineffectiveness of the King's new Coun- cil of Ministers :- (Backup, Page 7) 9 Feb 61 -0 DAILY BRIEF ii oP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 %La WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS A. To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostil- ities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future:3 B. CNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to ini- tiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future3 C. a'he capabilities of Communist forces in Laos for sus- tained military operations continue to be increased by the bloc airlift and by road improvements which permit truck support of the Plaine des Jarres area from North Vietnam during the dry season. There are no indications that the Communists intend to launch a major offensive in Laos at this time, but they possess the capability for such action and hence could exploit any favorable opportunity with sur- prise. The bloc is seeking both to legitimize its opera- tion and to play for time by promoting the establishment of the Souvanna Phouma "cabinet" in Xieng Khouang and by opposing a reactivation of the International Control Com- mission without a prior international conference: D. izenga's Stanleyville regime appears to have lost momen- tum, partly as the result of his failure to receive supplies and because of withdrawals. of pro-Stanleyville UAR troops from Equateur Province, Gizenga's African and bloc sup- porters are likely to increase their efforts to furnish ma- terial aid through the Sudan, which continues to deny trans- it rights, particularly if the proposed military movements of thP 11/1rihntii fnreps acraingri- Stanl llea wined. liTifh 9 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF -TOP SECRET 111 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 SECRET Now' Situation in Laos assessing the capabil- ities and intentions of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in the Plaine des Jarres area, conclude, on the basis of present indications, that the enemy will fight a delaying action along Route 7 preparatory to making a major stand either at Muong Soul or on the Plaine des Jarres itself. They estimate that the force now in contact with govern- ment troops just east of the Phou noun junction of Routes 13 and 7 consists of about two battalions, supported by a battery of 105-mm. howitzers, a few 120-mm. mortars, and two to four armored cars. This force could be rein- forced by an estimated four battalions (1,200 to 1,500 men) for a sudden counterattack on the government forces; how- ever, it is considered more likely that the bulk of this re- serve will be used in the defense of Muong Soul or the Plaine des Jarres. A potent factor in any delaying action would be the use of antitank mines, which the enemy has recently in- troduced into the fighting:7 The assessment notes reports of intensive recruitment activity on the part of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao combine, both for new troops and work gangs to be used in road im- provement and construction of defensive positions. The Pathet Lao are considered poorly trained, with North Viet- namese advisers in most cases providing tactical guidance down to the company level. With regard to logistics, it is estimated that a minimum of 40 tons of supplies are being landed daily by Soviet aircraft at the Plaine des Jarres air- field complex. This tonnage is apparently, being augmented by an undetermined amount of supplies being moved in by truck via Route 7 from North Vietnam) 0-Despite the defensive tactics being pursued by the en- emy in Xieng Khouang Province at the present time, the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces retain the over-all initiative in Laos through their ability to mount guerrilla attacks on widely scattered government posts:j outh Vietnam reportedly plans shortly to send a s _Iiecial army team to Laos, to be attached to Phoumi's staff.__ SECRET 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 . PHIJNG S V' f Kent Laps � � . . leloog Pa tia* � )...,,Adi i . , . , , C \ � ... gu m 2 N -k NI. I fir, ,..44 N.. ./ A, / LUANG ABANG l.�� t P , ) c-----,. ,,....,_ 71-- K. ) �-I�3 ',-��)" � . ..---,...,.... nt .) aesior 4) \ Don so MoMong Plotsanuiesk VIE NBAN CAP 14111 Rot. THAILAND �^* LAOS 9 FEBRUARY mei Gavernment forces Governm,nt Antigovernment Antigovernment concentrations � Kong Le (Pathet -La!, forces Main route number Road Trail Chinese Nationalist Irregulars 0 25 50 75 100 Miles I" 0 25 50 75 100 Kilorneters 155208 Base 267f6.1 5-58 ,,Bro-res, CAM BOP IA � Stunt Tn.' Sounderrei ond ere not neces..,r-ly Amu 'recognized by A. U.S. Government lit DE NE BOO ILE CAC BA DEMARCATION ONE .1` N't 806801*10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 SECRET the South Vietnamese military attache had been asked by the I3oun Oum govern- ment about the possibility of providing psychological war- fare and intelligence advisers for a newly established in- telligence organization. Phoumi and Boun Oum were in frequent contact with South Vietnamese leaders last fall during the period of their opposition to the Souvanna gov- ernment. Although Saigon promised them full support, it is not known to have provided significant assistance either In terms of materiel or personnel, up to this time. 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Ask Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Republic of the Congo CENTRAL AFRICAN- REPUBLIC SUDAN .Gernena EQUATEUR Coquilhat011e Brazzaville � LEOPOLDVILLE Leopoldville �Thysville Mat di Luanda Atlantic Ocean ANGOLA 9 FEBRUARY 1961 Port F ancqu STATUTE MILES 400 31592 Bauko KASA Bakwanga Luputa A T A Lake Albert UGANDA' KIVU Buka u RUANDA WWI Use Kongolo Albertville .Manonc GA ElisabethNell FEDFRVION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND ura TANGANYIKA Lake Tanganyika Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 'amp/QrrPcTVgid Situation in the Congo (Mobutu's troops in northeastern Equateur Province reportedly will approach battalion strength in a week, af- ter the reinforcements and trucks now being moved up the Congo River by barge reach 13umba. Mobutu apparently plans to move this force up a tributary of the Congo to Buta and thence southward by truck toward Stanleyville. At the same time he reportedly is concentrating other troops in Luluabourg, preparatory to a move overland through Lodja, Ikela, and OpaliQ (Mobutu and his lieutenants have so far given no indi- cation that they can handle a large-scale military under- taking, although in the present operation they presumably will be assisted by Belgian advisers. Congolese troops are poor fighters unless they receive strong leadership. In addition, the offensive will suffer from severe logistical handicaps. The southern group in particular faces difficult supply problems, since it will have to rely on secondary roads, often passing through hostile territory, for all sup- port once it leaves Luluabourg.73 rOongolese officials in Leopoldville appear to be under- estimating the difficulties facing their forces. They appar- ently are under the impression that Gizenga's regime has been sufficiently weakened to permit conquest of the eastern Congo. Ammunition and gasoline are in critically short sup- ply among the Stanleyville forces as a result of Mobutu's blockade of Congo River shipping. In addition, parts of the Congolese Army in Orien- tale and Kivu provinces are disaffected and have offered to come over to Mobutu's 51de.3 LBehind-the-scenes maneuvering among Leopoldville pol- iticians has intensified following the conference at the end of January. At Kasavubu's request, representatives of various groups reportedly are attempting to form a provisional gov- ernment and to have it approved by the members of parliament== representing all regions of the Congo--who have remained in Leopoldville since the legislature was closed by Mobutu 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 SECRET C8eptember. There apparently is widespread agreement that all important Congolese factions should be represent- ed; however, it is still questionable whether Lumumba supporters will agree to serve with Katanga represent- atives or that Kasavubu can reconcile himself to thp in- clusion of some Lumumba aclherenti SECRET 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 ..Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 1 in"---iteitE� �4110 President Nasir Extends Control Over Syria There are increasing indications that President Nasir will issue a new unified currency, probably on 22 Febru- ,a,ry--the third anniversary of the United Arab Republic. More than 15 million new "dinar" notes with a face value of almost $215 million were printed in the UK in early spring 1959, and issuance apparently was scheduled to begin about July 1959. However, pressures from leading Syrian politicians and businessmen caused Nasir to post- pone this action until his political control was more firmly estab The economic philosophies of the leaders of Egypt and Syria are quite dissimilar. Cairo has moved far in imple- menting Nasir's "socialist, democratic cooperative" con- cept which calls for substantial government ownership and economic control. With such control Nasir has been able to facilitate long-term economic planning, utilize large Communist credits, and direct private investment accord- ing to government design. Foreign exchange restrictions are essential for such an operation. In Syria, meanwhile, a free enterprise system has con- tinued with relatively little interference from Damascus. In fact most of the important Syrian leaders have fully support- ed this system, realizing that with very limited government resources the success of the country's overambitious econom- ic plan depended on full cooperation from the private sector. However, as Nasir added more and more controls in the Egyptian region, Syrian businessmen began to lose confi- dence. A substantial capital flight took place and foreign exchange reserves dropped to all-time lows. This, coupled with three successive years of drought, brought the country's economy to a low level of activity. In an effort to restore confidence, UAR Vice President Nur al-Din Kahhalah, a Syrian who is in charge of planning for the Syrian region, proposed a UAR guarantee for foreign and domestic private investment in Syria. Acting for the TOP SECRET 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 tioTOP SECRET Syrian Expeutive Council In Nasir's 23 December speech celebrating the 1956 "victory" over France, Britain, and Israel, he described UAR capitalists as "exploiters and profit seekers" and threatened to liquidate them. Two days later, Nasir denounced the Execu- tive Council's recommendations point by point TOP SECRET 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 �40, -SECRET Ousted Nepali Politicians Organize Resistance Movement Against King Mahendra Exiled leaders of the Nepali Congress party met in the northern Indian city of Patna on 27 and 28 January to plan a detailed program of resistance activity in Nepal against King Mahendra's direct rule. The King, acting primarily out of fear for his personal power, in December dismissed the Con- gress party government of Prime Minister Koirala, dissolved Parliament, suspended constitutional rights, and banned all political activity. Koirala and 138 other politicians remain under arrest in Katmandu. Deputy Prime Minister Subarna Shumshere, who has been in India since the day before the King's take-over, has spurned royal overtures and undertak- en to lead an active opposition campaign aimed at restoring parliamentary government. The gathering in Patna was attended by three former min- isters and avnany as 29 of the 101 members of the dissolved parliament. LThe Congress party leaders decided against any resort to armed insurrection until all possible means of polit- ical pressure on the King to reverse his action have failed. They also agreed not to cooperate with the Nepali Communist party to overthrow the monarchy except as a last resort. The Communists have been urging violent resistance in selected areas of Nepal; having failed to persuade other groups to work with them, they reportedly now are concentrating on organiz- ing bases, particularly in areas along the Tibetan border, from which some future revolutionary action could be launched3 Relations between Katmandu and New Delhi have be strained since Mahendra's move in December. Nehru, sur- prised and highly annoyed by the King's action_.) immediately expressed his "regret" over the "complete reversal of democ- racy" following Nepal's successful national elections in 1959. The Katmandu press reacted violently against Nehru's "inter- ference," and Indian officials have since been guarded in their SECRET 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 SECRET Nes comments on Nepal. asiehr assured Mahendra that India would continue to support s government) New Delhi ap- parently has concluded that it cannot afford any action which runs the risk of prompting Mahendra to seek closer relations with Peiping. {'hose Indian officials and politicians who are in regular contac with Nepali Congress leaders have privately in- dicated that New Delhi will not oppose their activities as long as they do not seriously embarrass the Indian Governmen13 9 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIQENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 � . 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 *NOO THE PRESIDENT The 'ice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Director, The Joint �Staff Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000191 .:rt/r" '4