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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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February 11, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 %so ZC�KC I 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 11 February 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 'TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 TUll'-aEeRET- -T01"-SEeRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 \ Approved \for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193' %1010SECRET40,19 11 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Communist China: Peiping selling silver bullion to help pay for recent grain purchases. (Page t) 2. Laos: Vientiane government to hold special cabinet meeting with King Savang today; may propose nego- tiations with Souvanna Phouma as tactical gesture. (Page t) 3. France-Algeria: De Gaulle says preliminary talks with Algerian rebels under way in Tunis. (Page ti) 4. Congo: Fate of Lumumba still uncertain. 5. Sudan: Opposition groups active against Abboud gov- ernment. (Page itt) 6. Iran: Attempt to foment general strikes today ex- pected to have only limited success. (Page itt) 7. British Cameroons: Disorders likely during self- determination plebiscites on 11 and 12 February. (Page iti) SECR Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 \ \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193' �1110� SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 11 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR - Communist China: Reports from Hong Kong indi- cate the Chinese Communists are selling silver to increase their foreign exchange holdings in order to pay for part of the recent grain purchases from Australia. Two British vessels recently departed China for London with cargoes of bullion silver reportedly worth more than $5,000,000. This amount is less than ten percent of Peiping's commitment to Australia, 0 k and goes only a small way toward meeting its over-all current foreign exchange obligations. These shipments may foreshad- ow more substantial sales. According to the US Embassy in Moscow, a Soviet repre- sentative in Tirana recently asked the French Embassy if the Chinese Communists had lived up to their contract covering purchases of French wheat for delivery to Albania, and par- ticularly whether Peiping had paid for the wheat on time. Such a request suggests that Moscow does not know how the Chinese plan to meet their current balance of payments crisis, and has not advanced a hard currency loan for Chinese emergency im- 'ports from the free world Laos: The Boun Oum government is casting about tor way of improving its political standing, both at home and abroad. special cabinet meeting, presided over by King Savaxig, is to be 'IL, held in Vientiane today. General Phoumi has said the cabinet will propose to the King that while intensifying military pressure on the Plaine des Jarres area, the government at the same time should announce its readiness to negotiate with its "enemies and rivals--even Souvanna Phouma." There is general agreement in the cabinet, however, that negotiations withthe Pathet Lao Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 \ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 �101 would be futile. Consideration will also be given at the cab- inet session to broadening the base of the Boun Gum govern- ment. Peiping on 10 February broadcast a People's Dail editorial attacking "continued US intervention in Laos,' and charging that its southern borders are threatened by Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Laos. Peiping strongly reasserted Its opposition to a reactivated international Control Commis- sion (ICCbinlesallle_ICCAs nredM byall_interrmann-grann- ference. the USSR also favors an international conference as Qpposed to Britain's proposal to reactivate the ica-.3 (Backup, Page 1) (Map) France-Algeria: De Gaulle said that taik-s with the Algerian rebel National Liberation Front (FLN) were under way in Tunis. He cau- tioned, however, that such talks should not be considered of- ficial contacts or negotiations. De Gaulle was not optimistic concerning prospects for negotiations with the FLN, and said he was "not in a conciliatory mood." He believes, however, that Tunisian President Bourguiba can be a "useful interme- diary." According to the Tunisian charg�n Paris, Bourguiba and De Gaulle will meet either the week end of 19 or 26 Feb- ruary (Backup, Page 3 Congo: There has been no further information concern- ing Lumumba's escape, which was reported by Katanga offi- cials on 10 February. Moscow radio and several other sources have suggested that the escape story was concocted by the Katanga government to cover up the ex-premier's death. If Lumumba has in fact escaped, he faces difficulties similar itt,45_, to those which confronted him on his flight from Leopoldville last November. Before he can make good his escape, he must travel on poor roads through several hundred miles of territory in which at least part of the population is hostile to him. Tshombe reportedly is recruiting pilots and soldiers in South Africa and may attempt to obtain recognition from the 11 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF Ii --8EeRET� ��: Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 %100 former French Congo in return for financial assistance to President Youlou's goverrpent. (CONFIDNTIAL NO FUR- Sudan: Opposition elements in the Khartoum area have been active in the past few days, and the leaders of impor- tant political and religious groups who have long been press- ing for a return to civilian government reportedly plan to submit an "ultimatum" to the Abboud government. This list of demands was prepared by Siddiq al-Mandi, leader of the large and influential Ansar religious sect. Mediation efforts are under way, but it appears unlikely that Abboud will make any major concessions. The opposition group, if the regime remains unresponsive, plans to stage a series of antigovern- ment demonstrations and strikes. (Backup, Page 4) Iran: an attempt by Iranian nationalists (antiregime non- Communist elements) to foment a general strike in Tehran, Isfahan, and possibly other cities today, is likely to meet with only limited success but may serve to attract sympathy from the general public. Demonstrations protesting the rigging of the current parliamentary elections have been going on sporadically for three weeki3 The opponents of the government are calling for a shut- down of Tehran shops and the bazaar and are urging high school and university students to join the strike. The nation- al railroad system and the textile mills of Isfahan may also participate. The tobacco workers have indicated that they are ready to strike, but the nationalists are reported to be reluctant to accept this support because of the strong Tudeh (Communist) influence among those worker'S-A i C britiSh CamerOeIns:-CDisorders may occur in the British- , , administered UN trust territory of Cameroons as a result 613 11,0� 1 11 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF 111 -SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 ' \W� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200019314 \ . SECRET Gleparate self-determination plebiscites being held in the ter- ritory's southern and northern sectors on 11 and 12 February. Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, the alternatives posed in both areas are union with newly in- dependent Nigeria or union with Cameroun, a French trust territory prior to its independence last year. Observers ex- pect the northern sector to opt for Nigeria despite an inten- sive last minute effort by the Cameroun government to win support there. British officials anticipate that southern vot- ers will favor Cameroun, probably by a small margin..D` (Backup, Page 5) (Map) 111 '�� i��\ 11 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv SECRET � � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 oleraelt geng Lap� Meng Pa L PING � . N a rrehi � T Wrong Sii."'" � t � r I! 5 Muang Aflgr I-- oDan sa, LUAN BANG Muong Kn de Ja r o H LI Ta Viang Plong ghat �Udon Teen THAILAND 10222 LAOS 11 FEBRUARY 1961 Government tortes Ant:government Anti4;overnment concentrations Kong Le 'Pathel Lao forces Main route number Trail A Chinese Nationalist Irregulars O 25 ua 75 100 Wes O 25 50 75 100 Kilometers SA, k \ (NI Moe, Pnanoe oteuang Vasoteo Mud �Wenn Chamrao, Nt. CAMBOD a, nem. em not necesserrOF 6, A. U.S. Govereenoni '1Ampern Chem men, ILE CAC BA ng lnuong CM Noe RON ASSAks.) 5, AlT 5 A � Stung Treng Mon Cat ILE OE Kf WAD ne�DEMARCAEION LINE Bo K6ern Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Situation in Laos The Bourn Oum government, since its formation in mid- December, has failed to generate enthusiasm in .Laos or wide- spread international support. It is generally undistinguished in composition, and some members are known to be corrupt. Its principal weakness, however, lies in the fact that it is es- sentially a regional government rather than a national one; it is overloaded with individuals from southern Laos, associated with Boun Oum and Phoumi in their Sa,vannakhet Revolutionary Committee. It is doubtful that Souvanna Phouma can be lured into any broadened government�mainly because of the animos- ity between him and Phoumi. However, the inclusion of repre- sentatives from the Vientiane area, from Luang Prabang, Nam Tha, and Phong Saly provinces in the north, and from Xieng Khouang Province in the east would make the government more truly national, putting it on more competitive terms with the Communist-supported shadow government in Xieng Khouang. The government's ostensible bid to the Pathet Lao as well as to Souvanna's followers is probably merely a gesture designed to erase the impression, widely held abroad, of political inflex- ibility and a single-minded preoccupation with a purely military solution to the crisis in Laos. ahe government advance along Route 7 toward the Plaine des Jarres area has been slowed considerably by the systematic delaying tactics of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. The col- umn has advanced only a few miles eastward from the iunetio7 with Route 13 near Phou Khoun three large crat- ers in the road, making a combined break of about thirty feet. The enemy has also felled trees up to six feet in diameter, engi- neered landslides and rockslides in steep defiles, and made extensive use of landmines. In the Ban Ta Viang - Tha Thom area of southern Xieng Khouang Province, little action has been reported; however, there are reports that the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces are sending reinforcements of about battalion strength to Ban Ta Viang.".3 Stating that Communist China takes a "particularly serious" view of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Laos, People's Daily on 10 February observes that this development "cannot but 11 Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 NOW ea La %.0.1 1,1-4 arouse the serious concern of the Chinese people." While Peiping seems intent on linking itself more directly withthehos- tilities by citing the threat it faces from an old enemy, the editorial contains no warning of action. People's Daily, however, does reflect Peiping's uncom- promising mood on Laos. Repeating the now-familiar charge of US "intervention," the editorial also hits at Britain and France for having "failedto�take any effective action to stop US aggression." These two countries are implicitly dammed for favoring reactivation a the ICC before an international conference is held on Laos. The Chinese insist a conference must come first. People's Daily states that the ICC's terms of reference have "become obsolete" because the ICC was originally set up to stop fight- ing between the government of Laos and the Pathet Lao. Peo- ple's Daily points out that since Souvanna Phouma's "lawful government" is not fighting the Pathet Lao, a conference is necessary to issue new instructions. This stand is a reversal of that held by Peiping in late December, when Foreign Min- ister Chen Yi urged that the ICC "promptly resume its activi- ties and fulfill its sacred duties." CIn recent talks with Western officials, Soviet spokesmen have reiterated that it is absolutely essential to convene an in- ternational conference on Laos Moscow could not agree to the British proposal of 21 January, which called for the Indian chairman of the ICC to discuss with King &yang the possibility of reactivating the commission. Re- flecting Moscow's position on this matter, Polish officials in Warsaw and Moscow, in conversations with Western am- bassadors, have expressed their opposition to a reactivation of the Tee without first convening an intern tional conferen 11 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 De Gaulle Acknowledges That Talks With Algerian Rebels Are Under Way &meeting between French and rebel representatives at Melun last June failed even to resolve procedural problems involved in preparing an Algerian settlement. De Gaulle ex- pects FLN leaders to demand the release of FLN Deputy Pre- mier Mohammed Ben Bella and other imprisoned rebel chiefs as a precondition to negotiations CDe Gaulle's invitation to Bourguiba to visit Paris was is- sued about the date of the conversation concerning talks withthe rebels. The Tunisian charge in Paris emphasizes that the meeting is intended to serve as a steppingstone to conversa- tions between De Gaulle and rebel premier Ferhat AbbaiD e rebels will resent any intimation that Bourguiba's visit involves substantive negotiations on an Algerian settle- ment. An official representative of the rebel provisional government told a US Embassy official in Tunis on 9 February that while the rebels have "full confidence in our Tunisian friends" and Bourguiba has "every right to go to Paris," there can be no substitute for direct negotiations between the rebel and French governmentS.. The rebels may eval- uate the results of Bourguiba's visit by whether it tends to Promote or bypass such direct negotiations: ii Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Intefnal Pressures Against the buctanese Military Government Antiregime plotting has been chronic in the Sudan since the T58 revolution brought General Abboud to power. The opposition group which is now renewing its demands had pre- sented a petition to the government last November calling on the army to return the government to civilian control. The Supreme Military Council�the regime's top ruling body--was split over what action to take against the signers; it finally determined to ignore the petition officially, and contented it- self with mild harassment of some of the signers.3 Cfhe opposition, which is by no means unified itself, has not until now sought to bring about a showdown. However, leaders of the group have recently been touring the provinces drumming up support, and they apparently feel that they now have sufficient strength to force concessions from the govern- m ent_D '?he government's greatest strength is its ability to rely on army support in the event of public disorders. Although there is almost certainly plotting among junior officers, the coalition group of civilian opposition leaders does not appear to have strong support within the army. In recent months Major General Hasan Bashir Nasr, deputy commander of the armed forces, has improved his control over the army by en- suring that loyal officers man the key posts. He has indicated in the past that he would resist any attempt to displace the mil- itary reginin (ft is possible that Abboud will attempt to split the civilian opposition by letting Siddigal-Mandi fill two or three minor ministerial posts on condition that he withdraw from the anti- regime coalition. As the head of the 1,500,000 members of the Ansar sect, the Mandi in a crisis situation could presum- ably count on the backing of several thousand primitively armed tribal warriors. Moreover, a substantial number of Ansar sect army troops would follow his leadership-3 SECRET 11 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 #11% BRITISH CAMEROONS 11 FEBRUARY 1961 STATUTE MILES 300 UNCLASSIFIED � Kaduna NIGERIA .Enugu EG 31575 � NORTHE N CAMEROON SOU ERN AM OONS Buea CAMEROUN CENTRAL AFRICAN REt'UBLIC Bangui poUala *Yaounde GABON 102113 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 A A iv L.AJ A 11 r1L 41.4 *IS '4,00 Pieuiscrce in tsritisn Lameroons CLondon hopes that the vote this week end will lead to a speedy and orderly termination of its responsibilities in an area it has ruled under international supervision since the first World War. Involved is a 34,000-square-mile terri- tory with a population of some 1,600,000, which has long been divided for administrative purposes into northern and southern sectors-.1 ENorthern Cameroons was governed as an integral part of Nigeria's Moslem-dominated Northern Region prior to Nigerian independence last October,and all major political parties active in the area favor a permanent return to that status. Such a solution is also strongly desired by north- ern Nigerian leaders as well as by Britain, which for some time has been working quietly toward this end. Within the past year a number of reforms have been introduced to re- dress local grievances believed to have been largely re- sponsible for the area's failure to agree in a November 1959 plebiscite to retain ties with an independent Nigeria. At that time a majority of northern voters chose to postpone a de- cision on the area's future. Should the forthcoming vote unexpectedly also go against Nigeria, a severe crisis, pos- sibly involving Nigerian intervention to nullify the plebiscite, could ensuee: Ole outcome appears to be much more uncertain--and the likely aftermath more unpromising�in Southern Camer- oons, which enjoys considerable local self-government and has been treated since 1954 as a potential fourth region of Nigeria. The governing party--by a slim margin--favors federation with Cameroun, but public opinion is sharply divided with major tribal groups opposing each other on the issue. The fact that some of these tribes overlap the coloni- al frontiers with Cameroun and Nigeria enhances the possi- bility that, in the event disorders do develop, either or both of those states may feel compelled to step in to protect re- lated tribesmen. Actually neither government has been anx- ious to acquire the southern territory, and Cameroun's con- servative rulers are distinctly unhappy over the prospect olj -C-ONRDEN-71-Ar 11 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 a .4 a. 441.04 110 65.ining more dynamic southern tribesmen while losing the north. Of particular concern to Camerounian President Ahidjo are radical elements in Southern Cameroons affili- ated with the extremist wing of the Communist-influenced Union of the Cameroons Populations in Cameroun republic. These extremists are continuing to carry on terrorist ac- tivities in southwestern Cameroun against the republic's pro- Western government Cpritish officials in Nigeria have expressed confidence that their battalion in the trust territory is capable of coping with any disorders which might develop. An additional bat- talion to the territory could be airlifted on short notice if necessary from the strategic reserve in Britain or Kenya -C-ONFIDENTIAL U Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 yrrir I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 Nor/ *PO � THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Director, The Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 " 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193 P�SECRIT P-9� 4r 7); rf ?o: I /r. 7 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2000193