Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 13, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815558].pdf773.93 KB
Wow. 13 March 1961 Copy No. C 77 CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 TOP SECRET 0-4 -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 . 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 101 Uf-I- 13 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Thompson. (Page t) 2. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 3. Congolese reportedly believe Indian troops are coming to enforce "Dayal's plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo." (Page it) 4. Angola: Portuguese officials try to conceal heavy native reas_ualtir in recent military operations. Page it) 5. Brandt's visit: SPD position paper discusses Bonn's role in Western relations with Soviet bloc. (Page it) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 1 JLA-1(C. 1 %of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 13 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR: an his conversation with Ambassador Thompson on 9-Wrch, Khrushchev raised the Berlin and German ques- tion and stated his desire not to worsen but to improve US- Soviet relations. He refrained from proposing resumption of negotiations or setting a deadline for action, but did reiterate his warning that the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the wartime allies did not agree to a treaty with both German statei-D LOn the disarmament issue, Khrushchev again tied Soviet agreement to general disarmament with the proposal to reor- ganize the UN secretariat, and used the Congo sit stress repeatedly the need for revision of the U1sQ (Backup, *Laos: Vientiane representatives and Souvanna Phouma are expected to meet this week to discuss details of the gen- eral program announced by General Phoumi and Souvanna in their talks at Phnom Penh. Souvanna's departure from Phnom Penh on a world tour is still scheduled for 15 March. Moscow characterized the Phnom Penh discussions as a diplomatic defeat for the Phoumi forces and emphasized that Souvanna stood firm on the need to convene an international conference to settle the Laotian problem. Both Peiping and k Hanoi have indicated that they are interested in the vaguely worded communique' only as a departure point for propagan- dizing the deteriorating position of the Boun Oum regime. gong Le Pathet Lao forces in both the Phou Khoun and Muong Kassy sectors apparently are consolidating their posi- tions. Their patrols continue to maintain contact with govern- ment force (Backup, Page 4) %47:41 II 'z,z4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 V "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 �11 IA.,' 011...t...,/XL. Congo: he expected arrival of the first contingent of Inaia's troops on 16 March will confront the UN with its next big hurdle in the Congo, according to Ambassador Tim- berlake. He feels that there is widespread belief among the Congolese that India's troops are coming to enforce "Dayal's ,41 plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo,"] / LXhrushchev, in his recent talk with Ambassador Thomp- son, showed little interest in the possibilities of a Congo set- tlement and used the occasion to reiterate Soviet charges of the ineffectiveness of the UN policies in the Congo. (Backup, Page 6) Angola: in one recent military operation at least 243 natives were killed, 90 wounded, and /7' 30 taken prisoner. The governor general saw problems in -/-/) minimizing the number of casualties, since the size of the op-P eration was known in Angola but "the actual number would in= hate the case in the eyes of international opinion." He sug- gested, "perhaps we could avoid mentioning numbers, saying that they were not high but that they are not known for certain, because the natives gathered their dead and fled with them. If you consider it advisable or necessary to indicate the numbers, then I suggest 14 dead natives in order to minimize the case." (Meanwhile, the leading non-Communist nationalist organ- ization in Angola is planning to launch a terrorist campaign on he night of 14 March in an effort to convince the Security ouncil that discontent is growing in that Portuguese territoryD. (Backup, Page 8) Berlin: an analysis of Soviet policy prepared at Mayor Brand's request for possible use during his US visit stresses that Bonn could play a key role in Western disarmament plan- ning and the relaxation of international tensions, in view of the). 13 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 (importance of the German problem to Khrushchev. It points to the desirability of a more intensified Bonn effort to ex- ploit internal instability in East Germany, without provoking the USSR, and calls for Bonn to establish diplomatic relations with the East European satellites. The paper, prepared by Sada' Democratic party (SPD) experts, suggests that an SPD victory in next September's national elections--now believed unlikely by most observers--would bring a new "national con- centration of effort" which could force Khrushchev to reap- praise his whole German p01icy:3 Eithile Brandt may be unaware that the memorandum was released into American official channels, presumably passed it on with the knowl- edge that its contents- -including its moderate tone and favor- able view of the Kennedy administration--would become known in Washingtmi.j (Backup, Page 10). 13 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET r iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 CONFIDENTIAL Aire Khrushchev Spells Out Soviet Position on Germany, Disarmament, and the UN At the end of his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev spelled out the Soviet position on Germany and Berlin along the lines of the recent memorandum to Bonn. He stressed the necessity of a peace settlement with both Germanys in order to confirm postwar developments and provide a legal foundation for the postwar borders. He denied that the bloc had any desire to expand to the West and offered to make a state- ment to this effect if the US was prepared to begin peace treaty negotiations fin connection with his threat to sign a separate treaty with East Germany, Khrushchev was careful to evade any response to the ambassador's question on how a separate treaty would affect the Allied position in West Berlin. Khrushchev reaf- firmed that a peace treaty would include a clause providing creation of a free city for West Berlin, but urged that the US and USSR join in working out a new status for West Berlin fithrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of the Berlin problem in asserting that the USSR would provide any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in West Berlin and to assure the United States that its prestige would not suffer. As examples of guarantees, he mentioned a joint police force, presumably composed of the four powers, and he repeated a previous Soviet proposal to permit stationing of symbolic forces of the four powers in West Berlin. He made it clear that East Berlin was excluded from a settlement on the grounds that it was the capital of East Germany, but he com- mitted Ulbricht to sign any guarantees for West Berlin.I {The Soviet leader concluded his remarks by repeating that if the US and USSR could sign a treaty on Germany, it would mark great progress in their relations and establish an atmos- phere of trust. He added that a treaty could be implemented by installments and provide for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Germany, which would aid in negotiations and disarmaments Erhe most notable aspect of Khrushchev's statements was his failure to stress the urgency of early negotiations on Berlin, ai) ----CONFffiENTIAL 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 CONFIDENTIAL Noe (Jie has in his recent conversations with Western diplomats and the Soviet memorandum to Bonn. This suggests that the USSR will continue to hold the Berlin question in reserve un- til the Soviet leaders assess more fully the US position on major East-West questions. Khrushchev's remarks on Ade- nauer's role and references to the memorandum to Bonn also suggest that he may be awaiting a reply as a pretext for pre- senting a more exact demand on negotiations. A French For- eign Ministry official was recently told by his Soviet counter- part that Moscow was considering a foreign ministers' conference on Berlin and Germany] [On the disarmament question Khrushchev implied that the Western powers were attempting to defer negotiations. His insistence that Soviet acceptance of general disarmament was linked to UN revision was the same position he took last fall at the UN General Assembly. At that time, however, he ex- plained that the reorganization scheme was not a prerequisite for negotiation an his statements to Ambassador Thompson on the Congo, Khrushchev labeled UN policy as "colonialist" and stressed that the USSR would oppose it "with all its means." He emphasized that a reorganization of the UN was necessary to prevent another situation such as that in the Congo, and argued that the US should have an interest in reorganization, since it might be in a minor- ity position some time in the future. Khrushchev's revival of the link between UN revision and disarmament, which has been played down in recent Soviet statements, probably foreshadows a more intensive effort to use the appeal of disarmament to gain support for at least Hammarskjold's resignation or progress to= ward a greater Soviet role in the UN executive organg-. CICh' rushchev showed considerable satisfaction when informed by Thompson that the US hoped shortly to lift its ban on Soviet crabmeat imports, although he expressed some disappointment at the recent canceling of a license for precision grinding ma- chines. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that trade relations must be normalized and again emphasized that the USSR-) 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Awe CONFIDENTIAL Nue grades with other Western powers. In addition, he pointed out that the USSR does not compete with the US in trade and could be a very good customer for American exports. Khrushchev avoided mentioning Moscow's previous request for credits to finance Soviet purchases. CONFIDENTIAL 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 SECRET The Situation in Laos General Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that during his recent visit to Phnom Penh, he was able to clear up the misconceptions of the Cambodian foreign minister over King Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission--com- posed of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya--and that Souvanna himself now would attempt to persuade Sihanouk to reconsider his rejection of the commission's chairmanship. Although Phoumi and his aides returned to Vientiane ap- parently convinced of Souvanna's acquiescence to an investiga- tive commission prior to a full-scale international conference, there is already some indication that Souvanna may have been temporizing. Souvanna is reported to have stated publicly on 11 March that the three nation commission should meet "about the same time" as the 14-power conference proposed by Si- hanouk, in order to enable the conference to give directives to the commission. Phoumi also reports that he and Souvanna, in their discus- sion of the question of a coalition government including the Pathet Lao, agreed that Communists should hold no posts. Phoumi, however, apparently did not rule out the possibility that "non-Communist" members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), the Pathet Lao's political arm, might be included. A long- standing argument of Souvanna, which has found favor among many Laotian officials, is that Prince Souphannouvong--head of the NLHS�and many other party members are nationalists rather than Communists. Moscow's initial reaction to the discussions between Phoumi and Souvanna Phouma indicates that the USSR will claim that the general compromised his own position as a result of his visit to Phnom Penh and that Souvanna will accept no solution in Laos which does not make the convening of an international conference the first order of business. A Pathet Lao statement, rebroadcast by both Peiping and Hanoi, vigorously attacked Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh as an effort to "use the name of Premier Souvanna Phouma" to split SECRET 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 SECRET the Laotian people. The Pathet Lao radio claimed it was only because of military reverses that Phoumi "attempted to compel Prince Phouma to negotiate with and make conces- sions to the traitors' clique." The statement clearly indicated that the Communists do not recognize the Phnom Penh commu- nique as in any way restricting their freedom of action. Reflecting some uneasiness over the possibility that Sou- vanna may have made some deal with Phoumi, the Pathet Lao radio stressed the unflinching support of the Pathet Lao for ces for Souvanna. It pointed out that Souvanna's speeches and statements made in Xieng Khouang during his visit there prove that he would refuse "to knuckle under in any circumstances before the traitors' clique in Vientiane." The statement reit- erated the bloc contention that an international conference must be held, to be followed by an international commission to work in Laos in accordance with the specific powers granted to it by the conference. EThe recent successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces appear to have been due less to aggressive action on their part than to withdrawal by the Vientiane forces in the face of such a threat. Vientiane troops north of Phou Khoun junction are re- ported in a state of low morale and unlikely to put up much re- sistance to any further Pathet Lao advance. All supplies that had been stockpiled by these troops at the junction were left intact when they withdrew and now are in enemy hand SECRET 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Situation in the Congo alammarskjold recently sent a conciliatory letter to Kasavubu, who is attending the Tananarive conference of Congolese leaders, in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of a conflict between Indian and Congolese troops. He tried to reassure Kasavubu that the arrival of these troops was not part of a planned military build-up to be used against the Congolese Army, explaining that the Security Council had not authorized such action in connection with the proposed reor- ganization of the army3 Lin a discussion with an American official, Hammarskjold indicated a belief that "some kind of political game was going on in Leopoldville" between two rival acting prime ministers In the absence of Ileo, who accompanied Kasavubu to Tananarive. He noted that acting Prime Minister Delvaux modified his earlier hostile attitude toward the UN and became willing to negotiate after Massa suddenly "took over" that office. Hammarskjold remarked that "there are too many untutored people with guns who become involved in political moves" in the Congo:1 Tshombe's apparent success in dominating the proceedings at Tananarive has been complemented by another success in Katanga. Before leaving for the conference, Tshombe�appar- ently fearing that his deputy Kibwe and French Colonel Trinquier were plotting to oust him--ordered Trinquier to leave the coun- try by 10 March. The American Consul in Elisabethville reported that Trinquier, under pressure from Katangan authorities and possibly the UN, departed for Brussels on 11 March. When informed that Brussels intended to remove some 30 Belgian military technicians from Katanga, Tshombe indicated he would oppose this action by all means possible and that he might close the Belgian Consulate General in Elisabethville. In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev said it was clear that the US and the Soviet Union were in com- plete disagreement on the Congo. Khrushchev failed to respond to Ambassador Thompson's remark that there was nothing in the CONFIDENTIAL 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 coNn DEN TIA esCongo situation basic to US or Soviet interests. The ambas- sador noted that the Soviet premier refrained from mention- ing any new approach to a solution of the Congo problem and referred to the internal Congo situation only in terms of the page, 21Khrushchev used the Congo question to launch a vigorous attack on UN policies; he told the ambassador that the US and the Soviet Union had different positions on this question and prospects were not bright. He reiterated the standard charges that the UN and Hammarskjold were responsible for Lumumba's death.) -CONFIDENTIAL 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 *quid TOP SECRET Portuguese Seeking to Minimize Numbers of Africans Recently Killed in Angola Portuguese author- ities were already anticipating that the Angolan situation would be discussed in the United Nations and that revelation of the ex- tent of their military operations against nationalist outbreaks in Angola last month would adversely affect their position. The Portuguese Overseas Ministry recently issued a statement claiming that the February disturbances were brought about by Communist-directed agitators from outside Angola, and that the number of victims could not be determined because of the Africans' custom of concealing their dead. in addition to the 243 known dead, there was an undeter- mimed number of casualties from air attacks. clear that the military operations were not the result of an intertribal struggle or of clashes erupting from a labor dispute, as indicated by official public Portuguese statements. Portugal, hostile to any influences which could lessen its tight control of its African possessions, has been increasingly concerned over the "infection" of its territories from neighbor- ing areas, particularly the Congo. Since July it has reinforced its troops to about 10,000 and increased its already considerable counterespionage forces. On 10 March the Portuguese foreign minister informed Ambassador Elbrick in Lisbon that Portugal intended "to take the necessary measures" to thwart a reported terrorist plan to take over the Portuguese enclave of Cabinda, at the mouth of the Congo River, in mid-March. The foreign minister said he wanted to stress that the terrorist operation was planned and organized from outside Portuguese territory. The Angolan Peoples' Union (UPA), an anti-Communist nationalist group with headquarters in Leopoldville, is going ahead with its plans to launch attacks this month in northern Angola, between Luanda and the Congo border. TOP SECRET the-3 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 1 os...r...,1CL, I (attacks, to begin on 14 March, were to be coordinated with other groups within Angola. the UPA had limited supplies of arms and ammunition ana lacked adequate communication facilities; he estimated that the fighting could last no more than ten dayg. TOP SECRET 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 SECRET- Nftw Nee Position Paper Prepared for Mayor Brandt [The position paper of the Social Democratic party (SPD), given to Mayor Brandt just before he left Germany, emphasizes that Moscow's stand on the German problem stems from confi- dence that the USSR can achieve control of West Germany be- tween 1970 and 1980. The paper also stresses that the internal weakness of East Germany has played an important part in So- viet planning, and points out that "liquidation" of West Berlin is necessary for any consolidation of the Ulbricht regime in East Germany:3 (The recent Soviet memorandum to Bonn is cited as con- firmation that Soviet goals in Germany and Berlin remain un- changed. The paper claims, however, that the Ulbricht regime for the time being is faced with a critical situation as a result of the collectivization of agriculture and the political disinte- gration within the Socialist Unity party, brought on by the con- tinuing problem of "revision" within the party and the discon- tent over recent purges of party members during the reissue of party membership books throughout East Germany:s CThe main purpose of the SPD analysis is apparently to dif- ferentiate between Soviet and East German goals; it implies that a firm Western policy on Berlin would bring about further difficulties for East Germany, which would cause Khrushchev to retreat from his offensive against Berlin. As such, the SPD paper tends to exaggerate the current situation in East Germany and to overemphasize the immediate objectives of East Germany in Berlin, while implying that IChrushchev could easily be dis- suaded from his determination to solve the German issue in 1961) [The paper is laudatory of the Kennedy administration, not- ing the "new powerful impetus" in the Western world. It calls for steps to improve German-American relations and to remove anti-German sentiments in the United States. Mayor Brandt re- cently told American officials in B erlin that he was concerned about reports from two of his party deputies who were recently in the United States that the American people have become in- creasingly critical toward Germany-) 3,N) 13 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1.0 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 CONFIDENTIAL `411itie THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001968 47,