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March 20, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 r ac�itc ,ftr 3.5(c) 20 March 1961 Copy No. C �fll CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 00 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 �Ter--SEeFiET� 21.11 -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Pr 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 ' k4 --SECRET- 20 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Situation in the Congo. (Page t) Wi I 3. USSR: Soviet officials hold to pessimistic line on nu- wA clear test ban talks, which resume tomorrow in Geneva. (Page it) 4. Angola: Luanda generally calm; demonstrations against US held in front of American installations in Portugal. (Page it) 5. North Vietnam: Army's political commissar removed from office, suggesting policy differences within party leadership. (Page tit) 6. Spain: Madrid takes firm position in dispute with Morocco over frontier violations in Spanish Sahara. (Page iii) 7. Mali: $44,000,000 economic aid agreement signed with USSR. (Page tit) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 SAYABOURY Sam NEUA � -�-r/ XIENG K Ffb-U-A N \ -'� Muong Soul Plai Pil!au Khou � Jarre --Xieng Khovan Muong Ka07,,,,j���� / Ban Ta Viang I �'!t. /. :;Vang Vieng Tha Thom .1 NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT IMO KONG LE - PATHET LAO KONG LE - PATHET LAO CONCENTRATIONS ) (AREA OF ACTION 1"6"a ROAD 0 TRAIL ROUTE NUMBER 10318 2 100 50 STATUTE MILES VIENTIANE Pak Sane 3 Vientiane KHAMM Thakhek SavannakFT 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 / 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 '%Ii�OP SECRET Noe? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 20 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Laos: [(Information available as of 0400 EST) The o e government's blocking positions on Route 13--located about 25 air miles south of Luang Prabang and 15 miles north of ' 4/ VangVie-ng--have held so far against probing attacks by - Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. These positions, however, are vulnerable to enemy flanking movements. Government, units in southern Xieng Khouang Province have been con- /7 / tinuing their withdrawal toward Tha Thom. The chief of the US military mission in Laos reported on 18 March that Gen- eral Phoumi is now rather desperate and cannot be persuadect-- to go on the offensive on any front. Phoumi, lacking trained /-P reserves, is committing newly formed units in an effort to hold his defensive positions I3loc airlift operations into Laos contint& Souvanna Phouma on 18 March arrived in India, where he hopes to obtain support for an immediate 14-nation con- ference on Laos. During his brief visit to Rangoon, Souvanna won Burmese Premier U Nu's agreement to participate in such a conference. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Congo: Implementation of the Tananarive conference res- olutions concerning the future structure of the Congo is likely eLLe_b_.}K to prove difficult, as almost every participant has a different `/_ , --,-/ idea as to what was decided. Ambassador Timberlake in Leo-"4 i--' poldville also believes that many of these leaders fail to ap- /7)--q -r : preciate the need for obtaining international recognition and that among those who do, there is disagreement as to the steps necessary to achieve it. Prospects for a reconciliation with the Orientale regime on the basis of the new confederal formula have dimmed as a result of new and seemingly more categorical denunciations by Stanleyville authorities of the �Ter Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 I (Jr ant-Az Leopoldville Buella � Sao Salvador Calmba Maquela do Zombo Luvaca Nova caipemb uimbunbe Lobito � Benguela � 10320 2 . Carmona (Uige) Quitexe ange ibaxe ! CUANZA NORTE ( CUANZA SUL '���-� . -������.. ���, � � BENGUELA k REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Malange MAL AN GE REP OF THE CONGO LUNDA NORTHWESTERN ANGOLA 0 4(F. AREA OF UNREST 190 200 STATUTE MILES 20 Mar 61 �TOP�SE�RE-F CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 A 'IMF- .� %11110 resolutions. aevertheless, Congolese factions represented at Tananarive and elements of the Gizenga regime�especially General Lundula�are likely to continue to engage in political maneuvering looking toward a possible rapprochement] (Backup, Page 3) (Map) USSR - Geneva Talks: Soviet officials apparently are un- der instructions to take a pessimistic view of the prospects for the nuclear test ban talks, which resume on 21 March. Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin is reported to have told the Austrian ambassador in Moscow that Soviet reports from Washington were "not hopeful," and that no new moves could be expected from the Soviet side on the main issues, frn a sep- arate conversation with Tsarapkin, the Canadian amba-ssador received an impression of Soviet indifference to a treaty. On the basis of talks with Soviet Embassy personnel in Paris, UK officials reported to London that Moscow may plan to raise the question of French adherence to an agreement. The American and British delegations feel this could be a tactical maneuver, probably to create pressure for early. Western concessions. The British delegation also feel however, that an early So- viet walkout is still a possibility.) OA Angola -Portugal: Portuguese forces in Angola have taken 0 e prompt action to repress the terrorist groups which attacked numerous localities in northern Angola on 15 and 16 March. Portuguese officials have referred to "hundreds killed." These groups probably were largely directed by the Leopoldville-base Angolan People's Union (UPA). Torrential rains and difficult forested terrain have facilitated the withdrawal of the terrorists, The American consul in Luanda reported on 18 March that calm prevailed throughout the capital except at the airport, where troops and refugees were being shuttled to and from the areas attacked. In Portugal, demonstrations have been held in front of American diplomatic and consular establishments in protest 41-imiAthAt y 20 Mar. 61 DAILY BRIEF nitele� TOP #4- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Vfor Release: aia)/08/11 CO2001970 F Now against the US vote in the Security Council last week. The Portuguese press inis.IheTJS vote has encouraged the Angolan agitators. (Backup, Page 5) (Map) North Vietnam: General Nguyen Chi Thanh, politburo e member and North Vietnam's army political commissar for the past ten years, has been removed from his army post, ac- cording to a decree published in Hanoi on 15 March. It is not known whether this change will affect Thanh's politburo status or his position on the Defense Council. Probably the imme- diate cause of Thanh's removal is his rivalry with Chief of Staff General Vo Nguyen Giap; however, a more basic power struggle may be under way. in Hanoi. FRecent reports suggest there may be disagreement in the party on what tactics will be most effective in the campaign to overthrow South Vietnamese President Diem:1 (Backup, Page 6) Spain-Morocco: Madrid is taking a firm position in its dispute with Morocco over alleged frontier violations of the Spanish Sahara, including the recent abduction of 11 oil pros- pectors, and is reinforcing its troops there. Following a talk with General Franco, Spanish Army Minister Barroso told Am- bassador Lodge, "We are going to have war with Morocco!' Madrid seems to be convinced that the abduction of the men resulted from an aggressive Moroccan policy which includes inciting and organizing tribesmen for guerrilla fighting. Bar- roso's reference to war, following Spanish complaints to Morocco and the UN, is probably a tactical gesture to induce the US to put pressure on Morocco. However, release of the men will remove neither Madrid's suspicions of Moroccan intentions nor rmination to maintain its position in the Sahara. Backup, Page 7) (Map) Mali-USSR: The signing in Moscow on 18 March of an eco- nomic and technical cooperation agreement providing for a long- term Soviet credit of about $44,000,000 marks the first time Mali 20 Mar 61 � DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET iii � � A � " � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 kad yr JEAACC I %me has received a specific aid commitment from the bloc. The accord follows Peiping's agreement in principle earlier this month to provide long-term aid to Mali--specifics of which are to be worked out when a Malian delegation visits Commu- nist China later this year. Acceptance of the Soviet credit, which reportedly is to be utilized to finance mineral prospect- ing, construction of cement works, and navigational improve- ments on the Niger River, is in line with the avowed determi- nation of Mali's Marxist-minded leaders to offset and reduce French influence in their country's economy. France this year is �rovidin about $ 2,000,000 in economic and technical aid. 20 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 '7�T-Oft SECRE-T- Situation in Laos iglhe collapse of the recent Phnom Penh talks with Souvanna Phounia has had a deleterious effect on the Boun Oum 'govern- ment's morale and confidence, already shaken by the military reverses. Laotian leaders, who had hoped that the talks might lead to a modus vivendi with the Pathet Lao, have turned their attention to various proposals of international action to resolve the crisis. They are even reconsidering the feasibility of some kind of UN actioq t-eneral Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that the Lao- tian vernment prefers a 14-nation conference to a possible revival of the International Control Commission (ICC), but he said King Savang was prepared to accept almost any new formula for composition of an international body which would promise progress in the political field. Phoumi's remarks about Savang tend to confirm Indian Ambassador Ratnam's account of his re- cent meeting with the King, whom he described as discouraged and ready to accept any solution agreeable to East and West-) The communique issued by the Boun Oum government on 17 March blaming Souvanna Phouma for the failure of the Phnom Penh talks came close to branding him a rebel. It denounced Souvanna for leaving on a world tour at the nation's critical hour and stated that the government could not permit his claim to represent before great powers "an authority of which parliament divested him and an influence over the factions that he never possessed." The communique advised that the Laotian Govern- ment would consider as an inimical gesture toward it any wel- come of an official character that might be given Souvanna in any country he visited. Vientiane is particularly aroused by a report from its charge in Paris that an official reception is being prepared for Souvanna in France and that he will be received officially by De Gaulle. Phoumi has instructed the charge to protest and has told Ambas- sador Brown that Laos would be forced to break off its diplomatic relations with France if Souvanna were so received. French For- eign Ministry officials have told American representatives in TOP SECRET 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 '414PPTOP SECRET *�40 Paris that the French Government has not yet decided on how to handle Souvannat visit, expected to last from 24 March to about 7 April. Burma termed Souvanna's recent visit "unoffi- cial," even though a joint communiqu�as issued. Communist bloc ambassadors, representatives,and corre- spondents are greeting Souvanna in full strength at each of his stops. Vientiane's concern over recent military and political de- velopments is echoed in other Southeast Asian capitals. Prince Sihanouk has expressed pessimism over, chances for achieving a truly neutral Laos, believing that a leftist-type neutrality is the best that can be hoped for in view of what he feels to be an Irreversible trend toward Communist military dominance there. rfohilippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano has stated _ that the West will be fortunate if it retains a small sec- tion of southern Laos against the Communists A recent report spoke of the low- ered public morale in Vientiane and a spreading desertion movement among the Lao Army and civil servants. , 15 Lao Air Force personnel, includ- ing five warrant officers and three sergeants, left their posts on the night of 16 March and are presumed to have desertedj a steady deteri- oration of Lao army morale; meanwhile, rumors and propaganda planted by the enemy have demoralized the civilian populal The Pathet Lao is pushing a campaign of psychological warfare to induce government troops to rally to its side, emphasizing that by so doing they will be saving their lives and hastening peace in Lao TOP SECRET 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 oftsApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 the Conc � 4 Brazzaville r� � Banana* Matadi Kitona Luanda 10320 INDIA 4500* SUDAN 400 TUNISIA 3.200 MALAYA 210 INDONESIA 1,150 MOBUTU 7,200 MALAYA 150 Gemena Scattered _For MOBUTU 3,400 � Coquilhatville Scattered Forces MOBUTU 800 �Boende Francqui Leopoldvi ysville GHANA 1600 4Luabourg Bak *Now arriving Approximate area controlled by: Kasavubu�Mobutu Gizenga EJ Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces Selected road Selected railroad 7...Selected airfield X Cut railroad STATUTE MILES 20 Mar 61 4010 Basoko.�--f MALAYA 400 KALONJI - 1,500 Luputa MOROCCO IRELAND LIBERIA 230 ETHIOPIA Kamina ETHIOPIA GIZENGA 7,000 Bukav NIGERIA Kongolo Albertville 1 NIGERIA 1300 �Manono SWEDEN 650 TSHOMBE 4,000 thviIIe Usumbura Lake _ Tanganyika CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 SECRET %��0 Situation in the Congo� Following recent conversations in Leopoldville with del- egates who attended the conference of Congolese leaders held between 8 and 12 Marc'a at Tananarive, Ambassador Timber- lake concluded that the participants could be divided into three broad groupings in terms of their attitudes toward the future structure of the Congo. One group, of which Katanga's Tshombe and South Kasai's Kalonji are the spokesmen, consists of "con- federalists" who favor giving each constituent state a veto power over, the central authority�the concept written into the Tanana- rive resolutions. A second group, represented by Congolese President Kasavubu and other Bakongo tribal leaders, is made up of "federalists" willing to concede sometvhat more authority to the central government. A third group favors a still stronger central government with greater allowance for local autonomy than in the highly centralized system now legally in effect and still desired by Lumumba's political heirs. Timberlake cited Premier-desig- nate Ileo, Equateur Province's Bolikango, and the Lumumbist President of Leopoldville Province, Kamitatu, as partisans of this third school of thought. The ambassador indicated his be- lief that while Tshombe's personality and financial resources carried the day at Tananarive, the representatives of the other views probably entered the "united front" with every intention of trying to modify the Tananarive resolutions at subsequent meetings. At this stage, the problem of effecting a legal transition to the confederal arrangement is looming as a difficult one which could further jeopardize the new regime's chances of gaining international acceptance, especially among the more militant African states. Under the Congo's present law, such structural changes must be referred to the Congolese parliament sitting as a constituent assembly- a provision on which both the Gizenga regime and its international supporters can be expected to insist. This procedure is apparently envisaged by at least the more na- tionally minded Congolese leaders including IleoEvfio, however, told Timberlake on 17 March that conditions were still not favor- able to reconvening parliament) Tshomb4, on the other hand, reportedly will have nothing to do with the assembly elected last year, though he is apparently SECRET 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 SECRET willing to consider some type of referendum or election to sanc- tify the new system. The Tananarive resolutions themselves were cryptic on this transition problem, specifying only that the present central government's "mission" would end upon constitu- tion of the projected new "coordinating organism." Meanwhile, the continuing arrival of the brigade of combat troops which India has made available to the UN Command has been marked so far by a complete lack of incidents such as were predicted by the Tananarive conferees when they asked the UN last week to cancel the Indian reinforcements. Nevertheless, the UN is cautiously arranging for the Indian soldiers to be housed in outlying areas of Leopoldville, where they will be removed as much as possible from contacts with Congolese. According to the acting chief of staff of the UN Command, there are no present plans to deploy the troops beyond the Leopoldville area.rEarlier Indications that at least some of the Indian troops might be as- signed immediately to northern Katanga reportedly prompted Tshombe to state that in such an eventuality, "there will certainly be war"--meaning nresumahlv, clashes with his Belgian-led forces 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 TOP SECRET Disorders in Angola The attacks, directed primarily against white residents of frontier posts and isolated plantations but also against several towns, appear to have been confined to three admin- istrative districts in northwestern �-Angola. They apparently were intended to focus world attention on the growing unrest among the native population rather than to signal the begin- ning of a civil war. The terrorists probably received some support from discontented natives who were serving the annual six-month term of forced labor required of unemployed Afri- cans in Portuguese Africa. While the expected anti-American demonstrations in Angola have not yet materialized, the American consul in Luanda stated on 17 March that local officials had become openly unfriendly to consular personnel. thPortuguese official in Lisbon has unof- ficially recommende at Americans in Angola--who number about 225, mostly missionaries--remain off the streets for the next several days so as to avoid any possible inciden9 Salalar planned to visit General Franco in Madrid on 19 March to discuss "present Portuguese problems." rPortuguese officials aware of the proposed visit believed an agreement would be reached at the meeting for Spain to provide military forces to help Portugal defend its overseas provinces. The visit has not yet been confirmed. Li,- isbon, which had been unresponsive to earlier initiatives by South Africa regarding joint defense efforts. may now be re- ceptive to such an arrangemeiitj 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Noe SECRET North Vietnam's Army Political Commissar Removed More politician than soldier, Nguyen Chi Thanh is a pro- tege' of Truong Chinh, a tough-minded party theoretician who has been eclipsed as Ho Chi Mirth's heir apparent by party First Secretary Le Duan. Both Truong Chinh and Thanh show affinity for the uncompromising approach taken by the Chinese Commu- nists on domestic and foreign policy matters. Thanh has sought to inject Chinese concepts into the army, insisting on greater power for political officers and advocating the use of the armed forces in such nonmilitary functions as truck gardening. Thanh's ability to implement his views was considerably enhanced when he was promoted to full general in 1959. This made him the only officer to share this rank with Chief of Staff Vo Nguyen Giap. Rivalry between the two generals has been long suspected and seemed close to the surface last September when Giap made a speech containing a thinly veiled suggestion that political officers would do well to confine themselves to troop indoctrination and leave army administration to soldiers. Giap also has been reported opposed to using the army as a labor corps. In January the army began to divest itself of non- military functions, and among the first to go were the army farms. Thanh's resig- natiori reflects a serious power struggle among Ho Chi Mirth's subordinates. Reportedly involved is disagreement over the most effective tactics for overthrowing South Vietnam's Pres- ident Diem. Some guerrilla leaders reportedly favor less em- phasis on the National Liberation Front advocated by Le Duan and more emphasis on violence, as-advocated by Nguyen Chi Than.2...hD Hanoi's intention to maintain both para- military and political pressure on the South Vietnamese Gov- ernment, 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Atlantic Ocean MADEIRA .- 4, ISLANDS (Pc rt.) CANARY ISLANDS (Sp.) C, 9 � SPANISH S Villa ."AHARA Cisn ero (-4 Lisbon/ PORT:r IFNI (sp.) TARFAYA MAURITANIA Nouakchott Iry SENEGAL 31589 10320 3 GIBRALTAR (U .K.) * Madrid SPAIN Ceuta (Sp.) Melilla (sp Rabat MOROCCO MALI Mediterranean Sea. STATUTE MILES 500 ' UNCLASSIFIED tuns TUN. 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 SECRET- Spanish Reaction to Abduction of Oil Prospectors In Spanish Sahara Spanish troop strength in the area, estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000, includes reinforcements of paratroops flown from Seville in six transport planes on 18 March, 1,000 Spanish foreign legionnaires moved from Villa Cisneros on the Spanish Sahara coast, and several hundred other troops dispatched from the Canary Islands. These moves are the "necessary steps" which Spain informed Rabat and UN Secretary General Hammar- skjold on 17 March it had taken in order to be able to repel any attack on Spanish territory by Moroccan armed contingents con- centrated near the Morocco- Spanish Sahara frontier. On 18 March the counselor of the French Embassy in Rabat informed his American colleagues that according to a reliable source, the three Americans and the one Frenchman missing among the abducted men were at the Royal Moroccan Army's camp in the capital. The official expected the men would be "momentarily and magnanimously" released with suitable pub- licity. Failure to include the five Spaniards in such a gesture would sharpen the suspicion in Madrid that Morocco is prepar- ing for military and political harassment of Spanish interests in the area, and might put strong pressure on Franco to order Spanish forces to retaliate. In recent months Madrid has become increasingly worried over the effect political and economic instability in Morocco may have on Spain's African possessions. Although these territories have little economic value, the Spanish military set great store by the maintenance of Spain's "presence" in northwest Africa. Madrid is particularly apprehensive that the security of the whole area and of Spain as well will be seriously threatened when France and the US complete the scheduled turnover of their bases to the Moroccans. Spain and France have continued to maintain close liaison regarding Moroccan developments, with particular emphasis on military aspects. Munoz Grandes, the chief of the Spanish High General Staff, visited Paris early in February, reportedly to put finishing touches to a new military accord between the two coun- tries. 20 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 --GONFIDEIVTIAL� NV� THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deplrtment of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investrgation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970TOP SECRET 0 -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001970