CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/03/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001970
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: March 20, 1961

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20 March 1961
Copy No. C �fll
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
00
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20 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Situation in the Congo. (Page t)
Wi
I
3. USSR: Soviet officials hold to pessimistic line on nu- wA
clear test ban talks, which resume tomorrow in Geneva.
(Page it)
4. Angola: Luanda generally calm; demonstrations against
US held in front of American installations in Portugal.
(Page it)
5. North Vietnam: Army's political commissar removed
from office, suggesting policy differences within party
leadership. (Page tit)
6. Spain: Madrid takes firm position in dispute with Morocco
over frontier violations in Spanish Sahara. (Page iii)
7. Mali: $44,000,000 economic aid agreement signed with
USSR. (Page tit)
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SAYABOURY
Sam
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NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT
IMO KONG LE - PATHET LAO
KONG LE - PATHET LAO CONCENTRATIONS
) (AREA OF ACTION
1"6"a ROAD
0
TRAIL
ROUTE NUMBER
10318 2
100
50
STATUTE MILES
VIENTIANE
Pak Sane 3
Vientiane
KHAMM
Thakhek
SavannakFT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
20 March 1961
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*Laos: [(Information available as of 0400 EST) The o e
government's blocking positions on Route 13--located about
25 air miles south of Luang Prabang and 15 miles north of
' 4/
VangVie-ng--have held so far against probing attacks by -
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces. These positions, however,
are vulnerable to enemy flanking movements. Government,
units in southern Xieng Khouang Province have been con- /7 /
tinuing their withdrawal toward Tha Thom. The chief of the
US military mission in Laos reported on 18 March that Gen-
eral Phoumi is now rather desperate and cannot be persuadect--
to go on the offensive on any front. Phoumi, lacking trained /-P
reserves, is committing newly formed units in an effort to
hold his defensive positions
I3loc airlift operations into Laos contint&
Souvanna Phouma on 18 March arrived in India, where
he hopes to obtain support for an immediate 14-nation con-
ference on Laos. During his brief visit to Rangoon, Souvanna
won Burmese Premier U Nu's agreement to participate in
such a conference. (Backup,
Page 1) (Map)
Congo: Implementation of the Tananarive conference res-
olutions concerning the future structure of the Congo is likely eLLe_b_.}K
to prove difficult, as almost every participant has a different `/_ , --,-/
idea as to what was decided. Ambassador Timberlake in Leo-"4 i--'
poldville also believes that many of these leaders fail to ap- /7)--q -r
:
preciate the need for obtaining international recognition and
that among those who do, there is disagreement as to the
steps necessary to achieve it. Prospects for a reconciliation
with the Orientale regime on the basis of the new confederal
formula have dimmed as a result of new and seemingly more
categorical denunciations by Stanleyville authorities of the
�Ter
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Leopoldville
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0
4(F. AREA OF UNREST
190 200
STATUTE MILES
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resolutions. aevertheless, Congolese factions represented
at Tananarive and elements of the Gizenga regime�especially
General Lundula�are likely to continue to engage in political
maneuvering looking toward a possible rapprochement]
(Backup, Page 3) (Map)
USSR - Geneva Talks: Soviet officials apparently are un-
der instructions to take a pessimistic view of the prospects
for the nuclear test ban talks, which resume on 21 March.
Chief Soviet delegate Tsarapkin is reported to have told the
Austrian ambassador in Moscow that Soviet reports from
Washington were "not hopeful," and that no new moves could
be expected from the Soviet side on the main issues, frn a sep-
arate conversation with Tsarapkin, the Canadian amba-ssador
received an impression of Soviet indifference to a treaty. On
the basis of talks with Soviet Embassy personnel in Paris, UK
officials reported to London that Moscow may plan to raise the
question of French adherence to an agreement. The American
and British delegations feel this could be a tactical maneuver,
probably to create pressure for early. Western concessions.
The British delegation also feel however, that an early So-
viet walkout is still a possibility.)
OA
Angola -Portugal: Portuguese forces in Angola have taken 0 e
prompt action to repress the terrorist groups which attacked
numerous localities in northern Angola on 15 and 16 March.
Portuguese officials have referred to "hundreds killed." These
groups probably were largely directed by the Leopoldville-base
Angolan People's Union (UPA). Torrential rains and difficult
forested terrain have facilitated the withdrawal of the terrorists,
The American consul in Luanda reported on 18 March that calm
prevailed throughout the capital except at the airport, where
troops and refugees were being shuttled to and from the areas
attacked. In Portugal, demonstrations have been held in front
of American diplomatic and consular establishments in protest
41-imiAthAt y
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against the US vote in the Security Council last week. The
Portuguese press inis.IheTJS vote has encouraged the
Angolan agitators. (Backup, Page 5) (Map)
North Vietnam: General Nguyen Chi Thanh, politburo e
member and North Vietnam's army political commissar for
the past ten years, has been removed from his army post, ac-
cording to a decree published in Hanoi on 15 March. It is not
known whether this change will affect Thanh's politburo status
or his position on the Defense Council. Probably the imme-
diate cause of Thanh's removal is his rivalry with Chief of
Staff General Vo Nguyen Giap; however, a more basic power
struggle may be under way. in Hanoi. FRecent reports suggest
there may be disagreement in the party on what tactics will be
most effective in the campaign to overthrow South Vietnamese
President Diem:1 (Backup, Page 6)
Spain-Morocco: Madrid is taking a firm position in its
dispute with Morocco over alleged frontier violations of the
Spanish Sahara, including the recent abduction of 11 oil pros-
pectors, and is reinforcing its troops there. Following a talk
with General Franco, Spanish Army Minister Barroso told Am-
bassador Lodge, "We are going to have war with Morocco!'
Madrid seems to be convinced that the abduction of the men
resulted from an aggressive Moroccan policy which includes
inciting and organizing tribesmen for guerrilla fighting. Bar-
roso's reference to war, following Spanish complaints to Morocco
and the UN, is probably a tactical gesture to induce the US to
put pressure on Morocco. However, release of the men will
remove neither Madrid's suspicions of Moroccan intentions nor
rmination to maintain its position in the Sahara.
Backup, Page 7) (Map)
Mali-USSR: The signing in Moscow on 18 March of an eco-
nomic and technical cooperation agreement providing for a long-
term Soviet credit of about $44,000,000 marks the first time Mali
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has received a specific aid commitment from the bloc. The
accord follows Peiping's agreement in principle earlier this
month to provide long-term aid to Mali--specifics of which
are to be worked out when a Malian delegation visits Commu-
nist China later this year. Acceptance of the Soviet credit,
which reportedly is to be utilized to finance mineral prospect-
ing, construction of cement works, and navigational improve-
ments on the Niger River, is in line with the avowed determi-
nation of Mali's Marxist-minded leaders to offset and reduce
French influence in their country's economy. France this
year is �rovidin about $ 2,000,000 in economic and technical
aid.
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Situation in Laos
iglhe collapse of the recent Phnom Penh talks with Souvanna
Phounia has had a deleterious effect on the Boun Oum 'govern-
ment's morale and confidence, already shaken by the military
reverses. Laotian leaders, who had hoped that the talks might
lead to a modus vivendi with the Pathet Lao, have turned their
attention to various proposals of international action to resolve
the crisis. They are even reconsidering the feasibility of some
kind of UN actioq
t-eneral Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that the Lao-
tian vernment prefers a 14-nation conference to a possible
revival of the International Control Commission (ICC), but he
said King Savang was prepared to accept almost any new formula
for composition of an international body which would promise
progress in the political field. Phoumi's remarks about Savang
tend to confirm Indian Ambassador Ratnam's account of his re-
cent meeting with the King, whom he described as discouraged
and ready to accept any solution agreeable to East and West-)
The communique issued by the Boun Oum government on
17 March blaming Souvanna Phouma for the failure of the Phnom
Penh talks came close to branding him a rebel. It denounced
Souvanna for leaving on a world tour at the nation's critical hour
and stated that the government could not permit his claim to
represent before great powers "an authority of which parliament
divested him and an influence over the factions that he never
possessed." The communique advised that the Laotian Govern-
ment would consider as an inimical gesture toward it any wel-
come of an official character that might be given Souvanna in
any country he visited.
Vientiane is particularly aroused by a report from its charge
in Paris that an official reception is being prepared for Souvanna
in France and that he will be received officially by De Gaulle.
Phoumi has instructed the charge to protest and has told Ambas-
sador Brown that Laos would be forced to break off its diplomatic
relations with France if Souvanna were so received. French For-
eign Ministry officials have told American representatives in
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Paris that the French Government has not yet decided on how
to handle Souvannat visit, expected to last from 24 March to
about 7 April. Burma termed Souvanna's recent visit "unoffi-
cial," even though a joint communiqu�as issued.
Communist bloc ambassadors, representatives,and corre-
spondents are greeting Souvanna in full strength at each of his
stops.
Vientiane's concern over recent military and political de-
velopments is echoed in other Southeast Asian capitals. Prince
Sihanouk has expressed pessimism over, chances for achieving
a truly neutral Laos, believing that a leftist-type neutrality is
the best that can be hoped for in view of what he feels to be an
Irreversible trend toward Communist military dominance there.
rfohilippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Serrano has stated _
that the West will be fortunate if it retains a small sec-
tion of southern Laos against the Communists
A recent report
spoke of the low-
ered public morale in Vientiane and a spreading desertion
movement among the Lao Army and civil servants.
, 15 Lao Air Force personnel, includ-
ing five warrant officers and three sergeants, left their posts
on the night of 16 March and are presumed to have desertedj
a steady deteri-
oration of Lao army morale; meanwhile, rumors and propaganda
planted by the enemy have demoralized the civilian populal The
Pathet Lao is pushing a campaign of psychological warfare to
induce government troops to rally to its side, emphasizing that
by so doing they will be saving their lives and hastening peace
in Lao
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the Conc �
4
Brazzaville
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Banana* Matadi
Kitona
Luanda
10320
INDIA
4500*
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3.200
MALAYA
210
INDONESIA
1,150
MOBUTU
7,200
MALAYA
150
Gemena
Scattered _For
MOBUTU
3,400
� Coquilhatville
Scattered Forces
MOBUTU
800
�Boende
Francqui
Leopoldvi
ysville
GHANA
1600
4Luabourg
Bak
*Now arriving
Approximate area controlled by:
Kasavubu�Mobutu
Gizenga
EJ Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces
Selected road
Selected railroad
7...Selected airfield
X Cut railroad
STATUTE MILES
20 Mar 61
4010
Basoko.�--f
MALAYA
400
KALONJI
- 1,500
Luputa
MOROCCO
IRELAND
LIBERIA
230
ETHIOPIA
Kamina
ETHIOPIA
GIZENGA
7,000
Bukav
NIGERIA
Kongolo
Albertville
1 NIGERIA
1300
�Manono
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
4,000
thviIIe
Usumbura
Lake
_ Tanganyika
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Situation in the Congo�
Following recent conversations in Leopoldville with del-
egates who attended the conference of Congolese leaders held
between 8 and 12 Marc'a at Tananarive, Ambassador Timber-
lake concluded that the participants could be divided into three
broad groupings in terms of their attitudes toward the future
structure of the Congo. One group, of which Katanga's Tshombe
and South Kasai's Kalonji are the spokesmen, consists of "con-
federalists" who favor giving each constituent state a veto power
over, the central authority�the concept written into the Tanana-
rive resolutions. A second group, represented by Congolese
President Kasavubu and other Bakongo tribal leaders, is made
up of "federalists" willing to concede sometvhat more authority
to the central government.
A third group favors a still stronger central government
with greater allowance for local autonomy than in the highly
centralized system now legally in effect and still desired by
Lumumba's political heirs. Timberlake cited Premier-desig-
nate Ileo, Equateur Province's Bolikango, and the Lumumbist
President of Leopoldville Province, Kamitatu, as partisans of
this third school of thought. The ambassador indicated his be-
lief that while Tshombe's personality and financial resources
carried the day at Tananarive, the representatives of the other
views probably entered the "united front" with every intention
of trying to modify the Tananarive resolutions at subsequent
meetings.
At this stage, the problem of effecting a legal transition
to the confederal arrangement is looming as a difficult one which
could further jeopardize the new regime's chances of gaining
international acceptance, especially among the more militant
African states. Under the Congo's present law, such structural
changes must be referred to the Congolese parliament sitting
as a constituent assembly- a provision on which both the Gizenga
regime and its international supporters can be expected to insist.
This procedure is apparently envisaged by at least the more na-
tionally minded Congolese leaders including IleoEvfio, however,
told Timberlake on 17 March that conditions were still not favor-
able to reconvening parliament)
Tshomb4, on the other hand, reportedly will have nothing to
do with the assembly elected last year, though he is apparently
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willing to consider some type of referendum or election to sanc-
tify the new system. The Tananarive resolutions themselves
were cryptic on this transition problem, specifying only that the
present central government's "mission" would end upon constitu-
tion of the projected new "coordinating organism."
Meanwhile, the continuing arrival of the brigade of combat
troops which India has made available to the UN Command has
been marked so far by a complete lack of incidents such as were
predicted by the Tananarive conferees when they asked the UN
last week to cancel the Indian reinforcements. Nevertheless,
the UN is cautiously arranging for the Indian soldiers to be housed
in outlying areas of Leopoldville, where they will be removed as
much as possible from contacts with Congolese. According to
the acting chief of staff of the UN Command, there are no present
plans to deploy the troops beyond the Leopoldville area.rEarlier
Indications that at least some of the Indian troops might be as-
signed immediately to northern Katanga reportedly prompted
Tshombe to state that in such an eventuality, "there will certainly
be war"--meaning nresumahlv, clashes with his Belgian-led
forces
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Disorders in Angola
The attacks, directed primarily against white residents
of frontier posts and isolated plantations but also against
several towns, appear to have been confined to three admin-
istrative districts in northwestern �-Angola. They apparently
were intended to focus world attention on the growing unrest
among the native population rather than to signal the begin-
ning of a civil war. The terrorists probably received some
support from discontented natives who were serving the annual
six-month term of forced labor required of unemployed Afri-
cans in Portuguese Africa.
While the expected anti-American demonstrations in Angola
have not yet materialized, the American consul in Luanda stated
on 17 March that local officials had become openly unfriendly to
consular personnel. thPortuguese official in Lisbon has unof-
ficially recommende at Americans in Angola--who number
about 225, mostly missionaries--remain off the streets for the
next several days so as to avoid any possible inciden9
Salalar planned to visit General Franco in Madrid on 19 March
to discuss "present Portuguese problems."
rPortuguese officials aware of the proposed visit believed an
agreement would be reached at the meeting for Spain to provide
military forces to help Portugal defend its overseas provinces.
The visit has not yet been confirmed.
Li,- isbon, which had been unresponsive to earlier initiatives
by South Africa regarding joint defense efforts. may now be re-
ceptive to such an arrangemeiitj
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North Vietnam's Army Political Commissar Removed
More politician than soldier, Nguyen Chi Thanh is a pro-
tege' of Truong Chinh, a tough-minded party theoretician who
has been eclipsed as Ho Chi Mirth's heir apparent by party First
Secretary Le Duan. Both Truong Chinh and Thanh show affinity
for the uncompromising approach taken by the Chinese Commu-
nists on domestic and foreign policy matters. Thanh has sought
to inject Chinese concepts into the army, insisting on greater
power for political officers and advocating the use of the armed
forces in such nonmilitary functions as truck gardening.
Thanh's ability to implement his views was considerably
enhanced when he was promoted to full general in 1959. This
made him the only officer to share this rank with Chief of Staff
Vo Nguyen Giap. Rivalry between the two generals has been
long suspected and seemed close to the surface last September
when Giap made a speech containing a thinly veiled suggestion
that political officers would do well to confine themselves to
troop indoctrination and leave army administration to soldiers.
Giap also has been reported opposed to using the army as a
labor corps. In January the army began to divest itself of non-
military functions, and among the first to go were the army
farms.
Thanh's resig-
natiori reflects a serious power struggle among Ho Chi Mirth's
subordinates. Reportedly involved is disagreement over the
most effective tactics for overthrowing South Vietnam's Pres-
ident Diem. Some guerrilla leaders reportedly favor less em-
phasis on the National Liberation Front advocated by Le Duan
and more emphasis on violence, as-advocated by Nguyen Chi
Than.2...hD
Hanoi's intention to maintain both para-
military and political pressure on the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment,
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Atlantic
Ocean
MADEIRA .-
4,
ISLANDS
(Pc rt.)
CANARY ISLANDS
(Sp.) C,
9
�
SPANISH
S
Villa ."AHARA
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PORT:r
IFNI
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31589 10320 3
GIBRALTAR
(U .K.)
* Madrid
SPAIN
Ceuta (Sp.)
Melilla (sp
Rabat
MOROCCO
MALI
Mediterranean Sea.
STATUTE MILES 500 '
UNCLASSIFIED
tuns
TUN.
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Spanish Reaction to Abduction of Oil Prospectors
In Spanish Sahara
Spanish troop strength in the area, estimated at between
8,000 and 10,000, includes reinforcements of paratroops flown
from Seville in six transport planes on 18 March, 1,000 Spanish
foreign legionnaires moved from Villa Cisneros on the Spanish
Sahara coast, and several hundred other troops dispatched from
the Canary Islands. These moves are the "necessary steps"
which Spain informed Rabat and UN Secretary General Hammar-
skjold on 17 March it had taken in order to be able to repel any
attack on Spanish territory by Moroccan armed contingents con-
centrated near the Morocco- Spanish Sahara frontier.
On 18 March the counselor of the French Embassy in Rabat
informed his American colleagues that according to a reliable
source, the three Americans and the one Frenchman missing
among the abducted men were at the Royal Moroccan Army's
camp in the capital. The official expected the men would be
"momentarily and magnanimously" released with suitable pub-
licity. Failure to include the five Spaniards in such a gesture
would sharpen the suspicion in Madrid that Morocco is prepar-
ing for military and political harassment of Spanish interests in
the area, and might put strong pressure on Franco to order
Spanish forces to retaliate.
In recent months Madrid has become increasingly worried
over the effect political and economic instability in Morocco may
have on Spain's African possessions. Although these territories
have little economic value, the Spanish military set great store
by the maintenance of Spain's "presence" in northwest Africa.
Madrid is particularly apprehensive that the security of the
whole area and of Spain as well will be seriously threatened
when France and the US complete the scheduled turnover of
their bases to the Moroccans.
Spain and France have continued to maintain close liaison
regarding Moroccan developments, with particular emphasis on
military aspects. Munoz Grandes, the chief of the Spanish High
General Staff, visited Paris early in February, reportedly to put
finishing touches to a new military accord between the two coun-
tries.
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--GONFIDEIVTIAL� NV�
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Deplrtment of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investrgation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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