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Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
April 1, 1961
Ft /////////////////////////////////////////e3 .-3(h )rzzi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 �Thrir omlilin& � Iwo." 'awe' 3.5(c) 1 April 1961 Copy No. C 79 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 �T-Ui;I-5EeRET� pigin4 �TOI:g-SEeRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 t41144 1 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi hints desire for improved relations with US to Swedish ambassador. (Page ii) 3. Congo: Tshombe's forces take Manono; Katanga con- tinues to receive military supplies from Belgium. (Page ii) 4. France-Algeria: Rebels cancel scheduled negotia- tions in Evian. (Page it) 5. Nationalist China: 3,852 irregulars evacuated from Burma-Thailand-Laos border area since 17 March. (Page it) 6. USSR: New delta-wing jet aircraft sighted outside plant in Moscow. (Page tit) 7. Africa: All-African People's Conference issues ex- treme anti-Western resolutions. (Page tit) 8. Common Market = Greece: Treaty of association signed on 30 March. (Page tit) -Ste= Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 eipproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 A 41iRMA Luang Prabanq SAYABOURY � I I Plru K ILhoun Muong Kas / NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT Forces in *I KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact 40 KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS 'i�ROAD -'3 0 ..- -TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER , j 10401 2 50 I I i STATUTE MILES 4J NA Phong Saly I IPHONG SALY - _ 1 11 / "... ". 9 k4Dien Bien Phu �-�.. 1, �1 ....../ ..� -4,e\ ..-11 .0. -, 1 � ..-- NAMITHA ."..." 1uong Sai /....----s_.) i i ......"" / "'''' "........../..� i LUANGI PRA ti . / Sam Neua AM NEUA ..������,/, ������ 1 r""'XIENG KHOUANG Muon; Soui .1/40 an Ban 0P, Xieng Khouabg acrn Ta Viang, s...;�,������?Tha Thom Vang Vien� � VIENTIANE Pak Sane Vientiane H A A N D Kam Keut KHAMM k Sa UANE lhakhek vannakhet 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 -SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 1 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: The capture by Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces on 31 March of 11-a, Thom, the government's main base on the south- ern approach to the Plaine des Jarres, indicates that the enemy forces intend to improve further their military position in Laos prior to any cease-fire. the well-executed attack followed an in- tensive artillery barrage directed by well-placed spotters. This action also opens the way for a possible drive southward against Pak Sane. The loss of Tha Thom will have a strong psychological impact on the Boun Oum government, particular- ly on General Phoumi, who is already alarmed over the reported Communist threat to Thakhek. *A Pathet Lao advance to either Pak Sane or Thakhek would cut off southern Laos, (Backup, Page 1) (Map) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 r-7,4 Banana INDIA 1711 SUDAN 400 TUNISIA 3,200 MALAYA 210 INDONESIA 850 MOBUTU Brazzaville,,MCP 7200, Matadi Kitona INDONESIA 300 Luanda 10401 MALAYA 150 emena Scattered, Forces MOBUTU 3400 EqUATEI �Coquilhatville .111111'" � Boende ETHIOPIA 1,800 MOBUTU 800 Aketi leyville Scattered Forces _LoPot nVILLE Leopoldvi ysville GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe (1) 00 United Nations Forces - Selected road Selected railroad =' Selected airfield STATUTE MILES ulua ourg Bakw 4040 Lupu MOROCCO IRELAND 655 MALAYA 400 LIBERIA ETHIOPIA Kamina Elisa GiZENGA 7 000 Bukavu' NIGERIA Kongolo Albertville NIGERIA 1,300 *Ma nano � Piana Mitwaba SWEDEN 650 TSHOMBE 7,000 Usumbura Mwanga ' 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 �SfeRF7- NW' Communist China:* contrast to Peiping's current propa- ganda attacks on the United States, Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi told the Swedish ambassador on 21 March that an improvement in Sino-US relations "must come" and that there is "no risk of war" between the two countries over Taiwan. De- spite his concilia.torytone, Chen avoided any suggestion that the Chinese were disposed to make any concession at this time to the United States. He implied rather that the next move was up to Washington, asserting that the United States had not yet re- ciprocated concessions already made by Peiping, such as the release of American prisoners after Hammarskjold's visit to China in 1956.3 rack- up, Page 4) Congo: Despite the apparent ease with which Tshombe's forces took Manono, the BalOa tribesmen in 7thern Katanga are likely to remain restive. Katanga apparently continues to receive military supplies from Belgium. shipments are coming by air via the UN trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi and by ship probably through the Angolan port of Lobito. future chin7ts are scheduled as far ahead as next August. (Map) France-Algeria: The rebel Algerian provisional govern- ment's (PAG) 31 March announcement that it will cancel the scheduled negotiations with the French follows by one day the coordinated official announcements in Tunis and Paris that talks would begin on 7 April at Evian. The PAG position is apparently a reaction to French Minister for Algeria Joxe's confirmation that France has begun talks with other Algerian groups, despite recent rebel warnings that such action would Jeopardize negotiations. (Backup, Page 5) 1 Apr 61 Nationalist China: EChinese Nationalist irregulars num- bering 3,852, including some dependents, have been evacuated I from the Burma-Thailand-Laos border area since 17 March jj .4, DAILY BRIEF -SECRE-T-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 %IS �SEeRE+ -load The operation is slowing and will soon end, since Taipei has evacuated the major part of the irregulars responsive to Na- tionalist control, presumably including the 1,000-man Taiwan- trained special force sent to the area in 1960. Most of the approximately 3,000 to 4,000 irregulars remaining in the area have never been responsive to Taipei, and few will choose to go to Taiwan without greater pressure from Thai and Lao au- thorities9 (Backup, Page 7) USSR: A new large jet aircraft, probably a bomber, was recently seen outside the Fill bomber production plant in Mos- cow. This aircraft, which was not complete, had delta wings and a supersonic configuration. The fragmentary information on this aircraft available to date suggests that it may be a fur- ther development of an aircraft designated Bounder, with im- proved performance characteristics. The Bounder, a jet bomber, was seen at this same plant in August 1958 but was not put into series production. These recent observations make it clear that the USSR is continuing research and devel- opment in heavy bomber aircraft. Additional information is Pxne eted horthr whieh will nprmit a mnrp rIptailpel analimiCt Africa: The anti-Western resolutions issued on 30 March by the Third All-African People's Conference in Cairo were even more extreme than the declarations of the previous meet- ings in 1958 and 1960. Delegations to the conference, which met from 25 to 30 March, were nongovernmental and consisted of 50 groups representing political parties and trade unions from 34 African states and territories. One resolution attacked American "Peace Corps" plans as designed to "reconquer and economically dominate Africa." The conference also called for the resignation of Secretary General Hammarskjold and the re- organization of the UN Secretariat. Although the conference does not represent the views of most responsible African officials, the resolutions reflect the opinions of a sizable and increasingly vocal body of Africans. Common Market - Greece: ale treaty of association be- tween the Common Market and Greece which was signed iii] 1 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF 111 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 �0 SECRET a_3russels on 30 March may serve as a pattern for such agree- ments with other countries. Still subject to ratification by the Common Market's council of ministers, the agreement pro- vides material benefits to Greece by way of extensive develop- mental aid and potential new export outlets. Preliminary talks on Turkish association with the Common Market are expected to resume on 10 April. Tunisia, Israel, and some of the newly independent countries in Africa have alLan-A3mr-P-----inte---r-e-Rt-in ssociation with the Common Market} (Backup, Page 8) 1 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv ---SEcRED z Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 NesTOP- SECRET Laos 5rior to news of the Tha Thom reverse, the Laotian Government apparently had been on the verge of appealing for help from SEATO on the basis of reports of a Commu- nist thrust developing in the Kam Keut area to cut Laos in half. King Savang, said he had advised the government against taking such a "premature" step. Savang expressed the view that any appeal to SEATO should await the Soviet reply to the British, but his appeal to Brown to advise General Phoumi to go slowly in this matter indicates that the King does not have full command of the situation. Savang, emphasizing the importance of preventing the enemy from using a cease- fire to improve its military position, said any cease-fire should involve withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops [The presence of the substantial enemy forces which are reported converging on Thaldiek has not yet been substantiated, but all efforts to confirm or deny Laotian field reports are seriously handicapped by the fact that aerial reconnaissance is frequently ineffective in this heavily wooded area and by the lack of Western observers on the ground. support Laotian claims of North Vietnamese assistance in the recent fighting in the Kam Keut area. on 10 March over 30 trucks transported provisions and ammunition from Vinh, North Vietnam, to Ithammouane Province via Route 8. Presi- dent Diem of South Vietnam has also received unconfirmed re- ports that North Vietnamese units are moving into Laos in the direction of Thakhek-3 Phoumi apparently remains convinced that the situation in southern Laos is serious. He feels he does not have sufficient forces to stop a major attack in this region, and says he is pre- paring for the necessity of evacuating Thakhek and Savannakhet. In a review of the security situation with Ambassador Brown on 30 March, Phoumi seemed greatly depressed and said he was -T-49P-SEeRET- 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 *....rferP�SEeRET distressed by the fact that American officials continually dis- count enemy strength in Laos0 new developments in bloc assistance to the Pathet Lao during the past few days. Both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao have expressed opposition to Western formulations that would freeze the present military lines in Laos. On 31 March the Pathet Lao termed a "de- ceitful trick" the idea of having a cease-fire precede a con- ference. On the same day, Hanoi charged the US with an at- tempt to "gain time" to bolster Vientiane forces and "prevent the expansion of patriotic forces." an a conversation on 29 March with Ambassador Stevenson, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated the generally mod- erate line he had taken in his previous discussion with Presi- dent Kennedy. Gromyko urged "patience" from both sides and voiced his hope that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would take measures to aggravate the situation in Laog-op (Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz of Poland recently told Ambassador Stevenson that while he was certain the Soviet Union wanted a detente with the West, the position of the Chi- nese Communists was causing acute difficulties. Winiewicz attributed the delay in Moscow's acceptance of a cease-fire In Laos to difficulty in obtaining Chinese approval and argued) TOP SECRET 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 lowTOP SECRET hat Khrushchev needs successes to demonstrate the effective- ness of his peaceful coexistence line to the Chinese. These re- marks probably were calculated to underscore Soviet moderation and restraint in the Laotian crisis and to provide a justification for the USSR's apparent unwillingness to agree to a formal cease- fire in Laos prior to an international conference. Similar state- ments regarding Sino-Sovtet divergence on policy in Laos were circulated by Soviet spokesmen in mid-January. With a view to discouraging the US from carrying out any action which might have expanded the conflict, bloc spokesmen at that time also warned privately that Peiping would send troops into Laos if US forces were introduced:3 A commentary published in the Peiping People's Daily today charges that the US has "still not abandoned its policies of war and aggression in Laos," and reiteFates the line that "convocation of an enlarged Geneva conference" is the "only way" to a peace- ful solution. The article calls for an end to "brinkmanship policy" and for the evacuation of "all troops and arms of the United States and its vassal countries, as well as the Kuomintang remnant bandits." Charging Vientiane and US "connivance," Communist China has also for this first time accused Chinese Nationalist irregular troops of raiding into China from Laos. A Chinese Communist domestic broadcast on 31 March claimed that the irregulars crossed into Yunnan Province on 14 March and fired on resi- dents before being driven off. The broadcast did not threaten retaliatory action, stating only that this act "has amused the anger of the people and alerted their vigilance." TOP SECRZ 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 SECRET Peiping Underlines Basis for Better Relations With US [The initiative for the conversation with the Swedish am- bassador came from Chen Yi, who said that he was disap- pointed by a recent editorial in a leading Swedish newspaper which criticized the Chinese Communist attitude at the last Sino-US meeting in Warsaw. Concerned that the editorial might reflect official views in Stockholm, Peiping prob- ably felt that a high-level exposition of its position was de- sirable to discourage any shift in Sweden's attitude of studied neutrality toward Sino-US relation] On his remarks, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stressed the friendship of the Chinese and American people and said that the Peiping regime was prepared to "show patience" until there is a change in the US position. Peiping probably does not expect an early improvement in Sino-US relations and Chen himself last November suggested that it might well take a decade Cchen deplored what he described as the failure of the Kennedy administration to show an "attitude of understand- ing" toward Peiping, citing the fact that it had not "softened" the US stand on Taiwan Or Chinese representation in the UN. Current Chinese propaganda attacks the new. American ad- ministration as "more aggressive" than the previous one and says it is busily preparing for both general and local war9 The Chinese Communists make it clear that they regard the withdrawal of, US support from Chiang Kai-shek as one of the very first steps to any improvement in Sino-US relations. They appear to reason that the American position in the Far East is weakening and that there is no necessity for conces- sions on their part. Peiping may, in fact, be stiffening its terms for an improvement in Sino-American relations. Chen, was recently quoted as insisting that the US withdraw from Taiwan before Peiping takes a UN seat. The Chinese had previously insisted only on the prior withdrawal of Chiang Ka AhPki A renresentativen �SECRET- 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 SECRET Nes French-Algerian Negotiations Canceled This week's announcement of French plans to consult with "other tendencies" before and during the negotiations with the PAG probably was an attempt by Paris to define the limits of De Gaulle's concession on his original demand for a round- table conference. Substantive issues have until now been glossed over, and the rebels may have overestimated the de- gree of French acceptance of their proposals. c Joxe's top assistant, Bruno de Leusse, said on 30 arch- -prior to the new rebel move--that he believed the PAG's first effort at Evian would be to attempt to gain recog- nition as a government, but that France had no intention of making such a concession. In contrast to his personal view, however, he said that the French Government was convinced that as early as September 1959--following De Gaulle's offer of self-determination�the PAG had decided to liquidate itself as a government following negotiations in order to participate as a political party in elections after self-determination. The PAG leaders have been deeply suspicious of French good faith since the failure of talks at Melun last June.. They have long insisted that they were the sole spokesmen for the Algerian people, and undoubtedly felt that their prestige would suffer if after Joxe's statement they went to Evian without clear assurance that Paris would engage in substantive negotiations only with them. They may also feel that their desire to be regarded during negotiations not merely as representatives of a rebel force but as the acknowledged leaders of Algeria, capable of making binding decisions conerning the country's future, would have been jeopardized by the present conditions. Moreover, the bomb killing early on 31 March of the mayor of Evian, presumably by French rightists, may have caused the PAG leaders to doubt that the French Government is in a position to assure their safety on French territory-.) The PAG was probably particularly angered by Joxe's implication that the French intend to consult with Messali Hadj and other leaders of the Algerian National Movement SECRET 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 -S-EeRET (MNA), and the French may have miscalculated the depth of the PAG resentment. The MNA, established by Messali two years after the rebellion began, has been active mainly in the Algerian colony in France, where it has fomented an exchange of assassinations with Algerians loyal to the PAG. Within Al- geria, however, its influence has been minimal, and virtually all Algerians who have actually fought against the French owe allegiance to the PAG. There is also the possibility, however, that "hard" ele- ments among the rebel leadership may have seized this op- portunity to break off negotiations, hoping thereby to stifle any tendency among the mnripraips to comnromise with France -stantive issues. �SECRET- 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 '41110� Evacuation oi uninese Nationalist Irregulars C_T_he Chinese Nationalists are planning to send Lt. Gen. Lai Ming-tang, vice chief of the General Staff, to Thailand early in April to make a final appeal to the irregulars to go to Taiwan. Lai believes that if the momentum of the evacua- tion is allowed to fall off, many of the irregulars attached to the area or under slack discipline will evade evacuation. He said that there were several hundred irregulars in scattered groups still in Burma, and they would not leave unless driven out by Burmese armed force EThere are 1,500 to 2,000 men under the command of Yunnan General Than who recently withdrew from Burma into Thailand, they have been relatively in- dependent of Chinese Nationalist control and thus far have re- fused evacuation. Many have married and settled in Burma, but also have villages in Thailand where they go to escape Burmese Army efforts to clean up the area. Great pressure is almost certain to be reauired to evacuate a significant num- ber of these. General Dawee, the Thai representative on the evacuation mission, be- lieves that over 1,500 Chinese in Laos have also refused evac- uations /Thai cooperation with the nationalists so far appears ef- fect e. Prospects have developed for Burmese-Thai military cooperation in removing the irregulars who have refused evac- uation. General Dawee will accompany General Lai to the villages and if necessary use force to disarm Tuan's group. General Dawee asked the Burmese to reinforce the border area to keep the irregulars from withdrawing into Burma-7:3 to large group of irregulars remaining in the area will tend to obscure the benefits of the successful evacuation and recall to the Burmese the incomplete previous evacuation in 1953 and 1954. However, with the special forces removed, it appears unlikely that the remnants will be capable of more than banditry unless in the future Tai ei resumes efforts to resupply, build up, or control the irregulars. TOP SECRET 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 CONFIDENTIAL 110.4 Common Market and Greece Sign Association Agreement c Greece's association with the European Common Market (EE t) has been the subject of laborious and frequently acri- monious negotiations since June 1959. Much of the difficulty has derived from Athens' demands for developmental aid and a privileged position for Greek exports, and from Italian con- cern over potential Greek competition in agricultural products. There has also been some political opposition among the six EEC countries--notably in the Netherlands and West Germany --to the principle of associations with individual countrie These difficulties are fully reflected in the resulting agree- ment, which is said to run to more than 100 articles and which provides in general for an eventual Greek-EEC customs union. Greek industrial exports will benefit from the tariff reductions in the Common Market, and special provision has been made for increased EEC purchases of tobacco, the major Greek ex- port item. Certain Greek industries will receive extended tariff protection from EEC competition, and over the next five years Greece will receive $125,000,000 in long-term develop- mental loans. The major disadvantage to Greece appears to be Italy's successful insistence on "safeguards" against imports of Greek citrus fruit by the other five EEC countrie-q While Athens has accordingly looked on the association agreement primarily in terms of its economic benefits, its importance to the EEC is principally political. Negotiations with other potential associates in the Mediterranean area Turkey, Tunisia, and possibly Israel--have been in abeyance pending conclusion of the Greek agreement. Prob- ably even more important, the agreement comes at a tithe when the EEC is increasingly preoccupied with its future as- sociative ties with Africa, since the convention which -linked the African territories of the EEC colonial powers with the Common Market expires in 1962. Many of these now-inde- pendent territories seem interested in continuing their EEC ties but will almost certainly insist on formal association agreements such as that concluded with Greecre-3 (he Greek agreement may also strengthen the Common Market in its continuing rivalry with the European Free Trade �eefifil5ErNITAL- 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 �eefffrit/ENTTAT Noe association (EFTA or Outer Seven). EEC officials have long insisted that bilateral association with the Common Market is a real alternative to the EEC-EFTA merger sought by the Seven, and can now point to Greece as an instance of its feasi- bility. This example could conceivably become especially at- tractive to such EFTA countries as Austria which are increas- ingly restive over the lack of an EFTA agreement with the EEq CONFIDENTIAL 1 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 111�0' �e0.PatHDEffft7M� THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001974