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April 5, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 .410, I NOV Nur 4(3) 1D1(3) (b)(3) 0(b)(3) /ZZ 5 April 1961 Copy No. C 62, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 101)--SEC-RET__ Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 %OF U 4.31PIGNIONM4-__ The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with representatives of departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable, the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk. 'n this publication is based on all sources, including Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep- resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi- fication in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis. WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Napo' -srelysz, Nolo 5 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 2. Congo: Relations still tense between Tshombeis forces and UN in Elisabethville. (Page ti) 4. USSR=India: Soviet presidium member Suslov to attend Indian Communist party congress. (Page itt) 5. Ceylon = Communist China: Annual rice=rubber barter agreement renewed. (Page ttt) ( 11 f ml ii / Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Aft, Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 11P-1 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Lb)(3) *ii-7SEC�REZ, re CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 April 1961 ..;0$ -vo -STeRET (b)(3) -7- 'I, .-/ i / / w / Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 AI& Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 F-7 Banana* Brazzaville Matadi Kitona INDONESIA 300 Luanda SUDAN 400 TUNISIA NIGERIA INDONESIA 850 MOB UTU Leopold�i hysville Gemena Lis Scattered .Force MOBUTU 3,400 Rumba moBUTU B 800 � Boende Scattered Forces GHANA 1600 MALAYA 750 Francqui KALONJI 1,500 4uabourg Bak nga Luputa INDIA 800 Approximate area nominally controlled by: F-1 Kasavubu-Mobutu IRELAND 655 L j Gizenga 1-1 Kalov I I Ishombe 610405 2 100 United Nations Forces (Service Forces � Selected road not included) Selected railroad .7".. Selected airfield 0 STATUTE MILES 400 Usumbura LIBERIA ETHIOPI Albertville �Manono SWEDEN 65() TSHOMBE 7,000 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 o E61Z F1 Congo: An agreement to return to the status quo at Elisabethville airport, with Katangan troops and a pwedish 0 UN contingent exercising joint control, apparently has papered over the immediate cause of the 3 April confronta- otat_tc, 72.2d tion between UN and ICatangan forces. The incident seems / to have been set off by the Katangans, who attempted to --4.0,-(1e.,.a block the airport runway and were apprehended and disarmed / by the Swedes. Tshombes regime remains apprehensive that A.4,,,,,t� 3 the UN will attempt to airlift Indian troops into southern Ka- tanga from Kamina. This distrust has been communicated to the civilian population and the armed forces, and civilian demonstrations against the UN occurred on 4 April. a2 a discussion in New York with American and British officials, Hammarskjold indicated that he is hopeful rela- tions between the UN and the Leopoldville regime will im- prove. He remains adamant, however, that UN military units must be readmitted to the port of Matadi in the near future. He disclosed that in an effort to meet Congolese ob- jections, his representative in Leopoldville was being in- structed to suggest that the force in the port might be lim- ited to 100 Nigerian police for the time being. He said he was asking for an early answer and stated that if no favor- able reply were received he would bring the question be- fore the Security Council. Soviet presidium nThber Brezhnev told the Swiss ambassador recently that the USSR has little interest or hopes in the Congo but is going to use the issue as a means of obtaining its objectives concerning the UN Secretariat, Including the removal of Secretary Gen3ral Hammarskjold. (Backup, Page 3) (Map) 5 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii VA ( Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 -7� / / / Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 --SETREZ. USSR-India: M. A. Suslov, member of the Soviet party presidium and secretariat in charge of liaison with foreign Communist parties, is reportedly scheduled to attend the Indian Communist party's sixth congress which opens on 7 April. The decision to send Suslov, who has played a cen- tral role in the Sino-Soviet dispute and particularly in the drafting of the resolution at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties, is probably related to the deepening split between those elements of the Indian party oriented to- ward Moscow and the group which generally follows the Pei- ping line. Suslov may also be bringing new instructions to the Indian party, reflecting the Soviet Union's concern that India's foreign policy has been shifting toward the West in the past few months. Soviet Ambassador to India Benediktov recently commented to Indian Foreign Secretary Dutt on the growing rapport between the Indian and US governments and bluntly inquired if this represented a change in India's policy toward the USSR?' Ceylon Communist China: Colombo and Peiping on 4 April signed the annual protocol to their second five-year rice-rubber barter agreement (1958-62). The 1961 proto- col calls for a return to the higher level of trade which ob- tained from 1953 through 1959. The resumption of previous trade levels stems more from Ceylonese economic necessity than from the neutralist Ceylonese Government's policy of increasing the bloc's small share of the island's trade. Last year Colombo eventually had to buy considerably more rice from China than the reduced amount specified in the annual contract. The Chinese rice commitment to Ceylon--set at 200,000 tons for 1961 is to be met by re-exports of the rice Peiping is purchasing from Burma. 5 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF �meR.Ez 111 (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 s;;TOP--SECREL (b)(3) Situation in Laos A Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on 4 April contended that convening of the conference should not be made condi- tional on a prior cease-fire verified by the ICC as proposed by the British. Moscow radio also acknowledged that an early truce in Laos would help create a favorable atmosphere for negotiations. The broadcast, however, repeated the po- sition taken in the Soviet note of 1 April that a cease-fire should be concluded by the Laotian "parties" themselves. The broadcast also urged that a "coalition government represent= ative of a united Laotian people" be formed prior to the in- ternational conference but "with the help of the member coun- tries of that conference." 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 iLTLRE.1 NNW Nur Situation in the Congo The tension in Elisabethville is unlikely to interiere witn Tshombdis reported plans to move on Kabala in the northern part of ICatanga, although the operation may be dela ed some- what. white andIMTtihare been airlifted to Kon- golo, north of Kabala, and a move southward is imminent. Hammarskjold stated on 3 April that in his opinion, the pres- ence of Indian troops at Kamina had brought Tshombe's offen- sive to a halt and a resumption of the operation was unlikely. However, the commanders in northern Katanga are likely to base their estimate of UN military effectiveness on the re- fusal of the Nigerian troops at Manono to intervene in the bat- tle there. The operation thus may be undertaken despite the enlarged UN force in Katangaj Elammarskjold said he believed that the Congolese in Leo- poldville were becoming apprehensive of Tshombe's ambitions and are happy to see the UN exerting pressure on Katanga. The 24-hour time limit set by Hammarskjold for a reply from Leo- poldville probably is a bargaining position and subject to modi- fication. Hammarskjold does feel, however, that a prompt settlementaf the Matadi dispute is a prerequisite for an im- riin-i1tinnbeLweeieJNandLeopoldvill 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 (b)(3, (b)(1) Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Niro' -SrEeRET-T-- 'Nov (b)(1 (b)(3 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 USSR Ruortedly Will Send a Top Leader to Indian* Party Congress -,guslov, a leading Soviet ideologist, led delegations to the French Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1959 and to the Italian Communist party congresses in 1956 and 1960. He also visited Great Britain as a guest of the British Par- liament in 1947, toured the Brussels World Fair in 1958, and revisited England "informally" at the invitation of the British Labor party to promote Anglo-Soviet relations. His prospective trip to India, the first he has made to an Asian country, points up the seriousness with which the Soviet leaders view the inroads Chinese concepts have made in a party in which USSR has long had the predominant influenc_9 there will be no Chinese delegates at the party congress. The Chinese had apparently intended to have the delegation to the just concluded World Peace Coun- cil meeting in New Delhi remain in India to represent them at the congress. The Indian Government�apparently de- liberately discriminating against Peiping--reportedly turned down the delegation's requests for visa extensions while ap- proving visas for other foreign delegates. Nehru's govern- ment, while highly critical of any foreign influence in Indian political affairs, may hope that the Soviet Communist party, in contrast to the Chinese party, will exercise a moderating influence on the Indian party-.1 alle last Indian Communist party congress was held in April 1958 at Amritsar, where the party formally adopted a "peaceful, parliamentary approach to power." Chronic fac- tionalism among the Indian Communist leaders soon led to a renewed struggle over party policy, and the dissension was accentuated by the recent Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. A series of executive meetings in February failed to break the deadlock between the moderate and extremist groups. Lead- ers of the various factions are preparing for a showdown fight at the national congress in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, but the final outcome is more likely to take the form of a corn- promise designed to hold the party together for the elections 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 '*1111SEef k.4.001 (laxly next year. Susloves presence will increase the pressure on rival leaders to compromise their differencesj Li. recent months, Indian policies on the Congo, on the reorganization of the UN Secretariat, and on Laos have re- sulted in a deterioration of Indo-Soviet relations. 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 TONFIII3E-PSIVAL No? Colombo and Peiping Sign 1961 Rice-Rubber Contract The first five-year barter agreement was negotiated in late 1952. The conservative, pro-Western United National party government then in office was motivated solely by eco- nomic factors: at that time rice was difficult to obtain and world rubber prices were low. Colombo has continued the exchange during the past eight years because the arrangement has provided a reliable source of nearly half the island's annual rice import requirements and a steady market for one of its three exports. Since 1953 all the annual contracts except last year's have involved a minimum exchange of about 200,000 tons of rice for 30,000 tons of Cey- lon's rubber. Negotiation of the yearly contract takes place alternately in Colombo and Peiping and normally is a routine process, al- though there occasionally have been protracted disputes over prices. The lengthy discussions on the 1960 contract marked the only occasion when the talks have taken a somewhat polit- ical turn; a few officials in the conservative caretaker regime in power in Ceylon at that time hoped to reduce the island's dependence on the pact, as well as to free for sale at better prices some of the rubber committed to China at fixed prices. Burma is the other ehipf snurep nf the island's rice im- ports. TOTTPti3ENTIAL_ 5 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 Approved for Release: 2-016107105*CO2001976 Nod \we' THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investibation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director TDNF1DEN-T-IAL, Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976 0 / / / / / / / Vo 1/7 ar /. .77 . 77 /7/ z://1.4 � Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 CO2001976