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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 7, 1961
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3C�KC I Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 3.3(h)(2) p,Ir3.5(c) 7 April 1961 Copy No. CENTRAL C INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 TOP 5ECRT TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 U Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Sid SECRET :of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page i) 7 April 1961 2. Congo: Kamitatu believes rapprochement possible between Gizenga and Leopoldville regime. (Page tt) 3. Communist China: Peiping shows concern over Soviet military and economic aid to Southeast Asia. (Page ti) 4. Communist China: Heavy oil shipments scheduled from USSR. (Page tit) 5. Iraq: Almost all political factions now appear opposed to Qasim regime. (Page tit) 6. Angola: Native uprisings in northern Angola. (Page tit) 7. Cuba: Castro's forces react to invasion rumors. (Page iv) �SEeltEr z A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 eir9 NAM1THA ... Phong Sal y , i 1 E 1PHONG SALY / -- 1, fa?' '", ..... ' y Dien Bien Phu *------ 0 1 A 1 -, N-..e \ .... . I 1 %_..,....:�. ,1/4 -T- tyluong Sail Nam Bac i \ fl� \. % t i Sam N / -',"*".../ I t ( .1."/ ,eua LUANG; PRABANG N. 'AM NEUA Luang Prabang � � N. ------;2� \."�..., .....- ........� 11* t AYABOURY r.--' X I E N G KHOUANG N.. � ......_,�.. muonA soul 4-�,41c2.4,3an * ? =--- PVu Khou Nip Xieng Khouang Muong Kaj,s :. / 1 I.... Ban Ta Viangei s.... //. f --- Tha Thoi: ,..Vang Vii,ing sok/. . "Ie. ...., . VIENTIANE 41:118erikhan$�. N' ....... Pak Sane 3 f. NORTHERN LAOS 4riP GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact IWO KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD - TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER 610406 50 100 I I STATUTE MILES Kam Keutilr-, t 8 ak Sao KHAMM UANE" 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 6.4SECRETNS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 7 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Laos:7(Information available as of 0430 EST) The status of the government's airborne offensive to retake Muong Kassy is still unclear. Forward elements of government troops south of that point, which were to move on Muong Kassy in conjunction with the airborne attack from the north, are reported in contact with the enemy. Government troops north of Phou Khoun junc- tion, however, apparently failed to execute their diver- sionary attack there when the combined operation was launchec_y (Backup, Page 1)(Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 soiSTOP SECRET Con,go: Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu, who � returned on 4 April from a trip to Stanleyville, was convinced a rapproche- (P. ment could be reached between Gizenga and the Leopoldville 16,LL,,z. regime. According to Kamitatu, Gizenga is unwilling to accept' A the confederation proposed at Tananarive, but would accept a somewhat more more centralized federal structure instead of the "unitary state" advocated by Lumumba. In addition, ICamitatu believes Gizenga would accept a subordinate ministerial posi- tion under virtually any prominent person. Gizenga insisted, however, that he would agree to such changes only if they re- ceived parliamentary approval. Jean Bolikango, Ileo's vice premier, is to confer with Gizenga later this week in western Orientale. ammarskjoId feels that the UN representatives in Katanga have compromised the UN's freedom of action at Elisabethville airport in their agreement with Tshombe. the UI Command has been authorized to send Indian troops to Eligahpthvillp if neepgqgry to maintain control of the airport. (Backup, Page ) kmap) Communist China - Southeast Asia: he Chinese Commu- k nists are showing concern over the effect Soviet military and economic aid is having on their position in Southeast Asia. While e-`") in Djakarta last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi told his Indonesian counterpart-- who passed the information to the US ambassador�that Indonesia ought to "go slow" in taking aid from the Soviet Union. Along the same lines, the Chinese Corn- munist ambassador to Burma, in a conversation with an Overseas Chinese businessman, is reported to have attached the "utmost importance" to finding out whether Ne Win would seek Soviet military aid during his current trip to the USSR. The ambas- sador suggested that the Chinese Government would be willing to provide the Burmese with military aid and m.entionedj 7 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 P SECRET rofficer-training prograug (Backup, Page 4) USSR - Communist China: Soviet petroleum deliveries to Communist China are now proceeding on a regular basis under a 1961 contract. The USSR has scheduled about 416,000 tons of petroleum for ship- ment to China by rail and sea in April. This figure exceeds by more than 75,000 tons the volume of such deliveries in April 1960 and is the highest noted in any single month. Although this year's Sino-Soviet economic and trade agreements are still be- ing negotiated, the apparent agreement on petroleum deliveries suggests that progress is also being made toward the settlement of other trade problems. Without new Soviet credits and techni- cal assistance, however, Chinese imports of complete plants and enuinmpnt from 1-1-.e USSR will be drastically reduced this year. (Backup, Page 5) Iraq: Qasim's prestige has deteriorated considerably fol- X' lowing the antiregime demonstrations at the end of March. His _d_L/4.1.2-1 violent suppression of the strike disorders has alienated much of the urban populace, and his attempt to make the western- , owned Iraq Petroleum Company the scapegoat for the disorders has not deceived the public. Nearly all political factions, includ- ing the Communists, now appear to be in opposition to the regime. Resentment against Qasim is growing in the army, which little relished its role in suppressing demonstrations with which it in large part sympathized. (Backup, Page 6) Angola: 5,Tative uprisings in northern Angola are continu- c ing. Thousands of native refugees from Angola are reported tob_j_i_di have entered the Congo at Matadi following Portuguese military,, efforts to create a 25- to 30-mile no-man's land on the Angola -v--et side of the bordelfg Portuguese authorities are taking repressive / measures against both white and native religious groups suspecte of involvement in last month's outbreaks. AcAy 7 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 111 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 SECRET �CUBA DI MILES 100 anel HAVANA , ?7-7-4- 10-14A,1,3A A4. M k 'PEL� 0 f Pinar dal Rio Mend-cgs -SV I L DIE -ISLE OF/ PINES UNITED GULF OF MEXICO MEXICO . HONDURAS ATLANTIC OCEAN TDOMg.E.0 CRIA CARIBBEAN SEA EL SALVADOR coNTA RICA cOL0NNA TANANA/ r- � VENEZUELA Trinidad �0 Tunas da Zane- 6 o CARIBBEAN SEA ( CASTRO ..mr" TROOP MOVEMENTS RORCES ) 10 AA PRACTICE INCREASED � APRIL 6 INSURGENT OUTBREAK SELECTED ROADS H*4011n, "../' ,-----2,4 +a 14,v, 1 Nicaro N. O. R, I,E 11; T E nieR, a.... Manzanillo' 4_ A a ' .-...---' "Y.M�.4. - d'OCINNENNanii, en IlirAL 51555A HAESTINA ,..--'$:.1.g. ;'60antanamo _ , (ANTI -CASTRO) (U.S. NAVAL 610407 3 -SEeitEr 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 NSTOP SECRET three nationalist organizations are planning a Conference of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies from 14 to 16 April in Casablanca to "unify the struggle against Portuguese imperialism. " (Backup, Page 7) *Cuba: "very urgent" troop movements in Las Villas and Pinar del Rio Provinces, an increase in antiaircraft firing practice to ten hours daily at a base near the north coast port of Martel, and the outbreak of new insurgent ac- tivity in Pinar del Rio Province. Early on 6 April, 500 men were dispatched to eastern Pinar del Rio where a group, tak- ing arms and supplies with it, had joined an insurgent move- ment, a captured insurgent said his group expected an imminent landing in Pinar del Rio, reports of imminent "invasions" of Cuba by anti-Castro groups in ex- ile, but were contradictory as to the exart date and nice of the expected landings SELECTED INTELLIGENCE TWYDrre A ',MI Orrrfiff A /TM' 0 cpuoiloutic-autiation m t,ogimunist unina: uurrent culties with Special Reference to the Food Situation, the Regime's Remedial Efforts, and Estimated Economic and Po- litical Consequences of the Difficulties. U. S. I. B. SNIE 13-61. 4 April 1961. 7 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 -*wittla�SEC�RET Nftio Laos [King Savang continues reluctant to take a direct political role in Laotian affairs. he is willing to have an inter- national conference, at which Pathet Lao presence will be "inevitable," but stated that he would not nominate the Lao- tian delegation. The King stated flatly that it would be uncon- stitutional for him to serve as prime minister or directly to appoint a prime minister, which was a matter for the assem- bly; gained the impression that he feels such a role would eliminate him as the country's last "stabilizing factor." The king's remarks revealed that he does not exclude Souvanna Phouma as premier. He looks to outside assistance to stop foreign intervention, believing that the Laotians could then settle their own internal problems4 Although Peiping has made no independent comment on the idea of a cease-fire in Laos, it has mentioned the subject several times since the Soviet note was handed to the British� The most recent instance was in Peiping's rebroadcast of Prince Souphannouvong's 5 April statement endorsing the So- viet note and expressing Pathet Lao willingness to enter ne- gotiations for a cease-fire. A 6 April Pathet Lao broadcast states emphatically that the "cease-fire should be conducted simultaneously with the meeting of the 14-nation conference." Repeating previous Pathet Lao insistence that Western support must be withdrawn from the Vientiane government before a cease-fire can be aghieved, the broadcast strongly implied that the Communists will not accept the US position that a cease-fire must precede ra_cord7rence. '51he Soviet airlift of supplies into Laos from North Viet- nam continu) Most of the Chinese Communist transports TOP SECRET 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 -.'TOF SECRET which flew to Hankow from locations in north and east China on 4 and 5 April have now returned to their bases. Although the reason for these flights is unknown, it does not appear that they were in connection with an airlift operation associ- ated with Laos. TOP SECRET 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 %-10P SECRET Nee Situation in the Congo Gizenga reportedly distrusts Kasavubu and regards Ileo as a nonentity. He is said to believe that Ileo has no desire to reconvene parliament, a belief shared by some Congolese in Leopoldville. The Gizenga regime's creation of a "presi- dential college" in Stanleyville to replace ICasavubu apparent- ly is an attempt to bypass the President and his associates while simultaneouly strengthening Stanleyville's own bargain- ing position. Gizenga apparently is willing, however, to work� with such Leopoldville figures as Bolikango and Interior Minister Cyrille Adoula. Kamitatu said he even volunteered to go in- to Equateur Province to meet a Leopoldville representative. Kamitatu also stated that an ambassador from Mali would present his credentials to Gizenga--who would be ac- ting as head of the "presidential college"--on 6 April. the Malian envoy was in Khartoum in late March and was scheduled to proceed to Juba in southern Sudan. From there he apparently was to travel overland into the Congo. There has been no indica- tion that he actually arrived in Stanleyville. Although a number of other neutralist Afro-Asian states have recognized Gizenga's regime as the legitimate Congo government, none of them has yet installed an ambas- sador in Stanleyville. TOP SECRET 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 /61.1 ---SteR&T- Nal Peiping Concerned Over Soviet Aid tot'Southeast Asia bere has been some evidence of past Sino-Soviet com- petition in aid programs to the underdeveloped Asian nations, both Communist and non-Communist. Thus, in the case of aid to the Asian satellites, China's offer of a $50,000,000 credit to Outer Mongolia last May was followed in September by an offer of Soviet aid three times as large. A Chinese credit of $105,000,000 extended to North Korea last October was countered by the USSR's canceling $190,000,000 of North Korea's debt in November. When the Soviet Union made an offer of $112,000,000 to North Vietnam in December, the Chinese responded with a $157,000,000 credit in January.] lin the case of Burma, China extended an interest-free, long-term credit of $84,000,000 last January, the largest ever made by Peiping to a non-Communist country. In March, the commercial counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon is reported to have declared that the USSR would have to re- dress the balance vis-a-vis Communist China either through increased loans or grant aid. U Nu has declared that Burma would turn to the Soviet Union or Communist China for arms only if adequate supplies were not forthcoming from either the US or the U1.9 fioviet military and economic assistance extended to In- donesia amounts to almost $900,000,000,far in excess of Com- munist China's economic aid program, which has been bogged down since the outbreak of the Sino-Indonesian dispute in1959. During his visit to Indonesia last week Chen Yi expressed Pei- ping's willingness to resume its aid] 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 CO2001978 *us SECRET Newr Soviet Petroleum Shipments to China Proceeding on Regular Basis Monthly schedules for Soviet petroleum and petroleum products (POL) shipments to China were noted regularly in communications intelligence through July 1960. From that time until recently, only fragmentary information on the amounts being e ivered. Although the USSR continued to supply China with some petro- leum in the latter half of 1960, reports of shortages during that time indicate that the amounts supplied were not suffi- cient to meet Peiping's requirements and small quantities were imported from nonbloc sources for the first time. Moscow's repeated requests in late 1960 for a decision from Peiping on China's POL import needs for 1961 suggest that the difficulties in this trade developed primarily from Peiping's uncertainty over its entire economic position, es- pecially its ability to maintain a level of exports commensu- rate with its import program. Trade negotiations for a protocol covering 1961 commod- ity deliveries have been continuing in Moscow between top-level Soviet and Chinese trade officials, and these negotiations re- portedly will be concluded shortly. There has been no infor- mation, however, on the results of the talks conducted by the Soviet economic delegation which left Peiping on 27 March for Mongolia to negotiate an aid protocol with Ulan Bator. This delegation presumably discussed various aspects of So- viet aid to China while in Peiping and visited many industrial sites where Soviet technicians had been working prior to their departure last summer. Reliable reports of Moscow's unwillingness to extend emergency economic assistance to help ease the current food crisis in China suggest the USSR is driving a hard bargain in these negotiations. SECRET 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 '-'TOP SECRET The Iraqi Situation The Iraqi public now sees little to distinguish the Qasim regime from the royalist one it replaced in July 1958, Polit- ical parties are moribund, large numbers of political prisoners of all tendencies are in jails throughout the country, and the army is being used to crush protest demonstrations. In addi- tion, the prosperity of the Nun i Said regime has been lost, while immunity, from arbitrary governmental actions has diminished - markedly. As Qasim is being personally blamed more and more for the country's ills, his ability to play off one political group- ing against another is being weakened. The riots which began with the taxi and bus drivers' strike at the end of March have served to increase and, to some ex- tent, coalesce the opposition to his regime. For the first time since the 1958 revolution, Communists and nationalists, although they did not cooperate, demonstrated against the regime at the same time. So many have been arrested in the aftermath of the disorders that prisoners are being sent to provincial jails. Qasim's loss of popularity and prestige is forcing him to rely more and more on the army, which is now the key to his continuance in power. Reports of anti-regime plotting in the army are growing. Most senior army officers are said to be giving lip service to Qasim in order to ward off suspicion while the remain in a position to carry out action against him. UAR support for anti-regime elements has been stepped up during the past month, This support has been aimed at forming a "national league" of anti- Qasim political elements, as well as increasing contacts with certain dismissed Iraqi army officers. TOP SECRE71 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 ."u/TOP SECRET Angola Portuguese authorities in Angola are suspicious of both Catholic and Protestant groups. On 1 April they arrested Monsignor Manuel Mendes das Neves, the vicar general in Angola, claiming that he might be the "supreme chief of the subversive organization responsible for the terrorist attacks." The authorities have accused Protestant missions in northern Angola of being intimately connected with last month's upris- ings because the attacks were better organized in areas where these missions are most active. Portuguese have staged vio- lent demonstrations against Protestant missions in Luanda and destroyed a clinic. the coming conference in Casablanca will be co-sponsored by the pro-Communist African Revolutionary Front for the National Independence of Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN) based in Guinea, the African Independence party of Portuguese Guinea, and the Goa League. Invitations have been sent to leading nationalist organizations representing Angola, Goa, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Sao Tome, and Timor; observers from various Afro-Asian organizations have also been invited. The sponsors hope to adopt a resolution to form a solidarity committee "to organ- ize the struggle" against Portuguese imperialism "on all fronts." The Leopoldville-based Angola Peoples Union ,(UPA) which played a maior role in the March uprisings, apparently was not invited. [L'ortuguese officials who recently visited Angola report- edly were astonished at the extent of participation by natives in the March uprisings. They admitted that Portugal was un- prepared for such events and stated they were convinced that Lisbon would have to institute major economic and social re- forms if it hoped to retain this overseas province) The over-all impact of the incidents on Angola's economy may be grave; coffee production, which accounts for nearly half of the province's foreign exchange receipts, is expected to de-- cline by about 10 percent because of damaged plantations and a labor shortage during the harvest season. Lisbon recently sent 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 %480130P�SEeRET Ns.* warnings to all banking institutions regarding the need for strict compliance with regulations controlling foreign exchange transactions. Stock quotations on firms operating in Angola and Mozambique have declined sharply on the Lisbon stock exchange. On 31 March, immediately following alleged attacks by natives on isolated posts in northern Angola, the Portuguese Government announced plans for creating in its African prov- inces a civil defense organization, comprising a corps of Por- tuguese volunteers in each province under the direction of the governor general and intended to help maintain order. in Luanda, the local military com- mander and the governor general are at odds over treatment of the insurgent natives, with the former advocating mass shoot- ings. On 3 April the American consul in that capital reported indications that civilian authorities had been carrying out large= scale reprisals against natives in various localities in Angola. In Lisbon on 4 April a Portuguese Government spokesman used a NATO anniversary celebration to renew attacks on US policies in Africa, declaring that the US desire to maintain an alliance in Europe was inconsistent with US policy in Africa hostile to Portugal, particularly when Portugal's very existence in the world community depended on its survival in Africa. P SECRET 7 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 � � � 0 ���� THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001978