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April 10, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 3.3(h)(2) %dr acumc 3.5(c) 10 April 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 ION Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 11131"--SECRET �-r-7 -TOP-SEeRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 'F SECRET ;kid 10 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Lam (Page t) 2. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, launched esterday, apparently failed in flight. (Page tO 3. Situation in the Congo. (Page it) 4. Belgian cooperation on Congo likely to be determined by UN action on pending resolution. (Page tt) 5. Kenya: Delay in formation of government invites violence. (Page tit) 6. USSR and Communist China sign 1961 trade protocol; Chinese delegation arrives in Moscow to "complete" economic, scientific, and technical agreement. (Page tit) El Salvador: Disagreements over reform program probably caused resignations from ruling directorate. (Page iv) VA 7/77' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 ispo Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 "Phong Saly 1PHONG SALY _ I � Dien Bien Phu ,�"" ���� NAMliTHA ;,0* \ � 3 tvluong 1 � LUANGIPRABANG Nam Bac SAYABOURY --4�. Sam Neuaik )1���,, `a-AM NEUA - - ' � \.'".`",�, - , � r���"' XIENG KHOUANG So ui Ilan Ban \ A Ban Ta Viang -�����,. - � - tha Thom �Wang VIENTIANE BorikhanS� Sane ���) Kam Keut7- ../ Vientiane NORTHERN LAOS 4ar GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO I Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS - � -TRAIL P 50 100 I STATUTE MILES. 0 ROUTE NUMBER 610410 k Sao KHAMMOUANE �=, � Nhommarkt � TI--iakhek 1 Savannakhet _ 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin, in his recent discussion with UK Ambassador Roberts on Laos, said that the Western position on Laos now is much closer to that of the USSR and that it should not be too difficult to reach agreement. Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi continue to imply strong objections to any proposal that a formal cease- fire must precede an international conference, but all have repeated a Pathet Lao statement that a cease-fire must take place "simultaneously" with the holding of a conference. In a summary of the statement, Moscow radio said that the cease-fire should coincide with the "convocation" of the con- ference. Mhe government forces seeking to recapture Muong Kassy are reported under enemy pressure north of the town; one column to the south remains stalled on Route 13; another col- umn moving northward by trail east of the highway is encoun- tering light oppositiof ) (Page 1) (Map) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 01.11k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kliona NDONESIA 870 Luanda tionr '6i0410 2 SUDAN 400 TUNISIA NIGERIA NDONESIA 280 MOBUTU .Gemena Scattered Force MOBUTU m Aketr � Coquilhatville � Boende ETHIOPIA Scattered Forces EOPOLDV1LLE '01 Leopoldv. ysville Ikelao. uluabourg Bak n GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu 7-1 Gizenga Kalonji 11 Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces - Selected road not included) Selected railroad Selected airfield co) foo STATUTE'MILES 400 Luputa GIZENGA 7,000 KALONJI rhe Congo ETHIOPIA Bukavu Kongolo Kabalo Albertville NIGERIA TSHOMBE 7,000 Elisab4thville NIGERIA 500 Usumbura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 002001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 �tod OP SECRET *USSR: Pi_ test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched fromr�r--Wra Tam at about 0915 GMT (0415 EST) on 9 April, and apparently failed in flight shortly thereafter. Delays to- taling approximately seven hours were noted in the countdown. the launching was associated with Soviet space program de- velopments. As in the case of last week's launching of a probable ICBM on 2 April, however, no facilities associated with previous space launchings participated in yesterday's shot. These facilities continue to reflect preparations for a forth- coming space program event &sterday's launching Was the seventh test shot this year of probable ICBMs from Tyura Tam. Three of these were failures. The total off generally successful Soyiet test ICBM shots to date,is 32:1 Congo: Hammarskjold told Ambassador Stevenson on 7 April that he feels Tshombe's military operations in northern ICatanga--which have already resulted in the capture of Manono and ICabalo�foreshadow intensified civil war in Katanga Prov- ince unless the UN can promptly establish its authority in the area. He added that if Tshombe's offensive does not stop soon,/' his forces will have to be "neutralized." Hammarskjold has requested that approximately 1,200 Indian troops be airlifted /P from Dar es Salaam to Kamina within the next few days; their arrival could provoke violent incidents by Tshombe's supporters. /9> In Elisabethville. Although military talks between Mobutu and Stanleyville General Lundula are apparently proceeding as scheduled, the political conference between Gizenga and repre- sentatives of the Leopoldville government, scheduled to begin on 9 April, has been postponed. The Leopoldville emissaries apparently feared for their safety, and now have suggested that the conference be held in neutral territory, possibly Addis Ababa, Backup, Page 3) (Map) Belgium: Paul Henri Spaak and his associates are confident a Social Christian - Socialist government will be formed with Spaak as foreig29 10 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii z Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 5_ninister, and that Spook is already thinking of an early visit to the UN in a move to improve relations over the Congo situa- tion. Spook is understood to be planning to absorb the Minis- try of African Affairs into the Foreign Ministry, in the hope of eliminating a major source of pro-Katanga influence and an Important channel of undercover dealings with Tshombe. !uture Belgian policy depends largely on UN action on the pending Congo resolution. A tough Indian draft resolution is scheduled to come to a vote today. A severe censure would not be accepted by the Belgian public and, would make Belgian cooperation with the UN less likelyj (Backup, Page 5) Kenya: apveral African leaders in Kenya are concerned that violence may occur if political factions continue to refuse to form a government until Jomo Kenyatta�convicted for his role in Mau Mau activities--is released from detention by Britain. As a result of the elections last February, Africans predominate in the legislature for the first time and had been k expected to fill most executive posts. The leaders fear that agitators capitalizing on the lack of progress in meeting economic problems aggravated by the political impasse may incite disorders among the 80,000 men who have been released from detention camps. Most of these men have not found jobs. Meanwhile, the Kenya administration apparently hopes to con- coct a government from among European, Asian, and minority African legislators, although such a government would prob- ably lack popular support and might precipitate nationalist- inspired disorder (Backup, Page 7) USSR - Communist China: The Soviet Union and Commu- 0 k nist China have announced the signing in Moscow on 7 April of their trade protocol for 1961, which calls for Soviet deliveries of heavy industrial machinery and equipment, petroleum prod- ucts, and similar exports in return for Chinese supplies of raw 7 /7" 10 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iii A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 111/7 A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 V. materials and light industrial goods. In addition to the trade protocol, Moscow agreed to "loan" Peiping 500,000 tons of sugar and to defer for five years repayment of the trade def- icit accrued by China in 1960. this deficit came to about $237,000,000. The agreements reached so far are only a first step to- ward the establishment of a new framework for Sino-Soviet economic relations following the Moscow conference in No- vember. In view of China's current economic difficulties, Peiping's negotiators are probably pressing for further Soviet assistance, which Foreign Minister Chen Yi recently termed "critical for all of us." A Chinese delegation has arrived in Moscow to "carry on and complete" the more difficult talks nrt �111 r�orktirtmin criantifir anti hanhnieal arrrPPment El Salvador: The resignation on 6 April of two of the three civilians on El Salvador's ruling civil-military directo- rate probably stemmed from disagreements over how fast the government should move in implementing the moderate pro- gram of social and economic reforms launched last month. A group of influential young military officers is insisting on more energetic implementation of reforms,and this may increase op- position to the program among wealthy businessmen and planta- tion owners. FA-A extensive cabinet reorganization reportedly is imminenS) (Backup, Page 9) 10 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv / A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 ',00P SECRET Situation in Laos In addition to insisting that a cease-fire be simultaneous with the international conference, the Pathet Lao broadcast of 7 April went on to elaborate on two other "necessary con- ditions" for a cease-fire. The statement asserted that the "interested parties" within Laos should work out the actual ground rules for a cease-fire, and that the cease-fire must coincide with the ending of "aggression and intervention" by the US and its "satellites." In connection with the latter point, the Pathet Lao radio had stated on 6 April that a real cease-fire could be achieved only when the US had withdrawn its "military officers, aircraft, armaments, and the aggres- sive troops of Thailand and Chiang Kai-shek's remnants," Pushkin did not react adversely to the suggested date of 24 April for convening a conference, but he acknowledged that the funeral of the late King of Laos, scheduled for the same period, did present problems which could not be ignored. The Soviet spokesman also expressed the opinion that the conference would be rather long and detailed and would not necessarily require the continuous presence of foreign ministers. How- ever, he said the ministers should attend the opening of the conference in order to demonstrate its importance. [-Political leaders in Vientiane are reportedly giving in- creased thought to ways of forming a single, reorganized government to represent Laos at an international conference. Reports have circulated that government officials are ready to ask King Savang to head a government composed of former prime ministers, partly as a means of countering foreign ef- forts to reinstate Souvanna Phouma as premier. Meanwhile, government spokesmen have continued to express alarm over possible further reinforcement of the Pathet Lao with North Vietnamese units in order to increase the enemy's advantage in forthcoming negotiat1ons3 (An attacking enemy force estimated at two companies reportedly was repulsed on 8 April by elements of the govern- ment paratroop battalion advancing on Muong Kassy from thej 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 OP SECRET giortho Although paratroop positions are reported encounter- ing enemy harassment on three sides, available information does not indicate that they are seriously threatened. Two companies have been requested as reinforcements by the government column stalled south of Muong Kassi4 L--nemy forces south of the Plaine des Jarres are reported to be Widening a trail for a distance of about 20 miles south- ward toward Pak Sane from their base at Ban Ta Viang. a Pathet Lao company is moving toward the area northwest of Pak Sane with a mission to sever Route 13 linking that town with Vientiane] LI'athet Lao forces are also reported to have extended their control in the Kam Keut - Lak Sao area to about six miles south of Lak Sao on the road leading to Nhommarat. There are indications that enemy supply dumps are being established in the vicinity. of Lak 67he Soviet airlift into Laos continues. The Soviet IL-14 en route to Hanoi from the USSR was scheduled to leave Pei- ping on 9 Apr i1 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Nee ',/�,-SEeRkET� Situation in the Congo -lammarskjold said that he is coming to the conclusion that shombe is "simply a criminal and outlaw," and that the element of force on Tshombe's side in diplomatic bargaining with the UN must be removed. Hammarskjold believes Tshombe's recent military moves in northern Katanga were made to undercut his rival, Jason Sendwe, and to increase his own prestige so that he could dominate a conference of Congolese leaders apparently to take place in late April in Katanga. The danger of spreading the civil war in Katanga arises from Sendwe's announcement in Leopoldville on 7 April proclaiming himself chief of the Luluaba state and calling on its people to resist Tshombe's invade] Kabalo was reported calm on 9 April, with UN troops holding the railway station and airport. However, there have been clashes between UN Ethiopian troops and Tshombe's forces which have resulted in casualties on both sides, and further violence could occur at any time, Elsewhere in Katanga, Tshombe's government is remov- ing restrictive measures against UN troops, but gradually so as not to lose face with the public. UN troops on 8 April had water and electricity in all installations, but food supplies were still low. The UN commander in southern Katanga stated on 8 April that continuation of the relatively relaxed attitude depends on events at Kabalo, reaction to the airlift of Indian troops to Kamina, and the ability of the Swedish and Irish UN forces to maintain order in Elisabethville. us a result of last week's transfer of the Irish battalion to Elisabethville, according to Hammarskjold, the Indian con- tingent in Kamina is sufficient only to hold the airfield. The secretary general thinks the arrival of additional well-dis- ciplined Indian troops in ICamina, where they would be less than an hour away from Elisabethville, would greatly strengthen his hand in dealing with Tshombe. The UN commander in Elisabethville has warned, however, that the appearance og 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 SECRET NuoV ffDdian troops in that city would set off bloody encounters be- tween UN forces and Katangan mobs supported by Tshombd's troopq said the black troops were worthless, since they had no discipline or sense of tactics and fired in all directions. The Belgian officers were not much better, as they had little knowledge of bush fighting and no control over the native troops. 32 white troops actually "took" Manono and then turned it over to the black soldiers, who massacred women and children left behind by the defender9 Alione Diakite, named Mali's ambassador to the Gizenga regime, presented his letters of credence on 5 April. He is the first diplomat accredited to Stanleyville to have arrived; others from bloc and African countries are in contact with Gizenga's Cairo office. SECRET- 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 vizo9P�SEGRE Congo Policy, of Probable New Belgian Government �be general opinion in the Belgian press is that the ap- pointment of Theo Lefevre, president of the Social Christian (Catholic) party, to negotiate with leaders of the other parties means that a Social Christian - Socialist coalition is almost certain. The Socialist Party Bureau and Socialist leaders have urged the speedy formation of such a coalition. The Catholic party, however, is handicapped by the opposition of its right- wing elements, which were shocked by the violence of the re- cent Socialist-instigated general strike and are insisting on a guarantee of law and order as the price of an alliance with the Socialists. The Liberal party appears willing to enter into another coalition with the Social Christians, but its sabotage of numerous socio-economic issues in the last government have made the party unacceptable to left-wing Catholic labor elements.] Ltefevre is faced with the possibility of a split in his party, no matter which partner he chooses. A tripartite coalition of all three parties does not appear a likely solution3 (iVIany government leaders fear that advocacy of a bolder Congo policy would jeopardize the prospects for domestic re- forms in which the electorate is primarily interested. Any government, therefore, will have to make a difficult decision with regard to how far it is willing to compromise on the Congo. The Social Christians lost heavily in the 19 March elections to small extremist parties largely on this issue, and they are less inclined than Spaak and the Socialists to meet the UN demands for further disengagement in the Congo. Reforms in this di- rection will be fought by powerful industrial interests like the Union Miniere, the right-wing press, and possibly the royal family, whose influence in Congo affairs has always been ex- tensive. Moreover, many Belgians in the Congo will continue to act in a manner that will complicate the efforts of any govern- ment to reach a satisfactory solutiopj Hammarskjold's personal representative has been havinly :LriF SE C' T 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Na0 [difficulties with the Belgian authorities in his negotiations in Brussels on the removal of Belgian military personnel from the Congo, and he has recommended "strong pressure" on Belgium and its allies to facilitiate his mission. It is possible, however, that the Indian draft resolution on the Congo, which calls for the withdrawal within 21 days of all Belgians who hold major military or political posts, will be moderated somewhat. I oKyo on 1Apru instructea its UN aeiegate to abstain from voting on the resolution because it is "too extreme and impractical.' 1) 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 CONPIDENTIALI __ Delay in Formation ot uovernment in is.enya-i-nvites Violence [iis a result of the legislative elections held in February and the later supplementary balloting by the Legislative Coun- cil for 12 "national" members�four from each of the African, European, and Asian groups= =the two leading African national- ist parties have 35 seats in the 65-member legislature. The Kenya African National Union� (KANU), with 20 seats the larger group, is led by its general secretary Mboya and its president Gichuru. The chief opposition group to KANU is the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), led by Ronald Ngala. It has 15 seats and represents minority tribal groups] L-In neither party can the leaders control their legislative representatives; KANU is particularly faction-ridden. Mboya is challenged by American-educated Julius Kiano as well as by pro-leftist Oginga Odinga, Several KANU members are re- ported dissatisfied with their party's rigid stand on the Ken- yatta issue and would probably break away and cooperate with KADU if the latter were successful in forming a government or if the governor made some face-saving compromise on Ken- yatta-4 LkADU leaders appear more willing to cooperate with the governor in forming a government, provided the party does not lose its popular backing thereby and provided some KANU members participate. Ronald Ngala is visiting London in an effort to obtain some $60,000,000 in grant aid for the resettle- ment of Africans in the former White Highlands. At the recent All African People's Conference in Cairo he sought nationalist support by attacking the United States for colonialist policie_ij KANU's attitude threatens to cause increasing difficulties for London. Mboya recently told American officials that he saw "no way out" unless Kenyatta were released. Even then, how= ever, KANU would form a government only with the intention of demanding a new constitutional conference in the near future with Kenyatta in attendance. Mboya now demands Kenya's inde- pendence in 1961; neighboring Tanganiyka is scheduled to become independent on 26 December 196.17 turitain remains opposed to releasing Kenyatta, although it has expressed its willingness to do so as soon as a Keny_aj. CONFIDENTIAL 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Nee NFIDEN1'IAL NAS 5overnment is formed and functioning well. On his recent visit to Kenya, Colonial Secretary Macleod gave his full support to anwarrinr Rpnison f r his policy regarding Kenyatta-.1 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page .8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 %sow �sEeRE-T-- Changes in Salvadoran Government The two civilians resigned because of their opposition to rapid implementation of reform measures. The directorate will continue operating with its three remaining members, hanges reportedly will be made in all ministries except defense, interior, and labor. The US Embassy at San Salvador believes the prospective appointees were chosen because they represented diverse groupings and thus would have a broad ap- peal. One of them, Miranda Lupone, whose appointment as foreign minister appears almost definite, is known to champion "reform by decree," including nationalization of the Central Bank Junior army officers believe reforms are not being im- plemented fast enough because most cabinet ministers are too much under the obstructive influence of wealthy businessmen and landowners. Most of the wealthy class became at least temporarily convinced of the necessity for reforms to improve the lot of the lower classes after an alarming upsurge of Com- munist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador between the coup in October 1960 and the one that brought the directorate to power last January. Many of the landowners began to change their minds, however, after the implementation of the first reforms, which included a forced reduction of rent for low- income housing and a paid day of rest on Sundays for agricul- tural workers. Coffee growers reacted to the Sunday rest law by dismissing large numbers of workers, and the Communists are reported working to exploit the resulting peasant discontent. The government warned violators that the reforms are in line with recommendations agreed to by 18 Latin American governments at Bogota, Colombia, last year, and that the army will be on the peasants' side in the event of any "social explo- sion." The rapidly diminishing influence of the upper class in the government and the prospects of having the schedule for the 10 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 `44101SECRETNviS implementation of social reforms timed by the army's junior � officers increase the probability that some wealthy Salva- dorans will resort to bribery and subsidized violence in an effort to frustrate the reforms and, if possible, to bring down the government. 10 Apr Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 Nftd N�110/' THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director =97ME'ffhfth- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 rr., WZrZrZrZrZrrrrrrrr/ //7 pis Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979 / TO-113-nreRE-T 7 1 1 / ,v /1 7 0' 0 0 % 0 / 0 / / $ '13/7ERE1/77 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001979