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August 27, 2020
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April 12, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 *C�i�KC I 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 12 April 1961 �...� tip y 11 �-� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 �Ter-5EeRERF-1011 -T.OR4EGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 OP SECRET Ame? xwe LATE ITEM USSR: From preliminary analysis, it appears that the Soviets have successfully orbited and recovered a man from space in Sputnik XI, launched from Tyura Tam at about 0607 GMT (0107 EST), 12 April 1961. The countdown proceeded smoothly with all Soviet facilities which had supported previous space events being identified in the operation. clearly showed a man who was seen to move his head. Moscow, made its first official announcement of the launch- ing about 50 minutes after lift-off and some 50-60 minutes be- fore recovery. The statement that Sputnik XI weighed about 10,400 pounds taken together with the data on its orbit indi- cates that the vehicle was similar to five previous Sputniks identified with the Soviet man-in-space program. Available data indicate that the capsule landed intact some 100-110 minutes after launch about midway between Saratov and Stalingrad and that the astronaut, still in the capsule about an hour later, was alive and reportin? that he had "a very big headache." TOP SECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 *No SECRET 12 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Congo: Dayal reportedly to return to Congo; inci- dents between UN and Congolese forces likely.(page tt) 3. Angola-Cabinda: Native uprisings may occur in next two or three weeks. (Page it) 4. France-Algeria: De Gaulle takes firm line in press conference. (Page ti) 5. 6. Cuba: Further Soviet arms cargo arrives. (Page tit) USSR: New gold sales appear normal. (Page itt) 7. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin situation. (Page tv) SECRET / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Phong Saly I.PHONG. S.ALY, I � Dien Bien Phu A _J� < N AMIT H A �*" \-.1a,�^"" ryluong Sail �Nam Bac _ "- Sam Neua � LUANG1 PRA AN.G NEUA Luang Prabang 1.1 . SAYABOURY � r***".XIEN. G KHOUANGA Muon.ps,sSoui Phou Khdun Muong ;Lissy No,Xieng Khouang , i,-�Ban Ta Viarig Thom . ._r VIENTIANE Borikhaie Pak Sane f����..) Kam Keut y- 'k Sao Vie.lriane NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT Forces in 410 4111 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD 0 - TRAIL t C7) ROUTE NUMBER 610412 I k STATUTE MILES 50 ,100 KHAMMOUANE Nhommarat 41.02 Thakhek Sayannakhet 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 ; AY , CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 12 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: he government's Muong Kassy operation ap- 3 parently is folding according to an appraisal of available - information from that sector by chiefs of American mis- sions in Laos. Elements of the infantry battalion airlifted,, north of that 'town on 5 April are reported withdrawing northward; the government parachute battalion in the same--_,-"-fl' general area reportedly has broken out of enemy encircle/'' ment but its present location is unknown. The CLLLL force south of Muong Kassy has received reinforcements - but thus far has made little forward progress. Ambassador Brown, noting the considerable government forces com- mitted to the Muong Kassy operation with scant results, does not rule out the possibility that General Phoumi might be maneuvering to create a situation that he would hope would bring American intervention. The ambassador also notes that Phoumi and other Laotian Army officers are pointing increasingly to their lack of reserves and the need for outside forces. The Australian ambassador has ex- pressed similar concern, suggesting that Phoumi might order a Laotian Army withdrawal from Pak Sane or else- where to bring Pathet Lao forces to the Mekong and thus seek to force American or SEATO interventiogg (Backup, Page 1) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 0114 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Luanda 610412 2 Leopoldville REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO CONGO I � �N LUANDA r ANGOLA 1 cANZA NORTE �"�% r � --. \ CUANZA SUL BENGUELA ' � LUNDA MALANGE CABINDA AND NORTHWESTERN ANGOLA 9 UNCLASSIFIED 190 STATUTE MILES 200 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 I/ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 1. ktardECRE T Congo: Jjongoiese officials in Leopoldville were told on 13 4 11 April that Hammarskjold plans to send Dayal back to the Congo as UN representative. The secretary general had earlier informed Ambassador Stevenson that as a result of pressure from Nehru, Dayal would return in a week or so. Commenting on this development, Congolese Foreign Minis- � ter Bomboko, who has been advocating moderation in Leopold- ville's dealings with the 17N, told an American official on 11 April that Dayal's return would be marked by a series of in- cidents between the UN and Congolese forces. He further asserted that no UN forces would be allowed in Matadi and that the Indian contingent presently being sea-lifted would be fired on if it attempted to land ther_c2.7 (Backup, Page 3) (Map) Angola-Cabinda: Western officials in Cabinda expect this b Portuguese exclave to be the next target for uprisings by Afri7,t',._tc., can nationalists�probably to coincide with General Assembly � discussions of Lisbon's policies toward its overseas territories. ,,eS The General Assembly is expected to debate this issue within'71 ( two or three weeks. Cabinda, settled by a relatively small - number of whites, has an insufficient number of troops--two 11- all-white companies and one African company--to close its /-1. frontiers to incursions from its Congo neighbors. In north- /? 3 western Angola armed white civilians are reported still con- ducting reprisals against natives for alleged participation in last month's outbreaks there. (Backup, Page 5) (Map) *France-Algeria: De Gaulle's remarks on Algeria at his long-scheduled 11 April press conference will give the rebel leaders little encouragement that he intends to go any further toward meeting their conditions for holding negotiations. While he did not close the door on peace talks, he belittled the in- fluence of the rebellion and questioned the provisional Algerian government's ability to take responsible action. In spelling 12 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii -SEGREZ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 ��PiEC�RE4 VA out additional details of his views on alternatives for Algeria's future, De Gaulle made his strongest threats to date designed to discourage the choice of "chaotic independence" without ties to France. He may, on the other hand, have sweetened for the rebels the alternative of association by indicating that it might involve French aid of varior tvneR in exchange for minority guarantees and base rights. Soviet Bloc - Cuba: The Soviet merchant ship Nikolai Burdenko on 10 April unloaded in the Cuban port of Mariel a cargo of military goods shipped from the Black Sea port of Nikolaev. Since mid-December 1960, when the bloc resumed sizable arms shipments to Cuba after a two-month pause, ten Soviet ships have delivered arms cargoes to Havana. Total bloc arms deliveries to Cuba since major shipments began last September total well over 35,000 tons, plus large num- bers of military vehicles. Thus far the deliveries have been limited primarily to land armaments, including medium and heavy tanks, self-propelled assault guns, field and antiaircraft artillery, and large quantities of small arms and ammunition. No additional shipments are known to be en route at present, but as Cuban military personnel complete training in the bloc--in- cluding advanced flight courses--additional materiel will nrob- hlv he delivered USSR: The USSR is selling gold on the international market for the first time since October 1960. Sales on the London mar- ket since 15 March have totaled at least $35,600,000 and may be as high as $47,600,000. So far, however, they do not appear to fall outside the general pattern of Soviet gold sales, which meets the USSR's foreign exchange requirements. (Backup, Page 6) 12 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 V 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 4 %1RIECRET CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has noted the following conclusions reached by Its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situation for the period 7 March 1961 through 10 April 1961: I- C4 L./ 1. We have no indications that the USSR plans to increase 1L4. tensions over Berlin at this time. 2. There have been no significant developments with re- gard to access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period covered by this report. 3. Over the past month the bloc has devoted increased at- tention to the German and Berlin issues. Soviet propaganda commentary, statements by high-level East German and Soviet officials, and the 30 March Warsaw Pact communiqu�ave all stressed the necessity of concluding a peace treaty and solving the Berlin problem, but without any suggestion of deadlines. (Backup, Page 7) 12 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 SECRET Situation in Laos Potian politicians, in the uncertain atmosphere in Vien- tiane pending decisions on a cease-fire and international conference, continue to propose various formulae for a new government. This situation has given rise to numerous ru- mors; there appears to be some substance to one that a rift is developing between Premier Boun Oum and General Phoumi. According to Phoumi, Boun Oum--now in Pakse on personal matters--feels that his own side has let him down by discuss- ing replacing him as premiH7, tumors are also circulating concerning the possibility that Phoumi may make a deal with the Pathet Lao which would ensure him a position in the government. Phoumies recent ap- proach to the British ambassador, asking his opinion of a gov- ernment divided equally among Souvanna Phouma elements, the Pathet Lao, and Phoumi men, has added fuel to these rumors Whatever their validity, these rumors are probably further demoralizing the government in its political and military ef- forts against the Pathet Lao.] Prince Sihanouk, commenting on the Laotian situation in a speech before the National Assembly on 10 April, warmly praised President Kennedy's objective of seeking a genuinely neutral Laos, but expressed serious doubt as to whether "past errors" in that country would permit achievement of this goal at this late date. According to press accounts, Sihanouk's response to a recent note from Macmillan deplored the fact that an international conference on Laos--first suggested by Sihanouk on 1 January--"was on the point of being accepted only under pressure of military events unfavorable to the West." Sihanouk reiterated his belief that a conference still offers the best solution, but under conditions "infinitely more disadvantageous than the West could reasonably have expected a few months ago." North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and Kong Le all appear determined to avoid taking any step in negotiations on Laos SECRET 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 SECTET which would lend substance to claims by Phoumi and Boun Oum that they represent the legitimate government. All take strong exception to Phoumi and Boun Oum's announced readiness to "sponsor" a conference of the various Laotian factions in order to form a united government. The Communists have indicated that they are agreeable to negotiations with Vientiane repre- sentatives, but assert that only the "lawful overnment of Sou- vanna Phouma" can call such a conference. Airlift operations continue to be scheduled. Three Soviet IL-14s now en route to North Vietnam from the USSR could either augment present operations or replace some of the IL-14s which have been flying almost continuously since early January. SECRET 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Bans na* Brazzaville� Matadi Kitona NDONESIA 870 INDIA 300 SUDAN acp. TUNISIA 3,200 NIGERIA 400 NDONESIA 280 � Gemena Scattered Forces MOBUTU 3,400 EQUATEU +Coquilhatville � Boende /i ETHIOPIA 200 r � MOBUTU I 7200 Scattered Forces , EOPO DVILLE Leo pa Idv. hysville >"; .1)uluabourg Bak GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Luanda 1-7 Kasavubu-Mobutu 11 Gizenga Kalonji 1111 Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces not included) 100j - Selected road Selected railroad Selected airfield 610410 2 STATUTE MILES 4010 GIZENGA 7,000 LIBERIA Lupu a .1�01.11k ETHIOPIA an leyvtlle ETHIOPI INDIA 1400, 1 V U Bu kayo ngolo 10 NIGERIA 900 TSHOMBE 7,000 lisabethville -4s NIGERIA Usurnbura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Neg70P�SECRET- Situation in the Congo Gizenga and his representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, are continuing their efforts to find a channel for furnishing funds to Stanleyville. On 9 April, Gizenga, answering a 6 April request from Cairo, told Mulele to credit funds to the account of an individual in Kenya whom he termed "most re- liab1e!1 asked for the name of such an individual in order to transfer a "large sum" to the Gizenga regime. An earlier attempt to send $380,000 to Stanleyville by courier failed when the courier "lost" the money in Khar- toum. Mulele apparently is worried, however, that his influence in Stanleyville is waning. he expressed concern that various recent attempts made by Stanleyville to establish lines of communication abroad appeared to bypass his office. Gizenga was growing impatient with Mulele, who has had little success thus far in securing aid for Stanleyville. Indecisive maneuvering between Stanleyville and Leopold- ville apparently is continuing. Telephone contact between lead- ers in the two capitals is being maintained, but Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu doubts that negotiations will have proceeded far enough to permit face-to-face talks this week. The tentative efforts of civil officials to come together appar- ently were disrupted by Mobutu's journey to northern Congo, allegedly to negotiate with Gizenga's military aides. The latter, however, reportedly refuse to act independently of Gizenga. Gizenga in turn is said to be unwilling to attend in the absence of Kamitatu, who refuses to attend any conference in which Mobutu participates. In Katanga, Tshombe is continuing his harassment of UN officials, in an effort to halt the apparent UN attempt to blunt the Katanga military operations around Kabalo. Elisabethville banks reportedly are no longer honoring UN checks, and Katanga troops at the Kamina base, where some 1,400 Indian troops are TOPS 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 vpeP�SEC-RET- stationed, are maintaining roadblocks and mining roads in the area. The UN has reinforced its contingent of Ethiopians at Kabalo, and a spokesman for the organization said on 10 April that the UN was in "complete control" of the town. The UN apparently now is investigating means of airlifting part of the Indian contingent in Dar es Salaam directly into Katanga in aircraft under its control. Hammarskjold has about 15 C-54s at his disposal, which could carry 40 troops each trip. TOP SECRET 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 eOP SECRET Disorders Expected in Cabinda The Leopoldville-based Angola People's Union (UPA), believed responsible for organizing the recent clashes in Angola, probably also is planning uprisings in Cabinda. Con- ditions in the exclave are particularly suitable for nationalist activities. In addition to being inadequately defended, Ca- binda's difficult terrain is even more suitable for guerrilla warfare than that of northwestern Angola. Close tribal ties exist between the natives of the exclave and those of the for- mer French Congo, and some government officials in Brazzaville are known to be sympathetic to nationalistic aspirations in Cabinda. Moreover, the exclave offers a convenient location for the establishment on Portuguese soil of a native "govern- ment in exile" from which to carry out a campaign to "liberate" all Portuguese overseas territories. three nationalist organizations were planning a Conference of the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies from 14 to 16 April in Casa- blanca to outline such a campaign. The governor general of Angola indicated that the situation in the disturpect nortnern region remains tense, with certain areas "practically in a state of alarm." He added that the situation would continue to get worse as long as insufficient forces were available to "calm the population and guarantee immediate repression of any rebellion which might arise." Armed white civilians in these areas are reported taking the law into their own hands by punishing natives after forcing them to admit participation in plots against whites. On 10 April the governor general warned the inhabitants of Luanda--for the second time in 48 hours--that he would impose a curfew unless calm returned to the capital. The second warning followed a clash which involved natives, police, and probably white civilians and which resulted in the death of several natives and the arrest of 30 others. 4-012�SEGRE 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 USSR Resumes Gold Sales total So- viet sales in London of $35,600,000 worth of gold between 15 and 23 March. Two shipments through Paris totaling about $12,000,000, which were reported by the press in early April, may be part of or in addition to these sales. During 1960 the USSR sold about $107,000,000 worth of gold in LOndon between May and October and then abruptly withdrew from the market during the international "gold rush" last fall. Moscow was apparently reluctant to sell gold since such sales might have eased the strain on the dollar. It ap- parently also believed that the new US administration would be forced to raise the price of gold. The resumption of sales was apparently motivated by the increased stabilization of the gold market, repeated denials by the US Government of any inten- tion to change the price of gold, and the balance-of-payments pressure on Moscow caused by its sustained import drive. Persistent reports that the USSR is supplying Communist China with foreign exchange to ease its difficult economic sit- uation remain unconfirmed, and so far the amounts involved in these sales suggest that they are to be used only for Soviet foreign exchange requirements. 1E-eftE-T 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Nowe-eONFf0Efff-htt, Possible Soviet Proposals on Berlin and Germany Moscow, in support of a call for new negotiations on Berlin and Germany, may advance further proposals broadening the standard Soviet call for a German peace treaty and free city status for West Berlin by incor- porating earlier East German schemes. that Moscow may endorse previous East German plans for a nonaggression pact be- tween the two Germanys, a phased approach to disarmament in Germany similar to the Rapacki plan, and the formation of an all-German confederative council and a peace treaty commis- sion--all of which were included in the plan proposed by party leader Ulbricht in February 1960. The Bonn Foreign Ministry is convinced that this report published in the Frank- furt paper on 30 March was in fact inspired by the Soviet Em- bassy. The Frankfurt paper was used _ in November 1958 to leak the Soviet proposal for a free city before the USSR officially presented the plan to the Western powers. the USSR was considering the timing of a new diplo- matic initiative on Berlin. Further confirmation of a possible Soviet offer along these lines was contained in Ulbricht's pub- lic statement on 1 April that his proposals were discussed "In detail" at Moscow. The bloc's increased attention to the German and Berlin issues since the publication on 4 March of the Soviet memoran- dum to Bonn also suggests that the USSR is preparing further diplomatic moves on Berlin, Moscow's reference in that mem- orandum to an interim agreement on Berlin was the first such public reference since before the Paris summit, and Ulbricht in his speech to the East German central committee plenum in CONFIDENTIAL 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN �Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 INSCONFIDENTIAL mid-March called for a solution in the "spirit of the Soviet memorandum." He also listed a number of initial measures for a Berlin solution, which appear intended as part of any interim agreement. The revival, well in advance of any nego- tiations, of the concept of an interim solution suggests that it will remain a principal element in any new package proposal. 12 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 -TrOVSEC-R-E-T- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981