CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001982
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 13, 1961

Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982 3.3(h)(2) /
�1� iv r az u iv& 1 -tor 3.5(c)
SO
13 April 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
TOP SECRET
A
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
" Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
�Vt/i'��SEertEir-
-T-or�-sEeitET�
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
iokiciroco)ved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
SECRET-
13 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page i)
2. Congo: Brussels reported still unresponsive to UN
pressures. (Page it)
3. Portugal: Further report on Defense Minister Monie
plans to force changes in Lisbon's policies. (Page tit)
4. USSR: Khrushchev-Lippmann conversation on Ger-
man problem. (Page iii)
5. Soviet Bloc: Comment on air-raid shelter construc-
tion program. (Page tit)
6. Nationalist China: Taipei takes all-or-nothing stand
on China's seat in UN. (Page iv)
7. Iraq: Qasim taking harsher position on foreign-owned
Iraq Petroleum Company. (Page iv)
8. Ghana: Shipment of small arms from USSR. (page iv)
9. Watch Committee conclusions. (Page v)
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
" Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
NORTHERN LAOS
GOVERNMENT Forces in
411111 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
0
--TRAIL I
ROUTE NUMBER
610413
50
tt[111
STATUTE MILES
AM
Lt't
X ,L KHOUANG
Moon) Soui Ban Ban
nu Khoun
.."*., Tha Th m
Vang Vieng � ,..esit..����. i
13 r f s' -,�1..
VIENTIANE Borikhan5N
Pak Sane .,:i
A
100
Vientiane
Kam Keut
KHAMM
k Sac'
UANE
Nhomm rat
Thakhek
9
vannakhet
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
A313 roved for Release: 2020/08iii c 02m 982,
� TOP SECRE
f
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos: Eresent thinking by King Savang and General Phoumi
Is to defer reorganization of the government at least until a
cease-fire is effected, possibly even awaiting the outcome of
an international conference. They hold that national reconcil-
iation depends on international agreement on a neutral status ,41
for Laos, hence any prior internal rearrangement would be
meaningless. They do not consider it necessary for Laos to
be formally represented at an international conference, al-
though they feel that representatives from the various com-
peting factions�Vientiane, Souvanna, and the Pathet Lao-
shoujcl be present for consultatiolg
L2houm1 reportedly has ordered the two government battal-
ions north of Muong Kassy to withdraw to Luang Prabang. Pres-
ent locations of these forces are unknown, but some elements
reportedly have already arrived�apparently via trails--at the
government's defense perimeter north of the Phou Khoun road
junctioig (Backup,
Page 1) (Map)
fflie Watch Committee at its meeting on 12 April reached
the following conclusion concerning Lao.�_g
Ellie apparent collapse of the government's Muong Kassy
offensive will further depress FAL and Vientiane morale and
will permit the Communists to resume attacks in the Luang
Prabang and yang Vieng areas. In the Pak Sane sector, there
are indications that the Communists are making preparations
for further military pressure against government forces which
had withdrawn from Tha Thom. There are increasing indica-
tions that Communist forces in central Laos have been strength-
ened in recent weeks, and the pattern of military clashes sug-
gests that the Communists are preparing to make a relatively7
TOP SECRET
7
rA
Ft-
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
40%
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Banana
INDONESIA
Luanda
A tianOr
/610413 2
SUDAN
400
blic of the Congo
.Gemena
Scattered., Forc
4M-O'BUTU
EC)IJATEU
f Coquilhatville
TUNISIA ETHIOPIA
3,200 200
NIGERIA
400
INDONESIA
280
MOB UTU
Scattered Forces
LEOPOLDVILL
Leopolthi
ysville
MOBUTU B
800
� Boende
GIZENGA
� 7,000
MALAYA
870
uluabourg �IBERIA
Bakw
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
'E1 Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshomb6,
ri United Nations Forces (Service Forces
Selee-ted road not included)
�_10.7 Selected railroad
=,Selected airfield
Lupu a
ETHIOPIA
'RENTAL
NIGERIA
8-00
TSHOMBE
lisab hville
Lake
ibert
NIGERIA
Usumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
vr,
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
A.� �4001 TOP SECRET
:4?
gtrong military effort in the direction of Thakhek. In view
of the government's weakened military posture in this region,
and its general lack of trained reserves, the Communists
can psobablyy make further extensive military gain!)
(the bloc position that the contending elements in Laos
should discuss the terms of a cease-fire is probably intended
to stall the termination of active hostilities. If the position
which the Asian Communists have advanced, that a cease-fire
should be effected simultaneously with a conference, becomes
the official bloc position, it will be further evidence of bloc
interest in maximizing, without precipitating SEATO interven-
tion, the Communist military and political position in Laos
prior to any conferenc�7
/Although we have seen no movements of North Vietnamese
or Chinese Communist military forces or equipment which
would indicate an immediate intention to intervene overtly in
the Laotian conflict, it is probable that they are in a osition
to take such action ranidlv and with little warninesi
Congo: aieb Sabhani, the Tunisian diplomat who is serv-
ing as Hammarskjold's representative in Brussels, told Amer-
ican officials on 10 April that the Belgian Government had been
almost completely unresponsive to pressure for the removal
of Belgians in the Congo. Asserting that Belgium's goal was
"not a stable Congo but a Belgium=oriented Congo," Sabhani
said he believed the Belgian proposals for tripartite talks
among the UN, the Congo, and Belgium were offered in bad
faith, since the Congolese would be tools of their Belgian ad-
visers and the UN would in effect be negotiating with two sets
of Belgians. He further stated that he had found Foreign Minister Wigny "impossible" and expressed fear that the next Bel-
gian Government would be badly oriented on the Congo questionj
(Backup,
Page 4) (Map)
13 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
. TOP SECRET
�
4.1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
A1.pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
mOtl TOP SECRET surof
Portugal: 'El.'he plans of Defense Minister Botelho Moniz
to force Prime Minister Salazar to change his present pol-
icies or step aside were "progressing extremely well" as of
Moniz, who has not carried out previously
reported intentions to give Salazar a virtual "ultimatum" on
specified dates, may now feel impelled to act in view of the
worsening situation in Portugal's African provinces and the
possibility that with further delay he would lose the initiative
tn nn is supporter.S
(Backup, Page 5)
USSR: 5 his discussion with Walter Lippmann on 10 April,
Khrushchev insisted that the German problem was "overripe"
for settlement, but stated several times that he realized the
President must be given time to consolidate his position. Khru-
shchev outlined three possible solutions: a peace treaty with
both Germanys, which, according to Lippman, he realized was
impossible to attain; a temporary arrangement along the lines
of the proposals made at the Geneva foreign ministers' confer-
ence of 1959; or a separate peace treaty between the bloc and
East Germany. He made his position clear that a temporary or
interim agreement on Berlin would only be possible on the def-
inite understanding that at the end of the period the occupation
of Berlin would be terminated
(Backup, Page 6)
Soviet Bloc: Jere is now firm evidence that during� 1960
basement air-raid shelter construction was common practice
for new masonry buildings in Warsaw. Shelters of this type
have been called for by Soviet civil defense manuals and have 7)'9
been under construction in the USSR for a decade and in most
of the European satellites for a number of years. There is
some indication, however, that in the large cities of the USSR?
13 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF
TOP SECRET
�
lii
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
/ /77
'Approved for Release: 20i0/08/11 CO2001982
/4
rni�O TOP SECRET r'
/
( /
/
Elje basement shelter building program has recently been re-
duced or suspended in favor of alternative civil defense meas-
ures-. (Backup,
Page 8)
Nationalist China: ,hinese Nationalist officials are tak-
ing an all-or-nothing stand in regard to China's seat in the
United Nations. Taipei is determined to cling to the mora-
torium formula in the United Nations General Assembly. Chiang
Kai-shek, in a recent speech, declared his intention to go it
alone if need be rather than abandon the position that he intends
to "recover the mainland." He spoke with anger of foreigners
it rtain the illusion of two Chinasj
(Backup, Page 9)
Ir --Oil: rime Minister Qasim has deliberately dead
locked negotiations with the American, British-Dutch:, and Ote
French-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), ending another
round in the talks which have been carried on intermittently
since the July 1958 coup which brought Qasim to power. Qasim
has ordered the company to halt all oil exploration and confine
its activities to producing oil in existing fields. The company 7
already has agreed to substantial changes in its oil concession,
including surrendering 90 percent of its concession area, and
now apparently feels that further negotiations are impossible.
Qasim is attempting to make IPC a scapegoat for the country's
economic and political problems, and a vitriolic press cam-
paign against IPC is now under way, The prime minister may
carry out his often-repeated and politically popular threat to
nationalize the French share of IPC as a gesture of solidarity
with the Algerian rebe?3 (Backup,
Page 10)
Ghana-USSR: E,ti 7,000-box shipment of small arms and (,)
ammunition is reliably reported to have been delivered to Ghana,etz
on 6 April by the Soviet merchant vessel Dneproges. Beret
fore Ghana has procured such supplies exclusively from.
13 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv
,
y
TOP SECRET
,
';',/ /
,
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
///
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
%sal#TOP SECRET
NS
Iommonwealth sources. The port of origin of the shipment--
Riga on the Baltic Sea�suggests that it is not part of a major
arms deal, since exports under such deals almost invariably
originate at the Black Sea port of Nikolaev. The Nkrumah re-
gime's purpose in acquiring arms from the bloc at this time
is not clear, but the apparently open manner in which their
arrival has been handled and the fact they are being stored at
a police barracks some distance west of Accra suggest they
are not intended for clandestine re-exporg
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
W.. 4
/
A.
No change from last week.
7
B.
No change from last week.
C.
LAOS: Carried on Page i of the Daily Brief.
,
WA
13 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF
P SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
'NS SECRET
Situation in Laos
houmi told Ambassador Brown on 11 April that the Lao-
\ tians themselves could handle the governmental problem if
International agreement were reached on a guarantee of Laos'
neutrality, and on supervision of a cease-fire and arms de-
livery. He said he was anxious to see Souvanna Phouma as
early as possible to try to obtain maximum agreement with
him prior to a tripartite meeting With Pathet Lao leader Sou-
phannouvong. Phoumi acknowledged that arrangements are
already being worked out with King Savang to ensure Souvanna's
presence at Luang Prabang on 28-29 April for funeral ceremo-
nies for the late King Sisavang Vong,who died in October 1959.
Laotian leaders have indicated that Prince Souphannouvong
would also be welcome. A Pathet Lao broadcast on 11 April
stated that people throughout the country should be permitted
to participate in the ceremony, but criticized the "rebel Phoumi
- Boun Oum group" as unfit to arrange the rites)
qcing Savang continues to respond negatively to the proposal
that he take personal charge of the government. He has sug-
gested that Souvanna might be suitable, provided he is "boxed
in" by men like Phoumi and former Premier Phoui Sananikone,
with the Pathet Lao excluded. Phoui, in a conversation with
Ambassador Brown on 12 April, took the realistic view that the
Pathet Lao would be very demanding and that Laos would need
the help of Western nation_sj,
Lie Diem government in South Vietnam is concerned over
the prospect that Souvanna may resume the premiership, which
Saigon feels would result in the loss of Laos to the Communists
from within. The Vietnamese authorities fear that this would
endanger South Vietnam's security, since Communist infiltra-
tion via southern Laos--already a serious problem--would be
facilitateLzg
Thai officials are also becoming increasingly restive over
the military and political trend in Laos. Bangkok has announced
that defensive measures are being taken in the border area, and
particular concern has been voiced over the possibility of a
Communist attack on Thakhek. Premier Sarit told newsmen on
-SECRET--
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
- SECRET
*ire
ii April, "There is no cease-fire; the Laotian Government
may go at any time." He saw little hope for a successful neu-
tral coalition government for Laos, and said that "a coalition
will lead to eventual takeover by the Communists."
LiVhile he apparently did not elaborate on the Soviet Union's
public position on the Laotian issue, Khrushchev in a 10 April
discussion with Walter Lippmann gave the latter the impression
that the Laotian problem would be satisfactorily settled. A
further indication, however, of Moscow's determination to
press for the most advantageous terms for negotiations is
provided by the remarks of the Soviet charg�n Paris
The
Soviet spokesman, who had earlier remarked that the USSR
could not accept a cease-fire as a prerequisite for a conference,
stated flatly that the Soviet Union would definitely not agree to
call for a cease-fire before the date of the international confer-
ence is set. the Soviet charg�
was unusually blunt and went on to say that the "Russians would
unquestionably win in Laos, thanks to the stupid mistakes of
Americans.ty
During the recent discussions on Laos with the UK ambas-
sador in Moscow, Soviet officials have attempted to secure a
definite date for the opening of the conference. They have
also reacted unfavorably to the British draft proposal which
stipulated that the conference would convene as soon as the
cease-fire in Laos has been reported fully effective by the
ICC chairman. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin indi-
cated that his first impression was that the Western powers
were still making the conference conditional on a cease-fire.
Soviet reaction on this issue strongly implies that, while the
USSR may join the British in issuing a joint appeal for a
cease-fire and propose that all contending factions in Laos
begin truce negotiations, Moscow intends to press for a firm
date for the conference at the same time the cease-fire appeal
is made and may even insist that cease-fire talks and the con-
ference begin simultaneouslg
aoviet airlift operations continue to be scheduled. Six-
teen Soviet transports--six IL-14s and ten LI-2s--were
detected in flights to Xieng Ktiouang on 11 Apr.1.9
-SEeRET-
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Nage
LA degree degree of urgency concerning the flight of the three
Soviet IL-14s en route to North Vietnam from the USSR but
(Waved at Hankow in Communist China
the three IL-14s must depart Hankow and land at Llano'
on 12 April. This is the first reflected instance of such
urgency in connection with the arrival of Soviet aircraft at
Hanoi.]
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
..w401)�SEefilET� *NNW
Situation in the Congo
ritaieb Sabhani, Hammarskjold's representative in Brus-
sels, said that Belgium was blind to the fact that unless it
modified its policy, pressures inside and outside the Congo
eventually would deprive Brussels of all its influence in the
country. He asserted that the Belgian arguments with him
were hypocritical and completely unconvincing. In response
to Sabhani's pressure for the removal of Belgians in Congo-
lese service, the negotiators in Brussels allegedly alternated
between a narrow legalistic position and references to the
mood of public opinion in Belgium. Their early April announce-
ment that Belgium was prepared to cooperate with the UN al-
legedly was the result of a threat by Sabhani to break off ne-
gotiations completely,3
1After talking with Lefevre and Spaak, who will probably
head a new Belgian government within the next few days,
Sabhani indicated he had enough hope to warrant staving on
and continuing discussions with then23
Lin New York, Hammarskjold is also putting pressure on
Brussels to exercise closer control over its nationals in the
Congo. the chief Bel-
gian delegate relayed to Brussels a letter from the secretary
general which enumerated the individual Belgians who were
present at a recent meeting between Tshombd and UN offi-
cials. Stating that he had given this information to Sabhani,
Hammarskjold stated, "I need not emphasize the strong ef-
fect such a report may have on the members of the United Na-
tions."
TOP SECRET
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
SECRET� '*ftire
Showdown Between Salazar and Portuguese Defense Minister
Seen Imminent
Moniz, if he moves,
will probably press Salazar first for internal changes, since
he believes these are prereauisite to badly needed changes in
Portugal's African policies.
I While 80 percent of the Portuguese oppose Salazar's inter-
nal policies, 95 percent would back Salazar against any one
proposing steps which could be construed as eventually lead-
ing to the loss of the overseas pr0vince_s4
(The US air attache in Lisbon believes a move by Moniz
at this time has a good chance of success. He bases this be-
lief on criticisms of Portuguese policies in Africa by most of
his contacts in the Portuguese Air Force and their view that
the provinces will be lost unless these policies are chang&
Salazar, for his part, may try to offset Moniz' pressure
by an early reshuffling of his cabinet in which Moniz' own posi-
tion would be improved and some modest concessions made to
demands for reform. Portuguese Foreign Minister Mathias told
Ambassador Elbrick on 2 April that a reshuffle would take place
after French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville's departure
from Lisbon, presumably on 10 Apry.4
SECRET
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
SECRET
%of �upsi
Soviet Proposals for an Interim
L&Anterim or "temporary" agreement on Berlin will
probably be the focal point of the Soviet position in any future
negotiations. The USSR introduced the idea of a temporary
agreement on -Berlinfor the first time at the Geneva foreign
ministers' conference on 10 June 1959. This proposal modi-
fied the original demand for a free city made in November
1958, in that it no longer called for an "immediate and com-
plete abolition" of the occupation in West Berlin. Instead,
Gromyko proposed that the West could retain certain rights
for one year and that communications to Berlin would continue
"in their present form." During this period the Western
powers would reduce their troops in Berlin to "token" contin-
gents, prohibit stationing of nuclear or rocket weapons in
West Berlin, and prohibit subversive activities and hostile
propaganda against the bloc:, an all-German committee
would be established to examine the questions of a peace treaty
and unification. If this committee failed to reach agreement,
the USSR would sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany,
and Gromyko explained that this would terminate all Western
rights in Berlin-)
In response to Western counterproposals for an interim
agreement, Gromyko on 19 June extended the Soviet plan to
18 months and modified it by proposing that at the end of this
period the foreign ministers could resume consideration of the
Berlin question, but would have to give "due regard for the
situation obtaining at that time." Gromyko was deliberately
vague on the status of Western rights in Berlin after the ex-
piration of the agreement. The 19 June proposal also dropped
the provision for a guarantee of the interim status by the Big
Four and East Germany-7
On 28 July, shortly before the conference adjourned,
Gromyko submitted another 18-month solution, incorporating
previous provisions but aimed at "changing the existing situa-
tion in West Berlin." For the first time, the USSR formally
spelled out a precise level for Western troops in Berlin--a
combined total of 3,000 to 4,000. A four-power commission
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
*es, SECRET .4.0�0
Fwould supervise the agreement, and at the end of the period
the Geneva Conference would reconvene if the all-German ne-
gotiation had failed. Moscow did not publish this proposal.)
ELhortly before the Paris summit meeting in May 1960,
Moscow returned to the interim agreement. On 9 May the
Soviet ambassador in Paris handed the French a new proposal
--also never published�extending the interim period to two
years but describing the purpose of the agreement as prepar-
ing conditions for the "subsequent transformation of West Ber-
lin into a free city." The new plan embodied the main features
of the previous proposal: progressive reduction of Western
garrisons, prohibition of nuclear or rocket weapons in West
Berlin, and prohibition of subversive activity or hostile propa-
ganda directed against the bloc. The agreement would "take
account of declarations" by the USSR and East Germany to
maintain access to Berlin in its present form, and these "en-
gagements" by East Germany could take a form which would
not signify diplomatic recognition by the West. The entire
agreement would be supervised by a four-power committee-.)
CAt the end of the interim period, however, if an all-Ger-
man committee failed to agree on the German question, the
four powers would sign a peace treaty with the two German
states, "or with one of them, as they would judge it desir-
able." Moreover, the four powers would be committed to
take measures to create a free city in West Berlin. As in
the proposal of November 1958, the USSR provided for some
form of UN participation in guaranteeing the free city. Thus,
unlike the previous proposal, this latest offer made a free
city the explicit goal of the interim arrangements:7
he only subsequent authoritative mention of an interim
agreement was the USSR's 17 February memorandum to Bonn,
which stated, "The Soviet position does not preclude the pos-
sibility of a temporary settlement of the West Berlin issue
prior, to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, but
on the condition that an exact date for the conclusion of this
treaty is fixed." This reference to a peace treaty at the close
of the interim period suggests that Mosenw hn g in mind the
unpublished proposal of 9 May 19601
SECRET
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
SECRET
Soviet Bloc Shelter Programs; A Status Report
LA US engineer who worked on the new US embassy. in
Warsaw from late 1959 through 1960 was informed by Polish
builders that every building in Warsaw must have a shelter;
upon seeing US-drawn plans for the new US embassy, the
builders asked, "Where is the bomb shelter?" but did not
insist on its inclusion. The engineer visited a number of
Warsaw construction sites during the course of his stay in
Poland and saw "many" which included the characteristics
of basement air-raid shelters depicted in Soviet and Polish
civil defense manua1s7
the USSR has been building basement shelters for about
a decade in new masonry buildings, including apartment
houses. The principal satellites have also constructed base-
ment shelters for several years. When fully equipped, these
shelters offer good protection from fall-out but limited pro-
tection from the effects of blast. Other types of shelters
which have been prepared in the Soviet bloc include light and
heavy bunkers, subways, and tunnels. The heavier types of
shelter should afford greater protection from high overpres-
sureAl
!Threis some evidence that the construction of basement
shelters in Czechoslovakia as well as in the Soviet cities of
Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Kharkov has been reduced or
suspended. Possible explanations for such a step would include
substitution of detached shelters because of increased use of
prefabricated units built without basements, the limitation of
basement shelter construction to small towns of low target po-
tential, a sufficiency of basement shelters in certain areas,
and greater reliance on partial evacuation of urban populations
as a civil defense measure.
reduction in basement shelter construction has not been
conclusively demonstrated for all areas of the USSR and Czech-
oslovakia, and the recent reliable report from Warsaw indicates
that Poland at least still considers the construction of basement
shelters a valid civil defense measure/
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
NIS CONFIDENTIAL __
Chinese Nationalists Increasingly Concerned Over Their
UN Position
Chinese NatlinlallbL Walelalbare VILJ141116 W11.11 increased
candor their apprehension about United States intentions with
respect to the Chinese representation problem in the UN Gen-
eral Assembly session this fall. They are anxious to know
what tactics are to be adopted and are apprehensive over what
seems to be a drift toward "two Chinas" in free world opinion.
They blame the US administration for failing to take a strong
stand which they contend could halt the trend toward seating
Communist China in the UN. They believe the United States
is considering the "internationalization" of Taiwan and the
adoption of a "two Chinas" solution in the un
Chiang Kai-shek is obsessed with the idea of returning to
the mainland and is opposed to a "two Chinas" concept even
though adoption of such a formula might cause Communist China
to refuse to enter the UN. He believes any erosion of his posi-
tion would accelerate the disillusionment of the mainlanders
who fled to Taiwan in 1949, encourage Taiwanese separatism,
and lead to eventual Taiwanese domination of the government./
The Chinese believe the United States should try to rally
support among other UN members for the moratorium. They
believe that the United States, preoccupied with the crisis in
Laos, has not yet reached a decision on its China policy and
that, therefore, the Chinese must firmly hold the line. Recent
official pronouncements have reiterated that the offshore islands
are an integral part of Nationalist China and have insisted that
the United States not weaken its policy toward the Chinese Com-
munist regime. which they describe as being on the "verge of
collapse7
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
-4,ftie SECRET
Iraqi Oil Negotiations
[During previous negotiations with the IPC, Qasim had al-
ready gained nearly all his original and most of his subsequent
demands. Competing interests of IPC's owners have made it
difficult for the company negotiators to maintain a firm posi-
tion in the face of persistent Iraqi pressure and probahl,
couraged progressively stiffer government demands,
he regime has ordered "spontaneous" telegra
support from army units "down to the battalion level.y
O
7.9_ofl
/Qasim, in a recent press conference, accused the com-
pany of fomenting the antiregime riots which grew out of a
strike against higher gasoline prices in late March. The
army's killing of a number of demonstrators while quelling the
riots caused Qasim's already waning prestige to fall sharply.)
a:1C secured its concession in stages from 1925 to 1938.
The concession now covers most of Iraq and embodies the
basic 50-50 profit-sharing formula in general use in the in-
ternational oil industry. The concession runs to the year 2,000
and beyond and its terms are somewhat more conservative than
the important Middle East concessions granted or modified in
recent years. Recognizing this, IPC has been willing to make
a number of changes, including an offer to return 90 percent
of its 172,000-square-mile concession to the government. How-
ever, Qasim's intermediate goal appears to be partial govern-
ment ownership of IPC. His ultimate objective appears to be
nationalization of the company/
CIraq does not now have diplomatic relations with France,
and Qasim has suggested that Iraq might justify nationalizing
the 23.75 percent of IPC owned by French interests on the
grounds that the French Government is a partial owner;)
�SECRET--
13 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
.The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001982
ZA