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Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
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April 14, 1961
Z/ZZZZZ7,777,77//777/44/7/77//77777777777777//77/7/7,/, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 3.3(h)(2) 1 r %o .a&UICL I 1011,9 ipmt 3.5(c) 14 April 1961 Copy No. C "f) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 1Wr Lit..tCL 1--- TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 - kSOP SECRET 14 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Situation in Laos. (Page t) 2. Congo: Katangan tribal leaders attempt to circumscribe Tshombe.'s power. (Page ti) 3. Portugal: Salazar removes Defense Minister Moniz; reshuffles cabinet. (Page it) 4. France-Algeria: US Embassy in Paris comments on De Gaulle's press conference. (Page ti) 5. Communist China - India: Peiping unofficially broaches possibility of arbitration of border dispute. (Page itt) 6. Japan-Korea: Pyongyang agrees to resumed repatriation of Koreans in Japan. (Page itt) 7. Afghanistan-Pakistan border situation. (Page iv) TOP SECRET 9,4 4.1 , %� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 poi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 BURMA ... / ������ ,;� 1 ../.., S 1� � ..� NAM1THA ; i'uong Sal I 3 ....." / i .....� ..... LUANGI PRA' Luang Prabang SAYABOURY hong Scaly i PRONG SALY7 A Dien Bien Phu �Y/ \�' / Sam N.eu \ � /SAM NEUA / N60".".. XIENG Art -uric d KHOUANGN � , muo9g Ban Phou Khoun Ban Pha Xieng KFLouang -"v\. Ban Ta Viangi sang V;:ing oLe....4 Thom .Tha VIENTIANE BorikhaneS Pak Sane Vientiane A LA NORTHERN LAOS 4rip GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact 440 KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS -.ROAD --TRAIL ? O ROUTE NUMBER 610414 50 STATUTE MILES 100 Kam K u ak Sao KHAMMTJANE oNh mArat L. Thakhek 9 Sovannakhet 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 SWOP SECRET Not; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 14 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Erhe withdrawal cross-country to Luang Prabang of government paratroop and infantry units from the airhead north of Muong Kassy has been virtually completed. -xe�e' continuing efforts by Kong � Le - Pathet Lao forces to reduce the government stronghold,' it I "---/ at Ban Pha�about 15 miles southwest of Xieng Kliouang town- where a mixed force of Lao/Meo troops has long been en- A _ Ad-�`-c. trenched. No significant military action elsewhere has been reportelg Caf-nboata nas issuea a statement suggesting that the pro- posed international conference on Laos take place in Geneva, in view of the "extreme urgency" of such a conference, and "In the face of objections against its being held in Phnom Penh as proposed by Khrushchev." The statement reiterated Sihanouk's view that the conference should institute a commission to arrange and supervise a cease-fire, and then address itself to the ques- tion of neutralizing Laos. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kitona NDONESIA 870 Atiuntic SUDAN 400 TUNISIA NIGERIA INDONESIA 280 ,Gemena Scattered Force lo ; EQUATEU tj Coquilhatville �Boende -06 EISTI"JTU 3,400 ETHIOPIA .> MOBUTU 7,200 Scattered�Forces EC)POLDVILL Leopold,/ ysville MOB UTU 800 Francqui uluabourg Bakw GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled Luanda El Kasavubu-Mobutu 71 Glzenga 1:EM Kalonji Tshombe. United Nations Forces (Service Forces � Selected road not included) Selected railroad =Selected airfield 410413 2 [001 0 STATUTE MILES 400 of the Congo GIZENGA ,000 MALAYA 870 LIBERIA 230 I ETHIOPIA ETH10P1 ngolo NIGERIA TSHOMBE 7,000 Lake Alk,ert NIGERIA Usumbura IRELAND I 650 SWEDEN I 650 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Wt9P-SEC-RE-T- Congo: Tshombe's hegemony in Katanga politics appar- ently is being challenged by tribal traditionalists led by Interior Minister Munongo. Under a proposed constitu- tional amendment published on 12 April and immediately denounced by Tshomb4 as illegal, most of the president's executive functions would be transferred to a prime minis- ter. Mtmongo, who is strongly opposed to Belgians and is unfriendly to whites in general, is the likely candidate for the new post. The tribalists dominate the legislature and are influential in most areas of Katanga, and Tshomb4, who seems to retain the support of his Belgian military and civilian advisers, may be faced with a breakup of the tribal coalition which brought him to power. (Backup, Page 3) (Map) Portugal: The 13 April cabinet changes, and particularly the removal of Defense Minister Moniz, represent a rejectioni by Salazar of demands for liberalization of Portugal's internal and African policies. Moniz was the principal advocate withi the cabinet of such liberalization. Salazar has taken the de- /7-, fense portfolio himself, appointed a comparative unknown as army minister, and promoted to the Overseas Ministry the previous undersecretary, the 38-year-old Adriano Moreira, fia a vigorous defender of the government's "stand firm" policies in Africa. .illazar's move may now provoke a reaction from Moniz, who recently intimated to US officials that he had the support of most top officers for his demand that Salazar either change his policies or face a military takeover) (Backup, Pagel) .France=Algeria: The American Embassy in Paris feels De Gaulle's 11 April press conference posed to the Algerians the clear alternatives of future friendship with France or a complete rupture, with independence in any case, and fore= shadowed the future development of France as a noncolonial power. The US consul general in Algiers points out that 14 Apr 61 � DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 gaiCtP SECRET De Gaulle's references to the FLN leaders, while far from granting them the role of exclusive spokesmen for Algeria, do attribute to them a "special" responsibility. The consul general feels that this may be sufficient to bring the FLN to peace talks with the French. The rebel provisional Algerian government has not yet commented officially on De Gaulle's remarks and may be experiencing difficulty in formulating a response. (Backup, Page 5) Communist China India: the possibility of Peiping's nronosinz arbitration of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. U Nu of Burma or Sukarno of Indone-sia as possible arbitrators, rejected a suggestion that the idea be broached to Nehru suggesting that Peiping wishes to keep the matter on an unofficial basis at this tim13 Pei= ping has never before submitted a political dispute to arbitra= tion. In the present case, however, the Chinese may see definite tactical advantages in the move. They probably rea- son that Nehru, who has consistently refused Chinese offers to compromise the border dispute, would in all likelihood reject an arbitration offer. The Indian leader insists that the border problem has grown out of Chinese aggression. The Chinese would try to present an Indian rejection as a refusal to ioin with Peiping in a move to relax tensions in the area. Japan-Kofea: Repatriation of Korean residents in Japan A--4-/ longer be a major irritant in relations between Japan and ,e,tc_i_z_e_J to North Korea will resume on 14 April but probably will no South Korea. The post-Rhee government in Seoul has tended,z 3� to ignore the repatriation question in negotiations to settle a t_ outstanding problems with Tokyo. Pyongyang suspended the le a repatriation program last February, presumably because the e North Koreans were embarrassed by the drop in the number 14 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 pis Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 CONFIDENTIAL Kush ha Farah Zahedan Sari Pul Maimana Herat Mazar i Shorif AFNISTAI4- AFGHANISTAN- PAKISTAN (PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA) PUSHTOON TRIBES AREA OF GREATEST FRICTION Roads Railroads STATUTE MILLS Stalinaba Te mez Pair ithuma Hil � Salang Pass Jai bed JAMMU (Status in diinute) RAW PINDI La bore CHINA 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 �40P�SECRET of Koreans seeking repatriation. Pyongyang, however, has been under pressure to resume the program both from the Japanese, who want to reduce the size of the troublesome Korean community in Japan, and from its own front group in Japan which has warned of a major prestige loss if repa- triation was not resumed. About 10 percent of the 600,000 Korean residents in Japan have gone to North Korea since rtk7ogram was initiated in December 1959. (Backup, Page 7) Afghanistan-Pakistan: ra.'he Afghan Army is apparently calling up more reservists as Kabul continues to anticipate an outbreak of fighting between Pakistani troops and Pushtoon tribes on the Pakistani side of the border. The Afghans have thus far been largely unsuccessful in promoting unity among these tribes to fight Pakistan 7 Earlier Afghan reports of fighting between Pakistani Government forces and Pushtoon tribesmen in Bajaur appear to have been exaggerated. Fol- lowing his recent return from Moscow, Afghan Prime Minis- ter Daud reiterated his government's intention to give full support to the tribesmen in their resistance to Pakistan's military "penetration" of tribal territories. (Backup, Page 9) (Map) 14 Apr 61 (Briefs continued on following page) DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 '10110P�SteltELT Nui 14 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF V Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 tiOPOP�SE SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) Probable Political Developments and the Internal Security Situation in Colonial Africa South of the Sahara OveritheNext Few Years. USIB. ME 60/70-61. 11 April 1961. Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US. USIB. ME 11-61. 6 April 1961. 0036854. Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament and Arms Control: Assessment of the Underlying Motivations and Objec- tives of the USSR, Communist China, France, the UK, West Germany, and Canada. USIB. ME 4-2-61. 6 April 1961. 14 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET vi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 is SECRET Nee Situation in Laos Souvanna Phouma, in statements issued during his brief visit in Belgrade, stressed the geographic necessity for Laos to follow a policy of neutrality as envisaged by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. He is quoted as stating that Laos would accept assistance from any country if no political conditions were at- tached, and that peaceful competition in aid would be better than the present situation in which "the blocs clash with arms in hand." Souvanna arrived in Prague on 13 April, and is scheduled to arrive in Warsaw today. g)n the internal Laotian situation, it is im- portant that a government of national union be formed nror to the 14-nation conference. As the French see it, Boun Oum and Souvanna would both resign and the King would call on Souvanna to form a new government. France could see no way of keeping the Pathet Lao out of the government but that they should be prevented from holding Ur fnrpiren affnirs defense, economic, and interior portfolios. Souvanna, who prior to his departure from Paris on 11 April had a number of meetings with high French Government leaders, had assured the French that he would retain those posts himsely the Geneva Agreements--un- der which France was granted the responsibility of training the Laotian Army and the right to station 5,000 troops in Laos--were fully adequate to control foreign military aid to Laos. all arms deliveries should cease with the convening of the 14-nation conferences, and that future army training should be given only by instructors authorized by the Geneva Agreements. although this would mean the withdrawal of US mil- itary personnel, "Western military nresence" would be main- tained. On economic aid to Laos, France' SECRET 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Niso' SECRET tRreferred bilateral arrangements and made clear that the UN mechanism would not be acceptabl, Soviet transports continue to be scheduled for flights into Laos. On 12 April a total of six LI-2s and one IL-14 flew to Xieng Khouang. Another LI-2 may have flown to an undeter- mined point in Laos. The three Soviet IL-14s at Hankow which were ordered to fly to Hanoi on 12 April were again delayed because of adverse weather and were rescheduled to continue their flight to North Vietnam on 13 April. 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 CONFIDENTIAL Situation in the Congo The proposed changes in the Katanga constitution would subordinate the executive to the legislature�an obvious ef- fort to check Tshombe's freewheeling. An earlier resolu- tion requesting the nomination of a prime minister passed the lower house by a vote of 34 to 6, and Tshombe's oppo- nents probably command a similar majority in the Grand Council of chiefs. Many of these leaders reportedly object that Tshombe's ministers have voted themselves salary in= creases without increasing the stipends of the chiefs; most of them, moreover, apparently oppose Tshombe's alliance with the Belgians. Tshombe has rebutted this attack with a plea that strong executive rule is necessary in view of the threats to Katanga's independence. He further asserted that the legislature cannot unilaterally promulgate a constitutional change, since the pres- ident's approval is necessary as well as that of two thirds of the lower house. Most Belgians in Katanga believe that Tshombe will weather this challenge, although one of them told the American consul in Elisabethville that he thought the Katanga president was "used up" as a leader. In addition, the Belgians reportedly are uneasy over the influence which tribalists such as Munongo can wield in the countryside, where many tribesmen are growing dis fied with t1e influence Belgium in exerting in Katanga. -CONFH3E-N-TIAL- 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Salazar Drops Portuguese Defense Minister In Cabinet Reshuffle general Manuel Gomes de Araujo, the chief of general staff of the armed forces, is considered exceptionally loyal to Salazar, and both he and the new army minister, Brigadier Mario Silva, are generally regarded as members of the ex- treme right-wing group of former Defense Minister Santos Costa. Santos Costa is a bitter rival of Moniz, and Salazar may intend to return him to the Defense Ministry shortly] EA further indication that the regime will continue to take a firm stand against changes in the overseas provinces appears in a recent statement made by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to Ambassador Elbrick in Lisbon on 8 April. He said that a long talk with Salazar and Foreign Minister Mathias revealed no sign of any "give" or new ideas for a solution of Portugal's African problems. Couve subsequently implied to US Ambassador Gavin in Paris that Salazar would have to go before there could be significant changes in Portugal's African policieg -S-EeRE-T-- 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 vase'CONFIDENTIAL Reactions to De Gaulle's Remarks on Algeria The US Embassy in Paris notes that De Gaulle carefully avoided questions of detail and procedure but feels that he has clarified his general intentions for Algeria once and for all and has offered the rebels a unique opportunity to come to terms. In his follow-up provincial speaking tour, De Gaulle declared on 12 April that he has been and still is offering Algeria peace and cooperation and said, "Let the other side want this and it will be done." On 13 April, he made another overture to the rebels saying, "We want to settle the rebellion by extending our hand to those who, up to now, have not wished to accept it, and in such a manner that it will be possible for them to construct the new Algeria, and for us, if they are willing, to help them do it." Although De Gaulle's statements are designed to demon- strate French willingness to seek a reasonable solution, he is still a long way from offering to deal with the Provisional Al- gerian Government on anything resembling a government-to- government basis. He continues to speak only in terms of self-determination by all of the Algerian people after a rebel agreement to stop the fighting. He also threatened that an in- dependent Algeria not closely associated with France would be left to face economic chaos and might also have to submit to partition. This type of presentation may revive latent discord within the PAG. The rebels had reached their decision to go to Evian in the first place by glossing over such long-range problems, and they were hoping for clarification of a few points of imme- diate interest to them. The rebels may view De Gaulle's reit- eration of these positions at this time as an attempt to limit the scope of negotiations and force a settlement which would provide for continued French influence. Powerful elements within the PAG could argue that no basis exists for successful negotiations within such a context. More moderate elements, however, in view, of what they consider improved relations with the US and possibly the UK--a British parliamentary delegation met with rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas on 10 April, apparently on British initiative--may consider it unwise to refuse to meet with the CONFIDENTIAL 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 French. The rebels are reportedly continuing attempts to establish through secret contacts a basis for opening talks. The early reaction in Algeria to De Gaulle's statements has been unfavorable. The settler ultras are likely to see in this week's speeches a full confirmation of their fears that De Gaulle is renouncing the maintenance of French sovereignty in Algeria and they will probably step up their bombings and other "counterterrorist" activities. The Moslem population, which had been looking toward an early end to hostilities, is disap= pointed that De Gaulle did not make more specific concessions to the PAG and fears an adverse effect on prospects for nego- tiations. 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Nage' SECRET Korean Repatriation From Japan to North Korea Resumed The repatriation agreement, concluded in mid-1959, is a private agreement between the Japanese and North Korean Red Cross Societies, but has the official backing of both govern- ments. Tokyo has long sought a means for solving the problem of its Korean minority, which has a high crime rate and has required heavy government assistance. The Japanese failed, however, in efforts to persuade President Syngman Rhees government that the program was based on humanitarian principles and would be entirely volun- tary. Rhee reacted by severing trade with Japan and breaking off negotiations for an over-all settlement of Japanese - South Korean differences. With the ouster of the Rhee regime and the actual implementation of the program, official and public outrage in South Korea subsided. The Chang Myon government opposes the program in principle, but in practice has tended to ignore it. Despite the friendlier atmosphere in negotiations be- tween Tokyo and Seoul in the post-Rhee period, however, major differences on issues other than the repatriation problem have prevented substantive progress. More than 54,000 Koreans have been sent from Japan to North Korea aboard the two repatriation ships made available by the USSR. There is now a backlog of 17,000 applications for repatriation, but many Koreans are likely to renege before de- parture time, and it is doubtful that the sailings, resuming on 14 April, will reach the previous average of 1,000 repatriates weekly. E3yongyang has apparently experienced difficulty in reset- tling repatriates, who find living conditions in North Korea less appealing than advertised by Chosen Soren, the Korean Commu- nist front in Japan. There are reports that dissatisfied repa- triates have refused to accept job assignments and have openly criticized the Communist regime. Many have written to rela- tives and friends in Japan of shortages in daily necessities and warned them not to apply for repatriation. Pyongyang has im- posed strict censorship on all mail, but elaborate private codes) 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 %we -SteRET--- %NIS [have been devised and reports on conditions continue to trickle oug Registration for sailings fell off sharply late last fall and Pyongyang suspended the program in early February, using its concern over a "flu epidemic" as an excuse. Chosen Soren, working diligently to build up a backlog of repatriates, has warned Pyongyang that North Korean prestige will suffer in the Japanese Korean community unless the program is speed- ily resumed. Despite a labor shortage in North Korea, repatriation has undoubtedly lost much of its political and economic appeal to Pyongyang. The regime has probably come to view the disaf- fected repatriates as an increasing liability, and probably would like to find a way to discontinue the program if it could do so without damaging North Korean prestige among Koreans in Japan. 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 SECRET No' Afghan Preparations on the Pakistani Border Kabul wants any fighting in the Bajaur area to appear to be Pushtoon tribal resistance against Pakistani Government oppression, although it is apparently giving covert assistance to dissident tribal elements there. The Afghans fear strong Pakistani counteraction and probably do not plan to se ily identifiable Afghan units into Pakistani territory. The Afghan Army, however, has apparently prepared some of its regular units for guerrilla operations in Pushtoon tribal territory in Pakistan by equipping them with British-made weapons. the local commander was ordered to distribute new, presumably Soviet-made, machine guns and to collect the Vickers light machine guns and send them to Kabul. On 7 March the provin- cial army headquarters responsible for the Afghan border region near Bajaur informed Kabul of shortages of Vickers heavy ma- chine guns and of mortars. British weapons in the hands of Afghan Army units stationed along the Pakistani border opposite Bajaur. The Afghan army uniform factory in Kabul has already manufactured 10,000 sets of tribal-type clothing, apparently for use by Afghan soldiers disguised as tribal irregulars. If Kabul is able to stimulate major fighting in the Bajaur region of Pakistan and decides to send these troops across the border to help tribesmen fighting Pakistani Government forces, the use of tribal clothing and the absence of Soviet-made weapons will make it harder to distinguish between Afghan soldiers and gen- uine tribal irregulars. Top Pakistani officials remain confident of their ability to crush any Afghan incursion; they are holding their forces 15 to 20 miles from the border in the hope that this will encourage the Afghans first to penetrate deeply into Pakistan, giving Pakistan grounds for strong counteraction. SECRET 14 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001983 �3