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Document Creation Date: 
August 14, 2020
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
April 15, 1961
/W/////////////////////////////////////////////7/////1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 I VT- ac�iim& 3.3(h)(2) osiof 3.5(c) 15 April 1961 Copy No. C 79 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN" 11 40P-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 AApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 luEr �T-OP-SEeRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 . 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Nisof / -TOP-SfeRET 1. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Laos. (Page i) CONTENTS 15 April 1961 2. Congo: Indian troops shortly to arrive in Katanga from Dar es Salaam by air. (Page tt) 3. Angola-Portugal: Further uprisings north of Lu- anda; Salazar reshuffles military supporters of Moniz. (Page it) 4. France-Algeria: PAG decision not to go to Evian reportedly strongly influenced by Moscow and Cairo. (Page ttt) 5. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, launched yesterday, apparently failed in flight. (Page li%) 6. Mongolia: Moscow's control in Mongolia further strengthened by new economic aid agreement. (Page tit) 7. Israel: Ben-Gurion's political position jeopardized by arrest of associate as Spy for USSR. (Page iv) 8. Somali-Ethiopian border problem. (Page iv) 9. France: Nuclear test postponed until 28 April; may be further postponed until end of UN General Assem- bly session. (Page tv) 10. Honduras: President Villeda Morales places civil security forces on alert; apparently fears coup at- tempt. (Page v) -T-OP-SECRET- , x7, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 04:proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 ORTH VIET AM Dien Bien Phu ..... -;.,.......,� I k ( LUANG! PRA BANG _ ����. AM NEUA Luang Prabang,... /11 ?: � � -.... ...- -...//' ���:-.......-����� X'IE N G SAYABOURY 4 r*".",,s . piaine desK H OU AN G \ Muon? ow jarres Ban Ban ou Khoun 41 Xieng,Kho/Jang 's Ban Ph Ban Ta Viang 1 .. ..... th-a Thom Vang VIENTIANE Borikhan$% Pak Sane ....t Muong kassy / NORTHERN LAOS Ivo GOVERNMENT Forces in 40 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD 0 __TRAILO I ROUTE NUMBER 610414 50 .1,,. STATUTE MILES Vientiane Kam Keut k Sa; KHAMMI0UANE Nhomm rat fhakhek 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 �kild TOP SECRET No CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 15 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos&eps are being worked out whereby the Boun Oum ()g government would "inform" all concerned--including Souvanna � Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong--that dt they would be welcome at the late King's funeral ceremonies 4 to be held in Luang Prabang the end of this month. The entire cabinet is scheduled to discuss this matter in Luang Prabang /3�, today with King Savang, who has indicated he would sanction such an informal get-together of the three Laotian faction) Li nemy patrols are reported active against government po- sitions on Route 13 south of Muong Kassy-D EThe government is moving additional infantry and artillery to the Nhommarath area northeast o Thakhek. but many of these reinforcements have little training (Backup, Page 1) (Maps) -TVP�SECRE-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Aproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 41101 Banana o Brazzaville Matadi Kitona INDONESIA Luanda ,Atiant. f610413 2 INDIA 300 SUDAN 400 TUNISIA 3,200 NIGERIA 400 INDONESIA MOBUTU 7200 .Gemena Scat r UTU 3 ,400 Scattered Farces OVILLE lEtrnb a moBUTu Basoke- 800 � � Boende d. lkela uluabourg Bakw GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: El Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces - Selected road not included) 7_17,7,� Selected railroad Selected airfield 00 0 STATUTE MILES 400 MALAYA 870 LIBERIA Luputa mr+11.- ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA KAT ANGA hville NIGERIA Usurnb r a IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 %id TOP SECRET Nee Congo: The 2,300-man addition to India's UN contingent has disembarked at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, and the first planeloads of troops are expected shortly in Katanga. In view of Tshombe's warnings against the reinforcement of UN 171 forces in Katanga, Hammarskjold is considering sending UN military commander McKeown or his deputy to assume per- sonal command of UN forces there. Gizenga's representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, has advised Stanleyville that while arms and ammunition are available in Cairo, "We do not know how to send them to you." With respect to aircraft, Mulele reported that "the friends" had agreed to provide two to four IL-18s, but only if sched- uled flights to Stanleyville could be arranged. He added that "if you can obtain for us an authorization to fly over the Sudan, the planes will reach you in 24 hours." Meanwhile, Gizenga has continued to leave the door open for a meeting with representatives of the Leopoldville govern- ment. Gizenga reportedly has suggested Addis Ababa. Berlin. or Athens as acceptable sites for a meeting. (Man) ngo a-Portuga error's ac vi y n a e area nor o Luanda is continuing in the face of a steady Portuguese mil- ti itary build-up. According to the Portuguese news agency, "thousands" of Africans attacked a village about 100 miles northeast of Luanda but were driven off with heavy casualties z by the small garrison there. Disorders have also been reported'''. in Cabinda. (The outgoing overseas minister in Lisbon told Am- -2, 3 - bassador Elbrick that the situation is very grave and is not im- proving. He said that the residents of Angola were very nerv- ous and that additional troops were being dispatchea.3 Provin- cial authorities are calling for volunteers and are beginning to mobilize reservists. Lis- bon instructed the Portuguese Embassy in Cape Town to purchase 500 twenty-pound bombs from the South African Government. an Portugal, Salazar has been reshuffling the military sup- porters of ex-Defense Minister Moniz, following the cabinet changes of 13 Apri_ (Backup, Page 3) 15 Apr 61 7/ TOP SECRET DAILY BRIEF ii oX A /4 44: .0.04 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 %IS TOP SECRET *France-Algeria:( the decision of the PAG not to go to Evian was strongly influenced by Moscow and Cairp, (Backup, Page 4) *USSR: about 1924 GMT (1424 EST) 14 April a test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched from Tyura Tam and failed in flight shortly thereafter. Facilities associated with Soviet space program launchings from Tyura Tam were not involved in this launching. However, the Soviet vessels involved in the manned satellite launching of 12 April have not yet begun returning to port. This is the eighth probable ICBM launching from Tvura Tam this vsar�fniir nf thsm hava hspn Mongolia: Moscow's pre-eminent position in Mongolia has been strengthened by the extension of further economic aid for the Mongolian Third Five-Year Plan (1961=65). In an agree- ment signed in Moscow on 13 April, the USSR granted Ulan Bator new credits worth $135,000,000 and agreed to defer repayment of trade debts and previous credits. Last September, three 0 /1( months after Peiping boosted the amount of its Mongolian eco- nomic aid program, the Soviet Union granted a $154,000,000 credit to Ulan Bator. Total Soviet economic aid extended to Mongolia since 1945 amounts to about $665,0O0,000, compared with the Chinese contribution of $115,000,000--all of which has been extended since 1956. In addition, however, Peiping main- tains a substantial technical assistance program in Mongolia which provides it with a considerable measure of influence in Mongolian industrial and acerieultural ripvPlonmP,nt 15 Apr 61 OP DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 ETHIOPIA- SOMALI REPUBLIC BORDER AREA Asmara. ERITREA Addis Ababa YEMEN _.� soM. Diredawa ETHIOPIA KENYA Dagabur s-A14 �Hargeisa � �Danot 0 L F SOM ALI OG A D EN //REPUBLIC � Gabredarre / �, Mogadiscio* INDIAN OCEAN 190 MILES - 200 UNCLASSIFIED 31138 5-60 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 kS TOP SECRET :od� Israel:LBen-Gurion's political position will be jeopard- ized as a result of the arrest of his unofficial personal mil- itary adviser on a charge of espionage for the Soviet Union. The prime minister, who heads a caretaker government pending elections next August, has already been widely crit- icized for his handling of the domestic crisis centering on the Lavon affair, which precipitated the elections. The rev- elation of the spy scandal will provide opposition parties with another issue to use against Ben-Gurion in the campaign:3 (Backup, Page 6) --- Somali Republic - Ethiopia: The Somali minister of in- teridi expressed his concern over a reported large- scale build-up of Ethiopian military forces in the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. The min- ister, in the northern region of the republic to investigate re- cent clashes between Ethiopian troops and Somalis, stated that the Ethiopians were "making no secret of their intention" to use the weapons and aircraft brought into the area "to ex- terminate once and for all" the Somali people there. However, relations in the Ogaden region between Somali tribesmen and Ethiopians are perennially bad and will further deteriorate following Ethiopia's recent reinforcement of its troops in the area. Ethiopia has also intensified patrol activities near the Somali border. Presumably this is an at- tempt to enforce its regulation against the presence on Ethio- pian soil of armed Somali tribesmen. (Back- up, Page 7) (Map) France: he fourth French nuclear test has been post- poned until 28 April or as soon thereafter as meteorological conditions permit. This date has been established by the gov- ernment on the assumption that the UN General Assembly session will have ended by then, 15 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv � TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984' .# TOP SECRET 7.1.00 � Prolongation of the session beyond 28 April--which seems likely�may cause a further postponement of the test. Moscow has softened its earlier charge that further French testing would make a test ban treaty "pointless." The chief Soviet delegate at Geneva told a US newsman on 8 April that a French test would "hamper" the negotiations and said he had chosen this word deliberately rather than a stronger term implying a breakdown in the conference;--), Honduras: )President Villeda Morales on lz April placed the civil guard '1141 other civilian-directed security forces on (9 a state of alert. He has had increasing difficulty in coping with extreme leftist and rightist groups, and apparently now feels the rightists, with army and air force support, are about,t44.z to make an attempt to unseat him. Pro-Castro groups, which are stronger in Honduras than in any other Central American country, would quickly exploit any effort to oust the moderate regime of Villeda Morales (Backup, Page 8) A N 3\ N N\ \ \\ \, \ I15 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF v i\ k -TOP SECRET- ' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 ,pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 111111, BURMA Luang Praba CHINA ��3' � Muong*Soui Bap-r.-.�� -11 aine es anglet Jorres Xieng ou Ban Ta '.....Tha Tho\�. Viang 'Pak Sane Kam Keu Vi tiane TI-tAI L AN Savannakhet TONLE SAP VIET aR;.c..mg GULF OF inh NhomrN. at hakhek � �?.' TONKIN 4-r SOUTH Attope( VIETNAM BAN PU.a PHO \ CAMBODIA Road Trail STATUTIE MILES 2C:0 UNCLASSIFIED 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 %ofTOP SECRET Situation in Laos neral Phoumi, discussing various aspects of a cease- fire in Laos with the chief of the American military mission, stated that he felt the Laotian Army this time should emulate Communist tactics employed after the 1954 Geneva Agree- ments by "playing the political game" while infiltrating when, ever possible to expand Vientiane's control over as much ter- ritory as possible. Phoumi felt that with helicopters he could pre-position army units and establish control in certain areas throughout the country not occupied physically by the Pathet Lao. Although Phoumi did not mention Meo guerrilla assets in this connection, they probably would play a role in any such undertaking since they exercise de facto control over much of the mountainous terrain in Xieng Ehouang Province and also have scattered bases in Luang Prabang, Sam Neua, and to a lesser extent Phong Saly Province:3 iPhourni saw only very slight possibility for an effective coalition government with the Pathet Lao since he felt they were by now strongly oriented toward Communist control. He expressed conviction that Souvanna's policy of peace, unity, and neutrality is not possible under present circumstances, and advocated instead a military solution An enemy force, estimated to number 500 men, is re- ported to have attacked two government companies on 13 April at Ban Pha Pho, an outpost in southern Laos about 25 miles from the Cambodian border. Details are lacking, but radio contact with the post has been lost and a ranger compny from e ha been ordered to reinforce the garrison evidence that Russians are directing tne airmt as well a,b flying the major part of it. On 12 February a DRV aircraft ap- parently was told not to use Vietnamese in contacting a Vietnamese airfield control tower. Two days later Dien Bien Phu airfield complained that "without a translator we can neither talk with-) TOP SECRET 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 TOP SECRET Nos or understand the friends. The friends are not pleased with this." The "friends" almost certainly are Russians. Airlift activity continues at about the average lever."1 EThere are suggestions that in the projected conference on Laos, the Communists may seek to reopen other matters covered by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The deputy chief of Poland's delegation on the ICC for Vietnam recently implied in Saigon that the bloc may attempt to resurrect the question of Vietnamese reunification. The Geneva Agreements alluded to reunification elections but did not specify when or how they were to be held. These details were spelled out in a separate declaration which stipulated that general reunification elections should be held throughout Vietnam in July 1956 under ICC super- vision. North Vietnam signed both the agreement and the declara- tion and has endorsed the elections--it has a population majority over the South. South Vietnam agreed to honor the spirit of the agreement and accepted the ICC but signed neither document and has not accepted the election formula-;-,) This has not prevented North Vietnam from charging Saigon with "violating the Geneva Agreements" by refusing reunification elections, by accepting US military assistance, and by attempting to halt Communist guerrilla depredations in the South. Communist propaganda has charged that South Vietnam is supporting pro-West- ern forces in Laos and that it threatens peace in Southeast Asia7.1, --T-eP SECRET 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 -TOP�SEGRE-T- Situation in Angola officials in Angola believe the situation is worsening and that the terrorist ac- tivity can be countered only with increased military actions. On 11 April Luanda asked that additional rifles and machine guns be sent from Portugal for distribution to the civilian militia and to the police. Troop reinforcements from Lisbon reportedly have been landed in coastal cities north and south of Luanda, and an official Angolan communique announced that further "important" reinforcements would arrive soon. In recent months there has been some discussion between South Africa and Portugal on military aid and mutual protec- tion. Previous initiatives aimed at closer military coopera- tion between the two nations have come largely from South Africa. CID New York, Angola Peoples' Union (UPA) leader Holden Roberto told American officials that he would continue the cur- rent UPA campaign of violence in Angola in an effort to retain the initiative won from pro-Communist groups. He further as- serted that UPA would be satisfied with nothin less than a target date within three years for independence. EIn Portugal, Salazar 's supporters reportedly felt confident on 14 April that the prime minister's dismissal of key military ministers the previous day had prevented a planned "coup" led by Moniz. the new army minister is rapidly completing a change of unit commanders to counteract any immediate move by Moniz, and the pro-Moniz commander of the Lisbon military district has been replaced. Moniz' own whereabouts is unknown. if Moniz failed to act on 14 April, he would have missed his chance since many unit commanders loyal to him would have then been replacecr.) TOP SECRET 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Noe SECRET Rep6rted Soviet Influence on Provisional Algerian Government reported on "guidance" given him by Soviet Deputy Premier Kosygir Kosygin advised the Algerians not to meet with the French unless the PAG were recognized as the sole representative of Algeria and were prepared to achieve a complete break with France, i. e., no bases and no French political or economic influence. Kosygin stressed that an in- dependent Algeria should follow the pattern of Nasir and Tours,. avoiding the "Bourguibaism" of Tunisia, and he warned the PAG to be wary of French moves and to treat with suspicion any over- tures from the US. Algerian representatives who had consulted with Nasir also reported along similar lines. presentation was reportedly very convincing, and, co�pleci witirFrench Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe's confirmation that the French would consult with other Algerian groups, could have persuaded the PAG that it should at least de- lay the opening of negotiationsT) LDe Gaulle reportedly was. briefed on 6 April about the Soviet recommendations and the PAG reaction to them. His 11 April press conference, which further clarified but did not change his basic policy of self-determination for Algeria, may have reflected this knowledge both in its general castigation of "Soviet imperi- alism" and in the "almost certain" extension of Communism to Algeria if the rebels chose a complete rupture with France. Joxe told the American Embassy in Paris prior to. Tunisian President Bourguiba's February meeting with De Gaulle that the USSR was "complicating matters" by trying to insert itself into the general Algerian picture-.--3 tDe Gaulle's speeches on his current provincial tour have continued his appeals to the rebel leadership to "be reasonable. SECRET- 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 SECRET Land accept French offers of cooperation. Approximately one sixth of the Algerians detained in camps have been released this week in a further gesture of good intent. De Gaulle's Sunday speech in Bordeaux--being billed as a major address-- cTe new initiative.j 15 Apr Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 -SECRET Isr&ell Spy Scandal Threatens Ben-Gurion "-i'he accused spy is Dr. Israel Baer, who has been mil- itary correspondent for Haaretz, Israel's most respected newspaper, and professor of military science at the Tel Aviv branch of Hebrew University. A native of Vienna, he is a graduate of the Austrian military academy. He took part in the Austrian socialist uprisings of 1934, joined the interna- tional brigade in the Spanish Civil War, and reportedly was among those officers of the brigade who were to be sent to Russia for special training at the Frunze Military Academy. However, he allegedly became a convinced Zionist "almost overnight" and went to Palestine instead. He served in a mil- itary staff capacity during the Arab-Israeli war and in recent years has been an Israeli Army historian. Before becoming closely associated with Ben-Gurion, Baer was a member of the extreme socialist Mapam party in Israeli g'he Israeli elections scheduled for 15 August were forced by the unwillingness of most other parties to serve again in a government under Ben-Gurion as prime minister. The Mapai party, however, refused to form a new coalition without the participation of its 74-year old leader. The prolonged crisis over the Lavon affair and Ben-Gurion's seemingly vindictive determination to crush Pinhas Lavon as a political challenger have alienated many of the prime minister's former supporters. His main political asset--his stature as pre-eminent defender of Israel's security--now is threatened by the espionage scandal. Even before this development. Mapai was expected to lose sev- eral parliamentary seats. 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 *a? SECRET Somali Republic Fears Ethiopian Aggression Sporadic clashes have occurred over the years between Ethiopians and Somali tribesmen who follow their flocks into the Ethiopian Ogaden in search of pasturage during the dry seasons. Recently, however, Somali nomads are reported to have taken part in organized efforts against the Ethiopian . authorities, including political and paramilitary activities.COn 2 April Somali infiltrators allegedly inspired tribal inhabitants of Dagabur--an Ogaden village located about 60 miles inside Ethiopian territory--to demonstrate for permission to organ- ize a political party and to seek independence for the Somali- inhabited areas of Ethiopia. After Ethiopian security forces arrived on the scene, fighting broke out in which 115 were re- norted the "whole civilian population of Gabreclarre"--largely Somali--approached the provincial office and "demanded Independence"; the governor was able to placate them, however, by promising to refer the matter to higher authority. The Dagabur incident is believed the first major outbreak of violence between Ogaden Somalis and Ethiopians since last December's clash at Danot, when several hundred Ethiopian. troops and armed Somalis were involved. The Danot clash began when nomads from the Somali Republic attempted to use water holes already held by Somalis domiciled in Ethiopia. After two days of minor skirmishes involving Ethiopian police, the nomads withdrew across the Somali border for reinforce- ments. They returned�allegedly reinforced by a well-trained and -equipped paramilitary force--and attacked the local Ethi- opian police garrison, but were repulsed by Ethiopian army units supported by aircraft. Addis Ababa reported 260 casual- ties in the conflict including 60 dead, and the Somali casualties were probably even greater. 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 -*ftiri SECRET Honduras Villeda is accused by his rightist opposition of weakening Honduran military forces while building up the politically dom- inated civil guard, of being lax toward the Communist and Castro elements, who are very active, and of tolerating Salva- doran exiles claimed to be plotting in Honduras. Leftists, including the radical wing of his own Liberal party, dislike his friendliness with the United States, his modus vivendi with armed forces chief Colonel Osvaldo Lopez, and his spo- radic anti-Communist moves. They consider all these prej- udicial to the interests of the Liberal party, which before Villeda's election to a six-year term in 1957 had been out of power for 25 years while the country was under military and authoritarian governments. Villeda's maneuvers to compromise between left and right have satisfied neither. Conservative groups have recently stepped up their activity against him. Conservative National- ist party members reportedly fear that if they do not move soon, their chances of regaining power will be lost. They are believed to be plotting with military officials who fear that Villeda's neglect of the armed forces will soon leave them powerless. Colonel Lopez, however, has consistently re- sisted their approaches for his support of a coup, despite his distrust of Villeda. Both the Nationalists and the military have been in close contact with Salvadoran officials. These in turn have been encouraging Armando Velasquez, a Honduran revolutionary who has made several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow Villeda. Velasquez, reportedly believing Salvadoran and other Central American governments were not prepared to give him sufficient support, planned to return to Spain on 13 April. However, Villeda, evidently convinced that a combination of rightist forces backed by the Honduran military was, pre- paring to move against him soon, acted accordinglyElnaddition3 -SECRET- 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 SECRET Nwo ao his alerting order of 12 Apri3 he made a nationwide radio denunciation of leftist and rightist groups which opposed his "liberal, impartial, and democratic" administration and would undertake the "criminal adventure" of overthrowing the legal government. On 13 April, in an apparent move to reassure the Salvadoran governing directo- rate, Villeda sent an urgent message to the directorate through his ambassador stating that exiled former Salvadoran President Osorio was not in Honduras and would not be allowed to stay if he sought asylum there. SECRET 15 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investi*gation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984 ZZZZ. tr Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 CO2001SS Top SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984