CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001984
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 15, 1961

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15 April 1961
Copy No. C 79
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN"
11
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Laos. (Page i)
CONTENTS
15 April 1961
2. Congo: Indian troops shortly to arrive in Katanga
from Dar es Salaam by air. (Page tt)
3. Angola-Portugal: Further uprisings north of Lu-
anda; Salazar reshuffles military supporters of
Moniz. (Page it)
4. France-Algeria: PAG decision not to go to Evian
reportedly strongly influenced by Moscow and
Cairo. (Page ttt)
5. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, launched
yesterday, apparently failed in flight.
(Page li%)
6. Mongolia: Moscow's control in Mongolia further
strengthened by new economic aid agreement. (Page tit)
7. Israel: Ben-Gurion's political position jeopardized
by arrest of associate as Spy for USSR. (Page iv)
8. Somali-Ethiopian border problem. (Page iv)
9. France: Nuclear test postponed until 28 April; may
be further postponed until end of UN General Assem-
bly session. (Page tv)
10. Honduras: President Villeda Morales places civil
security forces on alert; apparently fears coup at-
tempt. (Page v)
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KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
ROAD
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__TRAILO I
ROUTE NUMBER
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50
.1,,.
STATUTE MILES
Vientiane
Kam Keut
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KHAMMI0UANE
Nhomm rat
fhakhek
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos&eps are being worked out whereby the Boun Oum ()g
government would "inform" all concerned--including Souvanna �
Phouma and Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong--that dt
they would be welcome at the late King's funeral ceremonies
4
to be held in Luang Prabang the end of this month. The entire
cabinet is scheduled to discuss this matter in Luang Prabang /3�,
today with King Savang, who has indicated he would sanction
such an informal get-together of the three Laotian faction)
Li nemy patrols are reported active against government po-
sitions on Route 13 south of Muong Kassy-D
EThe government is moving additional infantry and artillery
to the Nhommarath area northeast o Thakhek. but many of these
reinforcements have little training (Backup,
Page 1) (Maps)
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41101
Banana
o
Brazzaville
Matadi
Kitona
INDONESIA
Luanda
,Atiant.
f610413 2
INDIA
300
SUDAN
400
TUNISIA
3,200
NIGERIA
400
INDONESIA
MOBUTU
7200
.Gemena
Scat r
UTU
3 ,400
Scattered Farces
OVILLE
lEtrnb a
moBUTu Basoke-
800 �
� Boende
d.
lkela
uluabourg
Bakw
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
El Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
Tshombe
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
- Selected road not included)
7_17,7,� Selected railroad
Selected airfield
00
0 STATUTE MILES
400
MALAYA
870
LIBERIA
Luputa
mr+11.-
ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA
KAT ANGA
hville
NIGERIA
Usurnb r a
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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Congo: The 2,300-man addition to India's UN contingent
has disembarked at Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, and the
first planeloads of troops are expected shortly in Katanga. In
view of Tshombe's warnings against the reinforcement of UN 171
forces in Katanga, Hammarskjold is considering sending UN
military commander McKeown or his deputy to assume per-
sonal command of UN forces there.
Gizenga's representative in Cairo, Pierre Mulele, has
advised Stanleyville that while arms and ammunition are
available in Cairo, "We do not know how to send them to you."
With respect to aircraft, Mulele reported that "the friends"
had agreed to provide two to four IL-18s, but only if sched-
uled flights to Stanleyville could be arranged. He added that
"if you can obtain for us an authorization to fly over the Sudan,
the planes will reach you in 24 hours."
Meanwhile, Gizenga has continued to leave the door open
for a meeting with representatives of the Leopoldville govern-
ment. Gizenga reportedly has suggested Addis Ababa. Berlin.
or Athens as acceptable sites for a meeting.
(Man)
ngo a-Portuga error's ac vi y n a e area nor o
Luanda is continuing in the face of a steady Portuguese mil- ti
itary build-up. According to the Portuguese news agency,
"thousands" of Africans attacked a village about 100 miles
northeast of Luanda but were driven off with heavy casualties z
by the small garrison there. Disorders have also been reported'''.
in Cabinda. (The outgoing overseas minister in Lisbon told Am- -2, 3 -
bassador Elbrick that the situation is very grave and is not im-
proving. He said that the residents of Angola were very nerv-
ous and that additional troops were being dispatchea.3 Provin-
cial authorities are calling for volunteers and are beginning to
mobilize reservists. Lis-
bon instructed the Portuguese Embassy in Cape Town to purchase
500 twenty-pound bombs from the South African Government.
an Portugal, Salazar has been reshuffling the military sup-
porters of ex-Defense Minister Moniz, following the cabinet
changes of 13 Apri_ (Backup, Page 3)
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*France-Algeria:(
the decision of the PAG not to go to Evian was
strongly influenced by Moscow and Cairp,
(Backup, Page 4)
*USSR: about 1924 GMT (1424 EST) 14 April a test vehicle,
probably an ICBM, was launched from Tyura Tam and failed in
flight shortly thereafter.
Facilities associated with Soviet space
program launchings from Tyura Tam were not involved in this
launching. However, the Soviet vessels involved in the manned
satellite launching of 12 April have not yet begun returning to
port. This is the eighth probable ICBM launching from Tvura
Tam this vsar�fniir nf thsm hava hspn
Mongolia: Moscow's pre-eminent position in Mongolia has
been strengthened by the extension of further economic aid for
the Mongolian Third Five-Year Plan (1961=65). In an agree-
ment signed in Moscow on 13 April, the USSR granted Ulan Bator
new credits worth $135,000,000 and agreed to defer repayment
of trade debts and previous credits. Last September, three
0 /1(
months after Peiping boosted the amount of its Mongolian eco-
nomic aid program, the Soviet Union granted a $154,000,000
credit to Ulan Bator. Total Soviet economic aid extended to
Mongolia since 1945 amounts to about $665,0O0,000, compared
with the Chinese contribution of $115,000,000--all of which has
been extended since 1956. In addition, however, Peiping main-
tains a substantial technical assistance program in Mongolia
which provides it with a considerable measure of influence in
Mongolian industrial and acerieultural ripvPlonmP,nt
15 Apr 61
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ETHIOPIA- SOMALI REPUBLIC
BORDER AREA
Asmara.
ERITREA
Addis Ababa
YEMEN
_.�
soM.
Diredawa
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
Dagabur
s-A14
�Hargeisa
� �Danot
0
L F
SOM ALI
OG A D EN //REPUBLIC
� Gabredarre /
�,
Mogadiscio*
INDIAN
OCEAN
190
MILES -
200
UNCLASSIFIED
31138 5-60
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Israel:LBen-Gurion's political position will be jeopard-
ized as a result of the arrest of his unofficial personal mil-
itary adviser on a charge of espionage for the Soviet Union.
The prime minister, who heads a caretaker government
pending elections next August, has already been widely crit-
icized for his handling of the domestic crisis centering on
the Lavon affair, which precipitated the elections. The rev-
elation of the spy scandal will provide opposition parties
with another issue to use against Ben-Gurion in the campaign:3
(Backup, Page 6) ---
Somali Republic - Ethiopia: The Somali minister of in-
teridi
expressed his concern over a reported large-
scale build-up of Ethiopian military forces in the predominantly
Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. The min-
ister, in the northern region of the republic to investigate re-
cent clashes between Ethiopian troops and Somalis, stated that
the Ethiopians were "making no secret of their intention" to
use the weapons and aircraft brought into the area "to ex-
terminate once and for all" the Somali people there.
However, relations in the Ogaden region between
Somali tribesmen and Ethiopians are perennially bad and will
further deteriorate following Ethiopia's recent reinforcement
of its troops in the area. Ethiopia has also intensified patrol
activities near the Somali border. Presumably this is an at-
tempt to enforce its regulation against the presence on Ethio-
pian soil of armed Somali tribesmen. (Back-
up, Page 7) (Map)
France: he fourth French nuclear test has been post-
poned until 28 April or as soon thereafter as meteorological
conditions permit. This date has been established by the gov-
ernment on the assumption that the UN General Assembly
session will have ended by then,
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Prolongation of the session beyond 28 April--which
seems likely�may cause a further postponement of the test.
Moscow has softened its earlier charge that further
French testing would make a test ban treaty "pointless." The
chief Soviet delegate at Geneva told a US newsman on 8 April
that a French test would "hamper" the negotiations and said
he had chosen this word deliberately rather than a stronger
term implying a breakdown in the conference;--),
Honduras: )President Villeda Morales on lz April placed
the civil guard '1141 other civilian-directed security forces on (9
a state of alert. He has had increasing difficulty in coping
with extreme leftist and rightist groups, and apparently now
feels the rightists, with army and air force support, are about,t44.z
to make an attempt to unseat him. Pro-Castro groups, which
are stronger in Honduras than in any other Central American
country, would quickly exploit any effort to oust the moderate
regime of Villeda Morales
(Backup, Page 8)
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Situation in Laos
neral Phoumi, discussing various aspects of a cease-
fire in Laos with the chief of the American military mission,
stated that he felt the Laotian Army this time should emulate
Communist tactics employed after the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments by "playing the political game" while infiltrating when,
ever possible to expand Vientiane's control over as much ter-
ritory as possible. Phoumi felt that with helicopters he could
pre-position army units and establish control in certain areas
throughout the country not occupied physically by the Pathet
Lao. Although Phoumi did not mention Meo guerrilla assets
in this connection, they probably would play a role in any such
undertaking since they exercise de facto control over much of
the mountainous terrain in Xieng Ehouang Province and also
have scattered bases in Luang Prabang, Sam Neua, and to a
lesser extent Phong Saly Province:3
iPhourni saw only very slight possibility for an effective
coalition government with the Pathet Lao since he felt they
were by now strongly oriented toward Communist control. He
expressed conviction that Souvanna's policy of peace, unity,
and neutrality is not possible under present circumstances,
and advocated instead a military solution
An enemy force, estimated to number 500 men, is re-
ported to have attacked two government companies on 13 April
at Ban Pha Pho, an outpost in southern Laos about 25 miles
from the Cambodian border. Details are lacking, but radio
contact with the post has been lost and a ranger compny from
e ha been ordered to reinforce the garrison
evidence that Russians are directing tne airmt as well a,b
flying the major part of it. On 12 February a DRV aircraft ap-
parently was told not to use Vietnamese in contacting a Vietnamese
airfield control tower. Two days later Dien Bien Phu airfield
complained that "without a translator we can neither talk with-)
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or understand the friends. The friends are not pleased with
this." The "friends" almost certainly are Russians. Airlift
activity continues at about the average lever."1
EThere are suggestions that in the projected conference
on Laos, the Communists may seek to reopen other matters
covered by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The deputy chief
of Poland's delegation on the ICC for Vietnam recently implied
in Saigon that the bloc may attempt to resurrect the question
of Vietnamese reunification. The Geneva Agreements alluded
to reunification elections but did not specify when or how they
were to be held. These details were spelled out in a separate
declaration which stipulated that general reunification elections
should be held throughout Vietnam in July 1956 under ICC super-
vision. North Vietnam signed both the agreement and the declara-
tion and has endorsed the elections--it has a population majority
over the South. South Vietnam agreed to honor the spirit of the
agreement and accepted the ICC but signed neither document and
has not accepted the election formula-;-,)
This has not prevented North Vietnam from charging Saigon
with "violating the Geneva Agreements" by refusing reunification
elections, by accepting US military assistance, and by attempting
to halt Communist guerrilla depredations in the South. Communist
propaganda has charged that South Vietnam is supporting pro-West-
ern forces in Laos and that it threatens peace in Southeast Asia7.1,
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Situation in Angola
officials in Angola
believe the situation is worsening and that the terrorist ac-
tivity can be countered only with increased military actions.
On 11 April Luanda asked that additional rifles and machine
guns be sent from Portugal for distribution to the civilian
militia and to the police. Troop reinforcements from Lisbon
reportedly have been landed in coastal cities north and south
of Luanda, and an official Angolan communique announced that
further "important" reinforcements would arrive soon.
In recent months there has been some discussion between
South Africa and Portugal on military aid and mutual protec-
tion. Previous initiatives aimed at closer military coopera-
tion between the two nations have come largely from South
Africa.
CID New York, Angola Peoples' Union (UPA) leader Holden
Roberto told American officials that he would continue the cur-
rent UPA campaign of violence in Angola in an effort to retain
the initiative won from pro-Communist groups. He further as-
serted that UPA would be satisfied with nothin less than a
target date within three years for independence.
EIn Portugal, Salazar 's supporters reportedly felt confident
on 14 April that the prime minister's dismissal of key military
ministers the previous day had prevented a planned "coup" led
by Moniz. the new army
minister is rapidly completing a change of unit commanders to
counteract any immediate move by Moniz, and the pro-Moniz
commander of the Lisbon military district has been replaced.
Moniz' own whereabouts is unknown.
if Moniz failed to act on 14 April, he would have missed his
chance since many unit commanders loyal to him would have then
been replacecr.)
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Rep6rted Soviet Influence on Provisional Algerian Government
reported
on "guidance" given him by Soviet Deputy Premier Kosygir
Kosygin advised the Algerians not
to meet with the French unless the PAG were recognized as
the sole representative of Algeria and were prepared to achieve
a complete break with France, i. e., no bases and no French
political or economic influence. Kosygin stressed that an in-
dependent Algeria should follow the pattern of Nasir and Tours,.
avoiding the "Bourguibaism" of Tunisia, and he warned the PAG
to be wary of French moves and to treat with suspicion any over-
tures from the US. Algerian representatives who had consulted
with Nasir also reported along similar lines.
presentation was reportedly very convincing, and,
co�pleci witirFrench Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis Joxe's
confirmation that the French would consult with other Algerian
groups, could have persuaded the PAG that it should at least de-
lay the opening of negotiationsT)
LDe Gaulle reportedly was. briefed on 6 April about the Soviet
recommendations and the PAG reaction to them. His 11 April
press conference, which further clarified but did not change his
basic policy of self-determination for Algeria, may have reflected
this knowledge both in its general castigation of "Soviet imperi-
alism" and in the "almost certain" extension of Communism to
Algeria if the rebels chose a complete rupture with France.
Joxe told the American Embassy in Paris prior to. Tunisian
President Bourguiba's February meeting with De Gaulle that
the USSR was "complicating matters" by trying to insert itself
into the general Algerian picture-.--3
tDe Gaulle's speeches on his current provincial tour have
continued his appeals to the rebel leadership to "be reasonable.
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Land accept French offers of cooperation. Approximately one
sixth of the Algerians detained in camps have been released
this week in a further gesture of good intent. De Gaulle's
Sunday speech in Bordeaux--being billed as a major address--
cTe new initiative.j
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Isr&ell Spy Scandal Threatens Ben-Gurion
"-i'he accused spy is Dr. Israel Baer, who has been mil-
itary correspondent for Haaretz, Israel's most respected
newspaper, and professor of military science at the Tel Aviv
branch of Hebrew University. A native of Vienna, he is a
graduate of the Austrian military academy. He took part in
the Austrian socialist uprisings of 1934, joined the interna-
tional brigade in the Spanish Civil War, and reportedly was
among those officers of the brigade who were to be sent to
Russia for special training at the Frunze Military Academy.
However, he allegedly became a convinced Zionist "almost
overnight" and went to Palestine instead. He served in a mil-
itary staff capacity during the Arab-Israeli war and in recent
years has been an Israeli Army historian. Before becoming
closely associated with Ben-Gurion, Baer was a member of
the extreme socialist Mapam party in Israeli
g'he Israeli elections scheduled for 15 August were forced
by the unwillingness of most other parties to serve again in a
government under Ben-Gurion as prime minister. The Mapai
party, however, refused to form a new coalition without the
participation of its 74-year old leader. The prolonged crisis
over the Lavon affair and Ben-Gurion's seemingly vindictive
determination to crush Pinhas Lavon as a political challenger
have alienated many of the prime minister's former supporters.
His main political asset--his stature as pre-eminent defender
of Israel's security--now is threatened by the espionage scandal.
Even before this development. Mapai was expected to lose sev-
eral parliamentary seats.
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Somali Republic Fears Ethiopian Aggression
Sporadic clashes have occurred over the years between
Ethiopians and Somali tribesmen who follow their flocks into
the Ethiopian Ogaden in search of pasturage during the dry
seasons. Recently, however, Somali nomads are reported
to have taken part in organized efforts against the Ethiopian
.
authorities, including political and paramilitary activities.COn
2 April Somali infiltrators allegedly inspired tribal inhabitants
of Dagabur--an Ogaden village located about 60 miles inside
Ethiopian territory--to demonstrate for permission to organ-
ize a political party and to seek independence for the Somali-
inhabited areas of Ethiopia. After Ethiopian security forces
arrived on the scene, fighting broke out in which 115 were re-
norted
the "whole civilian population
of Gabreclarre"--largely Somali--approached the provincial
office and "demanded Independence"; the governor was able to
placate them, however, by promising to refer the matter to
higher authority.
The Dagabur incident is believed the first major outbreak
of violence between Ogaden Somalis and Ethiopians since last
December's clash at Danot, when several hundred Ethiopian.
troops and armed Somalis were involved. The Danot clash
began when nomads from the Somali Republic attempted to use
water holes already held by Somalis domiciled in Ethiopia.
After two days of minor skirmishes involving Ethiopian police,
the nomads withdrew across the Somali border for reinforce-
ments. They returned�allegedly reinforced by a well-trained
and -equipped paramilitary force--and attacked the local Ethi-
opian police garrison, but were repulsed by Ethiopian army
units supported by aircraft. Addis Ababa reported 260 casual-
ties in the conflict including 60 dead, and the Somali casualties
were probably even greater.
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Honduras
Villeda is accused by his rightist opposition of weakening
Honduran military forces while building up the politically dom-
inated civil guard, of being lax toward the Communist and
Castro elements, who are very active, and of tolerating Salva-
doran exiles claimed to be plotting in Honduras. Leftists,
including the radical wing of his own Liberal party, dislike
his friendliness with the United States, his modus vivendi
with armed forces chief Colonel Osvaldo Lopez, and his spo-
radic anti-Communist moves. They consider all these prej-
udicial to the interests of the Liberal party, which before
Villeda's election to a six-year term in 1957 had been out of
power for 25 years while the country was under military and
authoritarian governments.
Villeda's maneuvers to compromise between left and right
have satisfied neither. Conservative groups have recently
stepped up their activity against him. Conservative National-
ist party members reportedly fear that if they do not move
soon, their chances of regaining power will be lost. They are
believed to be plotting with military officials who fear that
Villeda's neglect of the armed forces will soon leave them
powerless. Colonel Lopez, however, has consistently re-
sisted their approaches for his support of a coup, despite his
distrust of Villeda.
Both the Nationalists and the military have been in close
contact with Salvadoran officials. These in turn have been
encouraging Armando Velasquez, a Honduran revolutionary
who has made several unsuccessful attempts to overthrow
Villeda. Velasquez, reportedly believing Salvadoran and
other Central American governments were not prepared to
give him sufficient support, planned to return to Spain on 13
April.
However, Villeda, evidently convinced that a combination
of rightist forces backed by the Honduran military was, pre-
paring to move against him soon, acted accordinglyElnaddition3
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ao his alerting order of 12 Apri3 he made a nationwide radio
denunciation of leftist and rightist groups which opposed his
"liberal, impartial, and democratic" administration and
would undertake the "criminal adventure" of overthrowing
the legal government. On 13 April, in an
apparent move to reassure the Salvadoran governing directo-
rate, Villeda sent an urgent message to the directorate through
his ambassador stating that exiled former Salvadoran President
Osorio was not in Honduras and would not be allowed to stay if
he sought asylum there.
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi*gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984
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Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 CO2001SS
Top SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001984