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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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Publication Date: 
April 18, 1961
/./ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Now ur btLutc 18 April 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 7!:! INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 4proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986A -1-U1'�-SECRET TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 CONFIDENTIAL LATE ITEM USSR/Cuba: A Soviet government statement on 18 April said that continuation of the invasion of Cuba "may have the gravest consequences for world peace." The statement de- clared that the USSR "reserves the right to take all measures, with all states, to render the necessary assistance to the Republic of Cuba if the armed interference in the affairs of the Cuban peoples is not stopped." The Soviet government ex- pressed the hope that the US government would understand that the invasion of Cuba could "endanger the peaceful life of the population of the United States itself." The statement demanded immediate consideration of the Cuban, situation by the UN General Assembly. --e0N-FIDEIV7TAT A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 pAp roved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 *itO Sgelr- Noe 18 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Cuba. (Page t) 2. Laos. (Page tt) Ii 3. Angola: American consul sees possibility of "chaos worse than Belgian Congo." (Page tit) 11 4. Communist China: Peiping may increase trade with �43 Japan. (Page tii) 0 V 2 5. India: Differences among Communist leaders remain following 7-16 April party congress. (Page tit) 6. Iespraageel:tvIrabs object to military parade in Jerusalem. 7. Turkey: Military regime faces problem of transition to civil government. (Page iv) w/4 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986k A F-1 ,-"Perimeter of second mop IHAVANA Ap;r125-' H'AIB-A-1.1-A. 'tthnz A N Pinar del Me- A 0 603.103 2 CUBA SELECTED RAILROAD MILES 110 HAVANA Isle of Pines 610418 3 76 BAHAMA 76 ISLANDS ClIctiGUE MAT Puerto Mene0 1�.171 V.._ 0 MenzentOEO ;,....� Palma Scrim� &mill., de Cuba Jaguey Grande 6� \P �-_,.....1-kLaguna Del ciPlaya Larga Caribbean Sea \ Playa Giron ENTE B: 10 entenemo Cienfuegos CUBA-: AREA OF INVASION ---- Province boundary - Selected railroad 50 MILES 18 Apr Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 0/ ; ' Approved for 1 Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 %,// SECRET `viro CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 18 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Cuba: (As of 0430) Castro forces have suffered "considerable casualties" and the loss of several coastal points in southern Las Villas provincei "heavy arms are being brought in" by the attackers. a unit of the attacking forces had penetrated inland to the Laguna del Tesoro on the Matanzas provincial boundary. A Cuban radio station monitored by US press agencies issued an ap- peal for ambulances, "because there are many injured in Jaguey Grande," a town in Matanzas some 20 miles from the coast. Al- though the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council claims that the 17 April landings were intended largely to facilitate action by larger forces already within Cuba, there has as yet been no information of any significant action in support of the landing forces, continued ar- rests of suspected anti-Castro elements throughout the island. Pro-Castro groups elsewhere in Latin America were quick to react to the outbreak of fighting in Cuba. Mobs stoned USIA offices in Buenos Aires and the offices of an American airline in the Chilean capital on 17 April. Anti-US demonstrations also occurred in at least six other Latin American cities on the same day and more demonstrations are scheduled. In Bogota, demon- strators were dispersed by gun fire in front of the US Embassy. The Venezuelan armed forces, were alerted for demonstrations by the relatively strong pro- Castro groups in that country. Former Ecuadorean interior minister Araujo, addressing a pro-Castro rally in Quito on 17 April, called for volunteers to go to Cuba "to fight Yankee imperialism." Mexican ex-President Cardenas announced that he will go to Cuba as a personal gesture of solidarity with the Castro regime. Both Moscow and Peiping have confined themselves to the stand- ard non-committal statements of general support for the Castro government. The voluminous com.mentary has been general through- out the Bloc. � RL Approved for for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20019864 A1111,14 Phong Saly. 1PHONG SALY �-...?"\ �-�' . 1 -1 \---�' � � ... ...../ 1 NAMITHA i , � 3 A�1uon9 Sei � Nam Bac . i NI� .....**". � / ....* � / Sam 1`,1,Qua ../"-^...../ LUANGI PRA BANG \j� - `.., � SAM NEUA Luang Prabang � ' � .\....."�.. � .... ..- .... � �, .N. ":-..........�-' X I E N G tri. SAYABOURY rr. PiainedeK H 0 U AN G N. Muon SOUL ' an i Phou Khoun Xieng Khauang � -).Bvcirl. Phiit I. Ban to Viangit 1"���Tha Tho Yang \Peng VIENTIANE - NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG .LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD _--TRAIL ROUTE NUMBER � Bari kha ak Sane . I .4 Kam - 1.9k Sa KHAMMqUANE� Ai,hommarat � rhakhek Mallaxav ivaaaukil 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 //' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 '77 ii TI ;;;?..; � ��;. *Laos: In central Laos, the bulk of the government force from the Nhommarat area continues its disorganized with- drawal to Thakhek, although some elements have established/ A . new defensive positions along Route 12, about 11 miles from/P/ the town. In the confusion attending the withdrawal, bridges In the Nhommarat area, previously prepared for demolition, 6-LcZe-t-e-/ were not blown. Contact with enemy forces has been broken Rcz, off. The government garrison at Mahaxay, about e3a 25 miles due east of Thakhek, has been ordered to withdraw A westward to avoid being cut off. Urgent requests have been sent to Vientiane general headquarters for dispatch of 105-mm. howitzers to reinforce Thakhek. Southwest of Xieng Khouang town, enemy forces continue efforts to consolidate their position at Ban Pha. (Backup, Page 1) (Maps) 18 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 , SECRET Two 7, Angola: The American consul in Luanda reports that rebel terrorism and governmental counteraction have re= suited in the death of hundreds of whites and thousands of Africans in the past month. He feels that despite Portugal's determination to restore order, it will be impossible to re- turn to the status quo ante. He believes that Angolan Africans now would not be satisfied even with drastic reforms and that there is a possibility of a complete breakdown of law and or- der. leading ultimately to "chaos worse than the Belgian Congo." Communist China =Japan:. There are signs of a thaw in Sino-Japanese economic relations, obstructed since 1958 by Peiping's strict insistence upon prior political concessions from Japan. Actuated by a combination of economic difficul- ties at home and trade problems with the rest of the bloc, the authorities in Peiping now appear prepared to open the way for some recovery in Sino-Japanese trade, which dropped from $140,000,000 in 1957 to $23,000,000 in 1960. Publicly, however, Peiping still insists that any "large-scale" trade depends on Tokyo's meeting three conditions--that Japan stop being "hos- tile" toward Communist China, stop associating itself with the promotion of a "two Chinas scheme," and stop obstructing the normalization of relations between the Japanese and China. (Backup, Page 4) bA India:Elpdian Communist leaders made little progress in mending their differences during the party's congress from 7 to 16 April. Preliminary reports indicate that the congress adopted a moderate compromise resolution on the "present political sit= uation" after postponing once again a decision on the party's fu- ture tactical "program"�a move reportedly recommended by top OK Soviet representative M. A. Suslov. Both actions constitute a setback for the extremist faction and indicate that Indian Com- munists will continue to be guided by the "peaceful, parliamentary" policy adopted in 1958. The moderate-rightist group consolidated its control by re-electing General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh despite his poor healtS (Backup, Page 5) 18 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF -SECRET- lii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 \ X \\ \X Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Niof ���\ \ II Israel-Jordan: Israel has refused to abandon its plans to 0 hold the state's 13th anniversary military parade in Jerusalem on 20 April despite a ruling by the UN Security Council that the parade, and a rehearsal that took place on 17 March, are in violation of the 1949 Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement The Israelis have changed the intended route of the parade in ip order to avoid approaching the armistice line which bisects tie city, but they remain adamant about including tanks and other Aitc, heavy equipment in the procession contrary to armistice re- strictions. The Israelis have consistently refused to accept the UN's authority on their side of the Israeli-Arab armistice lines. The parade plans have again fanned Arab�particularly Jordanian--resentment toward Israel. (Backup, Page 7) Turkey: The military regime, which seized power on 27 May 0, has promised a transition to civil government and national elections by 29 October0 tight surveillance of all political activities and swift apprehension of those who in any way ex- press discontent with the military regime. Regardless of who wins the national elections, it is expected that the army will re- main a major factor in Turkish politics (Backup, Page 9) 18 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF SECRET \ iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20019861& BURMA Pou .--4:duong SAYABOURY 18 Apr 61 .."[...go Kay *Nam Bac...1, PRAilAN6 Sam A , ..... , � m tibng Soul anBan" - - n At ain es JrresXieng Kho iBan Ta .Tha Thom Viarig- San6 Kam Keu tiane . Savannakhe TONLE SAP GULF OF inh TONKIN eno S_-�VANN SOUTH Attopeu VIETNAM CHAMP SAK.IATTOPEU. BAN PI-TA PRO CAMBODIA Road Trail STATUTE MILES UNCLASSIFIED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 VOW TOP SECRET Situation in Laos 13,athet Lao influence appears to be growing among villages surrounding Vientiane. Communist guerrilla squads have been organized in more than a score of villages within a 25-mile radius and are malting preparations for ambush attacks on gov- arnmant nafrol Meanwhile, Pathet Lao agent propagandists continue active in and around Vientiane? The recent enemy attack on the government outpost at Ban Pha Pho in southernmost Laos may be more than an isolated incident. Communist intent to consolidate guer- rilla assets in southern Laos for eventual combat operations against local government forces, the importance of the task and detailed a strategy of collecting strength to "wipe out places one by one in order to insure vic- tory." Reference was made to military equipment and cadres available from "Central"--combined Pathet Lao - Vietnamese Communist headquarters, believed located somewhere along the northern Lao - Vietnamese border. There has been a notable lack of incidents in southern Laos, where government garrison forces are spread thinly and Pathet Lao guerrillas have long exercised de facto control over much of the hinterland. However, these guerrillas--at the end of the Com- munist logistical pipeline�have always been the poorest equipped in the country. Moreover, Communist attention since last fall has been principally directed at consolidation in northern Laos. With the government now increasingly on the defensive on all fronts, the Pathet Lao may feel free to divert additional troops and material from the northern sector for use in the south. Es- tablishment of an open presence in southern Laos would bolster the Pathet Lao's posture as a nationwide force and would commen- surately strengthen the Communist hand in any future negotiations. In this connection, Kong Le claimed in a speech at Xieng Khouang town on 15 April that the "government forces and Pathet Lao RET 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Noe `ture TOP SECRET fighting units" had liberated two thirds of the country's ter- ritory. ���� Soviet Pre- mier Khrushchev, in a recent discussion of world affairs with the Indian ambassador in Moscow, implied that the USSR had entered the Laotian struggle to prevent Chinese involvement. Khrushchev reportedly said that Chinese Communist involve- ment in Laos might have caused the conflict to spread "from Southeast Asia to the straits of Formosa;' and eventually raise the question of the USSR's obligations under the Sino-Soviet de- fense pact. Ithrushchev's purpose in referring to Sino-Soviet differences on policy in Laos probably was to impress New Delhi with the USSR's reasonableness and restraint in the Laotian af- fair and to underscore the need for accepting Soviet terms for negotiati0ns:4 rgoviet spokesmen apparently took much the same line with Indian officials in the US in mid-February. In a 14 February discussion with an American official regarding Laos, the deputy chief of Indian Mission, Chatterjee, remarked that he had gath- ered the impression from Soviet colleagues in Washington that if Laos developed into another Korea, the Chinese Communists would necessarily control the situation. Chatterjee said that the Soviet spokesmen took pains to leave the impression that the USSR, by remaining in control of the Laotian situation, had fore- stalled Chinese intervention3 Burmese Pre- mier U Nu and Chou En-lai endorsed the principal of "coordi- nation and cooperation" against the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Peiping and Rangoon mounted joint military operations against the irregular forces in Burma earlier this year. The reference to the Nationalist forces was prob- ably sought by the Chinese Communists as an implicit expres- sion of Burmese support for Peiping's expressed concern about the activities of these irregulars in Laos. Chinese Communist broadcasts have labeled the evacuation of irregulars from Laos to Taiwan "phony" and warned that only the old and ineffective were removed. Peiping radio also recently charged that Chinese Nationalist elements conducted a raid into China from Laos. II divided Laos is unacceptable, according to a Chinese Com- munist journalist who periodically briefs editors of the Communist/ 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Now TOP SECRET ress in Hong Kong. In a recent briefing he asserted that there was no reason to divide the country like Korea or Viet- nam when there was still a chance of gettin7 a unified Laos/ Airlift flights continue to be scheduled at about the average level. Since 15 April, however, airlift activity has been cur- tailed by adverse weather conditions, a situation that will prob- ably become more frequent with the approach of the monsoon season. TOP SECRET 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 SECRET Communist China Encourages Some Increase in Sino-Japanese Trade Taking the initiative in recent weeks, Peiping has offered Japan 60,000 tons of coking coal highly desired by the Japanese steel industry. For the first time since 1958 it has invited Japanese firms to send representatives to the annual spring trade fair in Canton. It has increased to over 70 the number of Japanese firms which are designated as "friendly" by the Chinese Communists and with which they will therefore do business. This is more than quadruple the number designated at the first of the year. In response to these moves, the Japa- nese have eliminated the requirement that this trade be con- ducted on a straight barter basis and eased clearing account procedures. Conciliatory Chinese moves have been accompanied by con- tinued reminders of the need for some initiative from Japan to- ward a political accommodation. Peiping hopes the bait of sub- stantial trade will keep alive pressure in Japan on the Ikeda gov- ernment to meet the Chinese conditions. Within Japan, press and business circles have welcomed the moves by both governments and have renewed suggestions for a government-to-government trade agreement--which Pei- ping says can be signed only if Tokyo meets its political demands. Skepticism about Peiping's intentions and tactics remains. Japa- nese business elements recognize that the government is not likely to make any move toward Communist China until after the prime minister's visit to the United States in June. SECRET 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 �SteRE Indian Communist Party Congress Fails to Repair Rift The main stumbling block to agreement on the CPI's future tactics continued to be the degree of support which Indian Com- munists should give Prime Minister Nehru and certain "pro- gressive" policies of his Congress party government. Several days of bitter debate on this basic issue failed to resolve the split between the moderates, who line up with Moscow in favor of exploiting Nehru's prestige domestically and internationally, and the leftist extremists, who echo Peiping's line that Nehru has sold out to the "reactionaries" and must be actively opposed. The question of the party's long-range program was turned over to the newly elected National Council, in effect shelving the problem for the time being. Press reports indicate that the council comprises 56 "right-wing" representatives, 36 "leftists," and 18 who take a middle-of-the-road position. The congress was confronted with three draft resolutions on the current political situation, reflecting the views of the rival factions. Prolonged discussion and maneuvering pro- duced a compromise in which the moderate-backed "official" draft, drawn up during the executive meetings in February, was accepted with some concessions in emphasis to the left- wing dissidents. The amended resolution probably will reit- erate much of the double talk characteristic of the February declaration. A striking omission in the discussions and statements of the congress was any reference to the Sino-Indian border dis- pute, suggesting that antagonism between the "nationalist" and pro-Chinese "internationalist" factions is still too strong to be smoothed over in a compromise resolution. all addition, So- viet delegate Suslov reportedly had exerted pressure to prevent discussion of this issue? While the party's official tactics for the national elections next February remain to be worked out, Ajoy Ghosh's closing address to the conference on 16 April indicates the line the CPI is likely to take under moderate leadership. Ghosh called on 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 SECRET "progressive forces" in all parties, including the ruling Con- gress party, to form a common front to work for the progress of India. A report issued by the party secretariat, while promising a "big political battle" against the government's "anti- people" policies, also pointed out that most of the CPI's "poten- tial allies" were inside the Congress party and should be drawn into "mass action." Suslov's presence and his apparent role in the decisions of the congress point up Moscow's continued predominant influence in Indian Communist party affairs. Chinese suspicions of the So- viet Union's "soft" policy in regard to countries such as India may well be re-fired by the moderation of the program which was adopted at a congress which Moscow apparently went to some lengths to control. In any event, the results of t n- gress will hardly be looked upon with favor in Peiping. 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 'Rape Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 CONFIDENTIAL Israeli Military Parade in Jerusalem The Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement signed on 3 April 1949 specifically excluded armored vehicles from a ten- kilometer (6,2 miles) strip on either side of the armistice demarcation line which includes the divided city of Jeru- salem. The Israelis have announced that their parade will include over 300 pieces of ordnance, headed by 14 recently delivered British Centurion tanks and including 18 Sherman tanks, 26 French AMX light tanks, heavy and light artillery including French 85-10 guided antitank missiles, and Amer- ican 106-mm. jeep-mounted recoilless guns. Some of these units are already in Jerusalem. The column also will include motorized infantry and a marching contingent of 4,000 men and women from the Israeli armed services. There will be no air force overflights because of the closeness of the bor- der. In recent years Israel has held its anniversary parade alternately in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem on the Jewish calendar date which corresponds to 14 May 1948, when Israel attained its independence. This year the Israelis attempted to forestall the furor that arose in connection with the 1958 parade in Jerusalem by apprising the UN Truce Supervision Organization, and through it the Jordanians, of their plans, stressing that the heavy equipment to be shown is only for ceremonial purposes. The Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) subsequently condemned theiIsraelis for using tanks and heavy artillery in the 17 March rehearsal. A Baghdad newspaper reported on 14 April that the Arab states might hold a joint military parade in the Arab sector of Jerusalem, with Jordan providing the major force and smaller contingents representing other Arab armies. Jordanian foreign minister has since said that his government has def- initely decided not to hold a "retaliatory" parade. However, he pointed out that failure to do anything would be interpreted both In Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world either as weakness or as yielding to pressure from the United Statesi On 15 April Jordan submitted a new complaint to the MAC regarding the Israeli heavy equipment which already is in tONFIDENTIAL 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 CONFIDENTIAL Jerusalem for the parade. The MAC indicated it would first consider a prior Israeli complaint on alleged Jordanian vio- lations. The Israeli press, meanwhile, has been criticizing the UN Truce Supervision Organization for making an "issue" of the parade. A Foreign Ministry spokesman has said publicly that Israel will cancel its parade if Jordan will implement those clauses of the armistice agreement dealing with free Israeli access to the Wailing Wall and the Mount Scopus enclave. The UN partition of Palestine on 29 November 1947 provided for putting the city of Jerusalem and its environs under direct international administration. The ensuing Arab-Israeli war prevented the carrying out of this resolution, but the General Assembly reaffirmed its recommendation on 9 December 1949. In accordance with these acts, the United States does not reco nize Israel's claim to Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. .COPIEFIDEI'ffV[T- 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 NNWSECRET*IS The Situation in Turkey The Turkish public appears to be more apprehensive over the future course of events than at any time since the Commit- tee of National Union (CNU) purged 14 of its 37 members last November. Civil leaders are moving cautiously to make sure that the CNU will have no occasion to back down on its promise to hold elections by 29 October. An American Embassy official stated recently that partisan sentiment seemed sure to become extremely disruptive either before or after elections. He also noted that one result of the political tension is a resurgence of xenophobia and an increase in private criticism of US-Turkish military cooperation. The avowed main task of the regime is to restore civil government. Many Turks believe that this will be done but that the timing will be determined by the completion of trials and approval of the new constitution and electoral law. The elec- toral legislation passed the House of Representatives on 6 April and has been sent to the CNU. The House now is debating the draft constitution. When this review is completed, the draft will be submitted to the CNU for approval, and must then be approved by a popular referendum. There can be little doubt that the military still determines the policy of the Turkish Government and that any cabinet min- ister who differs with the CNU must resign. The resignation of the minister of industry on 14 April suggests continuing discon- tent within the government over military rule. Ek's one prom- inent Turkish politician observed, "For years to come, Turk- ish politicians will feel a bayonet at the backs of their necks?, Since the relaxation of restrictions on activities of polit- ical organizations, it has become increasingly apparent that the banned Democrat party (DP) of the former regime remains a significant factor in Turkish politics. The CNU is apparently alarmed by indications of DP strength and is trying to keep it under control without having to take openly repressive measures. New political parties have been warned not to identify themselves too closely with the outlawed party. Behind the scenes the DP, SECRET--- 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 %me Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 SECRET e which may represent up to 50 percent of the electorate, has maintained considerable party cohesion, and at least one of the new parties has reportedly offered itself as a continuation of the DP and has appointed former DP members to positions of influence. Political observers anticipate the transfer of power from the CNU to the Republican People's party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu, but few believe such a transfer is possible in a truly democratic fashion. The CNU may regard such a transfer as the only way to provide stability for the country and assure safety for itself. The political trials of the leaders of the ousted Bayar- Menderes regime, now in their seventh month, are approach- ing the critical stage of determining who was responsible for the use of force against the student demonstrators in Ankara and Istanbul and whether Bayar and Menderes are guilty of violating the constitution by creating the special investigatory committee and by other repressive actions. Some executions are probable; estimates run as high as 80, but this is probably exaggerated. In the final analysis the CNU's decision will depend largely on its assessment of domestic and foreign reaction. 5E-e- 18 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 NorCONFIDENTIAL .�%.09 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Ais Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001986 Approved