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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 19, 1961
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Now 1#F. dIII "we 3.3(h)(2) e/ 3.5(c) 19 April 1961 Copy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN LIG -TOVSECRET- C e'a7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 -proved _for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 4.0P-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 y .41dApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 19 April 1961 -0# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1, USSR: Ithrushchey implicitly links Cuba to Laos in letter to President. (Page t) 2. Watch Committee Conclusion on bloc reaction to Cuban situation. (Page tt) 3. Cuba. (Page tit) 4. Laos. (Page v) 5. Congo: Kasavubu's agreement with UN to reorganize Congolese Army apparently made independently of Mobutu. (Page vt) 6. USSR: Soviet gold sales. (Page vt) 7. Yugoslavia: Regime shows confidence. (Page vt) 8. Austria: Business interests again urge recognition of Communist China. (Page vii) -SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 I. ktodApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 TOP-SEC-14E4 Nrio / T-OFL-SEeRET 7-� 7/7 2 V CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR-Cuba-Laos: The first official Soviet pronounce- ments on the Cuban situation foreshadow a massive prop- aganda and diplomatic campaign to mobilize world opinion against the US and generate alarm over the consequences of the fighting in Cuba. While the Soviet leaders will not hes- itate to make maximum political capital from Cuban devel- opments, neither Khrushchevis letter to the President nor the official government statements goes beyond the general warning that "we will extend to the Cuban people and its gov- 0 ernment all the necessary aid for the repulse of the armed attack on Cuba." 1Chrushchev's letter, however, implicitly links the Cuban situation to Laos by warning that "in general it is impossible to carry on affairs in such a way that in one area the situation is settled and the fire is put out and in an- other area a new fire is lit." Although the Soviet leaders prob- ably will be careful to avoid any commitments to specific counteraction in Cuba, Khrushchev's letter suggests that Moscow may continue to stall on cease-fire arrangements in Laos and may sanction increased military pressure against the Vientiane government. The Soviet Government statement, appealing to all UN members to "render all necessary aid" to Cuba and demanding that the UN General Assembly urgent- ly study the "aggressive actions" of the US, was followed by the Soviet resolution along the same lines presented in the UN yesterday evening. 22/7 y //. N. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 TOP SECRET 41. Watch Committee Conclusion: ahe Watch Committee at a special meeting on 1 April reached the following conclusior_g jtn connection with the Cuban situation, the Committee met to review Sino-Soviet bloc military posture and, in par- ticular, to discuss a reported alert of East German and Polish force recall of personnel from leave, and to "a battle alert" and mentioning the Cuban situation. The first, is probably unrelated to bloc reaction to the Cu- ban situation; the other, cannot be assessed, and there is no way to determine whose forces the operators are discussinzj7 abnormalities have been noted in the posture of Soviet and other bloc military forces. A condition of communications readiness in bloc forces can be expected, as has been the case in past periods of international tensio_ as an adjunct to Soviet political -efforts in the UN and else- where, it would be characteristic of the bloc to raise fears of spreading hostilities. Although we have no information to date, the bloc may in addition harden its position noticeably in vari- ous areas in reaction to the Cuban situation. We do not believe, however, that the Cuban situation in itself is likely to lead to the overt employment of bloc forces in Laos or to bloc actions in other parts of the world that would, in the bloc's view. in- volve serious dancer of major hostilitiei9 19 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20019014 610,1193 ISLE OF: PINES CUBA SELECTED ROAD � SELECTED RAILROAD AIRFIELD (6000 ft. or over.) UNCLASSIFIED 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approvfd for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 *Cuba: (Information available as of 0430 EST) Fidel Castro's forces, supported by air, tanks, and artillery, are hitting hard against the anti-Castro fighters in southern Las Villas Province, and the next day or two will be critical ones. according to a re- port from one observer, Soviet-type MIG aircraft were used against the anti-Castro landing forcq There is still no information of a general Cuban uprising, upon which anti-Castro forces that landed in Cuba on 17 April presumably had counted for assistance. The Castro govern- ment continues to maintain silence on the situation in the battle area. The regime is, however, stepping up its moves to arrest units in Las Lam and Camaguey actual or potential anti-Castro elements, provinces to "search churches, convents, and religious colleges in an orderly manner," arresting all "counterrevolutionaries." On 18 April the Cuban national radio network reported the ar- rest in Havana of the Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of Havana Province, long one of the church's most outspoken critics of the Castro government. Another 18 April broadcast stated that Castro's ex-Minister of Agriculture Humberto Son i Mann, who allegedly was involved in an assassination plot against Fidel Castro, was wounded and captured by government forces. Many Latin American political leaders are sympathetic to the anti-Castro cause, and there have been several anti-Castro demonstrations in Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. This anti-Castro sentiment is probably reflected in the comment by a Peruvian Foreign Ministry official, who said he was "privately delighted" with the action against Castro. An "anti-Communist guerrilla legion" reportedly was being formed in Guatemala on 18 April; an announcement claimed the organization had 400 men ready to "help in the fight against the Communist regime in Cuba." On balance, however, pro-Castro and pro-Communist groups In Latin America have been more articulate, though almost always 19 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 iiidApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 1410 / through relatively small groups. Yesterday saw pro-Castro demonstrations, of varying sizes and frequently aimed against US installations, in most Latin American countries; the Com- munist and pro-Communist direction of these efforts seemed most evident in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. In Panama, several hundred Castro sympathizers are said to have tried to enter the Canal Zone to demonstrate there. Further demonstrations of "solidarity with Cuba," some possibly violent, are likely. On 17 April, the Venezuela Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved a resolution condemning "armed intervention by a foreign country" in Cuba. This followed approval of a similar resolution in the Venezuelan Senate two days earlier. In Chile, Communist and other leftist groups have been urged by the Cuban ambassador to prepare strikes and work stoppages in support of Castro, a tactic which may be employed by pro- Castro elements elsewhere. Press reports state that "vol- unteers" to help the Castro forces are being enrolled in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, and the Cuban press service claims that "more than 1,000 volunteers" will leave Mexico for Cuba to fight for the Castro regime. (Map) 19 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 0Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001981 Phong Sa y :=T VIET AM !PHA. S AL Y - .���� IDien Bien Phu ---' 1 til� \.- _.../.. //".' / /---/ ., ,I Sam Neua - ../........./ i LUANG1 PRA ANG "�.. \i' SAM NEUA I..? Luang Prabang . .........,., , ...�........9 N..._ Nu., ; ����' XI EN U SAYABOURY. 1 ..-'''' , XHOUANG \ . H"le ,Ban Ban Muon; Soul _ Muon 4 Kasky ./ .0* �-������". Nam Bac Phou Khoun Xieng'Khouang �--)Ban Pha v Bat-) Ta Vg Thom *-1 A.:Nang \gong VIENTIANE I Borikha.15� Pak Sane Vie.lriane THAI & A N D NORTHERN LAOS IWO GOVERNMENT Forces in 4110 KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD 0 - --TRAIL / ROUTE NUMBER n4/92 50 .It. STATUTE MILES Kam Keut /4%/0�41( Lak KHAMM-UANE, rphommarat � Thakhek Mahaxay; 5c.iyan mil< he 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 1/4.04 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 6. TOP SECRET , �// *Laos: on 17 0 4- April the government post of Mahaxay, 25 miles east of oLL-L-Lkek) Thakhek was evacuated. 1 ezt 4_.t.,...t ordered this withdrawal in the face of the enemy --'' ' threat. Government troops in the Thakhek area continue to a occu defensive ositions about 11 miles east of that town Fragmentary reports suggest that there may be a de- rf/ veloping threat to Muong Sai, a key government post north of Luang Prabang. Some Pathet Lao elements are reported about six miles to the north of Muong Sai, while others are reported moving southward from Phong Saly Province with the mission of taking Muong Sal. The fall of this post would endanger the remaining western area of the tiro ince and Luang Prabang city itsel (Backup, Page 1) (Map) 19 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 th1- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987N Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kitona IN Luanda INDIA 300 SUDAN 400 TUNISIA NIGERIA INDONESIA MOBUTU Leopoldv le ysville public of the Congo .Gemena Scattered -orce ETHIOPIA Lisa t MOBUTU 800 Ike la. Francqui uluabourg Bakw GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji 641 Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces -Selected road not included) Selected railroad --r Selected airfield I 001 STATUTE MILES 400 Akeh GIZENGA 7,000 MALAYA 870 LIBERIA k 230 ETHIOPIA ETHIOPI INDIA 3000 Kongolo Kabalo Albertville NIGERIA 90Q *Marion() TSHOMBE 7,000 -lisab hville NIGERIA 500 Usumbura angonyJko IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 -/4 71/ , - Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 %or TOP SECRET Congo: Although President Kasavubu is still avoiding any 04- commitment to allow re-entry of UN troops into Matadi, he 41:1( declared his willingness on 17 April to cooperate with the UNg 4 and to permit a reorganization of the UN army under UN aus-i) pices. His agreement on reorganization of the army appears 6 to have been made independently of Army Chief Joseph Mobutu.'" It appears likely that Mobutu will demand assurances that suchio, a reorganization will not be used as a pretext for disarming the army. Mobutu claims to have re-established his author- ltv over Gizenga's forces in Orientale Province. (Backup, Page 3) (Map) USSR: File Soviet gold sales which began on the London market in mid-March, and which, amounted to $47,000,000 between 15 and 27 March, anded to include the Paris market as well. fflotal sales during the period 15 March - 10 Apri may have reached as high as $156,750,001. This is the largest amount of Soviet gold sold in such a short period and could presage sales for the year far in excess of the recent annual average of about $200,000,000. Sales of this magnitude are still consonant with the Soviet Urx= ion's own growing foreign trade imbalances. Increased imports== largely industrial equipment�from Western Europe and the sterlin area have resulted in a shift of Moscow's trade balance with these areas from an export surplus in 1958 to an import surplus in 19607 (Backup, Page 4) Yugoslavia: Belgrade is showing confidence in its ability to develop its domestic economy and to achieve greater public participation in achieving the regime's goals. The two most re= cent steps, the Third Five-Year Plan (1961=65) and a far-reach- ing economic reform, have the avowed purpose of reaching by 1965 a per capita income comparable to that of present-day Italy, i. e., about $575 per year. The initial adjustment to the 19 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECREi vi Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 / A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 '�ff �TOP SECRET reform, however, has not been as smooth as the regime had hoped, and certain elements in the party are concerned that inflationary trends accompanying the reform may create pub- lic dissatisfactioj23 In the political sphere, the regime has further demonstrated its confidence by releasing from jail Milovan Djilas, author of The New Clas and continuing to ease pressures on the CatholicWurch. (Backup, Page 5) Austria - Communist China: /the Austrian Government 0 ' is again under pressure from business interests to consider recognizing Communist China. A delegation from the League of Austrian Industrialists reportedly has urged recognition on Foreign Minister Kreisky, who said that he personally favored am_eei I such a move but that it would require time--perhaps half a year�to maneuver the government into position for it. Kreisky iP said he would raise the matter at a meeting of the new Gorbach cabinet. Kreisky has told Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki that there would be "no difficulty for Austria to recognize" Pei- ping but that Ausra had not so far dor so because of Wash- ington's position] (Backup, Page 7) NOTE: he Department of State believes that Kreisky's personal attitude toward Communist China is well known, and feels it unlikely any chanYe in Austrian policy wi take place in the foreseeable futufel 19 Apr 61 AA? . DAILY BRIEF vii TOP SECRET 1V,Yr JOA Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Laos :)rior to the latest Soviet response to the British on Laos, Prime Minister Nehru was becoming increasingly upset about Soviet delay in agreeing to a cease-fire, On 10 April Nehru reportedly sent a letter to Khrushchev expressing his concern and pointing out that each day without a call for a cease-fire not only wors- ened the internal situation but made eventual agreement more � difficult3 ouvanna Phouma told Ambassador Thompson in Moscow that inclusion of the Pathet Lao in a new government is essen- tial. In Souvanna's view, the new government would be provi- sional and elections would have to be held in six or eight months. Souvanna was critical of past American policy toward Laos and indicated he had so expressed himself to Soviet leaders but said he thought the present administration had changed policy. Sou- vanna apparently was equally frank in making it clear to Khru- shchev and Gromyko that he wanted a neutral Laos, and was opposed to Communismj CA-mbassador Thompson found most disturbing Souvanna's remark that when he last visited Communist China in 1956 he had been convinced that the Chinese wanted peace in S Asia for 20 years in order to build up their economy) Soviet transports continue to be scheduled for airlift op- erations into Laos. On 17 April, nine Soviet IL-14s and one North Vietnamese IL-14 flew from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang in airlift operations. Communications continue between the Phong Saly head- quarters of Colonel Khammouan and Kong Le headquarters in the Plaine des Jarres concerning the former's request for the paradropping of arms and supplies under an agreement he had reached with Souvanna's "defense minister" Quinim Pholsena and Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong at Dien Bien Phu on 6 April. In addition to weapons and ammunition, clothing, food, and medical supplies are included in the requested material. 19 Apr Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 %we Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 SECRET �430 the urgent need for the supplies to "re-establish stability in Phong Saly Province and to settle any misunderstanding between our forces and Pathet Lao forces." The relationship between the various forces in Phong Saly Province is somewhat obscure, but Souvanna lists Khammouan's troops along with Kong Le's forces as "his troops" as distinguished from the Pathet Lao. an armored car training school was to be opened on 16 April at _a_nlace_ahout_5_milerthest of Xieng Khouang town. forwarding to the Plaine des Jarres area of Laotian Government military and civil person- n1 Auhn have either defected or been captured. food and lodging be prepared for three govern- ment soldiers who "rallied with their weapons" at Ban Pha. SECRET 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 CONFIDENTIAL The Situation in the Congo The 17 April claim by Congo Army headquarters that Gen- eral Mobutu has reached agreement with the authorities in Orientale Province has yet to be confirmed by any spokesman for Gizenga. The position of the Leopoldville government rel- ative to its rivals appears to have improved, however, as a result of the internal dissensions besetting the Gizenga and Tshombe regimes. In Stanleyville, the leader of one faction was briefly under arrest in mid-April for subversive activi- ties; in Elisabethville, Tshombe's freedom of action has been limited both by factional rivalries among his subordinates and by diminishing popular support President ICasavubuts declaration of his willingness to cooperate with the UN contrasts with Tshombe's recent warnings against any reinforcement of UN troops in Katanga. That Kasavubu desires further to isolate Tshombe is suggested by a passage in his agreement with the UN calling for the ex- pulsion of all foreign political and military functionaries hired by any agency other than the Kasavubu government As of 17 April, approximately 900 Indian troops had been airlifted from Tanganyika to Kamina base in Katanga. UN officials, however, have charged that Tshombe has revived efforts to boycott the UN in Katanga and to prevent it from purchasing food and other supplies. On 14 April Albert Ndele, governor of the Congo National Bank, briefed foreign diplomats and businessmen on the financial condition of the Congo, which he described as grave. According to Ndele, governmental expenditures in the last half of 1960 exceeded income by US $12 million per month. Ndele observed that falling imports had brought serious inflation, and charged various government agencies, particu- larly the Congo Army, with fiscal extravagance. CONFIDENTIAL 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 SECRET Soviet Gold Sales though there is a possibility of double counting, reports indicate that the USSR sold $101,750,000 worth of gold on the London market between 15 March and 10 April, and another $55,000,000 to the Bank of France in the first week of April. Such sales, if substantiated, would be well above the unusually low volume in 1960 (estimated at $125,000,000), suggesting that the total for the year may exceed the $300,000,000 level in the peak year 1959j /These large-scale transactions may be attributed to a combination of circumstances. Soviet imports from Western Europe and the sterling area are expanding at a greater rate than exports. Moscow's balance of trade with the sterling area has changed from a slight surplus in 1958 to a deficit of about $100,000,000 in 1959 and an estimated deficit of about $130,000,000 in 1960. Similarly, Soviet imports from the rest of Western Europe in 1960 increased almost 50 percent over 1959, while total exports to the area rose less than 20 percent, thus reducing the USSR's traditional export surplus with the area from $164,000,000 in 1959 to $76,000,000 in 1960. This shift in Soviet trade with nonbloc areas, coupled with the small sales of gold last year, has undoubtedly caused a drain on Soviet foreign exchange reserves necessitating re- entry into the gold market:7 (Although no evidence exists, it is possible that the USSR is acting as an agent for Chinese Communist gold transactions. Peiping is currently short of foreign exchange, and a part of its gold holdings is assumed to have been sent to the USSR for minting and presumably for ultimate disposal in Western mar- ke?j SEC 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Noe -,400 SECRET Internal Developments in Yugoslavia Yugoslavia's parliament convened on 18 April to approve the annual report of the Federal Executive Council (the cab- inet) on economic development and the primary tasks to be faced in the coming year. While the report itself contains little of dramatic import, it comes at a time of significant change in Yugoslavia. On 1 January Belgrade announced that its Second Five-Year Plan (1957-61) had been completed one year early and that the third would be begun immediately. The economic reform accompanying the new plan will bring Yugoslavia's foreign trade practices into closer accord with those of the West by lessening central government con- trol over trade, unifying the exchange rate of its currency at 750 dinars to the dollar, and using simplified, direct tariffs. Belgrade hopes that these changes will increase foreign trade by 74 percent in the next five years. The reform also calls for further decentralization of Yugoslavia's political administra- tion and economy. By vesting more power at the local level, the regime hopes to solve a problem which plagues all Com- munist regimes�how to stimulate individual initiative and in- dustrial efficiency without endangering the regime's control. )The reform has had unsettling domestic effects,rind as a result, some party officials fear that popular unrest may de- veloRB Retail prices for certain consumer goods have risen sharply, necessitating the extension of price controls. Under the new system, some industries have engaged in monopolistic practices, forcing up prices despite the regime's expectations to the contrary. Belgrade has not been able, moreover, to re- duce controls on as many commodities as originally planned, because some of the Western aid--totaling $275,000,000--sup- porting the reform is relatively short term, high interest, and restricted as to its use. Yugoslavia is making ideological claims about the reform in an attempt to justify a program which some party cadres apparently consider non-Marxist. Moreover, these cadres may feel threatened by the regime's policy of emphasizing efficiency 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 \ad --SE-eRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 rather than party loyalty. The front organization and the trade union federation have undertaken a campaign to win popular support and to ensure compliance with the reform by local eco- nomic functionaries. In addition, Yugoslav courts have begun handing out jail sentences in cases involving economic malfea- sance by executives. In order to reflect more accurately the extent to which the Yugoslav system has been decentralized and "democratized"-- i. e.�, more persons involved in the processes of administra= tion�a new constitution is being written which will institution- alize current practices. Avowedly, it will also broaden civil rights and, perhaps, attempt to provide a mechanism which would ease the transfer of power after Tito's death. Djilas was released after serving only four years of his ten-year jail sentence for "hostile propaganda"; he is not be- ing subjected to normal parole restrictions, Djilas hopes to publish in Yugoslavia some of the five books he wrote while in prison and expects to resume a significant role in Yugoslav politics, although the latter seems unlikely during Tito's life- time. Similarly, Belgrade has moved since the death of Cardinal Stepinac in February 1960 to improve its relations with the Catholic Church; a working relationship has already been reached with the Moslem and Orthodox Church communities. Although progress has been made, a disagreement over ap- pointment of an apostolic delegate, who the regime insists ugoslav citizen, has not been resolved. SECRET 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 SECRET Pressure in Austria 'or ttecograzIng communist China tfn its session with the foreign minister, the delegation from the League of Austrian Industrialists argued that Austria should recognize Communist China before the US did, in order to avoid giving the impression that Austria was an American satellite. Kreisky, one of the prominent Socialist members of the coalition cabinet, replied that he could not move alone in the matter because his political enemies, particularly in the coalition People's party, were jealous of his growing prestige and would label him a Communist. He said that the Socialist party in general favors recognition because of its interest in developing the country's nationalized industries. Kreisky also told the delegates that in 1958 he had changed Austria's position in the UN from one of supporting the moratorium on Chinese UN representation to one of abstention on the issue, and that Austria's future attitude would depend on circumstances in the next General Assembly; ffn the first ten months of 1960 Austrian imports from Com- munist China were worth $5,200,000, practically double what they were for the same period in 1959. Exports, however, re- mained at about the same level, around $11,000,000 in each period. Austrian businessmen have frequently complained that lack of political ties is hurting Austria's export trade. Austria's trade with Communist China makes up about 13 percent of its total trade with the bloc. Austria has no diplomatic, consular, or commercial representation in either Nationalist or Commu- nist China. A trade commissioner resident in Hong Kong handles Austria's trade matters in the areg eisky, in telling US Ambassador Matthews about his discussions with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki during his visit to Vienna from 8 to 11 March, implied that establishing Austrian diplomatic relations with Communist China was main- ly a matter of time. Kreisky said he had turned down Rapacki's offer of mediation because of the domestic political situation, adding that the USSR had made a similar offer but that he pre- fers the mediation of a neutral like Switzerland which already has an embassy in Peipinli SECRET 19 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 044idCONFIDENTIAL 114.0f THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001987 "/'-/ rzz