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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 21, 1961
PDF icon CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15815565].pdf639.33 KB
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11.0O2001989 C w 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 21 April 1961 CENTRAL YT ELLIGENCE BULLETIN _TevSECRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 �Tel;R�b'bb�Kb-1� �4we -TO-11.-SEeRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 �000SECRETNief 71 21 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 2. Cuba. (Page it) 3. USSR: Izvestia article comments on President Kennedy - Adenauenmunique. (Page i) 4. Communist China: Final negotiations under way to pur- chase 6,000,000 tons of Canadian wheat over next three years. (Page itt) 5. Communist China: Peiping asks Moscow to post one fuel shipments scheduled for May and June. (Page iv) Kenya: Deadlock over forming new� government appar- ently broken. (Page iv) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 989 dos . .1 . Lt.-. NAM.THA � a tylluong Sai 1 Nam Bac - .. 1 Sam Neua . L.UANG PRA A.NG , '-.. ��,..? S'AM NEUA Luang Prabang ;.�����,-.;--7 XIENG SAYABOURY r--- . KHOUANG N. ",__1 souiPiaine des ___��.,._9,,, ''' '-'?..Jarres Ban .411ou Khoun '''',, . ' I . .... ...) Xieng Khogang,:: Muong Kawc...�.... va-1 Pha k , . Ban To Viang ! � )1Frilk yo,Tho Thorn AND NORTHERN LAOS imp GOVERNMENT Forces in 410 KONG LE - PATHET LAO I Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ----ROAD ---TRAIL P ' ROUTE NUMBER ElnAlq 21 Apr 61 50 .1001 STATUTE MILES Korn Keut "1\8)411; Lak S KHAMMAUANE Nhommarat � Thakhek Mahaxay So xa ri na k het CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 SECRET 'NM; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 21 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF 4CA, ----------- Laos: Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong and QuiniTholsena, a minister of the Xieng Khouang "govern- ment," arrived in Moscow on 20 April presumably to consult with Souvanna Phouma as well as the Soviet leaders.an his 1 interview with the British ambassador on 19 April, Grornyko reiterated the Soviet Union's position that only the contending factions in Laos could actually arrange a cease-fire. Although he emphasized that the ICC should immediately proceed to Laos to verify the cease-fire and even urged that this should be done prior to a conference, Gromyko made this move con- ditional on an agreement between the Laotians themselves re- garding a cease-firf3 Government forces in the Thakhek area are moving cross- country south of Route 12 in an effort to recapture Mahax Contact with the enemy apparently has not yet been madg (Backup, Page 1) (Map) A II Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 % Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 kis --SEC-RE-T uld Cuba: The communique read in Fidel Castro's name on the Cu�FiR radio early on 20 April acclaimed the victory "in less than 72 hours" over the "mercenary army" in southern � Las Villas Province. Future Cuban statements are likely to expand on the theme that this victory was a significant de- feat for "US imperialism." Meanwhile, strong repressive , 6 measures continue against those Cubans unsympathetic to Castro, and several "traitors," including Castro's former Minister of Agriculture Humberto Son i Mann, were executed on 20 April. On 19 April the G-2 unit in Matanzas urged Havana that "we must agitate the masses. . . to go in the streets" and demand the firing squad for "traitors." Che Guevara had accidentally wounded himself and was in grave condition. There is no information to corroborate this. Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Communists are planning demonstrations on 21 April against President Ydigoras for his alleged assistance to the anti-Castro "mercenaries." the demonstrations are to pave the way for a coup that would be "a lesson to the United States to leave Castro alone in the future." Ydigoras, though at present in a relatively strong po- sition, does face opposition from diverse political elements and some dissidence in the armed forces. 21 Apr. 61 DAILY BRIEF e/ Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 71 NS: *USSR-Germany: In response to the communique issued by the President and Chancellor Adenauer, Moscow published on 20 April an authoritative "Observer" article in Izvestia which stresses the urgency of a German peace settlement and a "spe- cial definition" of Berlin's status. The article makes no pro- posals for new negotiations, contains no hints of immediate unilateral Soviet action, and is probably intended to take advan- tage of current tensions over Laos and Cuba to issue a pointed reminder to the West that the USSR still considers Berlin and Germany to be priority issues. Izvestia warns against "fur- ther stalling" on these issues and declares that the USSR "can- notwait any longer, since all deadlines have passed." No new time limit for a settlement is mentioned, however. The article also repeats the line of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn of mid= February and urges Bonn to take the initiative in order "to have Its weighty say" on a peace treaty. The standard warning that the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty unless one is con- cluded with both Germanies is also r7eated. Communist China: Kommunist China is expected to con- clude shortly a purchase agreement for some 6,000,000 tons of Canadian wheat to be delivered over a three-year period, appar- ently beginning in June. While final negotiations are still under way in Peiping, as currently envisaged the agreement would al- low the Chinese to pay 25 percent down with the remaining 75 percent to be paid within six months after each shipment. Ac- cording to the Canadian trade commissioner in Hong Kong, the Chinese at first tried to drive a hard bargain but have now "baldly stated" their need for grain. China already has purchased about 3,000,000 tons of grain from nonbloc sources for 1961 delivery, and another large-scale transaction is pending with Australia-- perhaps also on credit. The credit terms--unprecedented in Chinese trade with the West--will help ease the impact on Pei- ping's balance of payments, but not sufficiently to prevent cut= backs in industrial imports:1 et) 21 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iii -SECRET-- 67 p Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Communist China - USSR: Communist China has asked the TISS13. to "discontinue the shinment in May and June" of ie fuel, "limited capacity" as the reason for this nostnonement of de- liveries. Moscow answered it was not possible to stop the May shipment of 40,000 tons but that no shipments would be made in June. The present rate of Soviet petroleum deliveries--an all-time high of 416,000 tons was scheduled for April--has presumably overtaxed Chi- nese storaee facilities and possibly also transport capabilities. Kenya: /The political deadlock in Kenya appears to have been broken by the Kenya African Democratic Union's (KADU) decision to participate in the formation of a government--the first under a new constitution providing for an African major- ity in parliament. KADU, the smaller of the two African par- ties, probably can count on support from European and Asian parliamentary members. However, unless it is also able to attract significant support from the Kenya African National Union (KANU)--which contains the country's most prominent African leaders--the new government probably will be short-. lived. KADU's decision to form a government was made only after the British governor agreed to make preliminary arrange- ments for the release from detention of Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta--probably before the end of this year--and indicated gness to consider other point!) (Backup, Page 3) 21 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 SECRET Situation in Laos Thailand is increasing its alert status in the border area adjacent to Thakhek. nhe Laotian Government, meanwhile, has prepared a contingency request to Thailand to permit the evacuation of administrative services of Kharnmouane Prov- ince to Thai territoril On 18 April, General Phoumi ordered martial law in Thakh'e-k and the evacuation of the civilian popu- lation to Savannakhet. Phoumi also has the cabinet's authority to appeal for SEATO intervention at any time, but on 19 April he repeated his promise to Ambassador Brown to consult with him prior to taking such a step. knemy forces south of Luang Prabang on Route 13 appear to be building up for an attack against opposing government troops Meanwhile, north of the royal capital more Pathet Lao forces are reported to have arrived just north of the Muong Sal post. Little change has been reported from the other fron3 [Colonel Vane Pao. leader of the government's Meo guer- rilla forces, the Meo peo- ple would suffer badly if a political settlement in Laos gave the Pathet Lao control over Meo-populated areas. He cited atrocities already committed by the Pathet Lao against Meos in areas where guerrilla units have been activej: approximately 100,000Meos reside in Laos. Most of them are in Xieng Khouang and Luang Prabang provinces; the rest are scattered throughout northern Laos The UK plans to issue a public announcement on the precise accepted Soviet terms for reaching a cease-fire in Laos in the hopes of providing a rationale for refusing to attend the confer- ence if the cease-fire does not appear to be effective. The So- viet Union, however, probably feels that if the Pathet Lao -Kong Le forces do not sharply increase their military operations in Laos, the Western governments will participate in an interna- tional conference in Geneva even if there has been no formal) -SEER-E-T 21 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 SECRET agreement to a cease-fir_e3 Moscow propaganda has already attacked the decision to attach US military advisers to Phou- mi's forces as a "provocative demonstration" designed to frustrate efforts to reach a settlement in Laos. Moscow radio has contrasted the US action with Britain's desire to reach "an early termination of hostilities in Laos." In an effort to blame the West for any protracted delay in achieving a meaningful cease-fire in Laos, Moscow said that the US apparently in- tends to postpone indefinitely the cessation of hostilities in Laos. Hanoi on 20 April denounced the US decision to set up a military advisory mission in Laos as an "aggressive and war- provoking scheme" designed to "broaden" the fighting. With- out specifying the action it might take, Hanoi declared that the US would be held "fully responsible for all consequences of its nolicv of military intervention" in Laos. Soviet airlift activity into Laos continues undiminished. The three Soviet IL-14s which arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR on 14 April are now flying airlift missions into Laos. Three other IL-14s were scheduled to leave Hanoi for Peiping. SECRET 21 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 -CONFIDENTIAL� Kenya Lin the constitution of early 1960, British officials and Kenya nationalist leaders agreed that Africans would be given strong minority representation on the executive coun= cil in addition to a majority in the local parliament. The new system, which provided for 53 popularly elected members and 12 indirectly elected "national members;' was put into effect following colony-wide elections last February. Of the 37 African seats in the 65-member parliament, KANU con- trols 20 seats and the smaller KADU 15; two seats are held by independents. The remaining 28 seats were allotted to the minority European, Asian, and Arab communities.] talle constitutional arrangements in effect clearly indi- cated the early African domination of Kenya and the ending of white settler control over the colony's political life. The �European community of some 66,000, in which a small group of large landholders has wielded influence disproportionate to their numbers, has for the most part reluctantly accepted the concept of ultimate African control. The Asian community of some 170,000�composed largely of commercial and small business entrepreneurs--is no longer a significant political force. The 37,000 Arab minority is conservative and will sup- port efforts to form a representative government.3 ale leaders of ICANU, president James Gichuru, general secretary Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and Julius Kiano, are the most influential African nationalists in Kenya, and any government formed without their support would probably be short-lived. Ronald Ngala, the president of KADU, comes from the politically insignificant coastal area and has no important tribal backing. Most other KADU members represent minor tribes, and if in new elections constituencies were drawn strictly � according to population, many KADU representatives would have little chance of being electely Er-he release of Kenyatta and his early return to Kenya pol- itics even in an advisory capacity would be of great significance to the nationalist movement. The Kikuyu tribe, the largest and/ CONFieeffritt 21 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN � Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 -eetettermAr most aggressive in Kenya, has in Kenyatta the country's best known nationalist. Under his influence tribal politicians might be stimulated to oust the present non-Kikuyu nationalist lead- ership. Although moderate nationalist leaders, recognizing Kenyatta's hold on the Africans, profess to follow his leader- ship, they undoubtedly hope to limit his participation in pol= itics to some lesser role such as the titular head of govern- ment-) CONFIDENTIAL 21 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 'Nue THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investrgation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001989 A rt ///k i