CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/04/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001989
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: April 21, 1961

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C w 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
21 April 1961
CENTRAL
YT ELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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21 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. Cuba. (Page it)
3. USSR: Izvestia article comments on President Kennedy -
Adenauenmunique. (Page i)
4. Communist China: Final negotiations under way to pur-
chase 6,000,000 tons of Canadian wheat over next three
years. (Page itt)
5. Communist China: Peiping asks Moscow to post one
fuel shipments scheduled for May and June.
(Page iv)
Kenya: Deadlock over forming new� government appar-
ently broken. (Page iv)
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21 Apr 61
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
4CA, -----------
Laos: Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong and
QuiniTholsena, a minister of the Xieng Khouang "govern-
ment," arrived in Moscow on 20 April presumably to consult
with Souvanna Phouma as well as the Soviet leaders.an his 1
interview with the British ambassador on 19 April, Grornyko
reiterated the Soviet Union's position that only the contending
factions in Laos could actually arrange a cease-fire. Although
he emphasized that the ICC should immediately proceed to
Laos to verify the cease-fire and even urged that this should
be done prior to a conference, Gromyko made this move con-
ditional on an agreement between the Laotians themselves re-
garding a cease-firf3
Government forces in the Thakhek area are moving cross-
country south of Route 12 in an effort to recapture Mahax
Contact with the enemy apparently has not yet been madg
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Cuba: The communique read in Fidel Castro's name on
the Cu�FiR radio early on 20 April acclaimed the victory "in
less than 72 hours" over the "mercenary army" in southern
� Las Villas Province. Future Cuban statements are likely to
expand on the theme that this victory was a significant de-
feat for "US imperialism." Meanwhile, strong repressive , 6
measures continue against those Cubans unsympathetic to
Castro, and several "traitors," including Castro's former
Minister of Agriculture Humberto Son i Mann, were executed
on 20 April. On 19 April the G-2 unit in Matanzas urged
Havana that "we must agitate the masses. . . to go in the
streets" and demand the firing squad for "traitors."
Che Guevara had accidentally wounded himself and was in
grave condition. There is no information to corroborate this.
Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Communists are
planning demonstrations on 21
April against President Ydigoras for his alleged assistance to
the anti-Castro "mercenaries."
the demonstrations are to pave the way for a coup that would
be "a lesson to the United States to leave Castro alone in the
future." Ydigoras, though at present in a relatively strong po-
sition, does face opposition from diverse political elements
and some dissidence in the armed forces.
21 Apr. 61
DAILY BRIEF
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NS:
*USSR-Germany: In response to the communique issued by
the President and Chancellor Adenauer, Moscow published on
20 April an authoritative "Observer" article in Izvestia which
stresses the urgency of a German peace settlement and a "spe-
cial definition" of Berlin's status. The article makes no pro-
posals for new negotiations, contains no hints of immediate
unilateral Soviet action, and is probably intended to take advan-
tage of current tensions over Laos and Cuba to issue a pointed
reminder to the West that the USSR still considers Berlin and
Germany to be priority issues. Izvestia warns against "fur-
ther stalling" on these issues and declares that the USSR "can-
notwait any longer, since all deadlines have passed." No new
time limit for a settlement is mentioned, however. The article
also repeats the line of the Soviet memorandum to Bonn of mid=
February and urges Bonn to take the initiative in order "to have
Its weighty say" on a peace treaty. The standard warning that
the USSR will sign a separate peace treaty unless one is con-
cluded with both Germanies is also r7eated.
Communist China: Kommunist China is expected to con-
clude shortly a purchase agreement for some 6,000,000 tons of
Canadian wheat to be delivered over a three-year period, appar-
ently beginning in June. While final negotiations are still under
way in Peiping, as currently envisaged the agreement would al-
low the Chinese to pay 25 percent down with the remaining 75
percent to be paid within six months after each shipment. Ac-
cording to the Canadian trade commissioner in Hong Kong, the
Chinese at first tried to drive a hard bargain but have now "baldly
stated" their need for grain. China already has purchased about
3,000,000 tons of grain from nonbloc sources for 1961 delivery,
and another large-scale transaction is pending with Australia--
perhaps also on credit. The credit terms--unprecedented in
Chinese trade with the West--will help ease the impact on Pei-
ping's balance of payments, but not sufficiently to prevent cut=
backs in industrial imports:1
et)
21 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Communist China - USSR: Communist China has asked
the TISS13. to "discontinue the shinment in May and June" of ie
fuel,
"limited capacity" as the reason for this nostnonement of de-
liveries. Moscow answered
it was not possible to stop the May shipment of 40,000 tons
but that no shipments would be made in June. The present rate
of Soviet petroleum deliveries--an all-time high of 416,000
tons was scheduled for April--has presumably overtaxed Chi-
nese storaee facilities and possibly also transport capabilities.
Kenya: /The political deadlock in Kenya appears to have
been broken by the Kenya African Democratic Union's (KADU)
decision to participate in the formation of a government--the
first under a new constitution providing for an African major-
ity in parliament. KADU, the smaller of the two African par-
ties, probably can count on support from European and Asian
parliamentary members. However, unless it is also able to
attract significant support from the Kenya African National
Union (KANU)--which contains the country's most prominent
African leaders--the new government probably will be short-.
lived. KADU's decision to form a government was made only
after the British governor agreed to make preliminary arrange-
ments for the release from detention of Mau Mau leader Jomo
Kenyatta--probably before the end of this year--and indicated
gness to consider other point!)
(Backup, Page 3)
21 Apr 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Situation in Laos
Thailand is increasing its alert status in the border area
adjacent to Thakhek. nhe Laotian Government, meanwhile,
has prepared a contingency request to Thailand to permit the
evacuation of administrative services of Kharnmouane Prov-
ince to Thai territoril On 18 April, General Phoumi ordered
martial law in Thakh'e-k and the evacuation of the civilian popu-
lation to Savannakhet. Phoumi also has the cabinet's authority
to appeal for SEATO intervention at any time, but on 19 April
he repeated his promise to Ambassador Brown to consult with
him prior to taking such a step.
knemy forces south of Luang Prabang on Route 13 appear
to be building up for an attack against opposing government
troops
Meanwhile, north of the royal capital more
Pathet Lao forces are reported to have arrived just north of
the Muong Sal post. Little change has been reported from the
other fron3
[Colonel Vane Pao. leader of the government's Meo guer-
rilla forces, the Meo peo-
ple would suffer badly if a political settlement in Laos gave
the Pathet Lao control over Meo-populated areas. He cited
atrocities already committed by the Pathet Lao against Meos
in areas where guerrilla units have been activej:
approximately 100,000Meos reside in Laos. Most of them
are in Xieng Khouang and Luang Prabang provinces; the rest
are scattered throughout northern Laos
The UK plans to issue a public announcement on the precise
accepted Soviet terms for reaching a cease-fire in Laos in the
hopes of providing a rationale for refusing to attend the confer-
ence if the cease-fire does not appear to be effective. The So-
viet Union, however, probably feels that if the Pathet Lao -Kong
Le forces do not sharply increase their military operations in
Laos, the Western governments will participate in an interna-
tional conference in Geneva even if there has been no formal)
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agreement to a cease-fir_e3 Moscow propaganda has already
attacked the decision to attach US military advisers to Phou-
mi's forces as a "provocative demonstration" designed to
frustrate efforts to reach a settlement in Laos. Moscow radio
has contrasted the US action with Britain's desire to reach "an
early termination of hostilities in Laos." In an effort to blame
the West for any protracted delay in achieving a meaningful
cease-fire in Laos, Moscow said that the US apparently in-
tends to postpone indefinitely the cessation of hostilities in
Laos.
Hanoi on 20 April denounced the US decision to set up a
military advisory mission in Laos as an "aggressive and war-
provoking scheme" designed to "broaden" the fighting. With-
out specifying the action it might take, Hanoi declared that the
US would be held "fully responsible for all consequences of its
nolicv of military intervention" in Laos.
Soviet airlift activity into Laos continues undiminished.
The three Soviet IL-14s which arrived in North Vietnam from
the USSR on 14 April are now flying airlift missions into Laos.
Three other IL-14s were scheduled to leave Hanoi for Peiping.
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-CONFIDENTIAL�
Kenya
Lin the constitution of early 1960, British officials and
Kenya nationalist leaders agreed that Africans would be
given strong minority representation on the executive coun=
cil in addition to a majority in the local parliament. The new
system, which provided for 53 popularly elected members
and 12 indirectly elected "national members;' was put into
effect following colony-wide elections last February. Of the
37 African seats in the 65-member parliament, KANU con-
trols 20 seats and the smaller KADU 15; two seats are held
by independents. The remaining 28 seats were allotted to
the minority European, Asian, and Arab communities.]
talle constitutional arrangements in effect clearly indi-
cated the early African domination of Kenya and the ending
of white settler control over the colony's political life. The
�European community of some 66,000, in which a small group
of large landholders has wielded influence disproportionate
to their numbers, has for the most part reluctantly accepted
the concept of ultimate African control. The Asian community
of some 170,000�composed largely of commercial and small
business entrepreneurs--is no longer a significant political
force. The 37,000 Arab minority is conservative and will sup-
port efforts to form a representative government.3
ale leaders of ICANU, president James Gichuru, general
secretary Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and Julius Kiano, are
the most influential African nationalists in Kenya, and any
government formed without their support would probably be
short-lived. Ronald Ngala, the president of KADU, comes from
the politically insignificant coastal area and has no important
tribal backing. Most other KADU members represent minor
tribes, and if in new elections constituencies were drawn strictly
� according to population, many KADU representatives would have
little chance of being electely
Er-he release of Kenyatta and his early return to Kenya pol-
itics even in an advisory capacity would be of great significance
to the nationalist movement. The Kikuyu tribe, the largest and/
CONFieeffritt
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most aggressive in Kenya, has in Kenyatta the country's best
known nationalist. Under his influence tribal politicians might
be stimulated to oust the present non-Kikuyu nationalist lead-
ership. Although moderate nationalist leaders, recognizing
Kenyatta's hold on the Africans, profess to follow his leader-
ship, they undoubtedly hope to limit his participation in pol=
itics to some lesser role such as the titular head of govern-
ment-)
CONFIDENTIAL
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'Nue
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investrgation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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CONFIDENTIAL
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