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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 22, 1961
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 3.3(h)(2) I 11---4ClialrES-1� Now 3.5(c) 22 April 1961 Lopy No. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETI\ 11 -T-OP-SEC RE-T- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 *Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 -T.01:1-&EGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 las? SECRET Nip* LATE ITEM )The situation in Algeria as of 0630 EST remains unclear beyond the fact that a military revolt against De Gaulle's liberal Algerian policy was launched in Algiers last night. The Paris government admits the insurrection, but insists this morning that the "coup" is confined to the city of Algiers. The insurrec tionists, in a communique signed by four well-known French generals, claim they control all Algeria and the Sahara. How- ever, the only military units pablicly identified as supporting the revolt are the First Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment and the predominently Moslem Seventh Regiment�) The timing of this move against De Gaulle by-inilitary par sans of "French Algeria" is connected with the widespread belief that a negotiated settlement involving Algerian independence was about to be achieved. Although the rebel Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) refused to initiate public negotiations with the French government as scheduled at Evian on 7 April--because of De Gaulle's �refusal to recognize the l'AG's claim to represent all Algeria--the fact that behind-the-scenes PAG-French talks have continued has been an open secret. Moreover, De Gaulle's 11 April press conference--in which he emphasized more clearly than ever before his intention to negotiate Algerian independence-- appeared to have dispelled PAG doubts as to his intentions and it was expected that negotiations would soon be announced. The PAG has not yet commented on the situation, and will probably take a cautious at- titude until the picture becomes clearei:-) The outcome of the insurrection will depend largely on the re- actioh of the European settlers, Moslems, and other military units in Algeria, but also on the reactions in France itself. The settlers and their rightist sympathizers in France are expected to welcome the coup as a blow to the "abandonment" of Algeria by De Gaulle. The Moslem population of Algeria, which was reportedly discouraged by De Gaulle's 11 April press conference because of fear that it had reduced chances for an early end of hostilities, could react violently--with or without PAG incitement--to any indications that the ,French army intends to prolong the De Gaulle's skillful management of militailT sensibilities and his irm stand during the January 1960 insurrection in Algiers'' SECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Npoo in which some army paratroop units wavered in their loyalty, had for some time apparently discouraged active military plotting against him. The four generals heading the new in- surrection--retired Army generals Henri Zeller and Raoul Salan (a former French commander in Algeria), retired Air Force General Edmond Jouhaud� thid Air. Force General Ma,urice'Challe (who re Signed early this year from the position as NATO -commander for Central Europe)--are prominent largely because of their anti-Gaullist sentiments apd activities. They are not believed to enjoy widespread support in the armed services, although much of the French military have sympathized with their "French Algeria" views. The current insurrection appears more serious than the settlers' revolt of 1960 in that this ,time' some army units are overtly opposed to the government, and thus openly pose the problem of "unity of the army." The new French Chief of Staff of National Defense, General Jean Olie, who took office on 1 March, lacks the prestige of his predecessor, General Paul Ely, who had played a majOr role in maintaining the armed services' loyalty to De Gaulle:1 A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 � 1/4:kipproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO200194) TOP SECRET 22 April 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 2. USSR: Test vehicle, probably an ICBM, successfully launched from Tyura Tam. (Page it) 3. Angola: Economic breakdown seen if withdrawal of Europeans from rural areas continues. (Page it) 4. Congo: Tshombet control in Katanga apparently weakens. (Page ii) 5. Japan - North Korea: Japanese restrictions on trade with North Korea lifted. (Page tit) TOP SECRE7' Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 014Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001-990 Phony Saly IPHOI\IG SALY Nam Bac � j yuong Sai i ......�*" / i .\/./ Sam Neua k ( .... LUANGIPR A A N G N..(AM N E U A Luang Prabang 1 ' - ' ";',..-.,-.� X I EN G SAYABOURY 13 Paine desK H 0 U A N G N. i\AL"DnP. S�U 1 'arres- an' Ban -1.., Phou Khoun Xieng Khouan KasiI �-)Ban Pha v Mei Ban Ta Viang Tha Thorn any V4!,eng VIENTIANE Borikha4 J4Pak Sane Vieatiane Kam Keu LakSarn KHAMM UANE: 9 NORTHERN LAOS ago GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS - ROAD 0 � -TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER 50 111111 STATUTE MILES \ihommara Thakhek Mahaxay 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 '14 'STOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 22 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Laos: Souvanna Phouma claims that the start of a cease- fire iriaos-a possible reference to the beginning of negotia- tions with the Pathet Lao--will coincide with his return to Laos, presumably to Xieng Khouang, possibly on 25 or 26 April. He appears confident that the Pathet Lao will be cooperative and feels that cessation of hostilities can be arranged within a few days after an appeal by the Geneva cochairmen. @romyko, on 20 April, told British Ambassador Roberts that the USSR and UK "should aim" for issuancP of such an annpal nn 29 Anrin a representative from Phong Saly to 'partici- pate on central committee for cease-fire' aouvanna told the Canadian ambassador in Moscow that his half brother, Prince Souphannouvong, had come to Moscow at his request and that they had discussed problems connected with a cease-fire. Souvanna was optimistic over chances for putting together a coalition government before an international confer- ence on Laos is convened, and said he thought he could prevent the Pathets from using their position in the government to take over control of the country, although "time was running out for establishing a ba7is for preventing thip.'7 No bloc airlift flights into Laos have been scheduled for 22 April. However, there are indications that supplies are being airlifted to the Vinh and Dong Hoi areas of southern North Viet- nam, from where they enlild be trucked into central and southern Laos. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Pointe Noire Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kitona INDONESIA 6104201 Luanda INDIA SUDAN 200 TUNISIA NIGERIA INDONESIA 44 MC)1320 U0TU ScattereYfocces ublic of the Congo � Gemena Scattered _force 3,400 MOBUTU MOBUTU 800 ETHIOPIA 200 Ikela LEO PO LDVI LLE Leopoldv ysville GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Kasavubu-Mobutu FT Gizenga Kalorni EMI Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces - Selected road not included) Selected railroad =Selected airfield, Francqui luabourg Bakw 00 STATUTE MILES 40,0 ' GIZENGA Luputa MALAYA 470 ETHIOPIA 1,500 anleyville KIVU Bukavu ETHIOPIA 500 MALAYA 400 INDIA go lb , a le t lbertville . NIGERIA .900. NIGERIA Usumbura IRELAND . 650 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page SWEDEN 650 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 z% /;-%// ��S TOP SECRET USSR: fA test vehicle, probably an ICBM, was launched from�TFaa am at about 0226 GMT on 21 Anril (2126 EST on 20 April). Preliminary analysis indicates that the test vehicle successfully reached the usual impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula. This is the tenth test shot this year of probable ICBMs from Tyura Tam. Four of these were failures. The total of zenerallv successful test ICBM launchings to date is 34-.1 Angola: Rebels in northern Angola are able to move at will through large areas of the countryside. The Portuguese are continuing their military build-up. The American consul in Luanda believes that the government's repressive measures are driving increasing numbers of Africans into rebellion. He feels that unless terrorist activity in the area can be contained C) in the next few weeks, most of the European-operated coffee plantations will be abandoned and almost all of this year's coffee crop will be lost. Withdrawal of Europeans from rural areas could lead to an economic breakdown, which would cause in- creased unrest among Europeans as well as amon elements of the African population at present still loyal. (Backup, Page 3) Congo: President Tshombe's control of Katanga appears more precarious than at any time since the Congo's independ- ence. The American consulate in Elisabethville reports that anti-Tshombe. sentiment is rising among the local population, and that demonstrations--stemming from economic grievances as well as resentment against Tshombe's Belgian advisers� may take place at any time. Tshombe has in large measure rescinded his boycott against UN troops, but animosity between the Katanga government remains strong. (Backup, Page 4) (Map) 22 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF 0 / r%� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 %STOP SECRET & Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990. Nief Japan-Korea: Jhe Japanese Government has lifted restric-r----'1'6 g/ tions on trade with North Korea. A Japanese Foreign Ministry 4-Z4H r official told the US Embassy that Japan could not continue to be l the only free world country, other than the United States, to mafii- - tain such restrictions. North Korea has sought to have these re strictions lifted for some time, and Pyongyang's propaganda has jx, claimed that trade could be expanded considerably if Tokyo woup,4�,,,, agree to exchange�preferably on a long-term basis--certain high-priority industrial equipment for North Korean iron ore. South Korea instructed � Foreign Minister Chong, now attending the UN General Assem bly session in New York, to seek US pressure on JaparS (Backup, Page 5) 22 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Tore SECRET �si.w Situation in Laos rp_ouvanna Phouma suggests that negotiations between rep- resentatives of the opposing sides in Laos should be held at Xieng nouang, the location of his rump government Vien- tiane is unlikely to accept this site, since acceptance would probably be portrayed by Communist propaganda as surrender to the "lawful government of Laos.") Souvanna left Moscow for Peiping on 21 April and is sched- uled to arrive in Hanoi on 25 April. Presumably he will visit Xieng Khouang from there and then go to Luang Prabang for the late King's funeral, 1Ie hopes to be able to visit the US in early May before a conference on Laos is held3 The US Mission at Geneva has learned that a representa- tive of the USSR's permanent delegation there has requested reservations for a 50-man delegation to participate in a con- ference on Laos at the "beginning of May." The Soviet official, in response to an inquiry regarding the level of Soviet repre- sentation, replied that it would be "the same as at the disarma- ment conference." Although the Soviet Union, in its 16 April aide-memoire, said that it assumed the conference would be conducted at the foreign ministers' level, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin had indicated to the UK ambassador on 5 April that the continuous presence of foreign ministers at the confer- ence would be unnecessary. He said, however, that they should attend the opening of the conference to mark its importance. Meanwhile, a proposal by Prince Sihanouk that the confer- ence on Laos be postponed to 12 May appears to be meeting with general East-West approval. aiorth of Luang Prabang, a Pathet Lao company skirmished with government troops near Muong Sal on 20 April. According to the American army attach�who visited Muong Sai on 18 April, the local Lao army commanders appeared dispirited and were convinced that an enemy attack was imminent. There were small- scale clashes at several other points in Luane Prabang Province on 21 April, govern- ment forces on Route 13 north of the Phou Khoun road junction were under "heavy attack" earlier today. In central Lao/ 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 %me *roe aovernment forces have advanced about 18 miles east from Thakhek along Route 12 without contacting the enemy. Two Thai 105-mm. howitzer batteries have arrived in Savanna- khet, plans call for moving one battery to Thakhek and holding the other in reservq SECRET 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Sod Situation in Angola The area of the current disturbances is the source of most of the coffee crop, which accounted for more than a third of Angola's export earnings in 1960 and is the princi- pal dollar earner for Portugal. Considerable coffee is still on hand from previous crops as a result of Portugal's commitments to the International Coffee Agreement, but an American official�whose company recently shut down all its oil exploration activities in the Cabinda exclave as a re- sult of the unrest--believes the economy will run down as soon as these stocks are exhausted... The uncertainty over Angola's future is causing concern in Lisbon over the stability of the escudo. Serious economic deterioration in Angola might threaten the stability of the Salazar regime. Nationalists, most of them Communist oriented, from Portuguese territories in Asia and Africa have been meeting in Casablanca. The final resolution, adopted on 20 April, announced that an organization will be set up in Morocco to coordinate the activities of the various anti-Portuguese groups. This organization appareAtly will supersede the Conakry-based Revolutionary Front for the Independence of the Portuguese Territories (FRAIN), which recently has been weakened by factionalism and by an inability to obtain international publicity. Holden Roberto's Angola People's Union (UPA), which reportedly triggered the current outbreak, is not affiliated with the new Morocco-based organization. The movement of additional troops from Portugal to Angola is continuing, both by air and by sea. More than 12,000 troops, of whom more than 4,000 are white, are now stationed in the province. Approximately 35,000 army troops remain in metropolitan Portugal. In addition, about 8,000 troops. the bulk of them native, are stationed in Mozambique. -GONFIDENT-f-AL-- 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Now%CONFIDENTIALNar0' Tshombe's Position Deteriorating in Katanga Tshombets regime is threatened by a combination of UN hostility and fading popular support. He has rejected demands of his recalcitrant legislature that he share his executive power with a premier, but it is doubtful that he can continue his one-man rule indefinitely, aided only by Belgian advisers. Tshombes rule in northern Katanga has long been threatened by hostile Baluba tribesmen, but until recently he appeared to enjoy the support of most non-Baluba groups in the south. Lately, however, there has been an increas- ing reaction to Tshombe's extensive reliance on Belgians and his employment of South African mercenaries in the ICatangan armed forces. Popular dissatisfaction with prevailing low wage levels has stimulated resentment against the Belgians, who are felt to have monopolized highly paid positions. Tshombe's difficulties are compounded by his bad rela- tions with the UN, which recently airlifted Indian troops into Katanga, One UN official predicted on 20 April that "a show- down" between the UN and Tshombe was rapidly approaching. A Belgian adviser to the Leopoldville government has opined that Tshombd has become a liability for the Belgians and that Brussels would take a "hard line" with him. Belgians in Elisabethville reportedly are apprehensive concerning their future there in view of renewed UN efforts to secure the with- drawal of foreign advisers. -GONFIDENTIAL- 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 TOP SECRET Japan Lifts Restrictions on North Korean Trade aince 1955, Japanese trade with North Korea has been con- ducted indirectly, principally through Hong Kong. The higher transportation costs of this triangular trade have served to limit the exchange of goods, particularly of bulk cargoes, such as iron ore, coal, and minerals, which account for most of North Korea's exports. North Korean - Japanese trade totaled about $7,000,000 in 1960. okyo has now placed this trade on a direct basis and in effect has abolished the compulsory barter requirement--the exchange of goods of equal value in each transaction--and sub- stituted cash settlement. Hedging against possible US and South Korean reaction, however, Japan has required case-by- case approval for each trade contract concluded with North Korean interest& 'dile Japanese Goyernment's action probably is in response to a request by the Japan - North Korea Trade Association in Tokyo. This organization in January negotiated an agreement reportedly providing for the purchase of North Korean indus- trial raw materials valued at $14,000,000, and for the sale of Japanese products--bearings, bars� wire rope, auto- mobile and tractor tires, wheat, and light manufacturing t--amounting to $42,000,001/ Foreign Minister Chong to support his representations to US officials by arguing that the Japanese move is a violation of a 1950 UN resolUtion against aid to North Korea and that it "will impede the progress" of negotiations between Tikvo and Seoul for over-all settlement of their differences [Because of its own stake in maintaining commercial ties with Japan, the South Korean Government is continuing prep- arations_ for signing a new trade agreement with Toky_?) TOP SECRET 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 ET Lijowever, reaction in South Korea could be sufficiently severe to force the Chang 11/1yon government to abandon this course in favor of a tougher policy toward Japajg --TOP SECRET 22 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 %we CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investrgation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001990 (- 4"/ Lot' z"z ff'