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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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April 28, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 lull w 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) / 28 April 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL 111111:11L BULLETIN p II -TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 , Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 I kJ 1,..31.2.+1/4.A�Li I %.,10 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 28 April 1961 2, Congo: Hammarskjold sees Congo problem as in "most hopeful" new phase, (Page tit) 3. USSR: Cruise-type missiles tested by Soviet Navy. (Page tit) 4. Nepal: Plans of exiled leader in India to oust King Mahendra. (Five itt) 5, Brazil: Quadros wants to meet President Kennedy outside US. (Five tv) -TOP-SEekET / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992jah rfil�i NAM1THA j A(li,uong Sai SAYABOURY Muon Kasiy / � NORTHERN LAOS Forces in 411.0, KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact *4,1 KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS 41110 GOVERNMENT ROAD � �TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER an �����. � ThOlm Va ng \e/r.reng VIENTIANE IKrikhan. Pak Sane -3 Kam Keut Vientiane 50 I 11_1 STATUTE MILES 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 �Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 I is CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 28 April 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: t he Pathet Lao reportedly have rejected General PhormIrs�proposal that cease-fire negotiations begin today in Luang Prabang, and have repeated their suggestion that the -Al - talks be held in Xieng Khouang town. Vientiane subsequently issued a declaration calling for a cease-fire to become effec- ' /, ' tive at noon on the same date. In an effort at compromise, the Boun Oum government plans today to attempt an informal con- tact with the Pathet Lao in the yang Vieng area to establish the time and place for future discussions. Meanwhile, Laotian and foreign dignitaries, including Prince Sihanouk, are converging on Luang Prabang for the funeral ceremonies for the late King. Thus far, there has been no definite word as to whether Sou- vanna Phouma and Pathet Lao representatives will attenG 4ao major military developments have been reported, ure on government positions continues ' I oviet and North Vietnamese flights from Hanoi into Laos on 27 April included one LI-2 flight to Xieng Khouang and three LI-2 flights to Phong Saly. Air operations scheduled for 28 April include the flight of five Soviet IL -14s from Hanoi to Xien Khouang and return. (Backup, Page 1) (map) The Watch Committee in a special meeting on 27 April ex- amined the status of bloc military forces in relation to a possible overt bloc military intervention in Laos, and issued the following statemeng rWe have re-examined the military situation in Laos, North Vietnam, and Communist China in relation to the recent Commu- nist military operations in Laos and see no development which would suggest any direct intervention by outside Communist forces at this time. We have examined the move between 18 and 22 April of 20 probable IL-28s from North to South China, and while this would place them in a better position for operations in Laos, Nyg TOP SECRET - Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 &el that these aircraft would have to deploy further to be ef- fective in any Laotian operation. We also feel that had the move been intended for operations in Laos, the deployment would have been made more direct and to air bases more suitable for strikes against Laos or naval forces. No other military movements related to Laos by either Communist ground or naval forces outside of Laos have been discerned. It is to be noted, however, that Communist forces have a capability of intervention with little or no warning.) 28 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF ii T-OP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992.06 -F1114 Pointe Noire Banana CONS() Brazzaville Matadi Kitona INDONESIA Luanda LIBERIA INDIA TUNISIA NIGERIA INDONESIA MOBUTU 7 200 Scattered Forces LEOPOLDVILLE Leopoldvi ysville blic of he Congo � Gemena Scattered force moItuTu isa Aketi mba EQUATEUR Coquilhatville � Boende GIZENGA * 7,000 ETHIOPIA 200 Ikela � Francqui .14\ GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: 1:3 Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces �Selected road not included) Selected railroad �1� Selected airfield luabourg Bakw a 0 STATUTE MILES , , 400 Luputa MALAYA 470 LIBERIA 230 ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA MALAYA 300 Bukavu Kongolo Kabalo Albertville NIGE RIA SManono ATANGi A I SHOMBE 7,000 NIGERIA 500 Usunibura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 laird -uuri LA-4 vt, 1 Ii � Congo: aecretary General Hammarskjold, noting signs of improved relations between the UN and the Kasavubu gov- ernment, has characterized the Congo problem as in a "most hopeful" new phase. Commenting on the political difficulties besetting President Tshombe, Hammarskjold observed that the UN's task would be "keeping Kasavubu close and Tshombe low:' He indicated that while Dayal would have to return to the Congo, he might shortly be removed by substituting a five-man com- mission for the post of senior UN representativs7 The circumstances surrounding Tshombe's detention at Coquilhatville continue obscure, with spokesmen for the Leo- poldville government denying that he is under arrest. Reports that Interior Minister Munongo has seized power in Katanga are unconfirmed. (Backup, Page 4) (Map) I USSR: The Soviet Navy has conducted tests of cruise-type missiles in an area off the coast of the Southern Maritime Dis- trict in the northern Sea of� Japan since early January0 nine missiles have been launched since 2 January. Two of these were failures; the other seven traveled a distance of about 225 n.m. at speeds be- tween 700-750 knots and at altitudes between 1,000-3,300 feet. a new submarine of undetermined class--pendant 608--launched the first of the missiles in this series on 2 January 1961. Two missiles were launched apparently simultaneously on both 16 and 26 April, and an additional four missiles--two of which aborted--were launched within eight minutes on 16 ApriL Although submarine 608 was in the launch area on both days, conclusive identification of the ship or ships launchingihese eight missiles has not been made Nepal: LEollowing recent conversations in New Delhi with Nehru and Defense Minister Menon, Nepali Congress party re Ok sistance leader Subarna Shumshere 28 Apr 61 :A\ DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET iii ����, Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 rbplans an "all-out" effort against King Mahendra in mid-June. uia arna, who has been in Indii since the King's takeover in Katmandu in December, recognizes that his plans are depend- ent on the success of his efforts during the coming month to ob- tain arms and additional financing. Nehru, who has been dis- turbed by the King's autocratic actions, reportedly again assured Subarna of his "sympathy," but the degree of sunnort which New Delhi will give Subarna is at present unclearj (Backup, Page 5) Brazil: resident Quadros is apparently seeking a meet- ing with President Kennedy outside the United States. At his meeting with President Frondizi on 21-22 April it was suggested that the approaching conference of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, which is to discuss the Alliance for Progress, be held in Uruguay and that President Kennedy be invited to at- tend. Brazilian Foreign Minister Arinos indicated to Ambassa- dor Cabot on 26 April that a meeting between the US and Brazil- ian Presidents migeht nrnvp hpinfni nn t e Cuban question (Backup, Page SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES (Available during the preceding week) Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles, U. S. I. B. NIE 11-5-61. 25 April 1961. Soviet Short-Term Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany. U. S. I. B. NIE 11-7-61. 25 April 1961. Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium. U. S. I. B. NIE 11-9-61. 25 April 1961. 28 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Noppo Situation in Laos North of Phou Khoun junction, on Route 13, enemy ar- tillery and mortar fire continues to harass government troops occupying blocking positions on the southern approach to Luang Prabang. However, ground reconnaissance revealed the ar- rival in this area by 26 April of a 20-truck enemy convoy, and the local government commander is expecting an imminent at- tack. probably _ the same convoy of 20 vehicles--including two-and-one-half-ton trucks and armored cars--heading west along Route 7 from the Plaine des Jarresn Below yang Vieng, shelling of the govern- ment battalion just north of the Nam Lik continues, and there are some indications that the enemy will attempt a flanking movement) il�iorth of Luang Prabang, the former garrison force at Muong Sal is withdrawing southwest from that post without apparent enemy pursuit. However, the enemy force, estimated at three battalions with artillery and mortar support, is considered capa- ble of advancing virtually unopposed toward Luang Prabang at any time of its choosing. MAAG personnel evacuated from Muong Sai report that the accuracy and timing of the enemy artillery, mortars, and heavy weapons during the attack indicated that highly trained troops were involved. In the Pak Sane area, the ene h s undert en small-scale probing attacks on Borikhanej receipt of re- quested supplies dropped from nine Soviet aircraft on 25 April. The items received included rice, flour, canned goods, cloth, medicine, radio batteries, and nearly a thousand each of com- bat uniforms, shorts, and pairs of boots. Although requests for weapons and ammunition had been included such items were not mentioned as received. information needed to prepare plans for negotiations lists the areas held by Vientiane and Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces, re- spectively, in the provinces of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 �SEeREF- Nam Tha, and Sayaboury. Positions listed as occupied by Vien- tiane forces were as follows: Luang Prabang Province--Luang Prabang and Muong Sai (since captured); Nam Tha Province-- four small towns; Sayaboury Province--four small towns. All remaining areas, including all of Phong Saly Province, were 1 imed to be controlled by anti-Vientiane forces. viet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin on 25 April indi- cated the USSR's displeasure with the UK's announcement fol- lowing the joint cease-fire appeal that it would not attend the conference without prior verification of an effective cease-fire. Pushkin's remarks apparently were designed to lay the ground- work for placing the blame on the West for any postponement or collapse of the Geneva conference scheduled to begin on 12 May. The Soviet official reiterated Moscow's position that only the Laotians themselves could work out cease-fire arrangements and that this was not the responsibility of either the UK or the Soviet Union] Communist propaganda is already seeking to place on the US and Vientiane the onus for any failure to reach a truce in Laos. Hanoi on 27 April quoted a Pathet Lao radio charge that the Phoumi Boun Oum forces have "launched new attacks" and that the Vientiane government does not really want a cease-fire. Hanoi also quoted Khamsouk Keola, acting premier of the Xieng Khouang "government," as warning that in the face of defeat the "US and its followers" have called for negotiations to gain time to "consolidate their forces and launch a new attack." Enlarging on the Peiping government's statement of 26 April, a People's Daily editorial commented on the "aspects" involved � in "bringing TEOut" a cease-fire. The Chinese called for a "check" on assistance to Phoumi, the withdrawal by the US and its allies of all military personnel and equipment in Laos, and the expul- sion of the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. Insisting that a cease- fire can "only" be achieved through negotiation between the "par- ties concerned," the Chinese indicated that the prospects for a cease-fire would depend on the attitude of the Vientiane author- ities. Although Chinese Communists did not label these "aspects" as explicit conditions for a cease-fire, they clearly regard them SECRET 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 --SEeRET as legitimate points for consideration in cease-fire negotiations. They afford the Communists excellent gambits for delaying an effective truce while the military situation continues to develop In their favor. Representatives of India, Canada, and Poland delegated to serve on the reconvened International Control Commission for Laos began assembling in New Delhi for their first formal meet- ing on 28 April. During preliminary exchanges on 27 April, dif- ferences apparently arose immediately over the same issues which hamstrung the commission prior to its adjournment in July 1958. Free movement of truce inspectors within rebel- held territory continues to be a key question, with. the Cana- dian and Polish representatives taking strongly opposing posi- tions based on their past experience in ICC negotiations. New Delhi has reappointed Samarendranath Sen, former ICC repre- sentative in Laos and currently high commissioner in Australia, as Indian member. While Sen is reputed to be an intelligent and capable official, he is inclined to be rigid and legalistic in adhering to the official Indian Government line; in his role as chairman of the commission, often playing a mediatory role, Sen probably will tend to equate the positions of the two sides in the Laotian conflict supported by the bloc and by the Wr7 rPsnPetivPhr and tn avoid taking sharn issn with either. --SESRET-- 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 A 1.1 11.1 rev Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 The pituation in the Congo rijammarskjold's characterization of the Congo as in a "most hopeful" phase stems in part from his satisfaction at the return of the UN to Matadi and at Tshombea's failing polit- ical fortunes. Hammarskjold expressed the belief that Kasa- vubu's ascendancy over Tshombe will improve prospects for agreement between Leopoldville and Stanleyville, adding that he had received confirmation of the existence of a military agreement between the Mobutu and Gizenga. force_!i Lliammarskjold's expressed optimism may be in part in- tended to prepare the way for a retreat on Dayal. When the intention to remove Dayal is communicated to Kasavubu, this should diminish the danger of demonstrations when Dayal re- turns to the Congo. It is not certain, however, whether Dayal's return to the Congo will be under sufficiently harmonious con- ditions to permit Hammars4731d to remove him without seeming to bow to Congolese pressure. � The director of the Katanga Information Service has urged Hammarskjold to use his good offices to secure Tshombe''s re- lease from detention in Coquilliatville. He also asked the United States to make representations to Hammarskjold, urging that Tshombe's immediate release was required to prevent a coup in Katanga by "more intractable elements." --SECRET 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 *re' Nepali Congress Exiles Planfiing Stepped-up tampaign Against King riollowing Nehru's initial public criticism of the King's actions in December, he appeared willing to adopt a wait-and- see attitude, maintaining normal relations with the King while affording the exiles a haven in India. Nehru has maintained contacts with the exiles via his own Intelligence Bureau and through leaders of the Indian Praja Socialist party, who are old Nehru colleagues and historically close to the Nepali Congress party leadership 2ehru's recent meetings with Subarna suggest that he may be moving toward more direct support of the Nepali Congress party. One report indicates that at their meeting early in April, Nehru interposed no obstacles to Subarnes plans to promote non-violent agitation from India. suggests Nehru did not express disapproval ot resort to violence as well. In addition, Krishna Menon gave no indication he would keep arna from importing arms, although Menon refused any direct assistance. Subarna, who has long financed the Nepali Congress party, has been in touch with Socialist leaders abroad, and has already reportedly arranged an arms purchase from representatives of the Israeli Mapai party) There is little doubt that at� this time only active Indian support would ensure the success of a Nepali Congress party effort to return to power. Unless there is a threat of a Communist takeover, however, New Delhi is unlikely to intervene directly as it did in 1950 when the Nepali Congress party overthrew the Rana oligarchy. The Indian leaders are more likely to encourage the exiles covertly while hoping that time, combined with Nepali Congress party agitation, will so erode the King's position that the need for active Indian intervention will be obviate �SEeRET-- 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Brazilian President Pursues Noncommittal Foreign Policy Quadros has previously indicated that he believes a mod- erate loosening of Brazil's traditionally close ties with the United States would help him increase his own and his coun- try's international power position. auadros is apparently pursuing this objective in expressing interest in meeting Pres- ident Kennedy but unwillingness to visit the United State_ED. Eesident Frondizi says he told Quadros during their meeting on 21-22 April that the Brazilian President could not continue his unpredictable foreign policy declarations without consulting friends. He said he told Quadros that such actions might win him some domestic political support for one or two years but would alienate the friends who had the resources to help him rebuild Brazil's economy. Quadros finally agreed, according to Frondizi. The joint communiqu�ffirmed their joint stand in "repelling the direct or indirect interference of extra-continental factors" in the western hemispherS Brazilian observers, including those who are close to Quadros' advisers, describe the joint declaration as strongly pro-Western and say that it reflects primarily the views of Frondizi, particularly on the Cuban question. In an apparent effort to maintain an equivocal position on Cuba, Quadros issued well-publicized instructions to the Brazilian UN dele- gation to vote for a pro-Castro Mexican resolution on the landings in Cuba and for a Brazilian addition calling for an investigation of their character and origin. Uruguayan President Haedo has endorsed the Brazilian- Argentine suggestion for the meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and has expressed the hope that it can be postponed from its tentatively suggested June or July scheduling to coincide with the Uruguayan national holi- day in August. The Brazilian Embassy in Washington reported on 24 April that it had the impression that President Kennedy would like to attend the meeting personally but that he is "in favor of holding it in Rio de Janeiro." -TOP-SE CR E T 28 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 NW, THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2001992 AP411916Faijaiii2��1 zozziwzrzzzzzzzw