CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02001994
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 1, 1961

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3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
1 May 1961
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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1 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo. (Page it)
3. Communist China: Health conditions reported deteri-
orating because of malnutrition. (Page W
4, Japan: Ikeda government criticized for rising consumer
prices and deficit in trade accounts. (Page tt)
5. Singapore: Prestige of ruling People's Action party dam-
aged by defeat in by-election. (Page tti)
6. Somali Republic: UAR to furnish jet pilot training and or-
anize commando= type unit in Somali Army.
(Page tit)
7. USSR: Soviet "good-will mission," reportedly headed by
Kosygin, to tour Latin America. (Page t)
8. Britain - West Indies: Constitutional talks opening in
Trinidad on 2 May; independence likely in 1962. (Page tv)
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4011 1011 SE G1E1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
k
*Laos: Souvanna Phouma announced yesterday that his rep-
resentatives would be prepared to begin cease-fire talks "as from"' �
1 May" at Namone village, inside Pathet Lao -held territory sevenee'�_
miles south of Vang Vieng on Route 13, instead of at Xieng Khouang.'
Subsequently, a statement signed by Pathet Lao leader Prince
Souphannouvong was broadcast stating that a Pathet Lao delegation
had been ordered to proceed to Namone. Souvanna's announcement
set no date for a de facto cessation of hostilities, as sought by Vien.d,' tP
tiane, and repeated Souvanna's package plan for holding talks on thetui
formation of a provisional coalition government and the appointment/P.�
of a Laotian delegation to the projected international conference at
Geneva concurrently with the talks on a cease-fire. Souvanna's
statement, issued at Xieng Khouang in the name of the "Laotian
government," obscures the question of a deadline for the "Sayan-
nakhet group" to meet with representatives of his regime and the
Pathet Lao. Hanoi on 29 April broadcast Pathet Lao stipulations
on the functioning of the International Control Commission (ICC)
In Laos which would circumscribe that body's effectiveness to super-
vise a cease-fire.
On the military side, the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces report-
edly have made new gains in northern Luang Prabang Province and
appear to be moving guerrilla elements into position closer to
Luang Prabang and Vientiane
DiX Soviet IL-14s flew airlut. UllbbLVIlb IA) .n.teng zhouang on 28
April. On 29 April eight IL-14s flew to Xieng Khouang and two LI-2s
dropped supplies in the Nam Bac area, north of Luang Prabang. On
30 April, a Soviet LI-2 flew to Xieng Khouang and a North Vietnamese
AN-2 flew to SAM NellA Twc-1 flicrhts were scheduled for 1 Maf.-1
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Pointe
Noire
Banana
NDONESIA
870
Atianc
Ocean
610128
mepubl c of the Congo
LIB A
0
INDIA
800
TUNISIA
NIGERIA
INDONESIA
MOB UTU
Leo poldv
ysville
Gemena
Scattered
MOBUTu
MOBUTU Bas k
800
�.� EQUATEU
Coquilhatville
� Boende GIZENGA
7,000
ETHIOPIA
200
Francqui
uluabourg
Bakw
Lupu a
GHANA
1600
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
_
Luanda Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizeng-a
r.-71 Kalonn
Tsttornte
United Nations Forces (Service Forces
�,---Seleded, road not included)
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
MALAYA
470
LIBERIA
ETHIOPIA
anleyville
ETHIOPIA
MALAYA
300
'vu
Bukav
Kongolo
K b lo
Albertville
NIGERIA
900
�
Manono
amiK
INDIA
TSHOMBE
Elisab hville
L
NIGERIA
Usumbura
IRELAND
650
SWEDEN
650
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�
*Congo: Resolutions passed by the Coquilhatville confer- C
ence of Congolese leaders, as announced by Foreign Minister
Bomboko yesterday, appear to reflect primarily the opinions
of Leopoldville-based politicians; the resolutions critical .14.,/
of both the Tshombe and Gizenga regimes, seem unlikely to
find significant support in either Elisabethville or Stanleyvillei
Ambassador Timberlake commented on 29 April that the "un-
sophisticated" effort of the Congolese Army to keep the leaders
In Coquilhatville until agreement is reached could hardly be suc-
cessful and was likely merely to prolong the stalemate and widen
the differences among the various Congolese factions. Tshombe
Is still under detention; yesterday Congolese government spokes-
men said he would be detained indefinitely, would be removed to
Leopoldville, and his release would depend upon "events." The
disarming on 28 April by Congolese forces of a Ghanaian unit
of UN troops at Port Francqui appears to have been done on local
initiative. Backup, Page 3) (Map)
Communist China:
malnutrition is becoming a serious medical problem in
mainland China.
stated recently in Hong Kong that 70 per-
cent of her patients were suffering from "excruciating neuralgic
Pains" brought on by inatitarnintA giet.
estimates on the basis of his
personal observation
that between 20 and 30 percent of the population in Communist
China had symptoms of nutritional edema--a disease which is
fatal if not properly treated. (Backup, Page 5)
01<
Japan: Rising consumer prices and a deficit in Japanese
trade accounts during the first three months of 1961 have cre-
ated an undercurrent of uneasiness about the Ikeda government's
economic program. Within the past week, two influential business ok
associations which normally support the government party have
charged the government with aggravating the situation by unneces-
sarily yielding to labor's demands for wage increases. Limited
1 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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price rises and trade deficits were expected to result from Ikeda's
long-range economic development program, but they have oc-
curred sooner and are larger than anticipated. While the situation
has not become critical, a worsening during the next several
months could affect the standing of the present government.
Oackup, Page 6)
Singapore: d'he decisive defeat of Singapore's ruling Peo- r k
ple's Action party (PAP) in a 29 April by-election is a damag- 4), 4wfx
ing blow to the party's moderate socialist leadership, which hac14.
committed its prestige to the outcome. Ong Eng Guan, a for- ,,
mer PAP leader and cabinet officer who was expelled from his 4-t
party and government posts in mid-1960 after he charged that
the leadership had lost its socialist and anticolonial fervor, won
a personal triumph in the election as an independent and now is
in a position to appeal for defections among the party's rank and
file. To avoid demoralization within the party, the PAP leader-
ship may call for a new general election, which it would probably
win but with a reduced majority and at the price of concessions
to pro-Communists, who control much of the party's mass base-D
(Backup, Page 7)
Somali Republic - UAR: The Somali Government, concerned
over Ethiopia's increasingly tough border policy and discouraged
by the lack of military assistance from Western sources, is turn-
ing to the UAR for arms aid.
Cairo will respond favorably to Somali requests
for jet pilot training and for organizing a commando-type unit
In the Somali Army. This assistance is presumably being granted
under the terms of a military accord signed by Premier Abdira-
scid and President Nasir late last year. At least two arms ship-
ments had been delivered to Somali ports under this agreement as
of early March. (Backup, Page 9)
USSR - Latin America: A large Soviet "good-will mission,"
reportedly to be headed by an "important political figure," will ,
�cuLat,
2"
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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soon leave the USSR for a tour of Latin America,
The delegation will include cul-
tural and trade promotion officials, the
mission is timed to exploit the atmosphere resulting from the
recent failure of Cuban insurgents. According to a Western
correspondent in Moscow, First Deputy Premier Kosygin will
head the delegation. (Backup, Page 10)
Britain - West Indies Federation: The premiers of Jamaica
and Trinidad fear the demands of the smaller islands in the West
Indies Federation for strong central powers may seriously af-
fect the constitutional talks opening in Trinidad on 2 May and
continuing in London on 31 May. Anticipating difficult negotia-
tions, Colonial Secretary Macleod has solicited US public state-
ments which would support a loose federation. He also wants
the US to indicate that such a federation would receive more aid
than would the separate units if the constitutional talks were to
break down. London, which hopes to compromise the differences
between the smaller and larger islands, aims to grant independ-
ence to the West Indies, probably in 196
(Backup, Page 12)
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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Situation in Laos
30 April enemy elements in northern Luang Prabang
Province were reported to have captured Na Mo, a village
about 23 miles northwest of Muong Sai, but the situation
in this area is still not clear.- The government force which
recently evacuated Muong Sai had earlier been reported re-
grouping in Na Mo, with some elements of this force with-
drawing westward to Nam Tha town, which tl.B government
expects to be the enemy's next objective. A village 15 miles
northeast of the royal capital of Luang Prabang has also
been occupied by a Pathet Lao force of about 300 men. A
band of about 209 or 300 enemy guerrillas is reported active
about 25 miles above Vientiane, east of Route 13 and south of
the Nam Lik River.77
he situation east of Savannakhet remains generally ob-
scure. Government troops were reported yesterday still
in control of Tchepone, but under fire. The picture present-
ed by reports from the area is one of scattered action by
several enemy groups along Route 9. Fighting has continued
on the Thakhek frontj
On 30 April, Vientiane Radio broadcast a message from
army commander General Bounleut again urging the Pathet
Lao to meet for truce talks in neutral territory between the
opposing lines above the Nam Lik River on the front south
of Vang Vieng. The message stressed that government units
have been ordered to hold fire unless attacked.
In New Delhi, the International Control Commission (ICC)
has been working to ready its recommendations on procedural
matters to be forwarded to the Geneva co-chairmen, Britain
and the USSR. The Pathet Lao commentary on the ICC which
was broadcast by Hanoi on 29 April said that the Laotian people
would "welcome". the ICC, but that "to carry out its functions
correctly and secure favorable conditions for JO work;' the
ICC "must correctly implement the relevant stipulations."
The commentary said that "to win the support of the Laotian
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people... , " the ICC "has to cooperate closely with the joint
armistice commission to be appointed by a meeting of the
parties concerned in Laos, under the sponsorship of the
legal government." In effect, this would subordinate the
ICC to a domestic body probably dominated by the Pathet
Lao, The Pathet Lao commentary also voiced opposition
to the dispatch to Laos of any military observers or troops
of the ICC member nations to help supervise the cease-fire.
The entry of foreign troops, it said, "would not be helpful
and, as in the Congo, would even worsen the situation."
SECIIE T-
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The Situation in the Congo
The arrival at Port Francqui of a Congolese provincial
official from Luluabourg to investigate the increasing tension
between members of the Lulua and Baluba tribesmen appar-
ently instigated the attack by the Congolese Army on the UN
units. The Congolese apparently believed the UN was either
behind the inspection or would protect the official in his probe.
At least three of a 60-man Ghanaian unit were killed and the
remainder, captured by the numerically superior Congolese
unit. The incident is indicative of Congolese sensitivity to
what they feel is UN interference in their affairs.
an Leopoldville, relations between the UN and the 'Casa-
vubu government are expected to worsen after the return of
UN representative Dayal. The government has indicated that
when Dayal returns, it intends to issue a release labeling him
an "uninvited foreigner" and strongly implying that it may call
for popular demonstrations "to dissipate any doubt which might
remain in Mr. Dayal's mind concerning the usefulness of his
presence in Leopoldville, which can only obstruct the success
of UN operations in the Congo,''3
Katanga, anti-Belgian sentiment is reported to be grow-
ing within the Katanga Government, Interior Minister Munongo,
Is reported to have joined a pro-French
clique of Katangan ministers. The Belgians in Katanga apparent-
ly believe that if Munongo should attain power, he would replace
Belgian advisers with French or other foreign technicians pro-
posed by the UN':-)
The US consul in Elisabethville reported on 29 April that of-
ficial and public reaction to the news of Tshombe's detention had
been slight. The Katangan Council of Ministers had been meeting
three times daily, but the only important decision was the proc-
lamation of a limited state of emergency--a move apparently aimed
at preventing the movement of Balubas and other Africans hostile
to the government and the mass exodus of Belgians. Munongo and
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the other ministers have not assumed power. Although Na-
tional Assembly President Charles Mutaka announced that he
is constitutionally entitled to assume temporary command of
the government when the president's position is vacated dur-
ing an assembly session, UN representatives and foreign con-
suls summoned to a meeting by the Council of Ministers on
29 April were informed that Tshombe was considered absent
for a conference and that no governmental reorganization was
envisaged.
CMonetary problems in Stanleyville, which appeared serious
in February, are now reported partially resolved. Soldiers
and noncommissioned officers are paid regularly and fully;
army officers and civil servants up to 75 percent. Reports
claim that monetary regulations were effective
are contradictory regarding the source of these funds.
, while
say that 50M00,000 francs were made available by
friendly countries
However, no abnormal num-
ber of new bank notes are in evidence. Moreover, with the
exception of two Egyptian telecommunications technicians to
keep the Stanleyville-Cairo line functioning, no foreign techni-
cians have been observed in StanleyvilleD
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Nine
Health Problems in Communist China
G.',VIao Tse-tung reportedly told an American journalist last
autumn that the average Chinese peasant currently was lucky
to receive 1,000 calories in food a day. According to a nutritional
study made by the Chinese Communists last year, the average
peasant needs 3,000 calories a day to do his worig Refugees
from the mainland have reported a rapid climb in tuberculosis,
liver disease, and stillbirths as a result of substandard diets.
The inadequate diet�particularly the shortage of fats--is at
least partially responsible also for the apathy now reliably re-
ported widespread in Communist China.
Most of these ailments are progressive. Even if the diet
of the average Chinese were to be substantially improved in the
immediate future, it would take many months before the damage
could be overcome. Labor productivity will continue to be af-
fected by the present extent of malnutrition.
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CONFIDENTIAL� Nee
Economic Uneasiness in Japan
The average consumer price rise of 4 percent in the past
year equals the total increase during the five-year period from
1955 to 1960. Despite unprecedented economic prosperity in
Japan and a steadily improving standard of living, this increase
has aroused some public discontent with the Ikeda government,
which had publicly predicted that prices would rise only about
one percent this year.
The trade account deficit of $230,000,000 during the first
quarter of 1961 reflects a very high rate of investment in new
plant and equipment as part of the government's ten-year pro-
gram for doubling national income. The price rise stems pri-
marily from strong consumer demand and from wage increases.
Profit margins are being cut in some industries as a result of
wage increases. Ikeda has responded to criticism on this point
by contending that for several years labor productivity has been
rising more rapidly than wages.
The prime minister points out also that Japan's foreign ex-
change reserves, which have grown to $2 billion, are sufficient
to withstand the small additional trade deficits expected in the
next several months. He asserts that government action to
counter the price rise and trade imbalance is not needed at this
time.
Difficulties of this kind are considered normal in an eco-
nomic expansion program, especially in its early stages, and
are not serious in themselves. However, a recent upsurge in
wholesale prices is likely to be followed by new increases on
the consumer level which could carry with them important polit-
ical effects. In July, Ikeda will complete his first year in office
and is scheduled to reshuffle the cabinet and major party posts
in a bid to consolidate his power. His intraparty rivals and the
opposition Socialists almost certainly will exploit any economic
discontent at that time in an effort to weaken hr leadership or
possibly even unseat him.
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%sr CONFIDENTIAL %1
Singapore Ruling Party's Prestige Damaged
j'he defeat of the People's Action party (PAP) reflects in
part the disenchantment of Singapore's economically depressed
workers impatient with PAP's failure during its two years in
office to effect solutions to the island's economic problems. PAP
won 43 of the 51 seats in the Legislative Assembly in May 1959
as a radical socialist and anticolonialist party promising a "new
order" for the working masses. Its basically moderate and care-
fully planned economic policies have not had spectacular results,
however, and as much as 10 percent of the Singapore working
force remains unemployed. In its preoccupation with creating
an attractive climate for private investment in the economic de-
velopment of the island, the government has attempted to hold
the line on wages and create stable labor conditions, and this
has led to some popular disillusionment with PAP's image as a
militant party of the left
[In addition, the party's generally cooperative relations with
the British, who retain broad powers over Singapore's foreign
relations, defense, and internal security, have exposed it to
charges leveled by Ong during his campaign that the party has
become a stooge of the British. One of the immediate effects
of the election may be diminished rapport between the PAP and
the British as the party seeks to refurbish its anticolonial repu-
tation
CpAP remains the best organized and most widely supported
party in Singapore, however, and its defeat by Ong is primarily
the result of a political miscalculation rather than an indication
of a dramatic shift in the political climate. The PAP leadership
forced a showdown with Ong in his home constituency, a congested
area of low-income and semiliterate workers where Ong, who has
a flair for demagoguery, was widely conceded to be almost un-
beatable;)
cBince its formation in 1954, the PAP has been ideologically
split between the moderates, who control the party's formal or-
gans, and a pro-Communist group which controls the militant)
-CONFIDENTIAL
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Gabor organs and the student groups which form a key part of
the party's mass base. The dimensions of Ong's victory--75
percent of the vote--suggest that the extremists, despite a
display of public support for the PAP candidate, may have
rested on their oars in order to embarrass the moderates. If
the government resigns, which is a possibility but not consti-
tutionally necessary, the extremists may well be in a position
to demand increased influence in the party in return for their
support in new election
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CONFIDENTIAL -*No'
Sonqali Republic Turns to UAR for Arms Aid,
/
CWhile moderate leaders in the Somali Government have
frequently expressed a preference for Western military as-
sistance, they feel compelled--for national prestige reasons
as well as for internal security needs--to accept such aid
from non-Western sources. To date, Western assistance in
this field is limited largely to one shipment from Italy of small
arms--3,000 Enfield rifles and 120 light machine gung-.3
Tripartite discussions among interested Western powers--
Italy, Britain, and the US--have been held periodically in an
effort to agree on a division of responsibility in the provision
of both economic and military aid to the Somali Republic. The
military aspect of these discussions has been particularly dif-
ficult and recently hit a snag. Rome initially indicated a will-
ingness to send a military training mission to Mogadiscio and
to bear the cost of training 120 Somali officers and specialists
annually. Italy maintained that the UK and US should assign
military attaches to assist the mission and should share with
Italy the cost of arming and equipping the Somali Army. London,
however, offered only to provide $420,000 in arms aid on a one
basis, contingent on the assigning of the Italian military
mission. Rome subsequently withdrew its earlier offer, par-
tially because of London's position but also because Washington
is concentrating its aid effort in the economic sphere and limit-
ing its arms support to the Somali policeD
d't the ceremony on 12 April marking the Somali Army's
first anniversary, Minister of Defense Mohamed proclaimed
the need for a strong army to protect the country from its ag-
gressive Ethiopian neighbor and praised the UAR for providing
arms and equipment for this purpose. In addition to a quantity
of small arms�probably including 5,000 rifles and ammunition--
the UAR has provided five light tanks, approximately 14 armored
cars and Bren gun carriers, and at least one propeller-driven
training aircraft of the two nromised last falf:1
CONFIDENTIAL
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Soviet Good-Will Mission Planned for Latin America
The planned mission is part of the bloc's program to ex-
pand its influence in the area. It is probably designed to exploit
not only what the Soviet Union considers to be a sharp decline in
US prestige in Latin America after the recent Cuban develop-
ments but also to take advantage of the more favorable attitudes
by some regimes toward relations with the bloc.
The success of the bloc's effort is demonstrated in part by
the expansion of its diplomatic relations there since Castro came
to power in January 1959. Cuba has diplomatic relations with
all bloc countries except East Germany; Brazil has established
relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania this
year; Caracas agreed in 1960 to accept a Polish embassy; and
Ecuador re-established relations with Czechoslovakia late last
year. Ecuadorean President Velasco told US Ambassador Bern-
baum at that time that he had no objection to relations with the
USSR but would take no initiative himself to establish them.
The Soviet delegation will probably be received by Uruguay
and Argentina, the only countries in South America with resident
Soviet missions, and by Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Chile,
which recently received a Polish trade mission, and Venezuela
may also grant the delegation visas. Other countries, however,
are likely to be more cautious. Haiti,. Panama, and Paraguay
recently refused to respond to�and Colombia denied�the visa
requests of Soviet Ambassador. to Mexico Bazykin, who then had
to limit his planned tour of the area last month to unofficial visits
to Ecuador and Venezuela.
Similar activities in Latin America are also being projected
by other bloc countries.
North Viet-
nam had proposed the visit of a cultural delegation to Brazil,
Mexico, and Ecuador. Brazilian President Quadros on 24 April
authorized an invitation to visit Brazil for a Chinese Communist
trade delegation now in Cuba--an invitation which apparently was
solicited by the Chinese. Moreover, a high-level Chilean Foreign
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Ministry official recently advised the American Embassy in
Santiago that an estimated 30 Soviet bloc representatives plan
to attend the meeting of the UN's Economic Commission for
Latin America scheduled for Santiago in early May. This is a
larger number than the bloc has sent to such meetings in the
past.
�TOP-SreitE-T
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ltain - West Indies
CJamaica's Premier Manley has been engaging in political
maneuvering designed to ensure that his specifications for a
weak, decentralized federation will be adopted by the confer-
ence. Until recently the trend had been running in favor of
compromises to retain Jamaican participation. Trinidad's
Premier Williams had backed down as leader of the forces
advocating a strong federation. The principle that federal
powers would be severely limited, at least initially, had been
accepted at the committee level, and the island ministers had
further agreed that Jamaica's share of the legislative seats
would be upped from 38 to 48 percent to correspond more
closely to the island's 53-percent share of the federation's
population:
The smaller islands, backed by Federal Prime Minister
Adams from Barbados, are becoming resentful of the increas-
ing tendency of Manley and Williams together to dominate fed-
eral affairs and have complained bitterly that the current pro-
posals for the conference provide for a federation too weak to
be effective:-)
[Secessionist sentiment is growing in Jamaica. This was
originally based on economic grounds�Jamaica provides about
53 percent of the federation's gross domestic product�and is
now reinforced by artificially fostered racial animosities. If
Manley, who had been expected to replace the ineffectual Adams
as prime minister, fails to obtain the concessions he seeks, he
may urge Jamaicans to vote against continued participation in
the referendum he plans to hold on the question in September.
Premier Williams has said he is unwilling to remain in the fed-
eration without Jamaica and claims he turned down a suggestion
by Prime Minister Macmillan to head the federation if Manley
withdraws ;j
(Critical powers which Jamaica seeks to retain--income tax
and industrial development incentives�are recognized in the
current proposals As subjects of ultimate federal control but are)
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*two,SECRET*of'
(left to island control for the present. Various proposals for
financing the federal budget through customs excises and con-
sumption duties are to be debated. Trinidad's unwillingness
to have its high per capita income downgraded by a flood of
immigrants has forced a proposal to restrict freedom of move-
ment between constituent territories. With an eye to Commu-
nist-led British Guiana, Jamaica also wants the power to veto
accession of new members L
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k_91 V JLOJElil V I /%1/Li
Ni0f
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investi'gation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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