Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Original Classification: 
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Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Publication Date: 
April 20, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587339].pdf176.53 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  %Bo.IU?SECRET  3.5(C)  �20 April 1951  Copy No. c.T.  CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  DOCUMENT NO.    NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  II DECLASSIFIED  CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  NEXT REVIEW DATE: eZ4   AUTH: HR 70-2  DATE122/1.../i _ REVIEWER:  Office of Current Intelligence  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  --4  3.5(c)  _Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  'AiiR CHET  SUMMARY  GENERAL  1. US Ambassador reports serious US French disagreement over mili- tary program (page 3).  FAR EAST  NEAR EAST  3. Shah reaffirms confidence in Iranian Prime Minister Ala (page 5).  WESTERN EUROPE  5. Abductions of Austrians in April now total six age 6).  * * * *  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  3.5(c)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  TPcKJcr  3.5(c)  *GENERAL,  1. US Ambassador reports serious US-French disagreement over military  program: 3.3(h)(2)  US Ambassador Bruce in Paris reports the pos- sibility of a "very damaging crisis" in US rela- tions with France over the amount and method  of US assistance to the French rearmament pro- gram. Foreign Minister Schuman told the US Ambassador on 15 April  that the French Cabinet is "puzzled and resentful" over the situation and,  in order to deal with it, has scheduled discussions "with difficult and un- fortunate implications!' Fo deal with itg All members of the US Embassy,  the Military'Assistance Advisory Group and the ECA Mission who deal  with this question are "acutely aware" of the "dangerously surcharged  atmosphere-.'" The Ambassador believes an urgent necessity exists to  terminate this state of affairs, in view of: (a) Gaullist criticisms that  the present French Government is "totally subservient" to US instruc- tions;� (b) the necessity of insuring mutual confidence at the Foreign Min- isters Conference Which is "probably approaching"; (c) constant negoti- ations with the French over military installations; and (d) "many other  political objectives of major importance" requiring the kind of close under- standing and French faith in US leadership which "simply does not exist  at present." This "discouraging" situation, according to the Ambassador,  stems primarily from conflicting interpretations of the military assis- tance agreement reached last October in Washington and also from mis- understandings of unilateral actions taken by both governments under  that agreement He feels that it is "comparatively irrelevant" whether  the fault for a failure of US diplomacy at this juncture would lie basical- ly with the French.  Comment: Periodic reports on the disagreement  over this matter have been received in the past few months, but the tone  of extreme urgency in the Ambassador's message is unexpected. Re- cently, the French Government has also resented the fact that it was ex- cluded from preliminary US-UK talks on Eastern Mediterranean and Yugo- slav problems. Furthermore, there has been ample evidence that US  influence in Indochina is already feared by French officials, including  General do Lattre himself, and that the French Government will be in- creasingly hard pressed in the pre-electoral period to defend its policy  - 3 -  TO  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  T604P ET  of military colaboration with the US against Gaullist and Communist  attacks. The reported developing "crisis" in relations with the US  need not be expected, however, to weaken France's firm orientation  toward the West or its growing support of Western rearmament.  FAR EAST  3.3(h)(2)  TSEC1OP ET   Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  111.4-) CEA i  3.5(c)  NEAR EAST  3. Shah reaffirms confidence in Iranian Prime Minister   3.3(h)(2)  On 17 April, the Shah of Iran informed US Am- bassador Grady that he will back Prime Min- ister Ala on any and all measures to crush  activities of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and  to destroy the effectiveness of the Fedayam Islam (a fanatic Moslem  organization). Despite what the Ambassador had been told earlier re- garding the Shah's alleged plan to ask for Ala's resignation and to in- stall Seyyid Zia Ed Din Ta,batabai in his place, Grady noNi states that  the Shah shows no evidence of such an attitude. Grady added that.  while the Shah might later have to call on Seyyid Zia, he had definite  reservations concerning him.  Comment: The Shah's continued confidence in  Prime Minister Ala is an encouraging sign for stability in Iran. Ala's  task will remain difficult, however, and agitation for his replacement  will undoubtedly continue. Apparently, the report that the Shah planned  to replace Ala with Seyyid Zia at this time is little more than a rumor  circulated by Seyyid Zia's supporters in an effort to procure the pre- miership for their candidate. 3.3(h)(2)  TOFSECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Cii pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051  T �-�) 'En'  WESTE,RN EURO.PE  5. Abductions of Austrians in .Aprilnovir total six;  US Minister Donnelly in Vienna reports that  the current epidemic of Soviet abductions, 3.3(h)(2)  which began on 5 April and which is troubling  Austrian Interior Minister Helmer, has in- volved six victims to date, all of whom were obscure persons. The  abductors have included Communist members of the 'Austrian criminal  police (acting under Soviet orders), commandeered Austrian police ac- companied by Soviet officers, and, in one case, an unknown agent in  civilian dress.  Comment: A descripti n of the victims re- veals no discernible pattern in these abductions, apart from the fact  that at least three of the victims had some prior contact with US per- sonnel in Austria. The Soviets may therefore have wished to warn the  Austrians against too close association with the US or they may have  desired to obtain particular information which they believed the victims  possessed.  6  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003051