CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/04/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003052
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: April 27, 1951

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27 April 1951
Copy No. C-.1-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
�
'DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: F. i
DAT Ea 4. f" I RrVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. US Political Adviser in Tokyo comments on local election results
(page 3).
2. General de Lattre says US has designs on Indochina (page 3).
NEAR EAST
4. Embassy Moscow comments on Sacichikov remarks concerning
intervention in Iran (page 5).
5. Nehru approves Congress Party opposition to Communist "peace
appeal" (page 5).
6. Egypt makes counter-offers to UK defense proposals (page 6).
7. Turkey continues to press for inclusion in Western security
arrangements (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
. Yugoslays may raise question of Satellite pressures in UN (page 8).
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FAR EAST
1. US Political Adviser in Tokyo comments on local election results: III
The US Political Adviser in Tokyo reports 3.3(h)(2)
that nearly complete returns in the nation-
wide local elections held on 23 April indi-
cate an impressive Conservative victory, with
Conservative-supported candidates winning 94 percent of the contested
seats. In his opinion, the Socialist defeat was not so much a blanket
endorsement of the tonservative parties as a rejection of the Socialist
"peace principles," (neutrality in the East-West struggle, opposition
to US bases in Japan and opposition to a "separate peace" with the
non-Communist nations). He adds that Ambassador Dulles' recent
return to Japan and his press conference of 19 April (which dealt pri-
marily with Pacific security) probably had a damaging effect upon the
Socialist campaign.
Comment: Socialist Party leaders, as well
as a large section of the Japanese press, agreed that Dulles' return
and subsequent remarks were an important factor in the Socialist de-
feat. With the long-desired peace treaty imminent, the Japanese people
were unsympathetic to the Socialist position, which they generally recog-
nize as inconsistent with an early termination of the Occupation.
2. General de Lattre says US has designs on Indochina:
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The US Consul in Hanoi reports that at a gather-
ing of top French military and civil officials 3.3(h)(2)
General de Lathe made several derogatory
statements about the US. The General accused
US officials in Indochina of slanting their re-
porting in favor of the Vietnamese, and asserted
that a Vietnamese political party in Tonkin was
supported by the Americans. He accused US
officials, especially those in ECA, of undermining the French position
and turning the Vietnamese against France. In addition, he stated that
US missionaries were turning the natives against the French. When the
TOP CRET
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Consul pointed out that to accuse the US of having designs on Indochina
is to accept the Communist propaganda line, the General replied, "Well
then, the Communists are right for once." On the following evening,
the Consul discussed De Lattre's remarks with the general's aide, Gen-
eral Cogny, who said that De Lattre's behavior was merely the frank-
ness of a man who felt himself among friends, and that it would be un-
fortunate if superficial French-US differences were permitted to play
into the hands of the enemy.
Comment: General de Lathe has made simi-
lar accusations in the past, particularly with respect to ECA. US of-
ficials have found it extremely difficult to assess the spontaneity and
sincerity of De Lathe's outbrusts against US policy in Indochina. There
seems to be little doubt that De Lattre, like many other Frenchmen, is
grievously conscious of France's decline during the past generation as
a world power and reacts in an exaggerated fashion to any real or fancied
slight to French honor.
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NEAR EAST
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4. _EmbasEy Moscow comments on Sadchikov remarks concerning inter-
vention in Iran: 3.3(h)(2)
Informed by the French about a conversation
between the Soviet Ambassador to Iran and
some Satellite officials regarding Soviet in-
tentions should the UK land forces in Iran, the
US Embassy in Moscow believes that in view of the USSR's customary
complete reticence as to its real intentions, this reassuring statement
by Sadchikov is a deliberate plant to encourage a chain of events favor-
able to Soviet expansionist moves in Iran. Terming the statement a
virtual invitation to the British, the Embassy adds that any landing of
UK forces would increase internal disorder and nationalist agitation,
possibly culminating in the establishment of a new government willing
to invite the Soviets to come "to its rescue" under the 1921 treaty.
(Sadchikov's conversation with the Satellite officials is summarized
in the Current Intelligence Bulletin of 26 April 1951..)
5. Nehru approves Congress Party opposition to Communist "peace appeal"../
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On 30 March, the Secretary-General of the
Indian Congress Party addressed a confidential
letter to all Provincial Congress Committees
advising party members to have nothing to do
with Stockholm Peace Appeal committees or
signature campaigns, since "they are designed
for certain political purposes." The US Em-
bassy in New Delhi is reliably informed that
Prime Minister Nehru attended the All-India Congress Committee meet-
ing at which the advisability of distributing this letter was discussed and
that he approved of its dissemination.
Comment The Congress Party's circular
letter is obviously designed to dis5uade party members from partici-
pating in the current Communist effort to obtain signatures in support
of an appeal for a Five Power Peace Pact and universal reduction of
5
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armaments. This is believed to be the first time that the Indian Con-
gress Party has taken official cognizance of international Communist
intentions and propaganda techniques and shown its opposition to them.
Prime Minister Nehru's reported approval of the letter, while thought-
provoking, does not necessarily indicate that his previously expressed
views on international Communism and the USSR have changed,
6. Egypt makes counter-offers to UK defense proposals:
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The British Ambassador in Cairo has revealed
that the Egyptian Government, in its reply to
the UK defense proposals, stated that practical-
ly all the British proposals were unacceptable.
The Egyptian reply also reportedly contained counter proposals, includ-
ing the demand for British evacuation from the Suez area within one
year, which were "the same old story. " The US Charge in Cairo corn-
me ts that the fact that Egypt has made counter-proposals leavesithe
door open for future talks, and that the UK has now succeeded getting
Egypt on record as opposing self-determination for the Sudan.
Comment: The fact that the Egyptian Prime
Minister and the Foreign Minister have so far refrained from making
detailed public comments either on the UK defense proposals or on
Egypt's reply, as well as the fact that Egyptian parliamentary debate
on this issue has been postponed, indicates that the Egyptian Govern-
ment would still prefer a continuance of the discussions to their com-
plete breakdown.
7. Turkeysontinues to press for inclusion in Western security arrange-
ments:
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Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu informed
the US Ambassador in Ankara that current
discussions with the Turkish Ambassadors 3.3(h)(2)
from London, Paris and Rome were being held
with a view to crystallizing Turkish foreigiy policy. The Turkish Am-
bassador to the US has been instructed to join them in Ankara. Koprulu
stated that French Foreign Minister Schuman had assured the Turkish
6.
SECTIT
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Ambassador in Paris that, while in Washington, he had almost reached
agreement with the US Government on support of a Mediterranean pact
which would include the US, UK, France, Turkey and Greece. In this
connection, Koprulu indicated to the US Ambassador that Turkey was
not adverse to such an arrangement if it were a subsidiary to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Comment: /
1 / Turkish desire
to assure its own security has been heightened by recent international
developments, such as the disorders in Iran and the recall of General
MacArthur. Currently, Turkey seems to be hopeful that, in view of
its firm stand in Korea and, its growing reputation as a non-Communist
bastion in the Middle East, it may be closer to achieving some type of
satisfactory security arrangement with the West.
EASTERN EUROPE
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9. Yugoslays may ra.,_seuesfim UN
atellite pressures in
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Upon his return from Belgrade-,. Yugoslav UN
delegate Bebler informed US Ambassador Austin
that increasing tension in the Balkans may force
Yugoslavia in the next month or two to raise
the question of Satellite pressures on Yugoslavia in the UN. As a possible
preliminary step to a full -fledged UN discussion, Belgrade is consid-
ering presenting a memo to the UN citing the causes and nature of the
tension provoked by the Satellites. Bebler, however, refused to commit
himself to a statement that Yugoslavia consider s the situation urgent.
Bebler further stated that the Yugoslav Government was unable to guess
the time and place where Satellite forces might strike, if ever. He sug-
gested that the build-up may be aimed at increasing the Soviet political
bargaining position, but admitted that the enormity of the economic ef-
fort indicates that the build-up is for a major purpose.
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