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Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Publication Date: 
May 17, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587350].pdf468.18 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062 3.5(c)  4-64-1-------11.CJ "  17 May 1951  Copy No. 0-'7  CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  DOCUMENT NO.  NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  r) DECLASSIFIED  CLASS, Ck-IAINKED TO: TS 104:501  NEXT FIEVIEVV DATE:  AUTH:  DATE� wrA   Office of Current Intelligence  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  . Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  SUMMARY  FAR EAST  3.3(h)(2)  .fAi12e0,1-624. 2. De Lattre again exhibits antagonism toward US economic, aid to Indo- china (page 3).  -7,75r7004.4- 3.A Indonesia claims its trade policy will depend upon UN decision (page 4  le   NEAR EAST  ForhP4. Pakistan will send troops to Korea if US supports it against India  -1L-fir6r7 and Afghanistan (page 5).  G  EASTERN EUROPE  j. _41404(7- Tito seeks tanks and artillery from the West (page 5).  3.3(h)(2)  �.Pft-rjrri*L_L  '4214-tii45548.  FfThrv-e'El4  WESTERN EUROPE  Peopl&s Party exploits Communist support of Socialists (page 6).  Austrian export control effort assessed (page 7).  De Gaulle's ourse expected to aid Communists in 17 June  elections age 7).  LATIN AMERICA  PrAbg-)Ar 10. Military junta ousts Bolivian President (page 8).  * * * *  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  sEettEr  3.5(c)  FAR EAST  De Lattre again exhibits antagonism toward US ecaiomic aid to Indo- china:  US Minister Heath in Saigon reports that,  while General de Lattre's "apparent new  policy" of respecting Vietnamese aspira- tions and his support for the creation of  a truly National Army is intelligent and beneficial, De Lathe has,  however, evidenced increased determination to exclude "foreign"  (i. e0, American) influence from French-Viet relations. De Lattre  - 3 -  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  %Jill-SECRET  Is particularly suspicious of the ECA,program, and any mention of  US economic aid in Indochina in the leading French language news- paper (which is controlled by the French High Commissariat)� is now  strictly pr hibited, The first ugpleasant public incident between  Heath and De Lattre took place recently when the general, in the  presence of several other officials, told Heath there would be more  housing for US military aid personnel in Saigon "if you would get rid  of s me of your ECA men and yOur American missionaries."  Comment; Thedeveloping ECA program  in Indochina has already evoked enthusiastic response from the Viet- namese in those areas where it has been applied and promises in the  future to be a vUtal factor in undermining the prestige and influence  of Ho Chi Minh's movement. De Lathe's previous criticisms of ECA  have been interpreted as resuittz from temporary pique, but it now  appears that he actually possesses a deep-seated antagonism toward  US economic aid.  3. Indonesia claims its trade policy will depe d upon UN decision:  Comment: Although it is likely that Indo- nesia would nominally adhere to a UN-recommended embargo, pri- marily because it does not wish to prejudice its opportunity to obtain  US assistance, it would not impose the stringent measures necessary  th prevent its rubber from reaching China.  MP -SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  NEAR EAST  . Pakistan  will send troops to Korea if US supports it against India and   a77Inu E an:   Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan  has assured the US Ambassador in Karachi 3.3(h)(2)  of his government's willingness to provide  one division of troops for service in Korea  if the US is prepared to support Pakistan against India in the matter  a Kashmir and against Afghanistan in the matter of Pushtoonistan.  The Prime Minister stated that the US should commit itself to his  country's support just as it asked Pakistan to make a decision that,  in his opinion, would constitute an irrevocable tie to the West  EASTERN EUR.OP:E  5. Tito seeks tanks and artillery from the West:   In reply to a query regarding Yugoslav arms  aid talks in Washington between the US, UK 3.3(h)(2)  and France, the Department of State has  informed the US High Commissioner in  Germany that the talks are based on arms requirement lists submitted  by Yugoslavia to the US and UK. The lists include light,and medium  artillery, tanks, and other items. The Department can find no evidence  that the Yugoslav decision to inform the US and UK of Yugoslav military  requirements was based on an estimate that hostilities are imminent  3.3(h)(2)  5  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  3.3(h)(2)  WESTERN EUROPE  Pe4pl&s Party exploits Communist support of Socialists:  US High Commissioner Donnelly in Vienna  states that the Communist decision to support  Socialist candidate Koerner in the run-off  presidential election on 27 May represents 3.3(h)(2)  the most skillful Communist effort to date  to drive a wedge between the Socialist Party  and its coalition partner, the cariservative  People's Party., The Socialist Party re- sponded to the Communist maneuver by instructing its officials to re- ject every Communist offer of cooperation in the Koerner campaign.  Nevertheless, the People's Party press is playing up the "Marxist  danger" and has termed the Communist decision a "momentous clari- fication, intimating that the Socialists deliberately chose a candidate  who was acceptable to the Communists.  Comment: The People's Party, although  well aware that the Socialists do not want Communist support, is un- willing to abandon a propaganda theme that has been effective in the  past Communist support cannot elect Koerner, if, as expected,  People's Party candidate Gleissner picks up the large minor party  vote that went to the rightist candidate in \the 6 May presidential elec- tion. However, the 5train put upon the present coalition �vernrnent  will be very great.  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  �  3.5(c)  8. Austrian export control effort assessed:   US Legation and ECA officials in Austria  report the Austrian Government is co- 3.3(h)(2)  operating effectively with the US in con- trolling East-West trade and, given the  limitations imposed .by the Soviet occupation, has gone as far as  possible in thwarting Soviet economic penetration Austria and in  denying the USSR strategic materials. The Austrians must be circum- spect in their efforts to control this trade because of the ever-present  possibility of Soviet retaliation, which could result either in the par- tition of Austria or in restrictiins upon shipments from the Soviet  zone to other parts of Austria. Only a small number of items subject  to embargo are produced in Austria, but the USSR would retaliate im- mediately if the action were taken to control transit shipments origi- nating in other Western countries, and furthermore, the Austrian  Government has no controls over the exports of the Soviet authorities  and plants. In matters of trade, Austria has been conceding to Eastern  Europe only what has been necessary to obtain essential Austrian im- p rts (principally coal) and to maintain the Eastern markets for Austrian  goods that do not sell ita the West. US officials declare that the con- tinued.orientation of Austria's trade tkward the West will gradually  further curtail Austria's dependence upon the East for raw materials  and markets.  Comment: Although the Austrian Government  doubtleas tries to control trade with the East, its ability to do so is  limited because of the predominance of S viet influence in Austria.  Soviet firms not only pr duce large quantities of 1-B items in Austria,  but Soviet-controlled shipping companies', in Vienna are actively en- gaged in buying up required items throughout Westrn Europe and  sending them East,  . De Gaulle's ourse expected to aid Communists in 17 June elections:  As Le French electoral campaign �Pens,  the c mparative apathy of the electorate  promises to hurt all parties except the  - 7 -  3.3(h)(2)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  Mail�Me=  3.5(c;  Communists. The Right, however, is expected to show "substantial  gains-, " presumably at the expense of the Center. If all non-Communist  parties formed electoral alliances, they could obtain the majorities  necessary to eliminate Communist reprtseritation, but De Gaulle has  ruled out this possibility by refusing to alLm.w his party's candidates  to affiliate with other parties. Since this decision will actually reduce  the num r of seats De Gaulle can expect to win, he is evidently more  anxious to undermine the strength of the Center than to decrease Com- munist representation. Both the Gaullists and the Communists, by  ignoring the Center in tJeir respective campaigns, hope to attract  those middle-of-the-road elements which could be expected to vote  for one extreme in protest agaList the other.  Comment: A gradual trend toward the Right  in French politics has been observed since 1947, and De Gaulle's  Rally of the French People can expected to become a major party  in the next Assembly at the expense principally of the centrist Popular  Republicans. The Communist Party, whose strength has shown little  or no decline in Assembly by-elections, is likely to benefit from the  growing inflathon. Electoral reform was intended to reduce Communist  representation sharply, but its effect has been largely counterbalanced  by De Gaulle's injunction against electoral alliances.  I.  LATIN AMERICA  10. Military junta *usts Bolivian President:  President Urriolagoitia has left Bolivia  following the military coup of 15 May, and  a military junta has installed General  Ballivian as President and Minister of  Defense.  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  TOP-SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062  Comment It has been expected that a mili- tary junta wruld take over the Bolivian Government in order to counter  the anticipated revolutionary activity of the Nationalist Revolutionary  Movement Additional incentives for effectik., the coup at this time  were probably (a) the increasing public comment in favor of permitting  the Nationalist Revolutionary MAvement to assume power, and (b) the  return from exile of alvINR labor leader who directed the violent  strikes at Catavi in 1949 and who, the junta fears, may again incite  -violence among the miners. The junta is expected to attempt to main- tain the normal flow of 'dm to the US.  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003062