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Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
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Publication Date: 
May 22, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587367].pdf444.33 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 *ego ra 1 22 May 1951 Copy No. Ca- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED. TO: TS .2.Coof NEXT REVIEW DATE: ' AUTH:. DAT REVIEWEF Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) 3.5(F) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 TG2 SECRET SUMMARY FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3. FrenchFord trucks arriving in Hong Kong for Chinese Ooinmunistj- r,240; (page 4). 4. MacDonald expresses views on Southeast Asia (page 5).PA44.440 C1j34, tisJ NEAR EAST 5, Shah states that admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO would 1-1?-kr MAIL have bad effect in Iran (page 5). 6. Shah continues to fear actions of Iranian Prime Minister (page 7. King Farouk opposes break in Anglo-Egyptian defense talks (page6). 3.3(h)(2) EASTERN EUROPE WESTERN EUROPE 9. Dispute in Ruhr Authority sver German 10. 'PrOpects for continuation Of Adenauer good (page 8). 11. French exert pressure on Tunisian Bey 12. Intensive Spanish propaganda campaign strike (page 10). � to isokdeamllioscsatciaobnisne: :age 81:97:: coalition still conside-red seeks to forestall Madrid - 2 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 TP SECRET FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) - 3 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) French Ford trucks arriving in Hong Kong for Chinese Communists: The US Consul General in-Hong Kong reports that French Ford three-ton-trucks are now arriving there in large numbers and that he is urging the Colonial Government to stop the 3.3(h)(2) reexport of these trucks to the Communist mainland. The colony earlier this month stopped the shipment of 51 Dodge trucks, and ac- cording to evidence obtained by the Consul General, the Communists intend to abandon Hong Kong as a source for trucks if the government bans export of the French Fords as well. The Consul General believes the Communists may endeavor to effect future deliveries via the Burma Road. Comment With the progressive broadening of Hong Kong's export controls, the Communists are said to be trans- ferring their purchasing activities to other areas, particularly India, where they reportedly negotiated a contract for several hundred five- ton trucks earlier this month. Hong Kong's seizure of the French Fords, following close on its seizure of the 51 Dodge trucks, would give future impetus to Communist efforts to by-pass the colony and develop alternate supply channels. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) 4 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 4. MacDonald expresses views on Southeast Asia: 3.5(c) Following a private conversation with the � UK High Commissioner for Southeast Asia, Malcolm MacDonald, the State Department official present in Singapore for the recent tripartite military talks,reports that MacDonald was less optimistic regarding the situation in Southeast Asia than his public pronounce- ments would indicate. 3.3(h)(2) , Although MacDonald knew of no evidence of support, in any substantial manner, to the bandit campaign in Malaya by China or the USSR, he at no time expressed the view that the end of the campaign was in sight. With reference to Indochina, MacDonald thought that the threat of Chinese Communist intervention overshadowed � all other developments, He believed that General de Lathe had developed a high degree of political ability but that possibly his political staff did not carry out the General's views. In his only mention of Burma, 'Ma4Donald said that US action toward attempting to resolve the problem caused by Chinese Nationalist troops in Kengtung has been very well received by the Burmese Commander-in-Chief, Ne Win, and that Burmese sus- picion of US support for these troops had been removed. NEAR EAST Shah states that admission of Greece and Turke to NATO would have bad effect in Iran: 3.3(h)(2) The Shah of Iran stated in a conversation with the US Ambassador in Tehran that the admit- tance of Turkey and Greece to NATO would have a bad effect in Iran "if nothing were done about Iran." The Ambassador feels that a statement by the US Government regarding Iran at the time Turkey and Greece enter NATO would be in order and helpful. - 5, TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 Tfari) SECRET Comment: The Shakand, other Iranian leaders have let it be known during the past two years that they have been dis- appointed and dissatisfied with the amount of aid given Iran in compari- son with Turkey and Greece. In presenting their case, they have pointed out that Iran was most vulnerable to Soviet aggression. While the pre- sent government will hardly press its inclusion in Western defense ar- ra,ngements, NATO's acceptance of Turkey and Greece will nevertheless add to general Iranian bitterness and irritation. Shah continues to fear actions of Iranian Prime Minister: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) In conversations with the US Anibassador in Tehran, the Shah expressed the fear that Prime Minister Mossadeq might "do harm" before Ms government falls. The Shah deplored his own position as a "looker�on"� and stated that he was afraid that the new oil commission would be terrorized into action dictated by the extremists and spearheaded by 1VIossadeq. In conclusions the Shah expressed him- self very strongly on the futility of the Prime Minister's apparent pro- gram neutrality. Comment: The Shah reluctantly yielded to the ��- popular demand for oil nationalization by appointing its foremost pro- ponent Prime Minister. The Shah, however, has not changed his opiniOn of Mossadeq. The latter's policies of free speech and free assembly are being exploited by the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, and his anti foreignism and mistrust of the army pose a real threat to Iran, 7. King Farouk opposes break in Anglo-Egyptian defense talks. 3.3(h)(2) US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has been :in by the Egyptian Royal Pres' CounseDor that King Farouk opposes any break In the Anglo- Egyptian defense negotiations at the present tie, assuming (a) that the forthcoming British reply leaves the door open for future talks and (b) that the Foreign Minister is invited to London soon for further discussions, According to the press counsel r, the Egyptian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have indicated that they will not force a showdown on the defense negotiations at the present juncture. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 Comment: The opposition of King Farouk to any break-down in the Anglo-Egyptian defense negotiations has undoubtedly acted as a moderating influence upon the Wald govern- ment's attitude on this question. While there is always the possibility that Egyptian public opinion may become inflamed over the Suez and Sudan issues and force the government to act in an irresponsible manner, the Anglo-Egyptian discussions will probably continue through the sum- mer in spite of the absence of any prospect that an agreement can be reached. EASTERN EUROPE 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) TOP-SECRET' Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 WESTERN EUROPE 9. Dispute in ituhT Authority over German coke allocations: 3.5(c) In the of the International Authority 3.3(h)(2) for the Ruhrthe Western European countries, led by ?ranee, are presently disputing with West Gerrnantr the amount of coke the Ruhr will be required to export to Western Europe during the months of July-September 1951. These exports are regarded as creating terms of reference which will be used by the Schuman, Plan High Authority. The French, who suspect the Germans of jockeying for the most advaletpegeous starting position in the Schuman Plan, want a German coke export of 6.75 million tons, whereas the Germans are offering 5.1 million tons. Privately, the permans have said they will agree to the US compromise figure of SI million, which the French repre- sentative will refer to his government. The French complain that though e Ruhr Authority was established to give Europe control of the Ruhr potential, in practice Germany controls Europe's steel ontput. Comment; The Germans are attempting to retain as much of their coke as they can, in view of the coming expan- sion of industry. Since the Germans succeeded in gaining relaxation of steel-production ceilings without making firm commitments on coke deliveries t France, the French are becoming increasingly concerned about the control Germany exercises over the European steel ind.ustry. Unless the Germans show a more cooperative attitude now, French Industrialists may be able to line up enough political opposition to the Schuman Plan to prevent its ratification. 10. Pi_z_upects for continuation of Adenauer coalition still considered US officials in Bon feel that, despite the 3.3(h)(2) continuing trend of looses by West German 'Chancellor Adenauer' s Christian Democrats in recent local elections, the outlook for t successful continuation of the present government is reasonably good. While the coalition partners have lost ground recently, the latest -8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 TG2 elections show that the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) are no longer gaining ground. Recent SPD opposition to the Schuman Plan has not been as profitable as earlier exploitation of the rearmament Issue . The government's successful continuation is still largely dependent on the maintenance of its slim working majority (211 out of 402) in the Federal Parliament's lower house.. In spite of the chancellor's somewhat dictatorial treatment ol his coalttion part- ders, they are not likely to desert :a government which he heads. Comment: Recent strains within the coali- tion over questions of economic policy, such as the issue of codeter,. min4tion in the coal and steel industries, have resulted from Adenauer's concessions to labor over the objections of his coalition partners. A similar situation is not expected to develop in the near future. The coalition parties are united in support of the Schuman Plan, which is actively opposed only by the Socialist opposition. 11. french exert pressure on Tunisian Bey to dismiss cabinet: The French Resident General in Tunisia 3.3(h)(2) has informed the reigning monarch, Larnine Pasha Bey, that if he retains his present cabinet the French will conduct no further negotiations with it. This decision resulted from the cabinet's boy- cott of the advisory Tunisian Grand Council during budget deliberations and the Bey's attempt to rush reforms, Because the dismissal of his ministers would be a difficult decision for the Bey, who has just proclaimed his complete confidence in them, he probably will take no action for the present. 3.5(c) Comment: This ultimatum is another indi- cation that the French intend to maintain a whiphand In. Twiisiao as in French Morocco. Extremely modest reforms announced last June have proceeded very slowly. French troops and police in the area are capable of controlling disorders arising from the disagreement of the Resident General and the Bey, but the anti-French sentiment aroused in the Middle East by the Morocco crisis will be further fanned by Fr enCh intransigence in Tunisia. - 9 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 T1.2 SECRET 12. Intensive Spanish propaganda campaign seeks to forestall Madrid strike: The controlled Madrid�press has appealed to the populace not to participate in the consumers' strike called for 22 May, calling it a crime against the state and threatening participants with severe reprisals, such as loss of their jobs and possible imprison- ment., Falange youth organizations are circulating leaflets blaming agitation for the strike on a "masonic, Communist consviracv" and urging the people to carry on their normal activities. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Comment: The probable extent or success of the strike cannot be gauged, but Madrid is not as volatile as the indus- trial, separatist centers of Bilbao and Barcelona. The non-Communist Lefty which is not effectively organized in. Madrid, is believed to regard the action of the Monarchists in calling the strike at this time as too precipitate. Available evidence points to Monarchist (and Catholic) elements as the principal agitators of the strike. The action of General Munoz Grandes sugge_Stidhat 00 Army may be taking a position of caution.. - 10 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003063 3.5(c)