CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/15

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02003071
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Publication Date: 
June 15, 1951
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587431].pdf260.89 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071 C-MfrAxTik.  '41�1: --4A=11-1---b-ZUNE  15 June 1951  3.3(h)(2)  Copy No ci -1  CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  _444P-5-.5  'DOCUMENT NO.  NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  ; DECLASSIFIED  NEXT REV:EDN DATE:  CLASS. CI-CANGED TO: 15 f  ALITH: HR  REVIEWER:  3.5(c)  Office of Current Intelligence  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  -TQP-SEeRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  ru  3.5(c)  SU140-AR  GENERAL  FAR EAST  4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks (page 4).  EASTERN EUROPE  5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries (page 5).  6. US warns Yugoslavia of dangers in establishment of Albanian refugee  committee (page 6).  WESTERN EUROPE  7. Franco's present position believed secure (page 6).  * * * *  - 2 -  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  3.5(c)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  GENERAL  FAR EAST  -3  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  4. Viet Minh admits discontent within its ranks   3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  A official broadcast of 6 ,Tune by the Demo- cratic Republic of Vietnam (DR V) reproved its  military "cadres" for not appreciating the ob- 3.3(h)(2)  sta,cles to victory and for net-understanding  their close alliance with the world communist  TOP-SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  V:IP SECRET  3.5(c)  movement for peace against the "imperialist warmongers. In the case of  rank-and-file troops, a cert4in lack of combativeness was criticized.  Comment: On previous occasions the central  authorities of the DV have indulged in "criticism and self-criticism."  However, they have never Wore come so close to admitting the existence  of discontent and war-weariness at the lower echelons and among the rank- The admission that the source of discontent is the implementation of inter -  national Communist as opposed to nationalist policies is especially sig- nificant. Probably only a continuing suspicion of French intransigence on  the issue of independence prevents large-scale defections from the Viet  Minh.  EASTERN EUROPE  5. Rankovic visiting Western European countries:   3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  � Yugoslav Minister of Interior Rankovic has  left Belgrade on a vacation trip of, several weeks  to Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland and  the UK. Ambassador Allen in Belgrade had been  informed that Rankovic was urged to make the trip by leading Politburo mem- bers in the belief that he should become better acquainted with western life.  Since Rankovic is generally regarded as responsible for the repressive  measures of the regime, Allen believes that Tito also felt the visit would en- able Western officials to form a better impression by meeting him, since he  is personally affable and mild-mannered. Allen notes that Rankovic has been  endeavoring recently td overcome the security police stigma.  Comment:  Since the beginning of 1951 there have been  numerous visits to the West by high-ranking Yugoslav visitors. These visits  probably have several objectives: (I) to gain internal IsuppOrt for the regime  among non-Communists by demonstrating the close association of the West  with the present leadership; (2) to make the regime more palatable to the  West by bringing Yugoslav leaders into direct contact with Western officials;  and (3) to promote closer ties between Yugoslav Communism and Western  Socialism.  3.3(h)(2)  - 5-.  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  US warns y'ug9slav,ia,oteziagger4s esta.Plishment of A  mittee;  � it  anian refugee   The Department of State has informed Ambas- sador Allen in Belgrade that the recent estab- lishment of an Albanian refugee committee in  Yugoslavia runs counter to basic US interests  in the area. The Department fears that this action may lead to a direct  conflict of interests between Yugoslavia and the US. Ambassador Allen is  instructed to point out to the Yugoslav Government that, if the activities  of Albanian exiles in the West; as alleged by Yugoslavia, are likely to pro- voke a Soviet move against Yugoslavia, the danger is obviousl/ much great- er when such activity JO Sponsored by the Yugoslays themselves. The US  Government is therefore concerned over the possibility that Yugoslav  creation of an Albanian exile organization may heighten tensions in the area.  cont: As late as 12 June a Yugoslav For- eign Office iesiteittl reiterated to Ambassador Allen his government's con- cern regarding Western support of resistance activities in Albania on the  grounds that disturbances there would give Bulgaria an excuse to intervene  under the Bulgarian-Albanian Mutual Assistance Pact.  WESTERN EUROPE  7. Frano'srs� pqston believed secure:  The UK Foreign Office concurs in an estimate 3.5(c)  from the British Embassy in Madrid that Franco  Will remain in power much longer than his-crle-.  mies predict and that if he is overthrown it will  more likely be by a militarYr junta than by his  "ineffectual political opponents." The US Am- bassador in Madrid agrees with this estimate  and states that the diminution of the strike move- ment, along with the virtual certainty of good harvests and the hope of an ad-.  ditional Export-Import Bank loan for wheat, makes Franco's position seem  firm.  6 -  3.5(c)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  Cuoiguat4 Continuation of Army support would  enable Franco to remain in power indefinitely. The principal non-Commun- ist opposition forces) aware that the peaceful change of regime they desire  can be effected on/Y by the Army, hope that the strike movement can be con- tinued and that it can be made sufficiently effective to convince the Army  that a change is essential. The net effect of strike movement on Franco's  political position is not clear at this time, but there is considerable evidence  that the Church is becoming increasingly outspoken in its criticism of the  regime, especially of its press and labor controls.  3.5(c)  TOP SECRET  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2003071  3.5(c)