CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/25

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02008385
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 25, 1951
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603287].pdf189.02 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2006385 -1.-UP 26 October 1951 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 5/ NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED REVIEW DATE: NEXT 290 CLA.SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C AUT 47 DA _ VIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 1NOP SECRET SUMMARY GENERAL 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) FAR EAST 3. Comment on Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech (page 4). NEAR EAST WESTERN EUROPE 6. Soviet attitude on seized Berlin district still unclear (page 6). 7. German defense contribution may be delayed by French stand (page 6). 8. Communists inspire strikes in German ports and plan Dutch dock strike (page 7). 2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 11,'01 SECRET GENERAL 3.5(c) FAR EAST 3.3(h)( - 3.. Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 2) 3.5(c) ..ferr Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 - TOP SECRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Comment on Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech: 3.3(h)(2) Mao Tse-tung's 23 October speech before the 'Nati nal Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference � an allegedly representative body which invariably endorses the Communist program � was his first major policy statement since June 1950. In con- trast to the 1950 speech, which Outlined Communist China's long-range pros- pects, Mao's most recent address emphasized the "great success" of the regime's three-point program for 1951: aiding Korea, advancing land reform and suppressing "counter-revolutionaries." Although reaffirming other recent Communist declarations that the Chinese commitment in Korea "must continue" until the UN agrees to a "peaceful settlement," Mao did not suggest any alteration in Peiping's previous terms for such a settlement and did not indicate Peiping's future course of action in Korea. Characterizing the USSR as the "most trustworthy and loyal ally" of China, Mao asserted that the Sino-Soviet alliance ensures the "doom" of "imperialist domination" of the world, and that Soviet strength has "greatly increased. " The first contention has been common in Communist propaganda of the past year, while the second has been emphasized throughout the Soviet world since Stalin's recent claim of Soviet atomic achievements. - 4 - ToCSEC�ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 SECRET NEAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)( 2) - 5 - SECIT1' Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.5(c) -Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 WESTERN EUROPE . Soviet attitude on seized Berlin district still unclear: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Soviet authorities in Berlin on 22 October ordered the East German Peoples' Police to withdraw from Steinstuecken, the small district in the US sector of BerU ized,by1 .PeopJes'..Police unitS four days earlier. Although the acting chief of the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin explained to the US Commandant that the community would revert to its former status, he requested further documen- tation of the US claim to the sector. During the conversations, the Soviet representa- tives gave the impression that they wished to extricate themselves from the whole affair by shifting the blame to the East Germans. In a later press,state- ment, however, they stressed that the future status of the area would be studied by Soviet and US specialists. Comment: At the_time the East Germans with- drew from Steinstuecken, the Allies were considering retaliatory action in the form of denying the Russians access to the important radio building which they now occupy in the British sector. Despite indications that the USSR was backing down completely, an unconfirmed press dispatch now reports that a group of Soviet soldiers and Peoples' Police returned to the area on 24 October, 7. German defense contribution may be delayed by French stand: 3.3(h)(2) The US delegation to Allied discussions in London n a German financial contribution to Western de- ense warns that the French position on this subject hreatens to "move back the entire timetable" for nc usion o con rac ua relations with the Germans, the establishment of the European Defense Forces, and the raising of German units. TOIC16 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 rl)P RET France &s insisting that a common defense budget be applied by the European Defense organization from its inception and hence seems to contemplate a "much fuller working out and implementation" of financial arrangements than was envisaged by the US. Comment: France had previously approved post- ponement by the Defense ConfeTli'Cce- of consideration of a budget, pending at least the initial results of the current NATO study of its members' poten- tial defense contributions. 3.5(c) Communists inspire strikes in German ports and plan Dutch dock strike:3.3(h)(2) Communist-instigated wildcat strikes have broken out in the key North German ports of Bremen and Hamburg. In Bremen, city and union officials agree that 80 percent of the dockworkers are out only because they fear Communist strong-arm tactics. Although the strikes are still confined to these two ports, they are rumored to be part of a long-range Communist program supported by a large fund sent from East Germany. Meanwhile, other reports indicate that the Dutch Communist-controlled dockers' union is planning to stage a 24-hour strike in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The walk-out is to be based on demands for a ten percent wage increase and a Christmas bonus; its success will allegedly determine the advisability of attempting a general strike. Comment: Daring the past several months there have been unconfirmed reports of a possible wave of strikes throughout Western Europe this fall. Communist strength in the German dock areas traditionally has been great. Communist influence in the Dutch dock areas has declined since the failure of the 1950 appeal not to unload MDAP ship- ments. A 24-hour strike now would serve to test present Communist strength in the area. No date for the Dutch strike has been given., 7 - SECgT Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2008385 3.5(c)