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Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
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Publication Date: 
July 29, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603116].pdf240.84 KB
a Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 Nire 'NOV 29 Iuly 1951 Copy Nooe CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. >e n DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S Coo NEXT REVIEW DATE: (772144z AUT H DAT 4.1REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) pproved for Release: 2019/.04/02 CO2014433 SUMMARY GENERAL Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese peace treaty (page 3). Increase in Costa Rican ship registry linked with Far East trade (page 3). FAR 'EAST 3. US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Iapanese at San Francisco (page 4). 4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations (page 4). NEAR EAST EASTERN EUROPE 7. Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength WESTERN EUROPE 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 2 TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) Afigid# for e.Lts.e.;:i2i1i9j4../02 CO2014433 GENERAL, comment on Italian Government's positios. onigp4p,ese peace. treaty; The Italian Government ia favorably consider- ing the acceptance 4-4 the W-UK-French offer to assist in the negotiation of a bilateral treaty withaotta- 13�; even though the Foreign Office has for- mally protested Italy's exclusion from the multUateral Iapanese peace conference and is reportedly much concerned over the effect of the ex- clusion on Italian public opinion. The Foreign Office reaction is probably due to the government's awareness that it must initially take a strong position on the issue, primarily in order to maintain prestige at home. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 2. Increase in Cpsta Rican ship reRistrv linked with Far East trade: 3.3(h)(2) Ship registrations under the Costa Rican flag have increased considerably in'the past few months, according to the US Embassy in San lose., Loose regulations attractive to foreign ship owners are given as the cause. One ship has been reported en route from Bremen to pick up Middle East oil for Vladivostok. Local Costa Rican officials believe that, since Costa Rica is still at war with Germany, touching at a German port could be used as grounds for the withdrawal of registry. Comment: Approximately 19 ships are now registered under the Costa Rican flag, about double the number registered one year ago. At least five of the larger ships have carried cargo to the - 3 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) Approvedtiv, for kta,sjii0Er1/02 CO2014433 Far East in recent months, and one of these (the tanker. Aster) is currently under Soviet charter for trade between Vladivostok and Com.munist Chins. In view of Costa Rica's traditional willingness to cooperate with the US, there is every reason to expect that it would respond to US requests for tighter control of ship registry. FAR EAST . US Political' Adviser warns against unaual treatment for Japanese at Sgn Franqlsco: 3.3(h)(2) The US Political Adviser in Tokyo, with the concurrence of General R idgviay, advises against any procedure which would exclude the Japanese delegation from the opening sessions of the San Francisco peace conference until invited to participate by a resolution of the victornations. He points out that in the light of past experience, the Japanese will be sensitive and tense, suspecting that any real or imagined discriminatory treatment is designed to stig- matize them as inferiors. 3.5(c) The Political Adviser also believes that such a procedure would be inconsistent with the announced conciliatory spirit of the treaty and with recent Occupation concepts; moreover, it would run the risk of rekindling the dormant desire of some nations to perpetuate the victor-vanquished relationship. He also feels that any unequal treat- ment for Japan would be resented by other Asian nations, and should the US become a party to any such concept of superiority, it might jeopardize the future of the entire US security program in the Far East Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations: 3.3(h)(2) As the result of a conversation with President Rhee, the US Ambassador in Pusan believes It will be most difficult during the course of � the Kae song conference to keep Rhee from pub- licly disassociating himself from the negotiations or frim indicating he is being forced to "go along." - 4 - Tep-SEeRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) 3.3 � Approved for Release: 2019/94/02 CO2014433 Ti' 5JUliJU Rhee feels he cannot publicly do anything which would give the impression that he accepts the partition of Korea. Now that the Kaesong conference agenda has been agreed upon. and thf possibility of an armistice exists, Rhee is infuriated by ROK participation, which implies his approval of any agreements reached. Rhee' s. present instructions to the ROK representative are to attend "for the time being only." NEAR EAST 5 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) (h)(2) 3.5(c) !Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) orA,nn EASTERN EUROPE Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugpslav military strength; 3.3(h)(2) Yugoslav officials have initially refused to answer an ECA questionnaire which would reveal the extent of Yugoslavia's military 70E-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.3(h "Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 Loor OLUIIL expenditures, the strength of its armed forces and other military infor- mation. Chief of Staff Popovic, in discussing the matter with Ambassador Allen, promised to report the inquiry to Tito and Kardelj, but exppessed the personal opinion that the information requested was not commensurate with the amount of aid granted or assured> Popovic could not understand why ECA, a civilian agency, needed the information and felt that Yugoslav determination to use the aid in the common cause against Soviet aggres- sion should be sufficient assurance to the US. In view, of the extreme Yugoslav sensitiveness regarding military information, Ambassador Allen suggests that the US should exercise patience and make the questionnaire as mild as possible in the beginning. comment Despite its increasing reliance on Western economic and military assistance, Yugoslavia has been re- luctant to join any Western-sponsored economic or military organization. For internal political reasons the regime probably considers it expedient to maintain an independent posftion and to continue its program of de- veloping an independent Socialist state. WESTERN EUROPE 3.5(c) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 )(2) 3.5(c) mApproved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 bhUnrii - 8 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)