CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02014433
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 29, 1951

a
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
Nire 'NOV
29 Iuly 1951
Copy Nooe
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. >e
n DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S Coo
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
(772144z
AUT H DAT 4.1REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
pproved for Release: 2019/.04/02 CO2014433
SUMMARY
GENERAL
Comment on Italian Government's position on Japanese peace treaty
(page 3).
Increase in Costa Rican ship registry linked with Far East trade
(page 3).
FAR 'EAST
3. US Political Adviser warns against unequal treatment for Iapanese at
San Francisco (page 4).
4. Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations (page 4).
NEAR EAST
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugoslav military strength
WESTERN EUROPE
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
2
TOP-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
Afigid# for e.Lts.e.;:i2i1i9j4../02 CO2014433
GENERAL,
comment on Italian Government's positios. onigp4p,ese peace. treaty;
The Italian Government ia favorably consider-
ing the acceptance 4-4 the W-UK-French offer to assist in the negotiation
of a bilateral treaty withaotta- 13�; even though the Foreign Office has for-
mally protested Italy's exclusion from the multUateral Iapanese peace
conference and is reportedly much concerned over the effect of the ex-
clusion on Italian public opinion. The Foreign Office reaction is probably
due to the government's awareness that it must initially take a strong
position on the issue, primarily in order to maintain prestige at home.
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
2. Increase in Cpsta Rican ship reRistrv linked with Far East trade:
3.3(h)(2)
Ship registrations under the Costa Rican flag
have increased considerably in'the past few
months, according to the US Embassy in San
lose., Loose regulations attractive to foreign
ship owners are given as the cause. One ship has been reported en route
from Bremen to pick up Middle East oil for Vladivostok. Local Costa
Rican officials believe that, since Costa Rica is still at war with Germany,
touching at a German port could be used as grounds for the withdrawal
of registry.
Comment: Approximately 19 ships are now
registered under the Costa Rican flag, about double the number registered
one year ago. At least five of the larger ships have carried cargo to the
- 3 -
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
Approvedtiv, for kta,sjii0Er1/02 CO2014433
Far East in recent months, and one of these (the tanker. Aster) is currently
under Soviet charter for trade between Vladivostok and Com.munist Chins.
In view of Costa Rica's traditional willingness to cooperate with the US,
there is every reason to expect that it would respond to US requests for
tighter control of ship registry.
FAR EAST
. US Political' Adviser warns against unaual treatment for Japanese at
Sgn Franqlsco: 3.3(h)(2)
The US Political Adviser in Tokyo, with the
concurrence of General R idgviay, advises
against any procedure which would exclude
the Japanese delegation from the opening
sessions of the San Francisco peace conference until invited to participate
by a resolution of the victornations. He points out that in the light of
past experience, the Japanese will be sensitive and tense, suspecting
that any real or imagined discriminatory treatment is designed to stig-
matize them as inferiors.
3.5(c)
The Political Adviser also believes that such
a procedure would be inconsistent with the announced conciliatory spirit
of the treaty and with recent Occupation concepts; moreover, it would
run the risk of rekindling the dormant desire of some nations to perpetuate
the victor-vanquished relationship. He also feels that any unequal treat-
ment for Japan would be resented by other Asian nations, and should the
US become a party to any such concept of superiority, it might jeopardize
the future of the entire US security program in the Far East
Rhee may dissociate South Korea from Kaesong negotiations:
3.3(h)(2)
As the result of a conversation with President
Rhee, the US Ambassador in Pusan believes
It will be most difficult during the course of
� the Kae song conference to keep Rhee from pub-
licly disassociating himself from the negotiations or frim indicating he is
being forced to "go along."
- 4 -
Tep-SEeRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
3.3
�
Approved for Release: 2019/94/02 CO2014433
Ti' 5JUliJU
Rhee feels he cannot publicly do anything
which would give the impression that he accepts the partition of Korea.
Now that the Kaesong conference agenda has been agreed upon. and thf
possibility of an armistice exists, Rhee is infuriated by ROK participation,
which implies his approval of any agreements reached. Rhee' s. present
instructions to the ROK representative are to attend "for the time being
only."
NEAR EAST
5
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
(h)(2)
3.5(c)
!Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433 3.5(c)
orA,nn
EASTERN EUROPE
Popovic reluctant to reveal Yugpslav military strength;
3.3(h)(2)
Yugoslav officials have initially refused to
answer an ECA questionnaire which would
reveal the extent of Yugoslavia's military
70E-SECRET-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.3(h
"Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
Loor OLUIIL
expenditures, the strength of its armed forces and other military infor-
mation. Chief of Staff Popovic, in discussing the matter with Ambassador
Allen, promised to report the inquiry to Tito and Kardelj, but exppessed
the personal opinion that the information requested was not commensurate
with the amount of aid granted or assured> Popovic could not understand
why ECA, a civilian agency, needed the information and felt that Yugoslav
determination to use the aid in the common cause against Soviet aggres-
sion should be sufficient assurance to the US.
In view, of the extreme Yugoslav sensitiveness
regarding military information, Ambassador Allen suggests that the US
should exercise patience and make the questionnaire as mild as possible
in the beginning.
comment Despite its increasing reliance
on Western economic and military assistance, Yugoslavia has been re-
luctant to join any Western-sponsored economic or military organization.
For internal political reasons the regime probably considers it expedient
to maintain an independent posftion and to continue its program of de-
veloping an independent Socialist state.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
)(2)
3.5(c)
mApproved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
bhUnrii
- 8
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014433
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)