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April 15, 2019
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April 22, 2019
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Publication Date: 
August 1, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602895].pdf442.53 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 _ NW .1. Lir o,nr, I 'Noe z�..... 1 August 1951 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO 3 NO CHANGE IN CLASS, ik DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE. AUT : DATE I REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release:.2019/04/02 CO2014434 J. CAL-' orsttlkitgiAlu,{ GENERAL Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy considered likely (page 3). USSR 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) FAR EAST 6. French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina. (page 6). NEAR EAST EASTERN EUROPE Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral (page 7). WESTERN EUROPE 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 10. Austrian Foreign Minister /Oaks with favor'upon reopening of treaty talks (page 9). 11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions (page 9). ' 12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy collaboration (page 10). * * * 3.5(c) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 1)t' J1fld GENERAL, 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) poviet 'peaceful oexistence" policy considered likely: 3.3(h)(2) The US Embassy in London suggests the possi- bility that the USSR will now seek a period of "peaceful coexistence" in which to increase its Own strength while the West is weakened by unpreparedness, complacency) or economic crises. Recalling the prece- dent of Soviet policies in the 1920's and 1930's, the embassy characterizes the coexistence policy as a middle road between a "genuine general retreat" and an imminent showdown with the West The USSR may even, for the time being, re- frain from further local aggressions through Satellites, since the risk of thereby precipitating a general conflict may be greater than the USSR cares to incur. 3 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) Approved �sofor R8lEsce.R9. /t0j10.2 CO2014434 The embassy considers that a renewed at- tempt to achieve an Austrian Treaty should be used to test the new Soviet protestations of a desire to cooperate. Comment: The only evidence of a possible change in Soviet foreign policies aside from a professed willingness to settle the Korean War, lies in the trade and cultural fields, but activities in these fields have .not so far involved any real concessions on the part of the Soviet Government They have coincided with a rather sharp shift in Soviet propaganda, apparently designed to persuade susceptible non- Communist ..governments that a costly Western alliance against the Soviet Union is no longer necessary. USSR 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 4 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) � Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 `112oF 6EUE.E.1: FAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 5 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 Ittok) SECRET 3.5(c) 3.3 h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) French considering repatriation of Chinese Nationalist internees in Indochina: The French Foreign Office appears to be re- ceding from its opposition to the repatriation to Formosa of Chinese Nationalist troops in- terned in Indochina, 3.3(h)(2) Nationalist Minister in Paris. Although emphasizing that General de Lattre and the next French Cabinet must approve any decision regarding the intern- ees, a Foreign Office official hinted to a US Embassy official that it might be possible to repatriate a few groups and then await the Chinese Communist reaction. Comment: The Chinese Nationalist Govern- ment has been attempting periodically during the past two years to obtain permission for the internees to leave Indochina for Formosa. The French, however, have firmly refused all requests, fearing that the proposed action might provide the Chinese Communists with a pretext for intervening in Indochina. - 6 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 iftsoF SECRET The above message is the second report during the past week that the French position in this matter has been relaxed. NEA. .AST 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) EASTERN EUROPE Impressive mass attendance at Cardinal Sapieha's funeral: 3.3(h)(2) The immense power of the Polish Catholic Church was demonstrated on 27 July when nearly a million persons attended the funeral rites for Cardinal Sapieha despite Commu- nist warnings against absenteeism and suppression of information concern- ing the rites. The fervor of the public's Mass demonstration derived from the fact that Sapieha symbolized, for the Polish people, national and spirit- ual independence. Polish Primate Wyszynski's funeral oration indicated that the Church, while not seeking open conflict with the government, was determined to resist, with the firm backing of the mass of the Polish people, any further CoMraunist incursions into the spiritual life of the country. - 7 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) eApproved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 wk' SEC.M.ET The US Embassy in Warsaw comments that, in death, the Cardinal made his most crucial contribution to the unity and strength of the Polish Catholic Church's struggle against Communism Comment Cardinal Sapieha was nationally revered as the spiritual leader of the Catholic Church in Poland. Because of his greatage (he was 86 when he died), he stepped aside several years ago so that Archbishop Wyszynski, who was younger and stronger, could become Poland's Primate, WESTERN EUROPE 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) - 8 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 -1 WI' 6,EUHEI: 3.5(c) 10, Austrian Foreign Minister looks with favor upon reopening of treaty talks: 3.3(h)(2) Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has wel- comed the US suggestion that negotiations be resumed on the.Austrian treaty, oil the grounds that the continuity of four-power treaty efforts should not be interrupted altogether. He believes that there Is not at present any urgency for a meeting of the deputies, but that it might be important to hold a session in September, depending on developments of the next few weeks. Comment In Iune of this year Gruber hoped for agreement on the Austrian treaty at a Big Four meeting, and therefore regarded the deputies' sessions as unnecessary. Now, with no prospect of a Big Four meeting, Gruber has changed his attitude. 11. Soviet motives in Berlin trade restrictions: 3.3(h)(2) US officials in Berlin feel that the success of Soviet restrictions on Berlin trade, which were originally related to immediate problems, may have influenced the USSR to continue the restrictions as a means to wider economic and political objectives. These officials foresee a tenacious Soviet campaign to retain and develop the pre- sent harassing restrictions, and estimate that the USSR could resist the effect of present and proposed Allied ec nomic countermeasures for another two months. If, however/ broader objectives appear feasible, the USSR would be willing to persist much longer. _Ciananagnt; The use of a limited air lift to re- lieve the large backlog of stalled goods is in prospect, and some commercial air freight shipments on a small scale have .already been made. Neverthe- less, a firm Allied stand on the issue continues to be delayed by French re- luctance to extend present countermeasures for fear that the "bluff would be called" by the USSR. Present countermeasures now include the refusal to approve the new interzonal trade pact and the institution of partial embargo of shipments to East Germany. French officials fear that Allied counter- measures will so discourage the USSR over the possibility of a restoration of normal trade that it will be willing to incur the economic loss involved -9-. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) AL;r0o;eiol fore.gace;:i2i0.1i9j4../02 CO2014434 in the imposition of a blockade. The East German economy would be serious- ly harmed by a considerable extension of the present partial embargo of key goods from West Germany, because, under normal trade conditions, the legally authorized trade has always provided an excellent cover for illegal shipments that have benefited the East 12. Norway-Netherlands atomic energy. collaboration:. 3.3(h)(2) The joint Norway-Netherlands experimental uranium pile at Kjeller, Norway, was operated for the first time on 30 Suly. Comment Operation of this experimental uranium pile represents the first major technical achievement by the Norway-Netherlands Ioint Commission. The contract for the project was officially signed on 12 April 1951. - Because this is strictly an experimental pile and its plutonium output will be negligible, it can provide only for the production of radioactive isotopes for tracer and medical use, and will have no military implications. - 10 - TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434 3.5(c) 3.5(c) a c .17�.17t [ONO Z0/170/6 1.0z :aseaia JOI panaidd\of 3MaIA .4? , A mit CT tlocct st -gag Amp *am Assay ;keit saw TAM aftly VG :1.1i0M31.43ti A.X3N S tL123ONVHO 'SS 13 031AIS5v13343 VSVIOM INV � 'ONIN3vurI000 Porientiftd ignoottei en* ININPNOta taTortiosEt .17�.17t [ONO Z0/170/61.0z JOI panaidd V 17�17171.0Z00 Z0/170/6 1.0Z :aseaia JOI pancuddV 9/115aT 9/oE6T .2014u &EST Jove g/oE5T atwo 9/OECT .2014g WeaCt E a OT 6 8/1aET RAM aa4J11 WOOCT 0/0E1T A L'OECT a A L/611t 8 L/oo6T a A 8 9/034T A 9/0ECT 404.11; S 9/005T 8 9/0E51 auq-au a 9/oo6T trnv 1 9 //6T1T a IJOOCT a 71/ all a +ACV a tialt St tgoEfir a Watt a v gala a triatt a tilatit m A lotata a � it CAOCT A E/oo5T 8 E/oE6T a 9 E/005T 8 E./CM a04.fie a VOOST a a a a a a/oE6T JeWe a aiotta A 2/036T M a/oE6T 404J a a/661T it a/a6T Jove lli powprottna "li vomaws f oTonav raM Til L/oo6T LAM aous 9/a61 1/0E5T Aa4Jv VOCia EX,W67i �E/agt 4043u C/6e6T 9 9 &Art PGIPTIctrki 17�1717[OZOO ZO/170/6 [0-Z .as6619 JOI panaiddV alma 10 Aug Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2014434. 1 � . r PUb 1 i atie4 Re4ected A.2.11,41...1.0 Stibilitta � Pz DuVetted ........ 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